Elipe Dharma Rao, J.:-This writ appeal is filed against the order dated 15.12.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No.17955 of 1997. 2. The writ petitioner, who is the first respondent herein, was an employee of the South Arcot Central Co-operative Bank and he was deputed to the appellant-society as Secretary. At that time, the fourth respondent was also employed in the Society. The Society was running a fair price shop. By proceedings dated 27.7.1985, which were initiated under Section 71 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), a show cause notice was issued to the first respondent, the fourth respondent and four others, stating that they have to account for deficit of the stocks of which they were in charge. After receiving explanation from them, the third respondent held that the deficit amount has to be recovered from the first and the fourth respondent. Hence, both of them have filed appeals in C.M.A. Nos.52 and 56 of 1995 before the second respondent and the same were dismissed by a common order dated 31.10.1996. 3. Aggrieved, the writ petitioner filed W.P. No.17955 of 1997 for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the second and third respondents made in C.M.A. No.56 of 1995 dated 31.10.1996 and in Na.Ka.No.2242/91/ku dated 21.12.1994 respectively before this Court and a learned single Judge of this Court, by order dated 5.12.1998, allowed the writ petition, setting aside the order passed by the third respondent dated 21.12.1994 holding that it violates the second proviso to Section 87(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 and had no jurisdiction to pass an award on that date and also setting aside the order passed by the second respondent dated 30.10.1996. 4. 4. Challenging the same, Ulundurpet Farms Service Co-operative Society Limited filed the present writ appeal, stating that learned Judge has committed an error in quashing the order passed by the third respondent dated 21.12.1994 by taking into consideration Section 87(1) of the Amended Act of the year 1983, which is operated from the date of commencement of the Act of 1983, whereas the proceedings were initiated under Section 71 of the Old Act i.e. Act 53 of 1961 under which no time limit was prescribed to complete the surcharge proceedings after initiating the same as contemplated under Sections 183 and 173 of the Act. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondents and perused the materials available on record. 6. Learned Single Judge, on consideration of facts and circumstances of the case, mainly relied on Section 87(1) of the Act, as per which, the time limit to complete the surcharge proceedings is seven years. The learned single Judge has held that since the surcharge proceedings, though initiated on 27.7.1985, were not completed within a period of seven years, the surcharge proceedings initiated on the writ petitioner are bad in law. 7. The argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that once the surcharge proceedings were initiated as per the old Act, the appellant will continue the proceedings after the new Act came into force, since no time limit is prescribed to complete the proceedings under the old Act. 8. Though the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 received the assent of the President on 15.7.1983 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 1.11.1983, it was brought into force along with the Rules on 13.4.1988. In the case on hand, the surcharge proceedings were initiated during the time when the old Act i.e. Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was in existence. It has not been disputed that under the old Act, no time limitation was fixed to complete the surcharge proceedings. In the case on hand, the surcharge proceedings were initiated during the time when the old Act i.e. Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was in existence. It has not been disputed that under the old Act, no time limitation was fixed to complete the surcharge proceedings. But, first proviso to Section 87 of the new Act contemplated that 'no action shall be commenced under Section 87(1) after the expiry of seven years from the date of any act or omission referred to in this sub section' and second proviso to this Section 87 contemplated that 'the action commenced under Section 87(1) shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of such commencement or such further period or periods as the next higher authority may permit, but such extended period or periods shall not exceed six months in the aggregate.' 9. Placing reliance on this amended Section, it has been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee that since the surcharge proceedings initiated against the respondent-employee were not completed either within a period of seven years from the date of commencement or within another six months period as provided under Proviso (1) or (2) of Section 87 of the New Act, the impugned order passed by the Authorities on 21.12.1994 is illegal and therefore, the same has rightly been set aside by the learned Single Judge. 10. Though this argument advanced on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee appears to be attractive, the fact remains otherwise. When there is no dispute or controversy to the fact that on the date of initiation of the surcharge proceedings against the respondent-employee, no time limit has been fixed either for initiation of completion of such surcharge proceedings, the law prevailing as on the date of initiation of such surcharge proceedings alone has to be taken into consideration. 11. The saving Clause under Section 173 of the New Act pressed into service by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee will have no bearing since what has been saved under the said section was only to protect the interest of the society or the actions initiated under the laws prevailing as on that date so as to avoid any collision between the two enactments. Had it been the intention of the legislature to quash or set aside such of the proceedings initiated under the old Act on the ground that they have not been either commenced or completed within the time limit prescribed under the new Act, there would have been a provision of law inducted into paving way for setting aside or quashing such of the actions initiated at the earlier point of time at one stroke. What has not been contemplated under law, cannot be inducted into by way of misinterpretation of the provisions of the Act, by defeating the very purpose for which the new amended Act was brought into force. 12. Learned Single Judge has proceeded on the basis that time frame fixed under Section 87(1) second proviso by way of new Act will also be applicable to the actions initiated under the old Act of the year 1961, which, in our considered view, is erroneous, in view of the fact that no such time limit was contemplated under the old Act, under which the present surcharge proceedings were initiated against the respondent/employee by the appellant/society. If such view is permitted to be in existence, automatically, it will fortify such of the actions initiated by the department thereby bringing a big dent to the exchequer and causing irrevocable damage, which is not at all the intention of the new Act, 1983. 13. Therefore, the writ appeal stands allowed, setting aside the order dated 15.12.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No.17955 of 1997. However, there shall be no order as to costs.