JUDGEMENT 1. Heard Mr. Hemendra Prasad Singh for the appellant, and Mr. Sushil Kumar Singh, learned Assistant Counsel to Government Pleader No. 1 for the respondents. The petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 582 of 2008 has preferred this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, and is aggrieved by the order dated 30.11.2009 (Annexure-1), passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed and the petitioners case for correction of his date of birth has been rejected. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. The appellants father was working as a Dafadar in Village-Mai, Block- Rafiganj, District-Aurangabad. Consequent upon the demise of the incumbent, the appellant started functioning in his place since 1974 as per the prevalent policy decision. According to the policy decision, such appointments were practically a matter of inheritance. Consequent upon the demise of the incumbent, his son or such other person(s) as per the detailed terms and conditions of the policy decision would start functioning in the place of the deceased incumbent." In other words, engagement of Dafadars were based on descent, and were entitled to monthly remuneration but not post retirement benefits. The services of the body of Dafadars was recognized by the State Government, and they were declared Class-IV employees with effect from 1.1.1990. Consequently, the appellant also became a Government servant with effect from that date, and his service book was opened on 4.5.1990. According to the entries made in the same, 10.1.1962 was originally recorded as his date of birth which was penned through and replaced by 1.3.1948, both authenticated by two different signatures, and it is not clear as to who were the functionaries authenticating alteration of the appellants date of birth in the service record. Taking 1.3.1948 to be the appellants date of birth, he superannuated from the services of the Bihar Government with effect from 28.2.2008, leading to the writ petition. The writ petitioner made out a case that consistent with the entry in his school leaving certificate, 1.10.1958 should be taken to be his date of birth which has not found favour with the learned Single Judge. He has held that there has been a genuine enquiry from the school in question about the date of birth. The writ petitioner made out a case that consistent with the entry in his school leaving certificate, 1.10.1958 should be taken to be his date of birth which has not found favour with the learned Single Judge. He has held that there has been a genuine enquiry from the school in question about the date of birth. He has also concluded that the writ petitioner (the appellant herein) refused to cooperate with the Medical Board. 3. W.e have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The appellant has placed a photocopy of the school leaving certificate which purportedly bears the signature of the Headmaster signed on 21.3.1990. According to the same, 1.10.1958 was the appellants date of birth. The authorities had referred the certificate to the Headmaster of the School for verification. The Headmasters report is part of the counter affidavit in the writ proceedings, wherein it is stated that the counterfoil of the certificate is not to be found at the appropriate place, the record is heavily moth-eaten, and the date of birth is now absent. The Headmaster has, however, compared the signature of the then Headmaster on the certificate produced by the appellant with the other allegedly admitted signatures in the contemporaneous records and infers that the date of birth recorded in the certificate, namely, 1.10.1958, may be taken to be the correct date of birth because it bears the genuine signature of the then Headmaster. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly refused to rely on the entry in the school leaving certificate. This, however, does not conclude matters. 4. After receipt of the Headmasters report, the authorities had referred the appellant to the Medical Board for determination of his date of birth. The Civil Surgeon has examined him, submitted his report, but did not record his final opinion awaiting x-ray report. The learned Single Judge has concluded that, in view of the position that the appellant failed to produce his x-ray report, he had refused to cooperate with the Medical Board. We have, no hesitation in disagreeing with the finding of the learned Single Judge, inter alia, for the reason that there is no rule, administrative instruction, or policy decision of the State Government that it is the duty of the employee to produce x-ray report. We have, no hesitation in disagreeing with the finding of the learned Single Judge, inter alia, for the reason that there is no rule, administrative instruction, or policy decision of the State Government that it is the duty of the employee to produce x-ray report. In such a situation we are of the view that it was the duty of the authorities including the Civil Surgeon to obtain the appellants x-ray report failing which we conclude that they failed to discharge their official duties and functions. Adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against the respondent-authorities. This also does not conclude matters. 5. Indeed the aforesaid adverse inference against the State Government does speak in favour of the appellant. However, we cannot loose sight of the fact that he has served as a Dafadar continuously for a long length of 34 years. In that view of the matter, we do not feel inclined to interfere in the matter. 6. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.