Judgment : 1. The State has preferred this Criminal Appeal assailing the judgment in C.C. No.9 of 1998 dated 20-10-2003 passed by the learned Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Nellore, whereby the learned Special Judge acquitted the respondent - accused officer for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act’). 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under: The accused officer was working as Additional Public Prosecutor for the Court of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Chirala, Prakasham District, as such, he was a public servant at the relevant point of time. While so, Smt. Prabhavathi, the daughter of the de facto complainant - PW.1, Moka Rama Mohan Rao, committed suicide on 18-12-1996, which was six months after her marriage that took place on 04-06-1996 with one Gollapothu Raju of Chinganajam, Prakasham District, due to the alleged harassment by her husband and in-laws for more dowry. On the complaint given by PW.1, a case in Crime No.76 of 1996 was registered by the police of Chinaganjam Police Station against his son-in-law, Gollapothu Raju, and 5 others, charge sheet was filed before the Magistrate and the case was committed to the Sessions Division, Prakasham District and in turn the case was made over to the Court of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Chirala, where the accused officer was working as Additional Public Prosecutor, for trial in S.C. No.194 of 1997. Thereafter, the case was adjourned 4 or 5 times since 06-11-1997. PW.1 attended the Court for first two adjournments but the accused officer sought adjournment on both the occasions. PW.1 could not attend the Court on the next adjournment day due to ill health. On issuance of non-bailable warrant, PW.1 attended the Court and got the warrant cancelled. Subsequently, the case was posted to 12-02-1998 for examination of PW.1 and others. In the meanwhile, on 25-01-1998, PW.1 met the accused officer at his residence at Perala and requested him to take interest in the case, for which the accused officer alleged to have demanded Rs.3,000/- as illegal gratification to take more interest in the case and to see that justice be done. On PW.1 pleading his inability, accused officer reduced the bribe amount to Rs.2,000/- and PW.1 unwillingly agreed to pay the same after receipt of his salary. On PW.1 pleading his inability, accused officer reduced the bribe amount to Rs.2,000/- and PW.1 unwillingly agreed to pay the same after receipt of his salary. The accused officer directed PW.1 to pay the bribe amount at his house at Perala on the morning of 30-01-1998. Then, PW.1 gave complaint to the A.C.B. officials on 26-01-1998 against the accused officer and the same was registered as Crime No.3/ACB-NPK/98 on 28-01-1998. Accordingly, pre and post-trap proceedings were recorded and trapped the accused officer successfully. The phenolphthalein test yielded positive result. 3. On his pleading not guilty, the accused officer was prosecuted for the offences referred supra. 4. To substantiate its case, the prosecution has got examined PWs.1 to 6 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-11 apart from MOs.1 to 10 on its behalf. However, no witnesses were examined and no documents were marked except Exs.D-1 to D-10 on behalf of the accused officer. 5. The trial Court found the accused officer not guilty of the offences charged against him and accordingly acquitted him for the same by the impugned judgment. 6. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the State has preferred this appeal contending that the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence and circumstances of the case in the right perspective and came to an erroneous conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt though the tainted amount was recovered from the possession of the accused officer and the phenolphthalein test yielded positive result and the trial Court failed to draw the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. 7. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the accused officer, supported the impugned judgment pointing out various lacunae in the case of the prosecution and discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses particularly PW.1 and contended the trial Court has given valid and cogent reasons for acquitting the accused officer and there are no merits in this appeal, as such, the impugned judgment does not warrant interference of this Court, and therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. 8. Now it is pertinent to refer paragraph Nos.12, 15 and 19 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in BABU v. STATE OF KERALA (2010) 9 SCC 189 in the context for the sake of convenience and better understanding of the legal position in an appeal preferred against a judgment of acquittal, which is as under: “(I) Appeal against acquittal 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [ (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837], Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar [ (1990) 4 SCC 17 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 518 : AIR 1991 SC 315 ], Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. [ (2003) 1 SCC 761 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 432], Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. [ (2004) 10 SCC 699 : 2004 SCC (Cri)1893 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 ], Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 377], State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [ (2007) 13 SCC 102 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 363: AIR 2007 SC 3075 ], S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [ (2008) 5 SCC 535 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 645 : AIR 2008 SC 2066 ], Arulvelu v. State [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 16 SCC 98 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 176] and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. [ (2010) 2 SCC 445 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1496]. 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] this Court reiterated the legal position as under:(SCC p.432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 9. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial Court was wrong in observing that the case of the prosecution suffers from lacunae since there are infirmities and variations in the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses in general and PW.1 in particular. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned judgment is not perverse and acquittal of the accused officer is neither erroneous nor illegal, as such, the impugned judgment is not liable to be interfered with. 11. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and acquittal of the accused officer is confirmed.