JUDGMENT ( 1. ) A resident of the fourth respondent Town Panchayat, has sought for a writ of quo warranto to declare the fifth respondent as unqualified for being a member of the fourth respondent Council, as per Section 50(1 )(d) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act 1920. The fifth respondent is the elected Councillor and the sixth respondent is her husband. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the fifth respondent has acquired interest in the contract awarded to the 6th respondent, as per Section 50(1)(d) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act 1920, the fifth respondent is disqualified, for continuing as a Councillor. He has also submitted that though the respondents 1 to 4 are aware of the award of the contracts, no action has been taken, as against the fifth respondent, and in these circumstances, the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition fpr the relief stated supra. In support of his contention, Mr.M.Venkatesan, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Satish Csander v. Rajasthan University AIR 1970 Raj 184 and (ii) Varadarajan v. Salem Municipality AIR 1973 Mad 55 : (1972) 2 MLJ 485 ( 3. ) MR. M. Govindan, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 is put on notice and that he submitted that the fifth respondent has been duly elected and there cannot be a writ of quo warranto. He further submitted that the remedy lies only in the form of an election petition, and therefore a writ of quo warranto would not lie. For the above said reasons, he prayed for dismissal of this writ petition. ( 4. ) HEARD the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record. ( 5. ) BEFORE adverting to the facts of the case, this Court deems it fit to extract Sections 49, 50, 51 and 51-A of the District Municipalities Act, 1920, required for adjudication of this case. "Section 49. Disqualification of candidates. ( 4. ) HEARD the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record. ( 5. ) BEFORE adverting to the facts of the case, this Court deems it fit to extract Sections 49, 50, 51 and 51-A of the District Municipalities Act, 1920, required for adjudication of this case. "Section 49. Disqualification of candidates. -(1)A person who has been sentenced by a criminal Court to transportation or to imprisonment for a period of more than six months fr any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral delinquency (such sentence not having been reversed or the offence pardoned) shall be disqualified for selection as a Councillor while the sentence is in force and for six years from the date of the expiration of the sentence. (1-A) A person convicted of an offence punishable under the protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (Central Act 22 of 1955), shall be disqualified for election as a Councillor for a period of six years from the date of such conviction. (2) A person shall be disqualified for election as a Councillor if such person is at the date of nomination or election (a) of unsound mind, a deaf-mute or a leper; (b) an applicant to be adjudicated a bankrupt or insolvent or an uncertificated bankrupt or undiscdharged involvent. (2) A person shall be disqualified for election as a Councillor if such person is at the date of nomination or election (a) of unsound mind, a deaf-mute or a leper; (b) an applicant to be adjudicated a bankrupt or insolvent or an uncertificated bankrupt or undiscdharged involvent. (c) interested in a subsisting contract made with, or any work being done for, the municipal council except as a shareholder (other than a director) in a company Provided that a person shall not be deemed to have any interest in such contract of work by reason only of his having a share or interest in (i) any lease, sale or purchase of immovable property or any agreement for the same; or (ii) any agreement for the loan of money or any security for the payment of money only; (iii) any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the council is inserted; or (iv) the sale to the council of any articles in which he regularly trades, or the purchase from the council of any articles to a value in either case not exceeding fifteen hundred rupees in the aggregate in any year during the period of the contract or work (Cc) employed as paid legal practitioner on behalf of the council or as legal practitioner against the council (d) an officer or servant holding office under this Act; or an honorary magistrate for the municipal town; (e) already a Councillor whose term of office as such will not expire before his fresh election can take effect; or has already been elected a Councillor whose term of office has not yet commenced; (f) the servant or employer or the official subordinate or official superior of a Councillor holding office on the said date; or (g) in arrears of any kind due by him (otherwise than in a fiduciary capacity) to the municipality up to an inclusive of the previous year, in respect of which a bill or notice has been duly served upon him and the time, if any, specified therein for payment has expired (2-A) If the Tamil Nadu State Election Commission is satisfied that a person: (a) has failed to lodge an account of election expenses within the time and to the manner required by or under the Act and (b) has not good reason or justification for the failure, The Tamil Nadu State Election Commission shall, by order published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette declare him to be disqualified for being elected as and for being a chairman or a Councillor, as the case may be, and any such person shall be disqualified for a period of three years from the date of the order. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) the Tamil Nadu State Election Commission may direct that such conviction or sentence shall not operate as a disqualification. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) the Tamil Nadu State Election Commission may direct that such conviction or sentence shall not operate as a disqualification. (4) Omitted Section 50 Disqualification of Councillors.- (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 51 a Councillor or a person referred to in Clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 3-C or Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3-Q shall cease to hold his office, if he (a) is sentenced by a criminal Court to such punishment and for such offence as is described in sub-section (1) of Section 49; (aa) is convicted of an offence punishable under the Protection of Civil Right Act, 1955(Central Act 22 of 1955) (b) becomes of unsound mind, a deaf-mute, or a leper; (c) applies to be adjudicated or is adjudicated, a bankrupt or insolvent; (d) subject to the proviso to Clause (3) of sub-section (2) of Section 49, acquires any interest in any subsisting contract made with, or work being done for the council except as a shareholder (other than a director) in a company (dd) is employed as paid legal practitioner on behalf of the council or accepts employment as legal practitioner against the council; (e) is appointed as an officer or servant under this Act or as an honorary magistrate for the municipal town; (f) accepts employment under or becomes the official subordinate of any other Councillor; (g) Omitted, (h) ceases to reside in the municipality or within two miles thereof; (hh) fails to pay arrears of any kind due by him (otherwise than in a fiduciary capacity) to the municipality within three months after a bill or notice has been served upon him under this Act, or where in the case of any arrears this Act does not require the service of any bill or notice within three months after a notice requiring payment of the arrears (which notice it shall be the duty of the executive authority to serve at the earliest possible date) has been duly served upon him by the executive authority; or (i) absents himself from the meetings of the council for a period of three consecutive months reckoned from the date of commencement of his term of office, or of the last meeting which he attended, or of his restoration to office as Councillor under sub-section (4), as the case may be, or if within the said period, less than three meetings have been held, absents himself from three consecutive meetings held after the said date: Provided that no meetings from which a Councillor absents himself shall be counted against him under this clause, if due notice of that meeting was not given to him. Section 51 Decision of questions of disqualification of Councillor by District Judge. - Whenever it is alleged that any person who has been elected as a Councillor is disqualified under Section 50, Section 50-A or Section 60 and such person does not admit the allegation, or whenever any Councillor is himself in doubt whether or not he has become disqualified for office, under Section 50, Section 50-A or Section 60 such Councillor or any other Councillor may, and the executive authority, at the request of the council, shall, apply to the District Judge of the District in which the municipality is situated. (2) The said judge after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, shall determine whether or not such person is disqualified under Section 50 Section 50-A or Section 60 and his decision shall be final. (3) Pending such decision, Councillor shall be entitled to act as if he were not disqualified. 51-A Election petitions.- (1) No election of Chairman or a Councillor shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the District Judge of the District in which the municipality is situated within forty five days from the date of the publication of the result of the election under Section 27. An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 51-B by any candidate at such election, by any elector of the ward concerned, or by any Councillor. (3) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all he candidates at the election (4) An election petition. (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which petitioner relies; (b) shall with sufficient particulars, set forth the ground or grounds on which the election is called in question; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings. (5) The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interest of justices in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion unless the District Judge finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reason to be recorded. (5) The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interest of justices in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion unless the District Judge finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reason to be recorded. (6) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the District Judge for trial." ( 6. ) WHEN the learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with a query as to whether the contracts said to have been executed in favour of the sixth respondent, husband of the Councillor, were either before or after the election, he has categorically admitted that the award of contracts to the tune of Rs.22,35,000/- are only after the declaration of the election results and after taking oath of office. As per Section 50 of the Act, Subject to the provisions of Section 51, a Councillor or a person referred to in Clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 3-C or Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3-Q shall cease to hold his office, if he- (a)... (d) subject to the proviso to Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 49, acquires any interest in any subsisting contract made with, or work being done for the council except as a shareholder (other than a director) in a company. ( 7. ) IN the case on hand, though the petitioner has contended that the fifth respondent has acquired interest in the contracts awarded to her husband, the sixth respondent herein, and placed reliance on a decision of this Court made in A. Rajangam v. Mohamed Hani (2000) 2 MLJ 51 , the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case with reference to the relief of "quo warranto", sought for against the fifth respondent/Councillor. Whether the fifth respondent has acquired any right in the contracts is a matter for evidence. ( 8. Whether the fifth respondent has acquired any right in the contracts is a matter for evidence. ( 8. ) PERUSAL of the judgment relied on by the petitioner also makes it clear that the issue as to disqualification of the Councillor therein was taken up before the concerned District Judge under Section 51(1) of the Act and after adjudication, challenge has been made to this Court, by way of a writ petition. There is no quarrel over the proposition that an elector has a right to seek for disqualification, but the question to be addressed is whether he can maintain a writ petition for quo warranto, on mere averments alleging acquisition of rights by an elected Councillor, which has to be proved by letting in evidence. Writ Court cannot be converted into a Court of appeal to analyse evidence, at this juncture. ( 9. ) READING of Section 51 also makes it clear that any person,who has been elected as a Councillor can be disqualified under Section 50, Section 50-A or Section 60 of the Act, when the executive authority, at the request of the council, applies to the District Judge of the District, in which the municipality is situated. Statute provisions also indicate that the allegations have to be put on notice to such person, against whom an allegation is levelled and if there is a denial, a request has to be made by the Council to the executive authority. ( 10. ) A combined reading of Sections 50, 51 and 51-A, makes it clear that even if the fifth respondent elected Councillor has acquired any interest in the contracts awarded to her husband; the same can not be a ground for seeking a writ of quo warranto. Once a Councillor has been duly elected and taken oath or affirmation, as per the provisions of the District Municipalities Act, an elector has no right to seek for a quo warranto. The petitioner is not a Usurper to the office of Councillor. She has been duly elected. No infirmity has been noticed in the nomination form, by the Returning Officer, nor any objection was raised by the petitioner, at the time of nomination or election. While that be so, the fifth respondent cannot be called upon to show cause, under what authority she holds office. She has been duly elected. No infirmity has been noticed in the nomination form, by the Returning Officer, nor any objection was raised by the petitioner, at the time of nomination or election. While that be so, the fifth respondent cannot be called upon to show cause, under what authority she holds office. The petitioner has not substantiated that the fifth respondent is holding a public office, by usurping the post of Councillor, without any legal authority. A writ of quo warranto would lie only if the petitioner satisfies the Court that the elected member, did not satisfy the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification, which debars a person from holding office. Declaring a person as disqualified from continuing the public office under the provisions, is different from calling upon the petitioner to show cause, in a quo warranto. ( 11. ) FOR the reasons stated supra and in the light of the principles of law, as held by the Apex Court, the writ of quo warranto is misconceived. What is quo warranto and when a Writ would lie have been explained in the following decisions: "The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. CD. Govinda Rao AIR 1965 SC 491 , has broadly explained as to what are all the conditions to he satisfied for the issue of a writ of quo warranto. At paragraph 6, the Apex Court held as follows: "Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons, not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." In B.R. Kapurv. State of T.N., AIR 2001 SC 3435 : (2001) 7 SCC 231 : (2001) 3 MLJ 165, the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has reiterated the principles stated supra, at Paragraphs 79, 80 and 81 held as follows " ......A writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against the person, who according to the relator is not entitled to hold an office of public nature and is only a usurper of the office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what authority that person is entitled to hold the office. The challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfil the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification, which debars the person to hold such office. The challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfil the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification, which debars the person to hold such office. So as to have an idea about the nature of action in the proceedings for writ of quo warranto and its original form, as it used to be, it would be beneficial to quote from Words And Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p.648. It reads as follows: "The original common law writ of quo warranto was a civil writ at the suit of the Crown, and not a criminal prosecution. It was in the nature of a writ of right by the King against one who usurped or claimed franchises or liabilities, to inquire by what right he claimed them. This writ, however, fell into disuse in England centuries ago, and its place was supplied by an information in the nature of a quo warranto, which in its origin was a criminal method of prosecution, as well as to punish the usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the Crown. Long before our revolution, however, it lost its character as a criminal proceeding in everything except form, and was applied to the mere purposes of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or ousting the wrongful possessor, the fine being nominal only; and such, without any special legislation to that effect, has always been its character in many of the States of the Union, and it is therefore a civil remedy only." 80. In the same volume of Words And Phrases, Permanent Edn., at p. 647 we find as follows: "The writ of 'quo warranto' is not a substitute for mandamus or injunction nor for an appeal or writ of error, and is not to be used to prevent an improper exercise of power lawfully possessed, and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer or corporation or persons purporting to act as such from usurping a power which they do not have. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy. Information in the nature of 'quo warranto' does not command performance of official functions by any officer to whom it may run, since it is not directed to officer as such, but to person holding office or exercising franchise, and not for purpose of dictating or prescribing official duties, but only to ascertain whether he is rightfully entitled to exercise functions claimed. State ex inf. Walsh v. Thatcher(emphasis supplied) 81. In Halsburvs Laws Of England, 4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I, p. 368, para 265 it is found as follows: "265. In general .-An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined." (emphasis supplied) ( 12. ) THE High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat AIR 2003 SC 1201 : (2003) 4 SCC 712 at para 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Writ of Quo-Warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. ( 13. ) THE recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose andOthers (2009)7 SCC 1 : (2009)4 MLJ 343 the Supreme Court has set out the principles, as to when a Writ of quo warranto to be issued. In paragraph Nos.131 to 135, it has been held as follows: "737. Concededly, judicial review for the purpose of issuance of writ of quo warranto in a case of this nature would lie: (A) in the event the holder of a public office was not eligible for appointment; (B) processual machinery relating to consultation was not fully complied. THE writ of quo warranto proceedings affords a judicial remedy by which any person who holds an independent substantive public office is called upon to show by what right he holds the same so that his title to it may be duly determined and in the event it is found that the holder has no title he would be directed to be removed from the said office by a judicial order. THE proceedings not only give a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law but also tend to protect the public from being deprived of public office to which it has aright. It is indisputably a high prerogative writ which was reserved for the use of the Crown. THE width and ambit of the writ, however, in the course of practice, have widened and it is permissible to pray for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. 132. In Corpus Juris Secundum (74 C.j.S. quo warranto ? 14), "quo arranto" is defined as under: "Quo warranto, or a proceeding in the nature thereof, is a proper and appropriate remedy to test the right or title to an office, and to remove or oust an incumbent It is prosecuted by the State against a person who unlawfully usurps, intrudes, or holds a public office. THE relator must establish that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by the respondent and that relator is entitled to the office." 133. In Law Lexicon by J.J.S. Wharton, ESQ., 1987, "Quo Warranto" has been defined as under: "Quo warranto, a writ issuable out of the Queen's Bench, in the nature of a writ of right for the Crown, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also in case of non-user, or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or abuse of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he exercises such a franchise having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited it by neglect or abuse." 134. Indisputably, a writ of quo warranto can be issued inter alia when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as has been held by this Court in High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat (supra) and R.K. Jain v. Union of India. (See also Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. GovtofHaryana.) In Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra. this Court has stated that it is not for the Court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned. (See also Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. GovtofHaryana.) In Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra. this Court has stated that it is not for the Court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned. (See also Arun Singh v. State of Bihar.) We may furthermore notice that while examining if a person holds a public office under valid authority or not, the Court is not concerned with technical grounds of delay or motive behind the challenge, since it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. (See Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr.) v. Speaker) 135. Issuance of a writ of quo warranto is a disdretionary remedy. Authority of a person to hold a high public office can be questioned inter alia in the event an appointment is violative of any statutory provisions. THEre concededly exists a distinction in regard to issuance of a writ of quo warranto and issuance of a writ of certiorari. THE sctipe and ambit of these two writs are different and distinct. Whereas a writ of quo warranto can be issued on a limited ground, the considerations for issuance of a writ of certiorari are wholly different." ( 14. ) THOUGH the right of the writ petitioner to seek for disqualification of the Councillor, has not been controverted, reliance placed on the decisions made in Satish Chander v. Rajasthan University (supra) and Varadarajan v. Salem Municipality (supra), would not lend any support with reference to the prayer for, "quo warranto". ( 15. ) FOR the reasons stated supra, this Court is of the view that a writ of quo warranto against the fifth respondent is not maintainable and hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.