1. Challenge in this petition is to order No. 52/DMA/PSA/11 dated 03.05.2011, whereby District Magistrate Anantnag — respondent No. 2 herein has ordered preventive detention of Shri Qazi Yasir Ahmad Son of late Qazi Nissar Resident of Qazi Mohalla Anantnag, (detenue for short) under Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978, (herein after the Act) and directed his lodgement in Central Jail Kotbalwal, Jammu. The petitioner seeks quashment of the detention order impugned in the petition on the following grounds:- A. That the Detaining Authority while alleging that the delenue is involved in the substantive offences, case FIR No. 300/2008, 302/2008,320/2008,171/2009,284/2009,247/2009 and 249/2009 all registered at Police Station Anantnag and Bijbhara failed to set out the compelling reasons that persuaded the Detaining Authority to press into service Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 instead of dealing with the detenue in accordance with general law. B. That the respondent No. 2, after earlier detention order No. Det/PSA/DMA/10/06 dated 09.07.2010 against the detenue was quashed on 22.04.2011, reporting the detenue to have been arrested in connection with case FIR No.284/2009, 247/2009 and 247/2009, and 249/2009, Police Station Bijbehara, slapped impugned detention order on the detenue erroneously assuming that next of the kin of the detenue may approach the Court for bail and detenue may be bailed out. It is urged that mere likelihood of the release of an accused on bail would not be a ground for preventive detention of the accused. C. That the grounds of detention referred to the activities of the detenue, during period the detenue was in detention under the detention order No. Det/PSA/DMA/10/06 dated 09.07.2010 as one of the reason to detain the detenue unmindful of the settled legal proposition that the detention order can not be made on the basis of the alleged activities during period of detention. D. That mere apprehension that the detenue in the event of his release may disrupt the ongoing Panchayat Elections, and obstruct smooth conducting of Amarnath Yatra — 2011 is not by itself a ground recognised under the Act, to order preventive detention. E. That as the detention order impugned in the petition has been made on the ground that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to the "Security of State" and "maintenance of public order". E. That as the detention order impugned in the petition has been made on the ground that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to the "Security of State" and "maintenance of public order". The detention order is liable to be set aside for the reason that "Security of State" and "public order" are two distinct concepts and can not be joined together to be made basis of a detention order. F. That the order suffers from non-application of mind and the material relied upon and referred to in the detention order has not been made available to the detenue, so as to enable the detenue to make an effective representation to the Competent Authority against his detention. G. That the detention order impugned in the petition has been passed on the same grounds pressed into service by respondent No. 2 to make the earlier detention order dated 08.07.2011 and is thus not sustainable under law. H. That the grounds of detention are vague, ambiguous and cryptic, preventing the detenue from making meaningful exercise of his right to represent against the detention order. I. That the respondents after the detention order was made have not followed the procedural safeguards available to the detenue under the Constitution of India and Jammu and Kashmir Public Safely Act 1978. The respondents despite adequate opportunities have not found it necessary to file their reply to the petition and controvert the grounds urged in the petition. The right to file reply has been closed „ on 10.06.2011. 2. I have gone through the petition as also the detention record made available by learned Additional Advocate General. I have heard Counsel for the parties. 3. Preventive detention as held in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88 and reiterated in Rekha v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 2011 SCW 2262 is, by nature repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. I have heard Counsel for the parties. 3. Preventive detention as held in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88 and reiterated in Rekha v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 2011 SCW 2262 is, by nature repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. The Supreme Court in Rekha's case (supra) while emphasising that Article 22(3)(b) Constitution of India is to be read an exception to Article 21 of the constitution of India and not allowed to nullify the right to personal liberty guaranteed under the later, observed; "Since however/Article 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal, but we must confine, the power of preventive detention to very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of Constitution of India, which was won after long ardous, historic struggle. It follows therefore that if law of land (Indian Panel code and other penal statues) can deal with the situation, recourse to the preventive detention law will be illegal". The Court further observed: "It must be remembered that in case of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention case is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction winch can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as "jurisdiction of suspicion". The Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since Clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of Clauses (1) and (2), the detenue is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safegaurds, however, technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital. The Court making reference to law laid down in Kamlcshwar Ishwar Prasad Patel v. Union of India and Others (1995) 2 SCC 51 (para 49) observed: "the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of alleged activities of the detenue". These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of alleged activities of the detenue". The Court quoted with approval following observation made in Ratan Singh v. State of Punjab and others 1981 (4) SCC, emphasising the need to ensure that the Constitutional and Statutory safeguards available to a detenue were followed in letter and spirit observed; But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that atleast those safeguards are not denied to the detenu's" Law on the subject was succinctly laid down by the apex Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha and another (1987) 2 SCC 22 in following words: "The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenue since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the Constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard". 4. The baseline, that emerges from the above overview of case law on the subject of preventive detention is that when-ever preventive detention is called in question in a Court of Law, the first and foremost task before the Court is to see whether the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 22 (5) Constitution of India and Preventive Detention Law pressed into service to slap the detention, are adhered to. 5. Let us, now shift focus to the present case to see whether the procedural safeguards have been meticulously and strictly followed while ordering preventive detention of petitioner. 6. The detenue appears to have been initially put under preventive detention vide order No. Det/PSA/DMA/10/06 dated 09.07.2010. His detention was directed to be for a period of 12 months, the detention order was questioned in HCP No. 266/2010, the challenge succeeded and the detention order was quashed vide judgement dated 22nd April 2011. The detenue though released was as, pleaded in para 4 of the petition, re-arrested in connection with case FIR No. 284 of 2009. His detention was directed to be for a period of 12 months, the detention order was questioned in HCP No. 266/2010, the challenge succeeded and the detention order was quashed vide judgement dated 22nd April 2011. The detenue though released was as, pleaded in para 4 of the petition, re-arrested in connection with case FIR No. 284 of 2009. The application for grant of bail was filed before the competent Court and the respondent No. 2 before the objections to the application were filed and application considered, put the detenue under preventive detention vide order No. Det/PSA/DMA/11/327-31 dated 03.05.2011, impugned in the present petition. 7. The grounds of detention that lay foundation for the detention order in question are in substance same as were the grounds of detention pressed into service while making the earlier detention order dated 09.07.2010. The grounds of detention refer to the "separatist tendencies" of the detenue and his "organising campaigns" on regular basis in district Anantnag "aimed and motivating the people to hold demonstrations" against the Government established by law, as are narrated in the grounds of detention for earlier detention order dated 09.07.2010. Similarly the grounds of detention make reference to the activities of the detenue during the year 2008 and his having taken "disadvantage of the situation" that "erupted in the State over controversial transfer of land". The grounds of detention in support of earlier detention order and now relied upon in support of the impugned detention order, make reference to the activities of the detenue in 2009,2010 and his encouragement to "gundaism" and involvement of the petitioner in case FIR's 247/2009 249/2009, 284/2009. In both cases it is alleged that the detenue provokes and instigates the general people to take out processions and go on strikes. 8. It is well settled law that when a detention order is quashed by the Court, the grounds of the order so quashed should not be taken into consideration, either as whole or in part, even along with fresh grounds of detention for drawing subjective satisfaction to pass fresh detention order. It is to be appreciated that once the Court sets aside the detention order, it nullifies the entire order. The detaining Authority therefore cannot consider the grounds that were relied upon to pass the earlier detention order or activities that were detailed in such grounds. It is to be appreciated that once the Court sets aside the detention order, it nullifies the entire order. The detaining Authority therefore cannot consider the grounds that were relied upon to pass the earlier detention order or activities that were detailed in such grounds. The position may be different where the earlier detention order is revoked due to technical reasons. In such a situation the grounds of detention may be used to make fresh detention order after removal of technical impediment or loopholes. However, no such recourse is available where the earlier detention order is struck down by the Court as it sets at naught not only detention order but the grounds on which the detention order is based. A reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in, Chhagan Bhai, Baghwan Bhai Qahar v. N.L. Kumar AIR 1989 SC 1234 , Jabbarkhan Azadkhan v. State of Gujrat, Masrat Alam Bhat v. State & Others 2003 (II) SLJ 570 : 2010 (3) JKJ HC-282, Mst. Zahida v. State & Others 2008 (1) SLJ 245 : 2008 (2) JKJ HC-406, Masrat Alam Bhat v. State 2008 (II) SLJ 689 : 2009 (2) JKJ HC-158. 9. The respondent No.2- Detaining Authority while admitting in the grounds of detention that the detenue was arrested in connection with case FIR No. 284/2009 Police Station Anantnag, under Section 148,149,336,436,353 and FIR No. 247/2009 under Section 147,336, 332, RPC, 13 ULA(P) & 249 in Police Station Bijbehara, felt persuaded to order detention on the basis of 'apprehension that NOKs of the detenue may approach the Court for bail and that if the detenue is bailed out it will prove harmful for peace in Anantnag". 10. A closer look at the grounds of detention and impugned detention order reveals that the Detaining Authority on 03.05.2011 was not aware that the detenue had moved a bail application and that the application was pending before the competent Court. The respondent No. 2 only voiced the apprehension that nearest of kin (NOKs) of the detenue may approach the Court for bail. Mere, apprehension of a bail application being moved on behalf of the detenue is not a valid ground for slapping detention order on an accused. The Detaining Authority must be satisfied that there is a real possibility of release of detenue on bail who has made an application i.e. pending before the Court. Mere, apprehension of a bail application being moved on behalf of the detenue is not a valid ground for slapping detention order on an accused. The Detaining Authority must be satisfied that there is a real possibility of release of detenue on bail who has made an application i.e. pending before the Court. If to the knowledge of Detaining Authority no bail application is pending the Detaining Authority cannot be expected to be satisfied that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail. However, as laid down in Rekha's case (supra) filing of bail application on behalf of the accused may not be necessary where a co-accused to the knowledge of the Detaining Authority has been released on bail, making it reasonable for the Detaining Authority to conclude that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail even though no bail application is pending. The apprehension voiced by the Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention as regards likelihood of the detenue being enlarged on bail, in the circumstances did not constitute a valid ground for recording subjective satisfaction by the Detaining Authority. In Amrit Lal & Ors v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3675 it has been held: There must be cogent materials before the officer passing the detention order that the detenue is likely to be released on bail. The inference must be drawn from the available material on record and must not be the ipse dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. Likelihood of detenu's moving an application for bail is not a cogent material and detention order based on such material is liable to the quashed. The reasoning that there is "likelihood to be released on bail" is different from "likelihood of his moving an application for bail". 11. The Detaining Authority-respondent No. 2 has slapped the detention order on his subjective satisfaction that the "activities".of detenue are "highly prejudicial to the security of State" and "maintenance of public order". It may be recalled that in terms of Section 8 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 detention order can be passed to prevent a person from acting in any manner "prejudicial" to the "security of State" or "maintenance of public order". It may be recalled that in terms of Section 8 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 detention order can be passed to prevent a person from acting in any manner "prejudicial" to the "security of State" or "maintenance of public order". The detaining Authority in the present case by clubbing both the grounds i.e. "security of the State" as well as "maintenance of public order" has depicted total non-application of mind. It appears that the Detaining Authority has not been himself satisfied whether the activities of the petitioner were likely to prejudice the "security of State" or "maintenance of public order". It needs to be emphasised that "security of State" and "maintenance of public order" are two different concepts, that may in a very small number of cases overlap While Section 8 (3) (b) defines the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" the definition of expressions "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State" is not given in the Act. The definition earlier given in Section 8 (3) (a) stands omitted by Act XII of 1988. Since the law makers have not defined the two "expressions" and picked up the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order" to be defined under Section 8(3)(a), it becomes more than evident that two "expressions" represent two concepts and are distinct from each other. The amendment to Section 8 (3) of the Act, does not neutralize the law laid down in G.M. Shah v. State of J&K (1980) 1 SCC 132 : 2010 (6) JKJ SC-850. It would be profitable to reproduce the following from the reported case. 8. The expressions “law and order", "public order" and "security of the State" are distinct concepts though not always separate. Whereas every breach of peace may amount to disturbance of law and order, every such breach does not amount to disturbance of public order and every public disorder may not prejudicially affect the "security of the State". The Supreme Court in Collector and District Magistrate and Others v. S. Sultan AIR 2008 SC 2096 held as under:- "15. Public Order", 'Law and Order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, then next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. The Supreme Court in Collector and District Magistrate and Others v. S. Sultan AIR 2008 SC 2096 held as under:- "15. Public Order", 'Law and Order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, then next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act can not fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State". 12. The detenue under Article 22(5) Constitution of India and Section 13 Public Safety Act, has two valuable rights-one to be informed immediately after he is placed under detention of the grounds of detention and that he has right to make representation against the detention not only to the Government but in the intervening period before the detention order is placed for approval before the Government, to the Detaining Authority, and second to be made available all material that is relied upon by the Detaining Authority to arrive at subjective satisfaction that the detenue is required to be placed under preventive detention so as to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the "security of the State" or "maintenance of public order". The detention order is liable to be quashed if above procedural safeguards are infringed. In the present case the perusal of the detention record reveals that though detention order as also the grounds of detention make a detailed reference to case FIR 171/2009 284/2009 320/2008 300/2008 Police Station Anantnag, yet neither copies of FIRs nor statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. 01 record reflecting other developments during investigation of the aforesaid FIR's have been made available to the detenue. It appears that involvement of the detenue in the aforesaid criminal cases has weighed heavily with the respondent No. 2 while recording subjective satisfaction in terms of Section 8 of Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The detenue in the circumstances cannot be expected to make a meaningful use of procedural safeguards available under Article 22 (5) Constitution of India and Section 13 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, and make an effective representation against his preventive detention. The detenue in absence of the said material would not be in a position to persuade the Detaining Authority and the Government that he is not connected with the alleged criminal cases and that apprehension regarding his activities being prejudicial to the "security of State" or "maintenance of public order" are misplaced. Failure on part of the respondents to provide all material relied upon while passing the detention order in question, has violated the Constitutional and statutory rights, guaranteed to the detenue under Article 22 (5) Constitution of India and Section 13 of Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act. 13.. For the reasons discussed above, the challenge to detention order succeeds. The petition is accordingly allowed and detention order No. 52/DMA/PSA/11, dated 03.05.2011 is set aside. 14. The detenue is directed to be let off, from preventive detention under the aforementioned detention order No. 52/DMA/PSA/11 dated 03.05.2011 Allowed.