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2011 DIGILAW 321 (CHH)

BASANT KUMAR SAHOO v. STATE OF C. G.

2011-09-16

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA

body2011
ORDER 1. By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the petitioner has prayed for quashing of Criminal Case No.2164104, wherein and whereby, the learned Magistrate, vide its order dated 9.9.2004 has taken cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent No.2- M/S. Mohan Feeds and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., registering offence under Sections 406, 420 & 422 of the IPC and issued summons. 2. Alleging non-payment of outstanding dues to the tune of Rs.2,52,989/- by the petitioner against supply of cattle feeds by the complainant, a complaint under Section 200 of the Code was filed by respondent No.2-M/s. Mohan Feeds & Chemical Pvt. Ltd. against the petitioner, who is said to be proprietor of M/s. Kalinga Traders. In the complaint, it has been alleged that the petitioner/accused was appointed as dealer of the complainant company for operating complainant's business in the Cuttack area of State of Orissa. It is further alleged that under various bills, from time to time, complainant sent through transport upon sale, cattle feed of the value of Rs.2,52,989/- to the petitioner, but the payment against such supply was not made. The complainant sent a letter on 31.8.200 I requesting for payments, but, no payments were made It is further stated in the complaint that on various dates, complainant supplied against advance payment, cattle feed to the petitioner/accused. Further allegation is that on demand of payment repeatedly, the petitioner/accused assured stating that it is taking goods and also making payments, therefore, the payment of Rs.2,52,989/- would be made later on, but, the payments were not made and as and when he was contacted, the payments was avoided. When the complainant sent his representative - Navneet Mathur for getting payment of the said balance amount to Cuttack. the petitioner stated that the goods as stated to have been supplied and sold have not been purchased nor such goods have been sent to the petitioner, therefore, question of payments against those supplies does not arise, thereby, the petitioner acted fraudulently and dishonestly. It is also alleged that the petitioner is the authorized dealer and having not made payment against the good supplied, the petitioner has also committed criminal breach of trust. On the aforesaid allegations, the complainant sought prosecution of the petitioner for commission of offence under Sections 405, 406, 409, 415, 420 & 422 of the IPC. 3. It is also alleged that the petitioner is the authorized dealer and having not made payment against the good supplied, the petitioner has also committed criminal breach of trust. On the aforesaid allegations, the complainant sought prosecution of the petitioner for commission of offence under Sections 405, 406, 409, 415, 420 & 422 of the IPC. 3. In support of complaint, the complainant examined its DirectorManmohan Mathur as P. W.-I and Rupesh Rawat as P. W.-2. 4. Vide its order dated 9.9.2004, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint by registering offences under Sections 406, 420 & 422 of the IPC against the petitioner and issued summons for appearance. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the complaint, as filed against the petitioner, is abuse of the process of law and present is a case where a civil dispute arising on account of alleged non-payment towards supplies made is sought to be converted into a criminal case, only as a shortcut to receive the payment without taking recourse to the civil proceedings of recovery. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the entire allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence so as to warrant registration of offence and subject the petitioner to prosecution for alleged commission of offence. He further submits that from the complaint and various documents which have been attached along with the complaint, it is manifest that the allegations therein are so absurd and inherently improbable, that on the basis of it, no prudent person would ever reach to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that criminal prosecution is a serious matter. Even though the complaint did not prima facie disclose commission of offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust, the learned Magistrate mechanically, without serious application of mind to the compliant, has, in a routine manner, registered the offence and subjected the petitioner to the agony of criminal trial. In support of his submission, learned counsd for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mis. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.1. -". . - - - - 6. In support of his submission, learned counsd for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mis. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.1. -". . - - - - 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the complainant referring to the allegations made in the complaint and the preliminary statements recorded by the Magistrate replied to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner by contending that present is not a case warranting exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.c., as the power to quash criminal proceedings at its initial/nascent stage, could be taken recourse to in rarest of rare cases and not to stifle legitimate prosecution instituted upon a complaint. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that in the complaint, it has been very categorically alleged that the petitioner was complainant's dealer through which the complainant was selling his goods in the market in Cuttack area of the State of Orissa and from time to time, cattle feed was supplied to the petitioner, but the petitioner failed to make payments towards such supplies made. He further submitted that even though at one point of time, the petitioner assured that the balance payment would be made later on, he failed to make payment and when the payments were not made. the complainant sent his representative to whom the petitioner falsely stated that the goods alleged to be supplied were never sent nor purchased, therefore, question of making payment against such supply does not arise. This conduct of the petitioner clearly shows that the petitioner, right from the beginning while receiving goods, dispatched from time to time, had a dishonest and fraudulent intention not to make payments against such supply made. Therefore, the allegation so made in the complaint, on a prima facie examination in the circumstances stated in the complaint do make out a case for proceedings for commission of offence under Sections 420 & 422 of the IPC. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 further submitted that the petitioner was an authorized dealer and therefore, whatever goods were received by him from the complainant were in the nature of "entrustment" and the petitioner was to sell the goods and deposit the sale proceeds with the complainant. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 further submitted that the petitioner was an authorized dealer and therefore, whatever goods were received by him from the complainant were in the nature of "entrustment" and the petitioner was to sell the goods and deposit the sale proceeds with the complainant. Having received the goods under various billslorders, non-payment amounts to criminal breach of trust therefore, the learned Magistrate has not committed any illegality in holding that a prima facie case for commission of offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the IPC is also made out. 7. The scope and ambit of the power of High Court under Section 482 of the Code came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of R.P Kapur Vs. State of Punjab2, wherein categories of cases, where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings, were summarized as below: "(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 8. The aforesaid principles were again reiterated elaborately and comprehensively in well-known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Hmyana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors.3, wherein the Supreme Court stated categories of cases by way of illustration wherein extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, as below: "102 .......... (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156( I) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. ('6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 9. The amplitude of the power and the guiding principles for exercise of such power as laid down in the aforesaid decision have been subsequently reiterated in the plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, some of them are- 2000 (2) SCC 636 (G. Sagar Suri and another Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.), 2000 (8) SCC 590 (Roy V.D. Vs. State of Kerala), 2005 (1) SCC 122 (M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.), 2000 (8) SCC 590 (Roy V.D. Vs. State of Kerala), 2005 (1) SCC 122 (M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. MD Sharaful Haque & Am:), 2006 (6) SCC 736 : 2006 AIR SCW 3830 (M/s Indian Oil Corporation Vs. M/s NEPC India Ltd., & Ors.) and so on. 10. The scope and power and limitation in the matter of quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code again came-up for consideration before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami & Another Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ofhers4, wherein the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision were again reiterated by the Supreme Court while dealing with a case relating to quashing of criminal proceeding in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court again considered the scope and ambit of power under Section 482 of the Code in the case of Hira Lal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.5 in following words: "12. The parameters of interference with a criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code are well known. One of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is that the allegations contained in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, commission of an offence is not disclosed. The High Court may also interfere where the action on the part of the complainant is mala fide." Similar is the view taken in the case of Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 11. The contentions made by learned counsel for the parties therefore are required to be examined in the light of principles which have been stated and re-stated in the aforesaid decisions, in order to find out whether a case for quashing criminal proceedings constituted upon complaint is made out so as to warrant interference by this Court, invoking power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. The complainant has alleged and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance by registering offence under Sections 406. 420 & 422 of the IPC. Section 406 of the IPC provides for punishment for criminal breach of trust. 12. The complainant has alleged and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance by registering offence under Sections 406. 420 & 422 of the IPC. Section 406 of the IPC provides for punishment for criminal breach of trust. Criminal breach has been defined under Section 405 of the IPC, which is extracted as below: "405. Criminal breach of trust- Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he as made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust"." 13. Examining the ingredients of offence of criminal breach of trust, the Supreme Court in the case of M/~•. Indian Oil Corporation (supra), observed as below : "17.......A careful reading of the section shows that a criminal breach of trust involves the following ingredients: (a) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property; (b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so; (c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.".... The Supreme Court, in this case, also relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Chellor Mankkal Narayan Ittiravi Nambudiri Vs. State of Travancore, Cochin (AIR 1953 SC 478), wherein, it held "to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essenti that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it. State of Travancore, Cochin (AIR 1953 SC 478), wherein, it held "to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essenti that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it. It has to be established further that in respect of the property so entrusted, there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal in violation of a direction of law or legal contract, by the accused himself or by someone else which he willingly suffered to do." It follows almost axiomatically from this definition that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal' breach of trust is alleged to have been committed. must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit." [Emphasis supplied] The Supreme Court also relied upon in its earlier decision in the case of Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney Vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1956 SC 575), wherein it was reiterated that the first ingredient to be proved in respect of a criminal breach of trust, is 'entrustment' and it was clarified as below: ..... But when S. 405 which defines "criminal breach of trust" speaks of a person being in any manner entrusted with property, it does not contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of propel1y makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain event." 14. Therefore the basic and the very first ingredient of criminal breach of trust is "entrustment". What has been spelt-out in the complaint, even if accepted in its entirety, goes to show and it is the case of the complainant itself, that the petitioner was authorized dealer through whom the complainant was selling its products in Cuttack area of the State of Orissa. In the complaint, it has been verily stated that the complainant used to send products under various bills and has given details of certain supplies made, in respect of which, payments were not made. In the complaint, it has been verily stated that the complainant used to send products under various bills and has given details of certain supplies made, in respect of which, payments were not made. In paragraph-4 of the complaint, the complainant itself has stated that the products were sent through transport, upon sale, to the petitioner from time to time, against which, payments were not received. In paragraph -5 of the complaint, it has been stated that on certain occasions, advance payment was made against which products were supplied. Therefore, it is manifestly clear that present is not a case of any "entrustment" so as to create a trust and to stand the petitioner in the position of a trustee. On the basis of averments made in the complaint itself, it is pure and simple case of supply of products to authorized dealer against which the complainant could claim payments and nothing more. It is not the case of the complainant that the petitioner was acting as an agent in the sense that the petitioner was to sell the products and deposit with the complainant the sale proceeds and would be getting commission. From the averments made in the complaint, all that is reflected, is that products of the complainant were to be sold by the petitioner in the area stated. 15. In the preliminary statements recorded by the Magistrate and various I documents attached along with the complainant as per the list of documents also do not make out any prima facie case of "entrustment" so as to result in criminal breach of trust in the event of payment not being made by the petitioner in respect of products alleged to be supplied by the complainant Therefore, the complaint, taken in its entirety, does not make out a case for registration of offence under Section 406 of the IPC. 16. The other submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the allegations in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in its entirety, no case for commission of offence under Sections 420 and 422 of the IPC is made out, is required to be examined within the scope of inquiry, at this stage, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, applying the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. To appreciate this submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, the provision contained in Section 415 and 420 of the IPC are required to be looked into. 17. Section 420 of the IPC provides for punishment for cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. "Cheating" has been defined in Section 415 of the IPC, which is reproduced as below: "415. Cheating.-Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat". Explanation-A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section." The ingredients and essence of cheating were examined by the Supreme Court in the matter of lnder Mohan Goswatni (supra), while considering whether a case for quashing FIR is made out in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. It was observed as under: "42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that the had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning." In the matter of Dalip Kaur and Ors. Vs. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning." In the matter of Dalip Kaur and Ors. Vs. Jagnar Singh & Another the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the provision contained in Section 415 of the IPC which defines the cheating. It was observed as under: "8.... An offence of cheating would be constituted when the accused has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. A pure and simple breach of contract does not constitute an offence of cheating." In the case of lnder Mohan Goswami4 (supra), while examining whether a case of quashing FIR is made out or not, the question which the Supreme Court posed to itself was : "38. The question before us is-whether the. case 0: the ap~el1~nts comes under any of the categories enumerated m Bhajan Lal. Is It a case where the allegations made in the first information report of the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467 and 120-B IPC? For determination of the question it becomes relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made in the FIR/complaint." While undertaking similar examination in the matter of quashing of FIR, in the case of Dalip Kuar (supra), the Supreme Court stressed upon the approach required to be adopted by the High Court, in following words : "10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception."... 18. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception."... 18. In the light of the aforesaid two decisions, which specifically deal with the cases relating to quashment of FIR, wherein allegation of commission of offence under Section 420 of the IPC have been made, the allegations contained in the complaint, preliminary statements recorded by the Magistrate and the documents attached along with the complaint need to be examined to find out whether the allegation contained in the complaint, even if taken 'on its face value and accepted in its entirety, do not prima facie constitute offence or make out a case against the accused or whether the allegation made in the complaint are so absurd or inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 19. The reading of the complaint and the preliminary statements recorded by the Magistrate as also the documents which have been filed as per list of documents along with the complaint, reveal that complainant has alleged that the petitioner was appointed as authorised dealer for operation of complainant's business in the area concerned. In paragraph-4 of the complaint it has been stated that the complainant upon sale, dispatched through transport, cattle products vide bills dated 3.2.2001 No.459 ofRs.75,15 11-, dated 22.2.01 No. 507 of Rs.36126/-, dated 4.4.2001 No.7 of Rs.47, II 0/- dated 8.5.2001 No.74 of Rs.48,729/- and dated 18.6.2001 No. BOC/12 ofRs.45,893/-, but the petitioner did not make any payment in spite of repeated requests. In paragraph -5 of the complaint, it has been stated that the complainant against receipt of advance payment ofRs.50,000/-, Rs.48,729/- and Rs.45,893/- on 7.5.2001, 14.6.2001 and 9.8.2001 dispatched products to the petitioner, however, the earlier dues of Rs.2,52,989/- were not cleared and it was stated that the payments would be made later on. Finally, the complainant sent its representative to the petitioner, but was shocked to learn that the petitioner flatly told complainant's representative Navneet Mathur that goods as are stated in the accounts were never purchased nor the same was ever dispatched and, therefore, there is no question of making any payment. Finally, the complainant sent its representative to the petitioner, but was shocked to learn that the petitioner flatly told complainant's representative Navneet Mathur that goods as are stated in the accounts were never purchased nor the same was ever dispatched and, therefore, there is no question of making any payment. In the complaint, it has been stated that in this manner, the petitioner cheated and acted dishonesty and fraudulently and thereby committed the offence including criminal breach of trust. The preliminary statements recorded by the Magistrate contain similar allegations as stated in the complaint. The correspondences between the parties have also been placed on record which show that there is dispute between the parties and the petitioner specifically denied that amount of Rs.2,52,989/- is outstanding. At this stage, this Court is not required to examine the veracity of the allegation contained in the complaint. The question which falls for consideration is whether the entire gamut of allegation prima facie make out a case for commission of offence under Section 420 of the IPC ? 20. If the entire allegations in the complaint, as considered hereinabove, are taken as it is and accepted in its entirety, all that can be said is that though the complainant supplied certain goods, the petitioner did not make payment against such supply made. What follows automatically from accepting the allegations as it is, is that having appointed the petitioner as dealer, the complainant sometimes used to send the goods and receive payments later on and on various occasions, the petitioner used to make advance payment for supply to be made to it by the complainant. In the complaint, there is no specific allegation with regard to the terms of dealership or any other kind of averment to show that on certain assurance or promise or a representation made by the petitioner with regard to mode or manner of payment against the goods supplied, including the time within which the payments were to be made, goods were dispatched by the complainant to the petitioner and but for such inducement, goods would not have been dispatched. There is no allegation, much less specific allegation of such a nature made in the complaint, which accepted on its face value and its entirety would prima facie make out that the petitioner had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction. There is no allegation, much less specific allegation of such a nature made in the complaint, which accepted on its face value and its entirety would prima facie make out that the petitioner had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction. As examined hereinabove, intention is the gist of offence. In order to allow the prosecution against a person on the allegation of commission of offence under Section 420 of the IPC, the allegation prima facie must show that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention right from the beginning. In the present case, there are no averments regarding any promise or representation to show that complainant was induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to the accused or that the complainant did or omitted to do anything which he would not have done or omitted ifhe was not so deceived. Applying the aforesaid test relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (supra) and Dalip Kuar7 (supra), this Court is unable to hold that a case of proceeding against the petitioner for alleged commission of offence under Section 420 of the IPC is made out. 21. It more appears to be an attempt on the part of the complainant to twist the arm of the petitioner by way of a criminal complaint to recover the amount claimed to be due and payable to the complainant without taking recourse to civil remedy, which is considered to be a long drawn process. 22. It would be apt to mention what the Supreme Court has observed with regard to increasing tendency of converting civil dispute into criminal cases. In the case of G. Sagar Suri (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under: "8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised with great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." The aforesaid growing tendency was again noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Indian Oil Corporation (supra). Again in the case of Inder Mohan Goswaxni4 (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "37. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not, adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors".... 23. This Court is not oblivious of the legal position that merely because the allegations relating to transaction between the parties give rise to a civil action, that would not be a bar to prosecution for commission of offence. However, in the peculiar nature of the allegation made in the present case, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the case stated in the complaint only makes out a case of civil dispute, bereft of any of the ingredient of commission of offence alleged under Section 420 of the IPC. 24. Lastly, the complaint needs to be examined with reference to the anegation of commission of offence under Section 422 of the' IPC. Section 422 of the IPC reads as under: "422. Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available for creditors.-Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently prevents any debt or demand due to himself or to any other person from being made available according to law for payment of his debts or the debts of such other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 25. The entire complaint, on the face of it, does not contain any allegation so as to even remotely suggest that the petitioner prevented the debt or demand 'due to himself from being made available according to law for payment of his debts in any dishonestly or fraudulently manner. The allegations are relating to supply of certain material and non-payment of the same. 26. In view of the discussions hereinabve, the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No.2164/04 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, instituted upon complaint filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 against .the petitioner are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. 27. The petition is according allowed. 28. Vide order dated 28.10.2005, the records of the lower Court was called and further proceedings were stayed. Let the records of the Court below be remitted forthwith. Petition Allowed.