JUDGMENT : V.M. SAHAI, J. 1. The questions of law which arise for consideration in this Letters Patent Appeal are: (i) what is the scope of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? (ii) whether the Labour Court was justified in altering the punishment of dismissal from service into reinstatement in service though it had held that the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct was proved against the workman? (iii) whether the approval granted by Labour Court or Tribunal to dismiss the workman from service could not be reopened by the Labour Court on the principles of res-judicata? (iv) whether the dismissal order against a workman, found guilty of serious misconduct, could be converted into reinstatement without back wages only on the ground that in the past no misconduct was committed by the workman? This intra Court Letters Patent Appeal has been filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the order of the learned single Judge dated September 28, 2010 passed in Special Civil Application No. 2777/2004 by which the learned single Judge has set aside the award of the Labour Court dated August 18, 2003 by which the appellant was directed to be reinstated in service without any back wages. 2. The facts in brief are that the appellant workman was working on daily wages with the respondents for about 15 years. A departmental inquiry proceedings were going on against one Shri Motisinh, another daily wager. While the inquiry proceedings were in progress, on March 11, 1986 the appellant along with one Abhaysingh Jitubhai entered the room where the inquiry was being held, misbehaved with the Inquiry Officer, snatched the inquiry proceeding papers and interrupted with the inquiry proceedings and tore the inquiry proceeding papers and thereafter burnt the same. A charge sheet was issued to the appellant by the respondent to which he submitted his reply. Departmental inquiry proceedings were held in which the appellant was found guilty of charges. By order dated March 7, 1987, the appellant was dismissed from service. Since an industrial dispute was pending, the respondents submitted an Approval Application u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal for granting approval to the dismissal order dated March 7, 1987. Departmental inquiry proceedings were held in which the appellant was found guilty of charges. By order dated March 7, 1987, the appellant was dismissed from service. Since an industrial dispute was pending, the respondents submitted an Approval Application u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal for granting approval to the dismissal order dated March 7, 1987. Considering the reply of both the workmen, the appellant and Abhaysinh Jitubhai, the Industrial Tribunal framed preliminary issue on the point as to whether the departmental proceedings conducted against the workmen was illegal and unjust? The evidence was recorded on the said preliminary issue and after hearing both the parties the Industrial Tribunal found that the departmental disciplinary proceedings were in violation of principles of natural justice and so the opportunity was given to the Electricity Board to prove the allegations against the workman before the Tribunal. The allegations were proved by the Electricity Board before the Tribunal. Thereafter, the Tribunal allowed the Approval Application on October 27, 1989 by recording a finding that the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct against the appellant had been proved in the departmental inquiry and the order of dismissal was just and proper. 3. The appellant raised industrial dispute challenging his dismissal from service which was referred to Labour Court, Anand being Reference No. 389/1990 which was renumbered as Reference (LCA) No. 730/1992. The Labour Court on material available on the record found that the appellant was guilty of misbehaviour and misconduct, however, it did not find that the charge of burning inquiry papers was proved. The Labour Court further came to the conclusion that in past since there was no allegation of misconduct or misbehaviour against the appellant and the incident dated March 11, 1986 appeared to the Labour Court being the first offence, therefore, it directed reinstatement of the workman without any back wages. The award of the Labour Court was challenged by the respondent employer before the learned single Judge by way of writ petition which has been allowed by the learned single Judge wherein it was held that the workman was guilty of serious misconduct and the Labour Court could not set aside the dismissal order only on the ground that in the past there was no misconduct committed by the appellant workman. The learned single Judge also came to the conclusion that apart from the punishment of dismissal, no other punishment could be imposed on the appellant. 4. We have heard Mr. U.T. Mishra holding brief of Mr. T.R. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Premal R. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that before the Labour Court, the respondent was required to prove the allegations against the appellant. The learned counsel has further urged that the learned single Judge has not considered the length of service of the appellant and the fact that for one misconduct, the appellant could not be dismissed from service, there being no past history of any misconduct against the appellant, the order of dismissal was illegal. The learned counsel further urged that the domestic inquiry was found to be in violation of principles of natural justice, the employer did not lead any further evidence before the Labour Court to prove the allegations against the appellant. The learned counsel has vehemently urged that the appellant was entitled to benefit u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the Act") and the Labour Court has found that the punishment awarded to the appellant was disproportionate to the charge and the incident dated March 11, 1986, being the first misconduct, it had directed reinstatement of the appellant without any back wages. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that on the basis of material on record, the Labour Court found that the appellant had misbehaved with the Inquiry Officer who was conducting the inquiry of another daily wage employee Shri Motisinh. The appellant, without any reason, entered into the room of the Inquiry Officer along with Abhaysinh Jitubhai while the inquiry proceedings were going on, snatched and tore the inquiry papers and misbehaved with the Inquiry Officer. These charges were sufficient to dismiss the appellant from service. The Labour Court was not acting as Appellate Authority or Disciplinary Authority and without any valid reasons, could not have held that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority was disproportionate to the charge only on the ground that in the past there was no misconduct committed by the appellant. He urged that the learned single Judge was right in setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court. 6. He urged that the learned single Judge was right in setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court. 6. The first question which arises for consideration of this Court is that what is the scope of Section 11-A of the Act? The question is no longer res Integra. Three Judge Division Bench of the Apex Court in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, (2005) 3 SCC 401 , in para 8 has held as under at pp. 159 and 160 of LLJ: 8. The question then is, whether the interference with the punishment by the Labour Court was justified? In other words, the question is whether the punishment imposed was so harsh or so disproportionate to the charge proved, that it warranted or justified interference by the Labour Court? Here, it had been clearly found that the employee during work, had hit his superior officer with a tension screw on his back and on his nose leaving him with a bleeding and broken nose. It has also been found that this incident was followed by the unauthorized absence of the employee. It is in the context of these charges found established that the punishment of termination was imposed on the employee. The jurisdiction u/s 107-A of the Act to interfere with punishment when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised by the Labour Court only when it is satisfied that the discharge or dismissal is not justified. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well settled. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 324 , this Court, after referring to the scope of interference with punishment u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of removal from service when the charge against the employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. In Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 200 , this Court after referring to the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 417 , also pointed out the difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when charges proved were grave, vis-a-vis the establishment, interference with punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489 , this Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that behalf. The Tribunal or the Labour Court could not interfere with the quantum of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. N.B. Naravade, (2005) 3 SCC 134 . This Court summed up the position thus: It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. This Court summed up the position thus: It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised u/s 11-A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the Court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which requires the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. V. Adikanda Sahu, 1960 I LLJ 518 (SC) and in New Shorrock Mills vs. Maheshbhai T. Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 590 , this Court held that use of abusive language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated "punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate." If that be the position regarding verbal assault, we think that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be found all the more justifiable. Recently in Employers, Management, M. Colliery, BCCL Ltd. vs. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union through Workmen, (2005) 3 SCC 331 this Court after referring to and quoting the relevant passages from Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 200 and The Management of Tournamulla Estate vs. Workmen, (1973) 2 SCC 502 held: The Courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have undermined the discipline in the organization, hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority u/s 11(A) of the Act to interfere with the punishment of dismissal. In another decision in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) vs. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 , in para 9 the Apex Court has held as under at p. 1077 of LLJ: From the above it is clear that once a domestic Tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to the Appellate Tribunals and Courts to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. In the present case, there is evidence of the inspector who checked the bus which establishes the misconduct of the respondent. The domestic Tribunal accepted that evidence and found the respondent guilty. But the Courts below misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the ticket-less passengers to reject the said finding which, in our opinion, as held by this Court in the case of Rattan Singh is not a condition precedent. We may herein note that the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh has since been followed by this Court in Devendra Swamy vs. Karnataka SRTC, 2002 (1) LLJ 454 (SC). The Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. R. Dhandapani, AIR 2006 SC 615 has held in para 7 as under at p. 331 of LLJ: 8. It is not necessary to go into detail regarding the power exercisable u/s 11-A of the Act, The power under the said Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, is expected to interfere with the decision of the management u/s 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment imposed by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. To support its conclusion the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words "disproportionate" or "grossly disproportionate" by itself will not be sufficient. To support its conclusion the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words "disproportionate" or "grossly disproportionate" by itself will not be sufficient. In another decision in Mavji C. Lakum vs. Central Bank of India, (2008) 12 SCC 726 , the Apex Court has held in para 23, the relevant portion is extracted as under: ...There can be no dispute that power u/s 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Besides, the Tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons.... 7. It is settled by the Apex Court that the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal cannot act as if it were the Appellate Body. Where two views are possible on evidence, the Industrial Tribunal should be very slow in interfering with the findings arrived at in domestic inquiry. In Employers Management West Bokaro Colliery of TISCO Ltd. vs. Concerned Workman, Ram Pravesh Singh, (2008) 3 SCC 729 , the Apex Court in para 17 held as under at p. 311 of LLJ: After going through the order of the Industrial Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has interfered with the findings recorded by the domestic Tribunal as if it was the Appellate Tribunal. There was evidence present on record regarding indecent, riotous and disorderly behaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. The Management witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence have unequivocally deposed about the misbehaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses, were not produced...... Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses, were not produced...... The Apex Court in a recent decision in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 111 LLJ 13, in para 6 held as under at p. 15 of LLJ: 6. It is now well settled that the Courts will not act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental inquiries. Therefore, Courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental inquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a Tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous consideration. B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , Union of India and Another vs. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs. (1997) 7 SCC 463 and Bank of India and Another vs. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S. Paid, (2001) 1 SCC 416. 8. The Parliament inserted Section 11-A in the Act by Act No. 45/1971 which came into force with effect from December 15, 1971. The object of amendment was that the Tribunal should have power, in cases wherever necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman. The Tribunal was also conferred the power to award lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal. The object of amendment was that the Tribunal should have power, in cases wherever necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman. The Tribunal was also conferred the power to award lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal. In a proper case the Tribunal could exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The Labour Court or the Tribunal have ample power to decide the question relating to quantum of punishment and they can interfere with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and the employee deserves a lesser punishment or reinstatement. Though they have power to reduce the quantum of punishment, the power has to be exercised within the parameters of law. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Tribunal u/s 11-A is wide one but it is not unlimited. The power u/s 11-A having a discretionary element involved in it, has to be dealt with, in the facts and circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula could be evolved. 9. The Apex Court in the above mentioned decisions have laid down that in cases where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, it is necessary for the Tribunal or Labour Court to give reasons in support of its decision and it has to arrive at the conclusion that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of words "disproportionate" or "grossly disproportionate" by itself would not be sufficient. The Labour Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with domestic inquiry by acting as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence. It cannot interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the material on record. It cannot substitute their subjective opinion in the place of one arrived at in the domestic inquiry. The decision of the Labour Court should not be based on mere hypothesis. Judicial discretion vested in the Labour Court cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. 10. The next question is whether the Labour Court was justified in altering the punishment of dismissal from service into reinstatement in service though it had found the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct proved against the workman? Judicial discretion vested in the Labour Court cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. 10. The next question is whether the Labour Court was justified in altering the punishment of dismissal from service into reinstatement in service though it had found the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct proved against the workman? On March 11, 1986 while the domestic inquiry with regard to another daily wager Motisinh was being conducted by the Inquiry Officer, the appellant along with another daily wager Abhaysinh Jitubhai entered into the room of guest house of Gujarat, Electricity Board where the inquiry proceedings were being conducted. He misbehaved with the Inquiry Officer, interfered with the inquiry proceedings and snatched away and tore the inquiry papers. The Labour Court also found that the charge against the workman of misbehaviour and misconduct was proved. The Labour Court has not recorded any finding except first offence and poor financial condition of the Appellant to alter the punishment. It has also not recorded a finding that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the appellant was shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman, and it disturbs the conscience of the Court. The Labour Court had directed reinstatement in service without back wages whimsically. 11. We are of the considered opinion that the Labour Court has completely lost sight of the gravity of offence, the impact of reinstatement in service after proved serious misconduct on the other workmen. The misconduct of unruly behaviour preventing the superior officer from holding inquiry with regard to another daily wager, would have adverse effect over the functioning of the respondent. When the charges were proved vis-a-vis the establishment, interference by the Labour Court with the punishment was not justified. The leniency shown by the Labour Court on the ground of poor financial condition was unwarranted and would in fact encourage indiscipline. Without mentioning any further reason as to why the Labour Court felt that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the charge, it was not open to the Labour Court to alter the punishment of dismissal into reinstatement of service. 12. The next question is that what is the effect of approval granted by the Industrial Tribunal to the dismissal order? The appellant was dismissed from service on March 7, 1987 on the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct. 12. The next question is that what is the effect of approval granted by the Industrial Tribunal to the dismissal order? The appellant was dismissed from service on March 7, 1987 on the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct. It appears that I.T. Reference No. 878/1984 was pending, therefore, for effective termination of the relationship of the employer and employee, the employer/respondent moved an Approval Application before the Tribunal u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act for approval of the dismissal order dated March 7, 1987. The Tribunal allowed the Approval Application on October 27, 1989 by holding that the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct against the appellant had been proved before the Tribunal, the order of dismissal from service was just and proper. The inquiry u/s 33(2)(b) is for the Tribunal's satisfaction for ascertaining whether it would be justified in granting its approval for the punishment of dismissal. The findings in proceedings u/s 33(2)(b) does not operate as res-judicata. 13. The last question is whether the dismissal order against a workman found guilty of serious misconduct could be converted into reinstatement without back wages only on the ground that in the past no misconduct was committed by the workman? The past conduct of the workman could be a relevant consideration. If the Labour Court finds that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate with regard to a particular conduct and no reasonable and prudent person or employer would impose punishment of dismissal for such particular misconduct, the Labour Court in its discretionary power has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied with the findings of the disciplinary authority or with the quantum of punishment and after recording a further finding that the circumstance of the case require awarding a less severe punishment, could consider the past conduct of the workman. In other words, whether the workman has committed minor misconduct or technical misconduct which had been found to be proved against the delinquent in such cases the Labour Court may, under its discretionary power u/s 11-A of the Act while considering past record of the delinquent can hold that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the workman was shockingly disproportionate to the charges. 14. 14. The Apex Court, in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. M. Chandrasekhar Reddy and Others, (2005) 2 SCC 481 , in paragraph 26 has held as under at p. 870 of LLJ: 23....The fact that the misconduct now alleged is the first misconduct again is no ground to condone the misconduct.... From the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it is clear that past record of service may be a relevant factor for considering as to whether the punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee was shockingly disproportionate to the charge or not but merely because it was a first misconduct could not be a ground to condone a serious misconduct. Now coming to the facts of the case in hand, we find that in past there was no misconduct committed by the appellant and poor financial condition may be a relevant consideration for awarding lesser punishment but the gravity of charge which was found proved against the appellant that he interfered with the inquiry proceedings of another daily wage employee, misbehaved with the Inquiry Officer, tore the papers of the inquiry proceedings were sufficient to warrant his dismissal from service. No lenient view could be taken in such matters as it would encourage indiscipline and such employee has to be dealt with an iron hand by the employer. The Labour Court had not given cogent reasons as to why it has directed reinstatement in service when the Labour Court had found the charge of misbehaviour and misconduct proved against the workman. The only reason given by the Labour Court is that in the past the appellant had not committed any misconduct was not sufficient to condone the grave misconduct committed by the appellant. The reprehensible behaviour of the appellant and serious misconduct committed by him was not pardonable and the dismissal from service in such case was the appropriate punishment. We do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the learned single Judge. In the result, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed summarily.