JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Srivastava, J.—This criminal revision has been filed by the revisionist feeling aggrieved by the order dated 9.5.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Court No. 3, Mau in S.T. No. 225 of 2001. Through this order the learned Additional Sessions Judge had allowed an application moved before him by the learned D.G.C. (Criminal), Mau under Section 321 Cr.P.C. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the alleged incident had taken place on 8.5.98 at about 10.30 a.m. in village Kurthi Jafarpur, P.S. Kopaganj, Mau. An F.I.R. was lodged by head constable No. 9, Wasim Anwar. According to the FIR a large number of persons in the shape of a crowed of 250-300 strength surrounded the police outpost, Kurthi Jafarpur. The accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly which was armed with deadly weapons. The mob had attempted to kill police personnel and other persons, caused simple and grievous hurt to a number of people, damaged properties, used criminal force in order to intimidate public at large and the police personnel and caused simple hurt to the government servants in order to deter them from discharging their official duties. An FIR was lodged with the police on the same day at about 1.45 p.m. in which 52 persons were named. The matter was investigated and a charge sheet under Sections 147/148/149/307/336/332/323/427/506 IPC was filed in the Court of learned Magistrate. The relevant case crime number was 206/98. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and after furnishing copies to the accused persons committed the case to the Court of Sessions. On 10.10.2002 the learned Sessions Judge, Mau framed charges against all the fifty two charge sheeted accused persons under various Sections of Indian Panel Code. Thereafter the learned lower Court proceeded to examine the prosecution witnesses. It appears that this case was transferred from the Court of learned Sessions Judge to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Court No. 3 in due course of administrative distribution of the session trials. On 7.2.2007 the learned D.G.C. (Criminal), Mau submitted an application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge under Section 321 Cr.P.C. Objections were filed on this application from the side of the revisionist. After hearing both the parties the learned lower Court on 9.5.2007 disposed of the said application. On 7.2.2007 the learned D.G.C. (Criminal), Mau submitted an application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge under Section 321 Cr.P.C. Objections were filed on this application from the side of the revisionist. After hearing both the parties the learned lower Court on 9.5.2007 disposed of the said application. He allowed the application and permitted the learned D.G.C. (Criminal) to withdraw the case and as a consequence all the accused persons were acquitted. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the present revision has been filed. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the records. Lower Court record has been received and is tagged with the file of this revision. It has been submitted from the side of the revisionist that the learned public prosecutor had moved the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. under the direction of the District Magistrate/State without application of his own mind. Referring the case of Subhash Chand v. State and others, AIR 1980 SC 423 , it has been argued that the decision of the public prosecutor must be independent and not in obedience of the direction of higher authorities. Referring another case law Balabhadra Dass v. State of Orrisa, 1991 Cr LJ 2457, it has been further argued that while exercising his power under Section 321 Cr.P.C. the public prosecutor should not Act merely as a rubber stamp of State Government. Referring to the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. and the government order dated 18.1.2007 the learned counsel for the revisionist has further argued that the application moved by the learned public prosecutor is not based on any material. It has also been stated that the learned public prosecutor has only mentioned in his application that since the State Government has decided to withdraw the case, the case should be permitted to be withdrawn. At this stage reference of Abdul Kareem v. State of Karnataka, 2001 Crl LJ 148 SC, has been given. It has also been submitted that the public prosecutor has not exercised his discretion and acted mechanically just to obey the direction of the State which action of the public prosecutor is bad and illegal. It has also been argued from the side of the revisionist that the learned lower Court has followed the ruling given by this Court, ignoring various rulings of the Apex Court cited before him. It has also been argued from the side of the revisionist that the learned lower Court has followed the ruling given by this Court, ignoring various rulings of the Apex Court cited before him. It has further been submitted that the learned lower Court has passed the order in a cursory manner and he did not go deep in the merits of the case as well as the settled provisions of law laid down by the Apex Court. In the above background it has been submitted from the side of the revisionist that the revision be allowed and the impugned order should be quashed and set aside. 4. The revision has been opposed vehemently from the side of the private opposite parties. It has been stated that the order passed by the learned lower Court is sound and based on established principles of law as laid down in respect of Section 321 Cr.P.C. It has further been submitted from their side that the revisionist does not have locus standi to move this revision and the revision should be dismissed on this count alone. This contention has been advanced, which is of preliminary nature, with a view to dislodge the locus standi of the revisionist to prefer the present revision. It was argued that when learned D.G.C.(Criminal) applied before the learned lower Court for permission to withdraw the prosecution against the accused persons the revisionist had no locus to oppose the withdrawal since it was a matter entirely between the public prosecutor and the learned Additional Sessions Judge and no other person had a right to intervene and oppose the withdrawal and since the revisionist had no locus to oppose the withdrawal, he was not entitled to prefer the present revision against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 5. Replying to the arguments relating to the locus of the revisionist the learned counsel for the revisionist has stressed that in criminal law any person can set Court in motion and stated that on this point law is very clear as has been established by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay’s case (1984) 2 SCC 500 . 6. I have considered the arguments as advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. I do not think that there is any force in the contention raised by the private opposite parties. 6. I have considered the arguments as advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. I do not think that there is any force in the contention raised by the private opposite parties. It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain Acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (Supra) the Apex Court pointed out the position of law. The relevant portion is quoted as follows : “It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that any-one can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint case, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complaint, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (I) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947 (iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribed any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribed any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complaint is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Cr. P.C. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an Act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See Section 2(n), Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for his orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offence is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an Act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary, Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statues enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be withheld down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception.” 7. In the above mentioned case the Apex Court observed that locus standi of the complainant of a case is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In the above mentioned case the Apex Court observed that locus standi of the complainant of a case is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Now, if any citizen can lodge a first information report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus standi to do so cannot be questioned, I do not see why the citizen who finds that a prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn, can not oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiator of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. Here in the present case, the offecnes charged against the private opposite parties of this revision are offences relating to public safety, security and its orderliness. If a crowed of 250-300 people form an unlawful assembly, some of the members of which have armed themselves with deadly weapons, the mob is indulging itself in rioting, arson and creating nasty nuisance in the public offending each and every member of the locality and public at large, any citizen of the society, specially a person who is dwelling near such a place, has definitely got a right to oppose withdrawal of the prosecution if he is of the opinion that such withdrawal is not fair, not in the interest of the society, not in the interest of the public tranquility and peace and not in the interest of justice. 8. In such circumstances any person who is interested in public morality and tranquility or in cleanliness of public administration would be entitled to file a complaint, as has been held by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay’s case (Supra). In these circumstances, I therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of the opposite parties of the case that the revisionist has no locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution or to file the present revision in this Court. In these circumstances, I therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of the opposite parties of the case that the revisionist has no locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution or to file the present revision in this Court. If he was entitled to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution, it must follow a fortiorari that on the turning down of his opposition by the learned Additional Sessions Judge he was entitled to prefer a criminal revision before this Court. On the basis of the above discussions, I am of the view that the revisionist has got full locus standi to prefer the present revision. 9. Now let us examine the revision as far as its merits are concerned. Following is the application 100/ka which was moved before the learned Additional Sessions Judge by learned D.G.C.(Criminal) Mau on 7.2.2007: U;k;ky; Jheku vij l= U;k;k/kh’k@QkLV VSªd dksVZ la0 3 eÅ izdh.kZ izkFkZuk i= la0 2007 jkT; izfr tQj vgen iz/kku o vU; vUrxZr /kkjk 147] 148] 149] 307] 323] 326] 427] 332] 506 vkbZ0ih0lh0 ,oe~ 7 fdzfeuy ykW vesUMesUV ,DV eq0v0la0 206@98 Fkkuk&dksikxat tuin&eÅ l= ijh{k.k la[;k 255@2001 Jheku~] vfHk;kstu i{k dh rjQ ls izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr /kkjk 321 na0iz0la0 fuEu vkèkkj ij izLrqr gS%& 1- ;g fd mijksDr l= ijh{k.k esa 'kklu }kjk vk[;k] i=kfn ij leqfpr fopkjksijkUr mDr okn dks okil ysus dk fu.kZ; fy;k gS mDr vkns’k dh lR; Nk;kizfr layXud&1 gSA 2- ;g fd 'kklukns’k fnukafdr 18 tuojh 2007 ds vk/kkj ij mijksDr l= ijh{k.k okil fy, tkus dh Lohd`fr iznku dh x;h gS vr,o vfHk;kstu okil fd;k tkuk U;k;fgr esa vko’;d gSA izkFkZuk%& vr% Jheku ls fuosnu gS fd mijksDr 'kklukns’k ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;kstu okil djus gsrq vkns’k djus dh d`ik dh tk;A izkFkhZ%& layXud%& ftyk 'kkldh; vf/koDrk 'kklukns’k fnukafdr ¼QkS0½ 18] tuojh 2007 dh tuin&eÅ Nk;kizfr 1 odZ 7-2-2007 vk0 g0 vLi"V fuLrkj.k gsrq 7-2-2007 fn0 22-2-07 filed on 12.02.07 dks is’k gksosA g0 vLi"V 12-2-2007 10. Following is the letter sent to the District Magistrate by Sri S.K.Pandey, Special Secretary, Government of U.P.: ;w0ih0lh0 la[;k & 194 Mcywlh@lkr&Uk; 5&2006&970 MCyw0lh0@2004 izs"kd% Jh ,l0ds0 ik.Ms;] fo’ks"k lfpo] mRrj izns’k "kkluA lsok esa] ftyk eftLVªsV eÅA U;k; vuqHkkx&5 ¼QkStnkjh½ y[kuÅ fnukad 18] tuojh] 2007 fo"k;& eq0v0la0&205@98 ,oa eq0v0la0&206@98] vUrxZr/kkjk& 147] 148] 149] 307] 323] 326] 427] 332] 506 vkbZ0ih0lh0] o 7 fdzfeuy ykW vesUMesUV ,DV] Fkkuk&dksikxat] jkT; cuke tQj vgen iz/kku ,oa vU; ds vfHk;ksx dks okil ysus ds lEcU/k esaA egksn;] 1- mijksDr fo"k;d vkids i= la[;k&1698@ts0,0&eÅ@06] fnukad 13-2-2006 ds lUnHkZ esa eq>s ;g dgus dk funsZ’k gqvk gS fd okn ds rF;ksa o miyC/k vk[;k@i=kfn ij leqfpr fopkjksijkUr 'kklu us mDr okn dks okil ysus dk fu.kZ; fy;k gSA 2& vr% Jh jkT;iky egksn; mi;qZDr okn ds vfHk;kstu dks okil ysus gsrq yksd vfHk;kstd }kjk U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr djus dh vuqefr iznku djrs gSaA 3& —i;k rnuqlkj rqjUr dk;Zokgh lqfuf’pr djas rFkk —r dk;Zokgh ls 'kklu dks voxr djkus dk d"V djsaA 700/ERK Hkonh; OC/J.A. g0 vLi"V —i;k vk0dk0 lqfuf’pr ¼,l0ds0 ik.Ms;½ dj voxr djkosaA fo’ks"k lfpo g0 vLi"V ftykf/kdkjh@ftyk eftLVªsV dk;kZy; ftykf/kdkjh eÅ eÅ 25-1-2007 la0 313/SA/Mau dt; 25.2.2007 izfrfyfi&1- iqfyl v/kh{kd eÅ dks rnuqlkj vko’;d dk;Zokgh djus gsrq 2- SPO MAU dks vko’;d dk;Zokgh gsrqA g0 vLi"V Ñrs ftykf/kdkjh eÅ 11. From the perusal of the application No. 100-ka/1 of the learned lower Court file it is evident that in 1st para of it, it has been mentioned that in the relevant session trial certain comments and communications were exchanged and after due consideration it has been decided that the case as a whole should be withdrawn from the prosecution. In the same para it has also been mentioned that a true photocopy of the said order from the Government of U.P. is attached to the application for withdrawal. In 2nd para it has been mentioned by the learned D.G.C.(Criminal) that through government order dated 18th of January, 2007 consent has been accorded to withdraw the said session trial and therefore on the basis of the said G.O. it is in the interest of justice that the case may be permitted to be withdrawn. Thereafter in the prayer clause the learned D.G.C.(Criminal) has made a request that on the basis of the above mentioned government order the Court may be pleased to pass an order of withdrawal from prosecution. 12. Thereafter in the prayer clause the learned D.G.C.(Criminal) has made a request that on the basis of the above mentioned government order the Court may be pleased to pass an order of withdrawal from prosecution. 12. Alongwith the above application photocopy of the government order dated 18.1.2007 has been annexed. From the perusal of the above application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. it is evident that no reason whatsoever has been given from the side of the public prosecutor as to what exactly were the circumstances on the basis of which he was of the opinion that it was a fit case which was fully covered under the provisions of Section 321 Cr.P.C. In fact the application merely states that learned public prosecutor has received a government order dated 18.1.2007 whereby consent has been given for withdrawal of the said session trial and therefore he is withdrawing the case. Clearly no application of mind on judicial side by learned public prosecutor appears to be there while moving the present application. One thing which needs mentioning here that this application has not even been signed by learned D.G.C. (Criminal) which atleast shows his seriousness about the entire matter. However, this mistake is of not much importance but it shows the reckless manner in which the matter has been dealt with by learned D.G.C. (Criminal). 13. From perusal of Para 2 of the application 100-ka/1 it clearly transpires that learned public prosecutor had merely communicated to the Court a decision taken at the government level, and he has added there nothing from his own which also indicates his non-application of judicial mind in the entire matter. 14. Now let us see what is the position of law in respect of Section 321 Cr.P.C. In, Ashraf Ali v. State of U.P., 2004(1) U.P. Crl. Ruling 600, a single Bench of this Court has held that if an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is made, it is not necessary for the Court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The Court’s function is to give consent. This Section does not require the Court to record reasons before consent is given. The Court’s function is to give consent. This Section does not require the Court to record reasons before consent is given. All that is necessary to satisfy the Section is to see that the public prosecutor Acts in good faith and that the Magistrate or Judge is satisfied that the exercise of discretion by the public prosecutor is proper. 15. From perusal of the case of Ashraf Ali (supra) it appears that in that case the learned Magistrate had discussed in detail the merits of the case. Such discussion has been discouraged by this Court in the said ruling. In the said ruling it has further been held that the Court should not lose sight of the basic principles as enunciated in various rulings passed by the Supreme Court. This Court has also opined that withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function and it is an exclusive domain of the public prosecutor. 16. In Awadesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and others, 1989 Crl.L.J. 1029,by a single Bench of Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench), it was held that while disposing of an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. the public prosecutor has to apply his mind independently without being subject to any outside influence. He has to state that, he has applied his mind independently in application and in prayer for withdrawal itself. 17. From perusal of the brief facts as contained in Awadesh Prasad’s ruling it appears that in the relevant case before Patna High Court no reasoning was given by the public prosecutor in the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. In Balabhadra Dash and another v. State of Orissa and others, 1991 Crl.L.J. 2457, the learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court has opined that the provision under Section 321 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that power vested in the public prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution is wide in its nature and therefore it is the duty of the public prosecutor and he is expected to apply his mind and consider whether it is just and reasonable to apply for consent of Court keeping in mind interest of the society against which the wrong has been alleged to have been committed. It has further been stated in this case that the public prosecutor should not Act merely as a rubber stamp for the State Government which instructed it to withdraw or to sign on the dotted lines. 18. It has further been stated in this case that the public prosecutor should not Act merely as a rubber stamp for the State Government which instructed it to withdraw or to sign on the dotted lines. 18. In M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P.V. Balakrishanan and others, 1972 Crl.L.J. 301, the Apex Court has stated that in respect of moving of an application under Section 494 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 [equivalent to Section 321 Cr.P.C., 1973] the public prosecutor can be asked by the State Government to consider the filing of a petition for obtaining permission of the Court to withdraw from the prosecution. If he (public prosecutor) is of the opinion that the prosecution ought not to proceed he can get the consent of the Government to file such a petition. This observation clearly indicates that the State Government may ask public prosecutor just to consider filing of a petition to withdraw the prosecution. Nothing has been said in the ruling that if the State Govt. directs the public prosecutor to withdraw the case, it is the bounden duty of the public prosecutor to apply to the Court to withdraw the same. 19. In Bansi Lal v. Chandan Lal and others, 1976 SCC (Cri) 39, the Apex Court had an opportunity to consider M.N. Sankaranarayanan’s case (supra) and after due consideration the Supreme Court has held that under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice while quoting the following : The request to grant permission under Section 494 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 should not be accepted “as a necessary formality” “for the mere asking”, but the Court must be satisfied “on the materials placed before it” that the grant of permission would serve the administration of justice and that permission was not being sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further and maintain. 20. In Subhash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn.), AIR 1980 SC 423 , it was held by the Apex Court that : “When a case is pending in a criminal Court its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statute. 20. In Subhash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn.), AIR 1980 SC 423 , it was held by the Apex Court that : “When a case is pending in a criminal Court its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statute. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a Court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The function of administering justice, under our constitutional order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the Courts’ process is Section 321 Cr.P.C. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor, and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the Court. The consent of the Court under Section 321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. Consent will be given only if public justice in the larger sense is promoted rather than subverted by such withdrawal. That is the essence of nolle prosequi jurisprudence. Invested by the statue with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him to apply an independent mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so, he Acts as a limb of the judicative process, not as an extension of the executive. The decision to withdraw must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those where displeasure may affect his continuance in office. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the Executive, however, high the accused, however, sure Government feels a case is false,, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle Court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration.” 21. In Abdul Karim etc. etc. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the Executive, however, high the accused, however, sure Government feels a case is false,, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle Court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration.” 21. In Abdul Karim etc. etc. v. State of Karnataka and others, 2001 Crl.L.J. 148, the Supreme Court has said that: “The law is that though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. In turn, the Court has to be satisfied, after considering all that material, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind independently thereto, that the Public Prosecutor , acting in good faith, is of the opinion that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest, and that such withdrawal will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice. It must therefore follow that the application under Section 321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case, placed before the Court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The Court has to give an informed consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest; but it is not for the Court to weigh the material. The Court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The Court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice. The Court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The Court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice. If, upon such consideration, the Court accords consent, it must make such order on the application as will indicate to a higher Court that it has done all that the law requires it to do before granting consent.” 22. It has also been held in Abdul Karim’s case that the power of the Court under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is supervisory but that does not mean that while exercising such power the consent has to be granted on mere asking. The Court has to examine that all relevant aspects have been taken into consideration by the Public Prosecutor in exercising of its executive function. 23. It is relevant to note here that the facts of Abdul Karim’s case (supra) are very much similar to the case in hand. In Abdul Karim’s case while discussing the facts and the law the Apex Court has stressed that where the Public Prosecutor seeking withdrawal so as to maintain peace among people living in the border area of a village and to prevent unpleasant situation in the area is itself not a ground on the basis of which withdrawal application should be moved or allowed by the Court if the application for withdrawal does not say as to why breach of peace was apprehended by the Public Prosecutor. Court granting consent could not therefore, have satisfied itself that Public Prosecutor had applied his mind to relevant material and exercised juris dictum in good faith. In these circumstances, the grant of consent is held to be bad in law. It has also been mentioned in this case that an application moved by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 Cr.P.C. on the ground that application for withdrawal has been filed on the basis of a government order, is not maintainable under Section 321 Cr.P.C. and any permission granted by the Court is bad in law. 24. It has also been mentioned in this case that an application moved by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 Cr.P.C. on the ground that application for withdrawal has been filed on the basis of a government order, is not maintainable under Section 321 Cr.P.C. and any permission granted by the Court is bad in law. 24. In S.K. Shukla and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 1 SCC (Cri) 306, the Supreme Court has dealt in detail the requirement of law which requires to be looked into and followed by all the Courts while disposing of an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. In para 32 of the S.K. Shukla’s case (supra) the Apex Court has stated that the Public Prosecutor has to shoulder a greater responsibility for withdrawal of the cases under Section 321 Cr.P.C. The Public Prosecutor can not Act like a postbox or Act on dictates of the State Government. He has to Act objectively as befits an officer of the Court. At the same time the Court is also not bound by that. The Courts are also free to assess whether a prima facie case is made out or not. The Court if satisfied, can also reject the prayer. 25. In the light of the above judgments, it is evident that it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind objectively before moving an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. and it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the action on the part of the Public Prosecutor is bona fide and that the application has been moved in good faith. In the case before me it is evident that the order passed by the learned lower Court is totally illegal. He has mentioned two case laws in his order-one of this High Court and other of the Apex Court. Surprisingly enough the learned lower Court has decided to chose the guidelines given by this Court and ignoring the guidelines given by the Apex Court. It should be mentioned here that the learned lower Court has failed to appreciate both the rulings. Infact the laws laid down by this Court and by the Apex Court are in close conformity to each other but the learned lower Court has understood it the other way. It should be mentioned here that the learned lower Court has failed to appreciate both the rulings. Infact the laws laid down by this Court and by the Apex Court are in close conformity to each other but the learned lower Court has understood it the other way. What he has written in the order impugned that since the facts of the case before him are closer to the facts of Ashraf Ali’s case (supra), he is following the law as laid down in Ashraf Alis case. Infact the learned lower Court has miserably failed to appreciate the law on the point. The case law as contained in S.K. Shukla’s case (supra) is very clear and elaborate which has been ignored by the learned lower Court. In the case before this Court it is evident that the learned Public Prosecutor has totally acted as a rubber stamp of the State Government and acted like a postbox. The learned lower Court has failed to examine in a proper manner the application before it under Section 321 Cr.P.C. 26. On the basis of the above discussions, I am of the view that the order impugned herein is totally illegal and it is liable to be quashed and set aside. As a consequence the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned lower Court on 9.5.2007 in S.T. No. 225/01 (Case crime No. 206/98) State v. Zafar Ahmad Pardhan, is quashed and set aside. The matter is sent back to the learned Sessions Judge, Mau who is directed to proceed in the matter in accordance with law and dispose of the case at the earliest possible. Since the matter is old and a bit complicated, it is desirable that the said sessions trial should be disposed of by some experienced Judge. Therefore, it is directed that the matter should be disposed of by the learned Sessions Judge himself. However, it is open to the learned Sessions Judge to transfer the said case to some other senior Additional Sessions Judge, if due to certain personal reason he does not want to try the case. Let the record of the lower Court be sent back immediately. —————