Judgment : Per V. DHANAPALAN, J. 1. This application is filed under Order 6 Rule 16 C.P.C. read with Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, praying to reject and strike off the Election Petition filed by K. Kalaimani, the election petitioner in the Election Petition. 2. Election Petition No. 6 of 2009 has been filed to declare that the rejection of the election petitioner‘s nomination filed for 197, Ilayangudi Assembly Constituency-Tamil Nadu, by the Returning Officer is improper, illegal, void and contrary to the provisions of the , 1951, in short, “the Act”, and the Returning Officer‘s instructions 2009 issued by the Election Commission of India and consequently to set aside the entire election process including the election of the first respondent as returned candidate from 197, Ilayangudi Assembly Constituency. 3. Facts: 3.1. According to the applicant, poll schedule for the bye-election with respect to 197, Ilayangudi Assembly Constituency was notified on 16.7.2009. The first respondent/election petitioner in paragraph No. 1 could state that the following schedule was fixed for the poll: (a) Date of commencement for filing nomination – 22.7.2009 (b) Last date for filing nomination – 28.7.2009 (c) Scrutiny of nomination – 30.7.2009 d) Last date for withdrawal of nomination – 1.8.2009 (e) Date of election – 18.8.2009 (f) Date of counting of votes and declaration of result – 21.8.2009 3.2. Thus, between the commencement of filing of nomination and the last date for filing nomination there was at least seven clear days to prepare and file the nomination. The petitioner claims that he has filed his nomination on 27.7.2009 before the Returning Officer namely the 12th respondent herein and in the Election Petition. In fact, the election petitioner had enclosed document No. 2 in the list of documents along with the election petition. The same is the poll schedule issued by the Election Commission of India. Thus, it may be seen that the election petitioner is fully aware about the schedule to bye-poll to be conducted and more about the date of commencement and the date of closure of the nomination also. The election petitioner is in the habit of contesting in elections irrespective of results. He had earlier contested in Parliament election held in May 2009 to elect 15th Lok Sabha and had secured just one thousand votes or about out of twelve lakh votes. The election petitioner is in the habit of contesting in elections irrespective of results. He had earlier contested in Parliament election held in May 2009 to elect 15th Lok Sabha and had secured just one thousand votes or about out of twelve lakh votes. The petitioner is also well versed in shifting himself to various political parties and he was earlier in Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, which is part of Bharathiya Janatha Party. When the earlier Ilayangudi M.L.A. joined DMK Party, this election petitioner also joined DMK Party. When he had left the party, this election petitioner also left the party. Thereafter, as an independent candidate, he had contested in the said Parliamentary election. After gaining all such experience he had filed this highly defective nomination in the Bye-poll. Thus, the petitioner has got good knowledge in election matters and has got rich experience. He has got required experience in contesting elections. 3.3. With the above background, the election petitioner has filed his nomination on 27.7.2009. Thus, on the 6th day after the start of filing of nominations he had every time in the world to prepare and present proper nomination that is capable of being acceptable. The petitioner‘s party though claim to be a registered party is not a recognised political party within the meaning of the Rules of the Election Commission of India. Hence, the question of allotment of reserved symbol or issuance of ‘A‘ form or ‘B‘ form does not arise. 3.4. The election petitioner, in para-5, had indicated the names of ten voters in the said Constituency, whom the petitioner claims that they have proposed him as a candidate. The petitioner has not filed any affidavit from those proposers nor indicated any genuineness about they having proposed the nomination of the election petitioner. According to the election petitioner, his nomination stood rejected on defective presentation. By his own admission in the election petition, he could state that the serial numbers of three proposers mentioned in the nomination paper did not tally with the voters list with respect to their names and corresponding numbers. This itself, as admitted by the petitioner, indicates that he had filed defective nomination. The petitioner falsely claims in para-9 that he had his bad health condition on the date of the scrutiny namely on 30.7.2009. This itself, as admitted by the petitioner, indicates that he had filed defective nomination. The petitioner falsely claims in para-9 that he had his bad health condition on the date of the scrutiny namely on 30.7.2009. The election petitioner even goes to the extent of stating falsehood that he was contacted by the Returning Officer and asked him to come over to the office “to set right the small issue appeared to have figured relating to serial numbers of three proposers mentioned in the nomination papers”. He is forgetting the fact that under the law any candidate who is filing his nomination is entitled to nominate his agent who could represent him during scrutiny. The petitioner has not stated in his election petition whether he has appointed any such agent for him at the time of filing nomination. 3. 3.5. Though the petitioner claims that he was taking treatment around 11.00 a.m. At the Salaigramam Hospital, Ilayangudi, he has not enclosed any document in the list of documents filed along with the petition numbering twenty which could indicate about his ill-health and his treatment at the hospital. This speaks volumes against him and his election petition. From the reading of the petition, it is stated by the election petitioner that on the date of scrutiny he had sent a person to represent him at scrutiny. According to him in para-7, he could state that he had issued necessary letter to Arulmozhi, whereas either a copy of the same or details about the same or at least an affidavit from him is not filed along with election petition. If any improvement is made on this after this application, it will be only an afterthought, whereas the fact remains the said Arulmozhi attended the scrutiny of nominations on his behalf and did not say anything on that day about the incorrect version or defect in serial numbers of the voters corresponding to voters list with respect to the alleged proposers. In fact, no written protest or complaint or explanation was offered before the Returning Officer nor a copy of any such thing is enclosed along with the election petition. 3.6. In election disputes before the Court of law, the question of oral discussion, oral intimation or the false claims on the Returning Officer‘s alleged conversation etc. does not have any valid proof. 3.6. In election disputes before the Court of law, the question of oral discussion, oral intimation or the false claims on the Returning Officer‘s alleged conversation etc. does not have any valid proof. The responsibility attached to a person filing election petition has not been done with any seriousness by the petitioner in a proper manner and the deliberate and unbelievable false averments are made which are perse unbelievable, false and incorrect even to the knowledge of the petitioner himself. 3.7. The averments made in para-10 are again an incorrect version as if the Returning Officer went away after scrutiny and the Returning Officer refused to accept the explanation of the election petitioner‘s letter. In para-10, the petitioner could further state that he has preferred a representation to the Returning Officer about the rejection of his nomination. The same is sought to be filed as document No. 9, which is extracted hereunder: “the small issue appeared to have figured relating to serial numbers of three proposers mentioned in the nomination papers.” 3.8. The reading of the above letter does not indicate that he was admitted in the hospital. The reading of the letter further indicates that he never went to the hospital at all and the letter only indicates that he was not well and due to that he could not attend the scrutiny. The reading of the letter does not indicate that he has sent any person by name Arulmozhi as falsely claimed in para-7 and 8. The reading of the entire election petition including para-7 and 8 no where states that he has authorised any one much less the said Arulmozhi to attend the scrutiny. Thus, he is twisting, suppressing and falsely stating many versions on the role of the said Arulmozhi. 3.9. The reading of the letter of the election petitioner dated 30.7.2009 (Document No. 9) does not indicate that he had given any clarification or the correct serial umber with respect to any proposer. His letter does not indicate that his “Party” “Leader” spoken to the Returning Officer to accept the nomination. No such conversation is allowed in law. Thus, it may be seen that the version revealed in the first and foremost letter on 30.7.2009 is totally different from what is now sought to be improved in the election petition. 3.10. His letter does not indicate that his “Party” “Leader” spoken to the Returning Officer to accept the nomination. No such conversation is allowed in law. Thus, it may be seen that the version revealed in the first and foremost letter on 30.7.2009 is totally different from what is now sought to be improved in the election petition. 3.10. The letter of the election petitioner dated 30.7.2009 does not clearly clarify on the details about the proposers and their serial numbers. The names thereof or the correct numbers. He has not quoted any rule in support of his contention. The claim made in par-10 is to the extent that “The petitioner pointed out and identify the correct serial numbers of the proposers to the Returning Officer and requested him to accept the nomination”. No proof was filed by the petitioner to the effect that his party leader Mr. Sakthivel spoke to the Returning Officer and clarified the doubts. It is not possible for the said leader since he is well away at Chennai nor such matters are allowed in election process. It is not correct to state that the rejection of nomination papers of the election petitioner was not supported by any order. In fact, the reading of para-8 and 9 cuts across the claim of the election petitioner made in para 11. There is no record available from the side of the election petitioner that the rejection order was not passed or made. There is no provision under law which could compel the Returning Officer to go on conversing with party leaders or the persons who have filed nomination. Document Nos. 8 to 11 are inadmissible documents as no credibility need be given on such representations made by third parties unconnected with the election process. 3.11. Except the letter dated 30.7.2009, nothing emanates from the petitioner thereafter. Thus, it may be seen that except the letter under Sl. No. 18, dated 11.9.2009, which is only a request for seeking an order, the rest of the correspondence maintained by some third parties claimed to be the leader of an unrecognized political party is alien to the election process and election petition. No such correspondence could be maintained in election matters and it is not as if such correspondence is answerable or to be replied by the Returning Officer under any rule of law. 3.12. No such correspondence could be maintained in election matters and it is not as if such correspondence is answerable or to be replied by the Returning Officer under any rule of law. 3.12. The election petition lacks reasoning and lacks genuine and triable issue to be gone into. There are no material facts or material particulars to point that the petitioner‘s nomination paper was improperly rejected. The candidate who is not in a position to file his nomination in a proper manner as required under election laws has no locus standi to question about the election result by means of an Election Petition. 3.13. The massive verdict of the voters in favour of the returned candidate namely the applicant in the application cannot be so lightly dealt with in the election petition that too at the behest of a person who had filed highly defective nomination and equally the Election Petition. The petitioner has lo legal right to file and maintain the above election petition. The election petitioner is improving a non-issue with the addition of documents and representations by third parties subsequent to the rejection of his defective nomination. They are nothing to do with the issue on hand. 3.14. Coming to the orders made in writ petition and the orders made in Writ Appeals made by the First Bench of this Hon‘ble Court it is sufficient to indicate that the petitioner has nothing to gain from the order of the learned single Judge since the said order has been fully reversed by the Division Bench well in time. The election petitioner has not taken the issue to the Supreme Court. Hence, the First Bench order stood confirmed and has become final. The election petition does not indicate any triable issue. There is no improper rejection of his nomination. There is no question of discretion or show of any sympathy available in election matters nor the election petitioner can insist on such misplaced sympathies from the Returning Officer. The strict adherence to rules and procedure is the hallmark of election process and conduct of elections. The petitioner has not made out any cause or case. The petitioner has not made out any material facts or material particulars to have any triable issue in the election petition. The strict and correct adherence of Rule of law made by the Returning Officer cannot be an issue in the Election Petition. The petitioner has not made out any cause or case. The petitioner has not made out any material facts or material particulars to have any triable issue in the election petition. The strict and correct adherence of Rule of law made by the Returning Officer cannot be an issue in the Election Petition. The election petition lacks material facts and material particulars to proceed further. 3.15. The rejection of nomination made by the Returning Officer is perfectly valid and proper since a candidate necessarily has to answer the nomination papers and fill it up in a proper manner so as to get him introduced and listed as a candidate to the voters. Election petitions are not filed or tried on the ground of false claims or false statements or conjectures or matters on sympathy or seeking any indulgence outside the scope of law. Neither the guidelines, nor any circular anywhere in this context could help the election petitioner on his defective nomination. At any rate, the election petition filed by the election petitioner in E.P. No. 6 of 2009 is not liable to be kept on record any further nor the averments made in the plaint or the petition filed in E.P. No. 6 of 2009 indicates any triable issue so as to allow it to continue on the file of this Hon‘ble Court. 3.16. Under the above circumstances, the applicant has filed this application for the relief stated supra. 4. The first respondent, namely, election petitioner has filed a counter affidavit, stating as follows: 4.1. The application has been filed without considering the material facts and triable issues made out in the election petition. The election petition has been preferred on the question of failure of the Returning Officer in exercising the mandatory requirement of verification of the nomination paper as contemplated under Section 33 (4) of the Act and whether the Returning Officer has satisfied himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls. This is a mandatory provision under Section 33(4) of the Act and any failure to exercise on the part of the Returning Officer is a triable issue and material fact with respect to rejection of the nomination papers. 4.2. This is a mandatory provision under Section 33(4) of the Act and any failure to exercise on the part of the Returning Officer is a triable issue and material fact with respect to rejection of the nomination papers. 4.2. In the election petition, it is stated that the Returning Officer has not allowed time to the petitioner to rebut any objection of the Returning Officer and thereby, the factual aspect of the same can be gone into only at the time of trial. It is made clear in the election petition itself that the election petitioner contacted the Returning Officer over phone at 11.10 a.m. and the Returning Officer instructed him to come over to his office to set right the small issue of discrepancy of the serial numbers relating to the then proposals of his nomination. Further, it was made clear in the election petition that the election petitioner reached the office of the Returning Officer as 12.30 p.m., but, by that time, the Returning Officer had left his office and returned only around 3.30 p.m. on 30.7.2009. Thereafter, the petitioner identified the correct serial numbers of the proposers with the Returning Officer and he also preferred a representation. The party leader of the petitioner also spoke to the Returning Officer over phone clarifying the legal position. In spite of it, the Returning Officer has only orally informed the rejection of the nomination paper, but so far, has not issued any order of rejection of nomination. All these are material facts which can be proved only at the time of trial and therefore, this is a triable issue on the above said facts. 4.3. At the time of scrutiny, as per proviso to Section 36(5) of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of the Returning Officer to grant time to rebut till the next day to the candidate in case of an objection raised by the Returning Officer. Therefore, the factual aspect of any objection being raised and allowing time to the candidate rebutting the same till next day is a triable issue. 4.4. Therefore, the factual aspect of any objection being raised and allowing time to the candidate rebutting the same till next day is a triable issue. 4.4. The election petitioner has also taken ground that the Election Commission has arbitrarily exercised its power on the question of rescrutiny by selectively conducting in respect of Bargur and Srivaikundam constituencies on the representation of the rejected candidate, but, wheres, Election Commission has failed to do it in the case of rejection of his nomination in spite of his party preferring a representation. The election petitioner has made all these things in paras 17, 18, 19, 23, 24 and 25. Therefore, the material aspect of the arbitrary exercise of power by the Election Commission can be proved only at the time of trial by calling for records relating to the order of scrutiny. 4.5. The Returning Officer has ignored and failed to act as per Clause 16.3 of Chapter V of the instructions of the Returning Officer‘s handbook, Chapter 6 of the handbook of instructions. All these things are material facts and the same can be proved only at the time of trial. 4.6. The application has been filed with the ulterior motive of thwarting the regular proceedings of the election petition by filing the above application with irrelevant facts and without understanding the provisions of the Act. 4.7. Without understanding the Act and Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order and handbook of instructions to the Returning Officer, the applicant has averred that Form A and Form B are meant only for recognized political parties as claimed in para 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the application. It is made clear in the Election Petition that the Returning Officer has not so far provided the order of rejection of nomination paper and it is only orally informed of the rejection on the ground of discrepancy in the serial number of the proposers. Therefore, the factual aspect of proving of the proposers can be proved only in the trial. Para 9 of the applicant‘s affidavit is contrary to Section 33(4) of the Act and handbook of instructions to the Returning Officers and this is a triable issue. Paras 10 to 15 of the application are misconceived and made without understanding the scope of the Act and handbook of instructions to Returning Officers. These are all material facts for trial. Para 9 of the applicant‘s affidavit is contrary to Section 33(4) of the Act and handbook of instructions to the Returning Officers and this is a triable issue. Paras 10 to 15 of the application are misconceived and made without understanding the scope of the Act and handbook of instructions to Returning Officers. These are all material facts for trial. The application has been filed without understanding the binding nature of the handbook for Returning Officers issued by the Government of India. The application is misconceived on the question of filing of supporting affidavits and he has failed to understand properly that a supporting affidavit is required only in the case of corrupt practices. The election petitioner has brought the material facts in the election petition which would constitute a complete cause of action with respect to wrongful rejection of any nomination papers and if the material fact is established only, the relief sought for in the election can be given. The Election Petition has been filed under correct provision of law in respect of the relief being sought under Sections 81 , 100 Sections 81 , 100 (1)(c) of the Act read with Rule 2 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions, 1957. The petitioner has provided all primary and basic facts which are necessary to prove the cause of action and has also averred that on account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, the , Election Symbols Reservation and Allotment Order, and handbook of instructions to the Returning Officers, it has materially affected the election result. The petitioner has specifically averred that the omission on the part of the Returning Officer has materially affected the election results. 4.8. Under the above circumstances, the first respondent has prayed to dismiss the application. 5. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that there is no cause of action; no triable issue and also no single material fact in the Election Petition. He would further contend that the nomination of the first respondent/election petitioner was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer and, hence, the Election Petition has to be dismissed. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel would rely on the following decisions: (i) Brij Mohan v. Sat Pal AIR 1985 SC 847 : (1985) 2 SCC 652 : “22. Learned counsel for the parties invited our attention to certain decisions. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel would rely on the following decisions: (i) Brij Mohan v. Sat Pal AIR 1985 SC 847 : (1985) 2 SCC 652 : “22. Learned counsel for the parties invited our attention to certain decisions. We think it necessary to refer to only three of them. In Hira Singh Pal v. Madan Lal a candidate had filed two nomination papers and both of them were rejected by the Returning Officer. In rejecting the nomination papers, the Returning Officer observed as follows: “Shri Madan Lal, resident of Village Parchech, P.O. Ghana-hatti, District Mahasu filed two nomination papers before me on 20.1.1967 which bear Sl. Nos. 5 and 6. According to the entry in the nomination paper Sl. No. 5 Shri Anant Ram proposer has been shown to be entered at Sl. No. 383 of Part 13 of the electoral rolls for 9-Arki Assembly Constituency. From the comparison with the final copy of electoral rolls for this constituency, at Sl. No. 383 of Part 13 the name of Shrimati Phullu wife of Shri Nirjal Singh has been entered. As such this entry in this nomination paper is wrong. As regards nomination paper bearing Sl. No. 6 the candidate has shown his name to be entered at Sl. No. 504 of Part 2 of the electoral rolls for 9-Arki Assembly Constituency. From the comparison with the aforesaid entry in the final copy of the electoral rolls at the aforesaid Sl. No. of the aforesaid part one Shrimati Darshnoo wife of Shri Ghanaya Ram has been entered. Hence this entry in the nomination paper bearing Sl. No. 6 is incorrect. At the time of scrutiny neither Shri Madan Lal nor his proposer or election agent nor anyone authorised on his behalf was present so that he could be given an opportunity for correcting these entries. This candidate while presenting his nomination papers claimed to be the substitute candidate of the Indian National Congress who have put up Shri Hari Dass as their only candidate. In view of the aforesaid circumstances it cannot be ascertained whether Shri Madan Lal is an elector in any Assembly Constituency of Himachal Pradesh or that his proposer Shri Anand Ram is an elector in the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency. In view of the aforesaid circumstances it cannot be ascertained whether Shri Madan Lal is an elector in any Assembly Constituency of Himachal Pradesh or that his proposer Shri Anand Ram is an elector in the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency. Shri M.R. Gupta, advocate the person authorised on behalf of Shri Hari Dass was informed to convey to Shri Madan Lal that he can approach me any time up to 3 p.m. today for correcting these entries. Shri Madan Lal has not turned up as yet. It is now 15 minutes past 3 p.m. In these circumstances there is no alternative but to reject both these nomination papers as the candidate does not seem to be interested in correcting these entries and filing proper and valid nomination papers. These orders are passed ex partesince Shri Madan Lal has not cared to turn up.” This Court has observed in that decision: “... As mentioned earlier, the errors found in the nomination papers are purely clerical errors. The Returning Officer had the duty to scrutinise the nomination papers when they were presented for finding out whether there were any clerical mistakes in the same. Under that provision he was required to find out whether the names of the candidates as well as their proposers and seconders were correctly mentioned in the nomination papers. He was also required to see whether their place in the electoral roll was correctly mentioned in the nomination papers. Evidently the Returning Officer failed in his duty. Further, when he scrutinised the nomination papers on 21.1.1967, he had before him all the required information. It may be that while scrutinising the first nomination paper (marked as No. 5) he had no material before him to find out whether the proposer of the candidate was really an elector in the constituency or not; but when he came to the second nomination paper where the proposer‘s name as well as his place in the electoral roll is correctly mentioned, it was improper on his part to have rejected that nomination paper. It is true that in that nomination paper, it had been mentioned that the candidate‘s name is found at Sl. No. 504 of Part 2 of 9-Arki Assembly Constituency, though in fact it is found at Sl. It is true that in that nomination paper, it had been mentioned that the candidate‘s name is found at Sl. No. 504 of Part 2 of 9-Arki Assembly Constituency, though in fact it is found at Sl. No. 504 in Part 12 of that constituency; but from the first nomination paper, the Returning Officer could have easily found out the correct part of the electoral roll. All the required information was before him. Obviously, he rejected the nomination papers for the reason that the respondent was only a dummy candidate but that was not a matter for him to decide. If he was a dummy candidate there was occasion for him to withdraw his candidature after the scrutiny of the nomination papers. Therefore, it is quite clear that the respondent‘s nomination papers were improperly rejected. Such a rejection was impermissible under Section 36 and the same is a ground for setting aside the election under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act.” That was a case where from a mere look at the two nomination papers and the electoral rolls the Returning Officer could have found out the correct part of the electoral roll and all the required materials were before him and, therefore, it has been held that the rejection of the nomination papers was improper. But, that is not the case here. There was no such prima facie material before the Returning Officer in the present case to find out the correct part number of the electoral roll in which the candidate Dog Ram and the proposer P.W.2 were registered as electors. There were as many as 77,000 voters registered in the 97 parts of the electoral roll in Jind Constituency and even Amar Heri village had two part numbers in the electoral roll. The postal address of the candidate Dog Ram given in the nomination paper was not a sure guide for the Returning Officer to trace the correct part number of the electoral roll in regard to the candidate Dog Ram and his proposer P.W.2. The Returning Officer who is expected to hold only such summary enquiry as he thinks fit is not expected to himself find out the correct part number of the electoral roll by making a roving enquiry and questioning the candidate or his proposer. The Returning Officer who is expected to hold only such summary enquiry as he thinks fit is not expected to himself find out the correct part number of the electoral roll by making a roving enquiry and questioning the candidate or his proposer. In the circumstances, he asked the candidate, who was present before him, to point out the entries in the electoral roll where the names of himself and his proposer are found as electors and as he was not in a position to do so he rejected the nomination paper. Therefore, the observations made in that decision do not help the respondent.” (ii) Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi AIR 1987 SC 1577 : (1987) Supp SCC 93 : “8. The first question which falls for our determination is whether the High Court had jurisdiction to strike out pleadings under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to reject the election petition under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code at the preliminary stage even though no written statement had been filed by the respondent. Section 80 provides that no election is to be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI of the Act before the High Court. Section 81 provides that an election petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 by an elector or by a candidate questioning the election of a returned candidate. Section 83 provides that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies and he shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that he may allege including full statement of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice. Section 86 confers power on the High Court to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 Sections 81 and 82 or Section 117. Section 86 confers power on the High Court to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 Sections 81 and 82 or Section 117. Section 87 deals with the procedure to be followed in the trial of the election petition and it lays down that subject to the provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable to the trial of suits under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply to the trial of an election petition, Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 6 Rule 17 are applicable to the proceedings relating to the trial of an election petition subject to the provisions of the Act. On a combined reading of Sections 81, 83 Sections 81, 83, 86 and 87 of the Act, it is apparent that those paragraphs of a petition which do not disclose any cause of action, are liable to be struck off under Order 6 Rule 16, as the Court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike out or delete pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or suit. It is the duty of the Court to examine the plaint and it need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points out the defects. If the Court on examination of the plaint or the election petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in striking out the pleadings. Order 6 Rule 16 itself empowers the Court to strike out pleadings at any stage of the proceedings which may even be before the filing of the written statement by the respondent or commencement of the trial. If the Court is satisfied that the election petition does not make out any cause of action and that the trial would prejudice, embarrass and delay the proceedings, the Court need not wait for the filing of the written statement, instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strike out the pleadings. If the Court is satisfied that the election petition does not make out any cause of action and that the trial would prejudice, embarrass and delay the proceedings, the Court need not wait for the filing of the written statement, instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strike out the pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings the Court finds that no triable issues remain to be considered, it has power to reject the election petition under Order 7 Rule 11.” “14. Before we consider various paragraphs of the election petition to determine the correctness of the High Court order we think it necessary to bear in mind the nature of the right to elect, the right to be elected and the right to dispute election and the trial of the election petition. Right to contest election or to question the election by means of an election petition is neither common law nor fundamental right, instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951. There is no fundamental or common law right in these matters. This is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal. These decisions have settled the legal position that outside the statutory provisions there is no right to dispute an election. The Representation of People Act is a complete and self-contained Code within which any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute must be found. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the extent as permissible by Section 87 of the Act. The scheme of the Act as noticed earlier would show that an election can be questioned under the statute as provided by Section 80 on the grounds as contained in Section 100 of the Act. Section 83 lays down a mandatory provision in providing that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts and set forth full particulars of corrupt practice. The pleadings are regulated by Section 83 and it makes it obligatory on the election petitioner to give the requisite facts, details and particulars of each corrupt practice with exactitude. If the election petition fails to make out a ground under Section 100 of the Act it must fail at the threshold. The pleadings are regulated by Section 83 and it makes it obligatory on the election petitioner to give the requisite facts, details and particulars of each corrupt practice with exactitude. If the election petition fails to make out a ground under Section 100 of the Act it must fail at the threshold. Allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature of criminal charges, it is necessary that there should be no vagueness in the allegations so that the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet. If the allegations are vague and general and the particulars of corrupt practice are not stated in the pleadings, the trial of the election petition cannot proceed for want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to avoid a fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Court to scrutinise the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strict manner.” (iii) Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi AIR 2001 SC 3689 : (2001) 8 SCC 233 : “23. Section 83(1) (a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. By a series of decisions of this Court, it is well settled that the material facts required to be stated are those facts which can be considered as materials supporting the allegations made. In other words, they must be such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The expression “cause of action” has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of Court. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. (See Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behari.) Merely quoting the words of the Section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. (See Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behari.) Merely quoting the words of the Section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. In V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis this Court has held, on a conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. Failure to plead “material facts” is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition.” (iv) Shaligram Shrivastava v. Naresh Singh Patel AIR 2003 SC 2128 : (2003) 2 SCC 176 “10. At the time of scrutiny the Returning Officer is entitled to satisfy himself that a candidate is qualified and not disqualified. Sub-section (2) of Section 36 authorises him to hold an enquiry on his own motions, though summary in nature. The Returning Officer furnished a pro forma to the candidates to be filled on affidavit and filed on or before the date and time fixed for scrutiny of the nomination paper. Therefore, providing a pro forma, eliciting necessary and relevant information in the light of Section 8 of the Act to enquire as to whether the person is qualified and not disqualified, is an act or function fully covered under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act. The Returning Officer is authorized to seek such information to be furnished at the time or before scrutiny. If the candidate fails to furnish such information and also absents himself at the time of the scrutiny of the nomination papers, is obviously avoiding a statutory enquiry being conducted by the Returning Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act relating to his being not qualified or disqualified in the light of Section 8 of the Act. It is bound to result in defect of a substantial character in the nomination. 14.For the purpose of scrutiny further information is necessary. The scrutiny may call for even suo motu inquiry by the Returning Officer though summary in nature. It is bound to result in defect of a substantial character in the nomination. 14.For the purpose of scrutiny further information is necessary. The scrutiny may call for even suo motu inquiry by the Returning Officer though summary in nature. It is one of the statutory duties of the Returning Officer to scrutinize the nomination paper in the light of Section 8 of the Act and he is statutorily authorised to hold a summary inquiry about the qualification and disqualification of a candidate. (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit.) Such a power which vests in the Returning Officer is not dependent upon any instructions issued by the Election Commission, therefore, it is not necessary to enter into the controversy which is sought to be raised as to whether the instructions issued by the Election Commission are in exercise of its power under Article 324 or not. The Returning Officer is supposed to have the necessary information at the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper and for that purpose he can very well require a candidate to furnish information relevant for the purpose of Section 8 of the Act before or on the date of scrutiny. At best it can be said that the Election Commission by its letter dated 28.8.1997 had brought to the notice of the Returning Officers certain decisions of different High Courts in regard to disqualification under Section 8 of the Act. It was further desired that such a scrutiny be made by the Returning Officers looking to the menace of criminalisation of politics. Barring the fact that the instructions apprised the Returning Officers of the position under law in the light of the judgments of the High Courts, nothing else was provided thereunder which was already not within the power of the Returning Officer under the statutory provisions rather it was a part of their duty to scrutinize the nomination papers in the light of Section 8 of the Act which implies that he is authorised to seek necessary information for the purpose. It can be suo motu as well. 17.In the case in hand the candidate had failed to furnish such information as sought on the pro forma given to him and had also failed to be present personally or through his representative at the time of scrutiny. It can be suo motu as well. 17.In the case in hand the candidate had failed to furnish such information as sought on the pro forma given to him and had also failed to be present personally or through his representative at the time of scrutiny. The statutory duty/power of the Returning Officer for holding proper scrutiny of nomination paper was rendered nugatory. No scrutiny of the nomination paper could be made under Section 36(2) of the Act in the light of Section 8 of the Act. It certainly rendered the nomination paper suffering from defect of substantial character and the Returning Officer was within his rights in rejecting the same.” (v) Rafiq Khan v. Laxmi Narayan Sharma (1997) 2 SCC 228 : “3. The learned counsel for the appellants took us through the electoral roll as well as the documentary evidence and contended that the learned Judge had overlooked certain important and significant aspects of the evidence placed on record. Firstly, he contended that before he submitted the nomination form he had taken out a photocopy and the same was appended to the petition. He says that this photocopy belies the contention that the figure 136 was changed to 138 after the rejection of the nomination paper. There is no other evidence except that of the appellants and the proposer in this behalf. In the first place it is difficult to understand why the Returning Officer should reject the nomination paper if the name of the proposer and the serial number are correctly recorded. Appellant 1 as well as his proposer say that they were not called before the rejection of the nomination paper. Now, in the ordinary course, official action must be presumed to have been done in accordance with the rules and the procedure. Secondly, even on the statement of appellant 1, he and his proposer went to the place of scrutiny at about 3.00 p.m. Thirdly, it is an admitted fact that he did not raise any objection when his nomination was rejected on 1.11.1993. In ordinary course if he and his proposer were present at the time of scrutiny and their names were not announced on the microphone we would expect them to react by enquiring of the Returning Officer why his name was not announced at all. In ordinary course if he and his proposer were present at the time of scrutiny and their names were not announced on the microphone we would expect them to react by enquiring of the Returning Officer why his name was not announced at all. The evidence of R.W.2 shows that the names of the candidates who had submitted the nomination forms were announced one after another and when his name was announced, neither he nor his proposer turned up before the Returning Officer. If he and his proposer were in fact present they would have responded to the call and if despite their presence his nomination form was rejected, there would be any number of independent witnesses available to corroborate his version, since even according to him the room was full. Therefore, the conduct of the appellant and his proposer does not seem to be natural; more so because both the appellant and his proposer are lawyers. They certainly would have reacted sharply if their names were not called out when the names of all others were called out. This unnatural conduct leads one to believe that the appellant‘s contention that his name was deliberately not announced as the Returning Officer had made up his mind to reject his nomination form, does not appear to be correct. Merely because he produced in Court a photocopy of the corrected nomination form cannot advance his case. He must satisfy the Court that the photocopy was taken out before the rejection of the nomination form. No doubt he has said so in his evidence but it is difficult to believe his version for the simple reason that if the form had been submitted after correction and the photocopy was taken out in advance, his conduct would have been totally different at the time when his name was not announced at the scrutiny of the nomination forms on 1.11.1993. Therefore, on the totality of evidence it is difficult to hold that the learned Judge committed any error in the appreciation of evidence placed before him. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether the appellant was guilty of tampering with the document at any point of time after its submission because that is a matter for investigation. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether the appellant was guilty of tampering with the document at any point of time after its submission because that is a matter for investigation. However, we think that on the totality of evidence before the Court, the view taken by the High Court is a plausible view and we would not be justified in interfering with it. 5. Now Section 33(4) says that on the presentation of a nomination paper the Returning Officer shall satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral roll. The proviso then proceeds to add that no misnomer and inaccurate description or clerical, technical or printing error in regard to any name or place mentioned in the electoral roll or the nomination paper and no clerical, technical or printing error in regard to the electoral roll number of any such person in the nomination paper, shall affect the full operation of the nomination paper with respect to such person or place in any case where the description in regard to the name of the person or place is such as to be commonly understood. It further provides that in such a situation the Returning Officer shall permit any such defect or deficiency to be corrected or record that the same shall be overlooked. Section 36 next deals with the scrutiny of nominations. Clause (4) of that provision provides that the Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character. sub-section (6) next provides that the Returning Officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and in the case of the latter briefly indicate the reasons for such rejection. Now, in the instant case, the reasons for rejection have been indicated though they are not endorsed on the nomination paper. That by itself, without anything more, cannot be said to be fatal as urged by the counsel for the appellant. 8.Our attention was lastly drawn to the decision of this Court in Brij Mohan v. Sat Pal. Now, in the instant case, the reasons for rejection have been indicated though they are not endorsed on the nomination paper. That by itself, without anything more, cannot be said to be fatal as urged by the counsel for the appellant. 8.Our attention was lastly drawn to the decision of this Court in Brij Mohan v. Sat Pal. In this case Sat Pal had filed the election petition alleging that Dog Ram was registered as an elector at Serial Number 177, House No. 57 in Part 39 of the electoral roll of the Jind Constituency and Ram Pratap who proposed Dog Ram was registered as elector at Serial Number 313, House No. 6 in Part 39 of the same constituency. The name of Dog Ram and his postal address were correctly given in the nomination paper. But the part of the electoral roll was mentioned as 57 instead of 39 by mistake. So also in the case of the proposer, the serial number of the elector and the number of the constituency were correctly given but the house number was wrongly entered. These inaccuracies in the nomination paper were, contended the appellant, technical in nature and should have been rectified by the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny. This Court held that the responsibility of producing documentary evidence of registration as elector in a different constituency rests entirely on the candidate. It further held that it was not possible to generalise and hold that all errors in regard to electoral roll numbers of the candidate and the proposer in the nomination paper do not constitute defects of a substantial character. They would not be defects of substantial character only if at the time of scrutiny the Returning Officer either by himself or with the assistance of the candidate or his proposer or any other person is able to find out the correct serial numbers of the candidate and the proposer by reference to the correct part number of the electoral roll. If that is not the case, he would be committing a great error by accepting the nomination paper without verifying whether a candidate was a voter in that constituency. It was, therefore, said that the question whether the defect is of a substantial character or not, would depend on the facts of each case. If that is not the case, he would be committing a great error by accepting the nomination paper without verifying whether a candidate was a voter in that constituency. It was, therefore, said that the question whether the defect is of a substantial character or not, would depend on the facts of each case. Unless the defect is one which can be per se noticed and corrected at the stage of Section 33(4) or later at the stage of Section 36 (4) without the need to refer to various other documents the same cannot be said to be of a non-substantial character. In the instant case also the defect as to the number could have been said to be not of a substantial character if the appellant had shown that the name of the proposer appeared on the very same sheet at Serial Number 138 instead of 136 i.e. only two steps away. In that case, one can say that the Returning Officer could have verified the same if he had exercised due diligence. In such a situation, even if the appellant and his proposer were absent the Court could have taken the view that the defect was not of a substantial nature. But, the defect cannot be noticed unless the Returning Officer is required to sift through various other documents or the voters‘ list or is required to undertake an enquiry as to whether the proposer‘s name appears anywhere else in the voters‘ list. The defect may not be one capable of being cured without the assistance of the candidate or his proposer and in such a situation he would be justified in rejecting the nomination paper. In the instant case, since there is no evidence to suggest that the name of the proposer appeared on that very sheet at Serial Number 138 instead of 136 in the electoral roll, we find it difficult to find fault with the rejection of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer.” 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the first respondent/election petitioner rebuts the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicant, contending that there is every cause of action; every triable issue and every material fact in the Election Petition. He would further contend that the nomination of the first respondent/election petitioner was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer and, hence, the Election Petition has been filed. He would further contend that the nomination of the first respondent/election petitioner was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer and, hence, the Election Petition has been filed. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel would rely on the following decisions: (i) Jagannath Ramchandra Nunekar v. Genu Govind Kadam AIR 1989 SC 475 : (1989) Supp 1 SCC 55 : “11. The Returning Officer, who commenced the scrutiny of the nomination paper at 11 a.m. on 11.1.1986 proceeded to reject the nomination paper of the appellant on the ground that the certified copy of the relevant entry in the electoral roll could not be treated as a certified copy of an electoral roll which was in force at that time. Under the proviso to Section 36(5) of the 1951 Act it is provided that in case an objection is raised by the Returning Officer or is made by any other person the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny, and the Returning Officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned. The Returning Officer did not choose to wait even for a few hours on 11.1.1986 to give a chance to the appellant to make his plea that what had been produced before him along with the nomination paper was a certified copy which could be acted upon or to produce another certified copy which in fact he did produce at 1 p.m. on 11.1.1986 before the Returning Officer, even before the final list of candidates, who had filed valid nomination papers, was published on the notice board. The Returning Officer had acted on his own information in rejecting the nomination paper of the appellant, namely, that there was a revision in 1985 and that the certified copy which had been produced was from an electoral roll which had become defunct. If that was so, he should have secured the necessary material from the concerned Electoral Registration Officer and placed it before the appellant before rejecting the nomination paper. 12.It is no doubt true that the electoral right is a statutory right and a person who wishes to contest an election should comply with the law applicable to elections strictly. If that was so, he should have secured the necessary material from the concerned Electoral Registration Officer and placed it before the appellant before rejecting the nomination paper. 12.It is no doubt true that the electoral right is a statutory right and a person who wishes to contest an election should comply with the law applicable to elections strictly. But in the instant case, we find that there is no default at all on the part of the appellant. He had actually produced before the Returning Officer a certified copy which he had obtained within less than 24 hours from the Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency where he was residing and that he had not done anything to mislead the Returning Officer. Unless the certified copy produced before the Returning Officer itself on the face of it showed that the electoral roll from which a certified copy had been prepared had been substituted by another electoral roll, the Returning Officer was not justified in not treating the production of the certified copy prepared on 8-1-1986 as sufficient compliance under Section 33(5) of the 1951 Act particularly having regard to the close proximity between the date of preparation of the certified copy and the date of the production of the certified copy. In the circumstances, unless there was any evidence to the contrary the Returning Officer should have treated the certified copy produced before him as a certified copy of the electoral roll for the time being in force of the constituency to which it related. It is clear from the evidence of the Tahsildar that there was no other roll which had taken the place of the supplement in which the name of the appellant had been entered. Even the second copy supplied on 10.1.1986 had been prepared from the same supplement. Both the first certified copy and the second certified copy were copies of the same original. Sub-section (7) of Section 36 of the 1951 Act lays down a rule of evidence. It says that a certified copy of an entry in the electoral roll for the time being in force of a constituency shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the person referred to in that entry is an elector for that constituency, unless it is proved that he is subject to a disqualification mentioned in Section 16 of the 1950 Act. In the absence of any such objection on the part of any other candidate or any information which the Returning Officer may have had with regard to the disqualification of the appellant, the Returning Officer should have in the circumstances of this case proceeded to accept the certified copy produced along with the nomination paper and acted upon it. We hold that the certified copy produced along with the nomination paper satisfied the requirement of Section 33(5) of 1951 Act. 13.We are of the view that in the circumstances the appellant who was an innocent person has been denied the right to contest the election unreasonably. We hold that the rejection of the nomination paper of the appellant was improper. It follows that the election of Respondent 1 should be declared void in view of the provisions contained in Section 100(1)(c) of the 1951 Act. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and declare the election of respondent 1 to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from Jaoli constituency void.” (ii) Moti Ram v. Param Dev AIR 1993 SC 1662 : (1993) 2 SCC 725 : 1993-II-LLJ-629 : LNIND 1993 SC 197 at p. 631 of MLJ: “4. Although in the instant case the election is not challenged on the ground of commission of any corrupt practice and a finding would not result in electoral disqualification in future but the present case differs from the case of Loknath Padhan v. Birendra Kumar Sahu in the sense that in the Loknath Padhan v. Birendra Kumar Sahu (supra) case the election petition was dismissed whereas in the present case the election petitions against the election of the appellant have been allowed and the election has been set aside. It has been submitted by Shri A.K. Ganguli, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that in view of the fact that the decision of the High Court set aside his election, the appellant may be required to refund the various allowances that he has received while he was functioning as a member of the Legislative Assembly after his election till the decision of the High Court. It would thus appear that invalidation of the election of the appellant may give rise to the liability to refund the allowances received by the appellant as a member of the Legislative Assembly. It would thus appear that invalidation of the election of the appellant may give rise to the liability to refund the allowances received by the appellant as a member of the Legislative Assembly. It cannot, therefore, be said that the questions arising for consideration in this appeal are purely academic in nature. In these circumstances, it becomes necessary to go into the merits of these appeals.” (iii) Michael B. Fernandes v. C.K. Jaffer Sharief, AIR 2002 SC 1041 : (2002) 3 SCC 521 : “82. Parties of the petition.—A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition— .(a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.” Section 83 provides as to what should be contained in an election petition and Section 86 in Chapter III deals with trial of election petitions. Section 87 is the procedure for such trial and it provides that every election petition shall be tried as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits. As stated earlier, Section 100 indicates the grounds on which an election can be declared to be void and Section 101 indicates the grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. We are not concerned with the other provisions of the Act in the case in hand. An appeal to the Supreme Court has been provided under Section 116-A. On a plain reading of Section 82, which indicates as to the person who can be joined as a respondent to an election petition, the conclusion is irresistible that the returned candidate, the candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice have been made is to be joined as party-respondent when declaration is sought for holding the election of the returned candidate to be void and when a prayer is made as to any other candidate to be declared to be duly elected, then all the contesting candidates are required to be made party-respondents. On a literal interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of Section 82 , therefore, it can be said that an election petition which does not make the persons enumerated in Section 82 of the Act, as party-respondents, is liable to be dismissed. The two decisions of this Court directly on the question are the cases of Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal and B. Sundara Rami Reddy v. Election Commission of India. In the former case, CHINNAPPA REDDY,J., speaking for the Court, held that right to elect or to be elected or dispute regarding election are neither fundamental rights nor common law rights but are confined to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and consequently, rights and remedies are all limited to those provided by the statutory provisions. On the question of joinder of parties, referring to Sections 82 and 86 Sections 82 and 86 (4) of the Representation of the People Act, it was held that the contest of the election petition is designed to be confined to the candidates at the election and all others are excluded and, therefore, only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition, who are mentioned in Sections 82 and 86 Sections 82 and 86 (4) and no others. An argument had been advanced in that case that even if somebody may not be a necessary party under Section 82 of the Act, but yet he could be added as a proper party as provided in Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the Court rejected that contention on a finding that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to election disputes only as far as may be and subject to the provisions of the Act and any rules made thereunder and the provisions of the Code cannot be invoked to permit that which is not permissible under the Act. It was in that context the Court further observed that the concept of “proper parties” is and remains alien to an election dispute under the Act. It was in that context the Court further observed that the concept of “proper parties” is and remains alien to an election dispute under the Act. This decision was followed in B. Sundara Rami Reddy v. Election Commission of India (supra) case referred to supra and it was reiterated that the concept of “proper party” is and must remain alien to an election dispute under the Act and only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition, who are mentioned in Sections 82 and 86 Sections 82 and 86 (4) of the Act and no others. The Court in this case added that however desirable and expedient it may appear to be, none else shall be joined as the respondents. Mr Venkataramani, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the law enunciated in the two decisions and the observations made are too wide and while Section 82 casts an obligation on an election petitioner to join those mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) as party-respondent, it does not put an embargo for addition of any other person in an appropriate case, depending upon the nature of allegation made and consequently, the expression “any other” in the two decisions referred to above, must be held not to have been correctly used. Mr Venkataramani relied upon the observations made by this Court in M.S. Gill case wherein the Court had observed that the Constitution contemplates a free and fair election and vests comprehensive responsibilities of superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of elections in the Election Commission. This responsibility may cover powers, duties and functions of many sorts, administrative or other, depending on the circumstances and submitted that the basis of electoral democracy being a free and fair election and fairness imports an obligation to see that no wrongdoer candidate benefits from his own wrong. In case where allegations are made against the Returning Officer or the Chief Electoral Officer with regard to the conduct of the election, there should be no bar to array them as parties and according to Mr Venkataramani in Gill case the Chief Election Commissioner was a party and, therefore, this Court in Jyoti Basu as well as the subsequent case, having not noticed the aforesaid judgment of the larger Bench, the latter decision will be of no assistance. We are not in a position to accept the submission of Mr Venkataramani inasmuch as in Gill case2 an order of the Election Commissioner was under challenge by filing a writ petition and it was not an election petition under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. There is no dispute with the proposition that a free and fair electoral process is the foundation of our democracy, but the question for consideration is, whether by indicating in the Act as to who shall be arrayed as party, the Court would be justified in allowing some others as parties to an election petition. For the aforesaid proposition, Gill case is no authority. Mr Venkataramani then relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. Harekrishna Konar where the question came up for consideration directly and the Calcutta High Court did observe that the Returning Officer may nevertheless in an appropriate case be a “proper party” who may be added as party to the election petition and undoubtedly, the aforesaid observation supports the contention of Mr Venkataramani. Following the aforesaid decision, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of H.R. Gokhale v. Bharucha Noshir C. had also observed that the observations of SHAH, J. in Ram Sewak Yadav case in paragraph 6 are not intended to lay down that the Returning Officer can in no event be a proper party to an election petition. But both these aforesaid decisions of Calcutta High Court3 and Bombay High Court4 had been considered by this Court in Jyoti Basu case and the Court took the view that the public policy and legislative wisdom both seem to point to an interpretation of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act which does not permit the joining, as parties, of persons other than those mentioned in Sections 82 and 86 Sections 82 and 86 (4). The Court also in paragraph 12 considered the consequences if persons other than those mentioned in Section 82 are permitted to be added as parties and held that the necessary consequences would be an unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of achieving the goal contemplated by Section 86(6) of the Act. The Court also in paragraph 12 considered the consequences if persons other than those mentioned in Section 82 are permitted to be added as parties and held that the necessary consequences would be an unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of achieving the goal contemplated by Section 86(6) of the Act. In the aforesaid premises, we reiterate the views taken by this Court in Jyoti Basu case and reaffirmed in the later case in B. Sundara Rami Reddy and we see no infirmity with the impugned judgment, requiring our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.” (iv) M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Hande AIR 1983 SC 558 : (1983) 2 SCC 473 : “31. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was total and complete non-compliance of the requirements of sub-section (3) of Section 81 and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under sub-section (1) of Section 86. The argument to the contrary advanced on behalf of the respondent was that the photograph filed along with the election petition had to be treated as a document in proof of the allegations contained in para 18(b) and not as a part of the election petition. The submission is that there is a distinction “between a schedule or annexure to the petition referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 83” and “a document which is merely evidence in the case which is annexed to the election petition” and to such a document sub-section (3) of Section 81 is not attracted. 32. The preliminary issue and the appeal turn on a short point of construction. The question that arises is whether the words “copies thereof” in sub-section (3) of Section 81 comprehend the election petition proper or do they also include a schedule or annexure annexed thereto. The controversy whether the photograph was a schedule or annexure in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 83 or merely a document only in proof of the allegations in para 18(b) must turn on a construction of sub-section (3) of Section 81 read with sub-section (2) of Section 83. The controversy whether the photograph was a schedule or annexure in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 83 or merely a document only in proof of the allegations in para 18(b) must turn on a construction of sub-section (3) of Section 81 read with sub-section (2) of Section 83. It now appears to be well settled by Sahodrabai case that sub-section (2) of Section 83 applies only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the election petition and not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition. In dealing with sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Act it was observed: “... we are quite clear that sub-section (2) of Section 83 has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures. We can give quite a number of examples from which it would be apparent that many of the averments of the election petition are capable of being put as schedules or annexures. For example, the details of the corrupt practice there in the former days used to be set out separately in the schedules and which may, in some cases, be so done even after the amendment of the present law. Similarly, details of the averments too compendious for being included in the election petition may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition. The law then requires that even though they are outside the election petition, they must be signed and verified, but such annexures or schedules are then treated as integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the respondent if the requirement regarding service of the election petition is to be wholly complied with. But what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with the election petitions. They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof. They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof. The pamphlet therefore must be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition in so far as averments are concerned.” 33.The High Court rests its conclusion on the decision of this Court in Sahodrabai case but that decision, in our opinion, is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Sahodrabai case an election petition was filed together with a pamphlet as annexure thereto. A translation in English of the pamphlet was incorporated in the body of the election petition and it was stated that it formed part of the petition. A preliminary objection was raised that a copy of the pamphlet had not been annexed to the copy of the petition served on the returned candidate and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed under sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Act. The Madhya Pradesh High Court sustained the preliminary objection and dismissed the election petition. On appeal, this Court held that the words used in sub-section (1) of Section 81 are only “the election petition” and there was no mention of documents accompanying the election petition. Since the election petition itself reproduced the whole of the pamphlet in translation in English, it could not be said that the averments with regard to the pamphlet were themselves a part of the petition and therefore the pamphlet had in fact been served on the returned candidate although in a translation and not in the original. The Court then stated that even if it were not so, sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Act has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition, but in the accompanying schedules or annexures. 34.It was observed that the details of averments may be too compendious for being included in the petition and may be set out in the schedule or annexure to the election petition. The Court then gave examples on which it would be apparent that many of the averments of the election petition are capable of being put as schedules or annexures. The Court then gave examples on which it would be apparent that many of the averments of the election petition are capable of being put as schedules or annexures. It then went on to say that such annexures or schedules are treated as integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the returned candidate if the requirement regarding service of the election petition is to be wholly complied with. But that this rule was not applicable to documents which are merely an evidence in the case but which, for reasons of clarity and to lend force to a petition, are not kept back but are produced or filed with the election petition. The Court added: “They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof.” In that view of the matter, the Court held that the pamphlet in question had to be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition so far as the averments were concerned. It said: “It would be stretching the words of sub-section (2) of Section 83 too far to think that every document produced as evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the election petition proper. In this particular case we do not think that the pamphlet could be so treated.” 35.It follows as a necessary corollary that if the pamphlet had not been incorporated in the body of the election petition, the decision of the Court in Sahodrabai case would have been otherwise. That precisely is the case here. 36.In this connection, we may next refer to the decisions of this Court in Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh v. Rajendra Kumar Poddar and Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram. InJagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh case there were serious discrepancies between the original election petition filed in the Court and the copies supplied to the contesting candidates. 36.In this connection, we may next refer to the decisions of this Court in Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh v. Rajendra Kumar Poddar and Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram. InJagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh case there were serious discrepancies between the original election petition filed in the Court and the copies supplied to the contesting candidates. This Court dismissed the election petition on the ground of non-compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 81 as the copies furnished to the contesting respondents were not true copies and there was divergence between the allegations made in the petition and the allegations made in the copies, and that such divergence was bound to mislead the contesting candidates and prejudice their defence, particularly in a case where the returned candidate is charged with corrupt practice. That is because he must know the nature of the charge against him, so that he may prepare his defence. It was observed: (SCC p. 444, para 7) “The law requires that a true copy of an election petition should be served on the respondents. That requirement has not been either fully or substantially complied with....” 37.The next case in point is Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram where the election petition was not accompanied by the requisite number of spare copies for service on the respondent and no schedules were filed along with the petition. When the petition came up for scrutiny, the Deputy Registrar of the High Court asked the election petitioner to remove the defects. Before the date refixed, the spare copies were filed and the defect removed. The question before the Court was whether the petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Act for non-compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 81. The importance of the decision in Satya Narain case lies in the fact that the Court laid down that the first part of sub-section (3) of Section 81 which required that the election petition should be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there were respondents mentioned in the petition, was mandatory in character and non-compliance with it was fatal to the petition in view of sub-section (1) of Section 86. 38.The decision in Kamalam (M.) v. Dr V.A. Syed Mohamad may also be referred. What had happened in that case was this. 38.The decision in Kamalam (M.) v. Dr V.A. Syed Mohamad may also be referred. What had happened in that case was this. The signature of the election petitioner by way of authentication appeared at the foot of the copy of the affidavit but there was no such signature separately appended at the foot of the copy of the election petition. There was a preliminary objection raised that since the copy of the election petition had not been attested by the petitioner under her own signature to be a true copy, there was no compliance with sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act and hence the petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Act. In repelling the contention, the Court observed that the second part of sub-section (3) of Section 81 had been complied with upon the view that the copy of the petition and the affidavit filed along with it as required by law constituted one single document and the signature in original of the petitioner in proof of the affidavit satisfied the requirements of sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act. In explaining as to what constitutes an election petition for purposes of sub-section (3) of Section 81, it was observed: (SCC pp. 664-65, para 5) “Now, the first question which arises is as to what constitutes an election petition for the purpose of Section 81, sub-section (3). Is it confined only to election petition proper or does it also include a schedule or annexure contemplated in sub-section (2) of Section 83 or a supporting affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 83 , sub-section (1)? To answer this question, we must turn to Section 83 which deals with contents of an election petition. sub-section (1) of that Section sets out what an election petition shall contain and provides that it shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings. The proviso requires that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the election petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The context in which the proviso occurs clearly suggests that the affidavit is intended to be regarded as part of the election petition. The context in which the proviso occurs clearly suggests that the affidavit is intended to be regarded as part of the election petition. Otherwise, it need not have been introduced in a Section dealing with contents of an election petition nor figured as a proviso to a subsection which lays down what shall be the contents of an election petition. sub-section (2) also by analogy supports this inference. It provides that any schedule or annexure to an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as an election petition. It is now established by the decision of this Court in Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar that sub-section (2) applies only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the election petition and not to a schedule or annexure which is merely evidence in the case but which is annexed to the election petition merely for the sake of adding strength to it.” 39. The test to be applied in determining whether the photograph referred to in para 18(b) is an integral part of the election petition or was merely a piece of evidence in proof of the allegations contained therein, depends on whether it is a part of the pleadings. Upon the view that the photograph was not merely a document accompanying the election petition but was a part and parcel of the pleading contained in para 18(b), it is unnecessary for us to deal with the submission based on Order 7 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Our attention was drawn to the passage inSahodrabai case at SCR p. 18 of the report. The Court observed that under Order 7 Rule 14 where a plaintiff sues upon a document in his possession or power, he is required to file only one copy of the document and not as many copies as there are defendants and therefore a copy of the document is not expected to be deliberate with the copy of the plaint to the answering defendants when summons is served on them, and that it would be too strict a reading of the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 81 and sub-section (2) of Section 83 to lay down that the election law provides anything different. These observations cannot, in our opinion, be read out of context. These observations cannot, in our opinion, be read out of context. The decision in Sahodrabai case was that since the election petition itself reproduced the whole of the pamphlet in a translation in English, the pamphlet filed along with the petition had to be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition and that being so, the Court observed that it would be stretching the words of sub-section (3) of Section 81 and sub-section (2) of Section 83 too far to think that every document produced as evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the election petition proper. 40.We would add for the sake of completeness that we have been referred to the decision of this Court in Sharif-ud-din v. Abdul Gani Lone but that decision is not directly in point. One of us (VENKATARAMIAH, J.) had occasion to deal with the corresponding sub-section (3) of Section 89 of the Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 which reads: “Every election petition should be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be true copy of the petition.” In that case, both the copies of the election petition contained the endorsement “Attested true copy, Piyare Lal Handoo, Advocate”. The question arose whether there was a sufficient compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 89 of that Act. The Court pointed out that sub-section (3) of Section 89 consists of two parts. The first part requires that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and the second part requires that every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The first part of the Section has been held to be a mandatory requirement by this Court in Satya Narain case. The Court held the second part also to be mandatory and observed: (SCC p. 410, para 18) “It is true that Section 89(3) of the Act is purely procedural in character and that ordinarily procedural law should not be given that primacy by Courts as would defeat the ends of justice. The Court held the second part also to be mandatory and observed: (SCC p. 410, para 18) “It is true that Section 89(3) of the Act is purely procedural in character and that ordinarily procedural law should not be given that primacy by Courts as would defeat the ends of justice. But if a law even though it may be procedural in character insists that an act must be done in a particular manner and further provides that certain consequences should follow if the act is not done in that manner, Courts have no option but to enforce the law as it is.” Upon that view it was held that the attestation of the copies by counsel for the election petitioner as true copies was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 89 of that Act as it required attestation by the election petitioner himself. The decision is an application of the rule that mandatory provisions must be fulfilled exactly. 41.It is obvious that the photograph was a part of the averment contained in para 18(b). In the absence of the photograph the averment contained in para 18(b) would be incomplete. The photograph referred to in para 18(b) was therefore an integral part of the election petition. It follows that there was total non-compliance with the requirements of sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act by failure to serve the appellant with a copy of the election petition. In Chapter Subbarao case the Court held that if there is a total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 81, the election petition could not be treated an “election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part” within the meaning of Section 80 of the Act. Merely alleging that the appellant had put up fancy banners would be of no avail unless there was a description of the banner itself together with the slogan. 42.The conclusion is irresistible that the words “copies thereof” in sub-section (3) of Section 81 read in the context of sub-section (2) of Section 83 must necessarily refer not only to the election petition proper but also to schedules or annexures thereto containing particulars of any corrupt practice alleged therein. 42.The conclusion is irresistible that the words “copies thereof” in sub-section (3) of Section 81 read in the context of sub-section (2) of Section 83 must necessarily refer not only to the election petition proper but also to schedules or annexures thereto containing particulars of any corrupt practice alleged therein. That being so, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the High Court insofar as it holds that the photograph of the fancy banner adverted to in para 18(b) could not be treated to be an integral part of the election petition but was merely a piece of evidence as to the nature and type of fancy banner erected by the appellant and therefore failure to supply a copy of the photograph to the appellant did not amount to a violation of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act. 43.For these reasons, all the appeals and special leave petitions except Civil Appeal No. 38(NCE) of 1981 must fail and are dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 38(NCE) of 1981 partly succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the High Court holding that the amount of Rs. 2,000 having been deposited to the credit of the Registrar, High Court in the Reserve Bank of India on the strength of pre-receipted challans issued by the Accounts Department on the basis of a lodgment schedule, there was substantial compliance of the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 117 of the Act, is upheld. But the judgment of the High Court is set aside insofar as it holds that the failure to supply a copy of the photograph of the fancy banner referred to in para 18(b) along with a copy of the election petition to the appellant did not amount to a breach of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act, and instead we hold that the failure to do so amounted to non-compliance of subsection (3) of Section 81 inasmuch as the photograph of the fancy banner was an integral part of the election petition and therefore the election petition must be dismissed summarily under sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We further direct that the High Court shall permit the appellant to withdraw the recrimination petition filed by him under Section 97 of the Act in terms of the undertaking given by learned counsel for the appellant during the course of the hearing of the appeal.” (v) Sheo Sadan Singh v. Mohan Lal Gautam AIR 1969 SC 1024 : (1969) 1 SCC 408 : “5. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Veda Vyasa, learned counsel for the respondent, that the petition must be held to have become infructuous in view of the dissolution of the Assembly. In this proceeding we are considering the validity of the election of the respondent and not whether he is continuing as a member. If the contention of the appellant that the respondent was guilty of corrupt practices during the election is found to be true then not only his election will be declared void, he is also liable to incur certain electoral disqualifications. The purity of elections is of utmost importance in a democratic set up. No one can be allowed to corrupt the course of an election and get away with it either by resigning his membership or because of the fortuitous circumstance of the Assembly having been dissolved. The public are interested in seeing that those who had corrupted the course of an election are dealt with in accordance with law. That purpose will stand defeated if we accept the contention of Mr. Veda Vyasa. 6. The election petitions in this country are solely regulated by statutory provisions. Hence unless it is shown that some statutory provision directly or by necessary implication prescribes that the pending election petitions stand abated because of the dissolution of the Assembly, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted. 9. From the above provisions it is seen that in an election petition, the contest is really between the constituency on the one side and the person or persons complained of on the other. Once the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner. 9. From the above provisions it is seen that in an election petition, the contest is really between the constituency on the one side and the person or persons complained of on the other. Once the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner. The reason for the elaborate provisions noticed by us earlier is to ensure to the extent possible that the persons who offend the election law are not allowed to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.” (vi) Loknath Padhan v. Birendra Kumar Sahu AIR 1974 SC 505 : (1974) 1 SCC 526 : “3. Whilst the appeal was pending in this Court, the Orissa Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the Governor on 3.3.1973 under Article 174(2) (b) of the Constitution. The respondent, therefore, raised a preliminary objection at the hearing of the appeal before us that in view of the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it was academic to decide whether or not the respondent was disqualified from being a candidate under Section 9-A and we should accordingly decline to hear the appeal on merits. The argument of the respondent was that unless there is a living issue between the parties the Court would not proceed to decide it: it would not occupy its time by deciding what is purely an academic question which has no sequitur so far as the position of the parties is concerned. Here, contended the respondent, even if the appellant was able to satisfy the Court that on the date of the nomination, the respondent was disqualified under Section 9-A , it would be a futile exercise, because the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, the setting aside of the election of the respondent would have no meaning or consequence and hence the Court should refuse to embark on a discussion of the merits of the question arising in the appeal. We think there is great force in this preliminary contention urged on behalf of the respondent. It is a well-settled practice recognised and followed in India as well as England that a Court should not undertake to decide an issue, unless it is a living issue between the parties. We think there is great force in this preliminary contention urged on behalf of the respondent. It is a well-settled practice recognised and followed in India as well as England that a Court should not undertake to decide an issue, unless it is a living issue between the parties. If an issue is purely academic in that its decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the parties, it would be waste of public time and indeed not proper exercise of authority for the Court to engage itself in deciding it. Speaking of the House of Lords, VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said in the course of his speech in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis, “I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the authority which this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an academic question, the answer to which cannot affect the respondent in any way”, and added: “… it is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be disposed of by this House that there should exist between the parties to a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to decide as a living issue”. This statement must apply equally in case of exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this Court. It would be clearly futile and meaningless for the Court to decide an academic question, the answer to which would not affect the position of one party or the other. The Court would not engage in a fruitless exercise. It would refuse to decide a question, unless it has a bearing on some right or liability in controversy between the parties. If the decision of a question would be wholly ineffectual so far as the parties are concerned, it would be not only unnecessary and pointless but also inexpedient to decide it and the Court would properly decline to do so. In the present case, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, it has become academic to consider whether on the date when the nomination was filed, the respondent was disqualified under Section 9-A . Even if it is found that he was so disqualified, it would have no practical consequence, because the invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly would be meaningless and ineffectual. It would not hurt him. Even if it is found that he was so disqualified, it would have no practical consequence, because the invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly would be meaningless and ineffectual. It would not hurt him. The disqualification would only mean that he was not entitled to contest the election on the date when he filed his nomination. It would have no consequences operating in future. It is possible that the respondent had a subsisting contract with the Government of Orissa at the date of nomination, but that contract may not be subsisting now. The finding that the respondent was disqualified would be based on the facts existing at the date of nomination and it would have no relevance so far as the position at a future point of time may be concerned, and therefore, in view of the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it would have no practical interest for either of the parties. Neither would it benefit the appellant nor would it affect the respondent in any practical sense and it would be wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified on the date of nomination. 6. We are, therefore, of the view that, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved during the pendency of this appeal, it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under Section 9-A at the date of nomination and since that is the only ground on which election of the respondent is challenged, we think it would be futile to hear this appeal on merits. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with no orders as to costs all throughout.” (vii) A recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5142 of 2011 in the case of Nandiesha Reddy v. Ms. Kavitha Mahesh, decided on 8.7.2011: “21. ….....It is trite that if an Election Petitioner wants to put forth a plea that a nomination was improperly rejected to declare an election to be void it is necessary to set out the averments for making out the said ground. The reason given by the Returning Officer for refusal to accept the nomination and the facts necessary to show that the refusal was improper is required to be set out in the election petition. The reason given by the Returning Officer for refusal to accept the nomination and the facts necessary to show that the refusal was improper is required to be set out in the election petition. In the absence of the necessary averments it cannot be said that the election petition contains the material facts to make out a cause of action. Section 83(1) (a) inter alia provides that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts. Further, Section 87 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder every election petition shall be tried in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits. Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is devoted to the pleadings generally and Rule 2(i) thereof, inter alia, provides that every pleading shall contain statement in a concise form all the material facts on which the party pleading relies for claim. In an election petition, which does not contain material facts, no relief can be granted. The phrase material fact as used in Section 83(1) (a) of the Act or Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been defined in the Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, all specific and primary facts which are required to be proved by a party for the relief claimed are material facts. It is settled legal position that all material facts must be pleaded by the party on which the relief is founded. Its object and purpose is to enable the contesting party to know the case which it has to meet. An election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish the material facts to give rise to a cause of action. However, what are the material facts always depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application is possible to be laid down in this regard. 22. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal position when we proceed to consider the facts of the present case we are of the opinion that the Election Petitioner had disclosed material facts and the matter is fit to go for trial. Whether those material facts are true or false is a matter of trial. 22. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal position when we proceed to consider the facts of the present case we are of the opinion that the Election Petitioner had disclosed material facts and the matter is fit to go for trial. Whether those material facts are true or false is a matter of trial. As regards authorities of this Court in the case of Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar (supra) and Ram Sukh (supra) we are of the opinion that the same do not lend support to the contention of the appellant. In both the cases, this Court on fact came to the conclusion that the election petition did not contain statement of material facts and accordingly, the election petitions were dismissed at the threshold. However, in the present case, on facts we have found that the election petition does contain material facts and it is not liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 23. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing at the final decision of the election petition. 24.Accordingly, we dismiss both the appeals with costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent.” 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records and the decisions relied upon. 8. Order 6 Rule16 C.P.C. deals with Striking out Pleadings, as per which the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading- (a) which may beunnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. 9. A perusal of the affidavits filed in support of the application and also the Election Petition does not disclose any pleadings to be struck out, which are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or which are otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, as per Order 6 Rule 16. What is all stated in the application is that the nomination of the first respondent/election petitioner was properly rejected by the Returning Officer and, hence, the election petition should be rejected. 10. What is all stated in the application is that the nomination of the first respondent/election petitioner was properly rejected by the Returning Officer and, hence, the election petition should be rejected. 10. Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, deals with “trial of election petitions”-and as per sub-section (1) thereof, the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117, which Sections refer to ‘presentation of petitions‘, ‘parties of the petition‘ and ‘security for costs‘ respectively. 11. It is not the case of the applicant that the first respondent/election petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 and 117 of the Act. His main case is that nomination of the first respondent was properly rejected by the Returning Officer for some genuine reasons and, hence, the Election Petition has to be rejected. On the other hand, the contention of the first respondent/election petitioner is that his nomination was improperly rejected that too without there being any order to that effect and, hence, the election of the returned candidate viz., the applicant herein, has to be declared void. 12. The bottom line of the learned counsel for the applicant is that continuing with the election petition is only academic in view of the subsequent election held and, therefore, the election petition has become infructuous by lapse of time. 13. To the above contention, learned counsel for the first respondent submits that there is always a subsisting contract even after the period of session is over and what are all the benefits accrued to the returned candidate is the matter to be adjudicated in the election petition. Of course, it is not the case of the first respondent that election has to be declared null and void on the ground of corrupt practice. 14. In this context, the point that arises for consideration is, when the right of a citizen to contest an election is democratic, which can be exercised statutorily as per the Act, can that right be taken away by the Returning Officer, by rejecting the nomination for some reason or other? The right of a citizen is always to be protected and safeguarded in a manner known to law. The right of a citizen is always to be protected and safeguarded in a manner known to law. The principle of natural justice, before rejection of nomination, is also raised by the election petitioner and when such an aspect is to be adjudicated, the applicant‘s claim for rejection of the election petition cannot be accepted. 15. No scrutiny of the nomination paper could be made under Section 36(2) of the Act in the light of Section 8. While so, Section 36(5) makes it clear that the Returning Officer shall hold scrutiny on the date appointed in this behalf under Clause (b) of Section 30 and shall not allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when such pleadings are interrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control, provided that in case an objection is raised by the returning officer or is made by any other person the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny, and the returning officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned. 16. In the case on hand, the first respondent as election petitioner, in the election petition, has specifically stated that at the time of scrutiny, as per proviso to Section 36 (5) of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of the Returning Officer to grant time to rebut till the next day to the candidate in case of an objection raised by the Returning Officer, but the said time is not granted to the first respondent to rebut the objection raised by the Returning Officer and, hence, there is a violation of principles of natural justice, which is a basic and fundamental principle to be followed by the Returning Officer. Therefore, the factual aspect of any objection being raised and allowing time to the candidate rebutting the same till next day is a triable issue. 17. Therefore, the factual aspect of any objection being raised and allowing time to the candidate rebutting the same till next day is a triable issue. 17. The points raised by the election petitioner in the election petition that (i) there is failure of the Returning Officer in exercising the mandatory requirement of verification of the nomination paper as contemplated under Section 33(4) of the Act and whether the Returning Officer has satisfied himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls; (ii) at the time of scrutiny, as per proviso to Section 36(5) of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of the Returning Officer to grant time to rebut till the next day to the candidate in case of an objection raised by the Returning Officer; (iii) the Returning Officer has not allowed time to the petitioner to rebut any objection of the Returning Officer; (iv) the Election Commission has arbitrarily exercised its power on the question of rescrutiny by selectively conducting in respect of Bargur and Srivaikundam constituencies on the representation of the rejected candidate, but, whereas, Election Commission has failed to do it in the case of rejection of his nomination in spite of his party preferring a representation, as mentioned in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 23, 24 and 25 of the Election Petition; (v) the Returning Officer has ignored and failed to act as per Clause 16.3 of Chapter V of the instructions of the Returning Officer‘s Handbook, Chapter 6 of the handbook of instructions; (vi) the Returning Officer has not provided the order of rejection of nomination paper and it is only orally informed of the rejection on the ground of discrepancy in the serial number of the proposers; (vii) non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Representation of the People Act, Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, and Handbook of Instructions to the Returning Officers by the authorities has materially affected the election result are all material facts and triable issues which are to be decided only in the Election Petition, based on the material documents subsequent to trial, but not in this application, which is premature. Further, prima facie, it appears that the Election Petition has been filed under the relevant provisions of law in respect of the relief sought for under Sections 81 and 100 Sections 81 and 100 (1)(c) of the Act read with Rule 2 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions,1957. 18. The above observations of mine would lead to the irresistible conclusion that this application has been filed with the ulterior motive of thwarting the regular proceedings of the Election Petition, especially when no substantial grounds are available to the applicant to reject and strike off the Election Petition, as the Election Petition does not disclose any pleadings to be struck out, which are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or which are otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties, except the one cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent in Nandiesha Reddy v. Ms. Kavitha Mahesh (supra), wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that when the election petition contains material facts, it is not liable to be dismissed at the threshold, are not relevant for consideration at this point. In the said case, the Apex Court also imposed costs of Rs. 25,000/-on the appellant/returned candidate to be paid to the respondent/election petitioner therein. Therefore, this application is dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,000/-, to be payable to the election petitioner. Any observation made by me in this order is only for the purpose of disposal of the application and shall have no bearing at the final decision of the Election Petition. 19. In that view of the matter, the Election Petition has to be adjudicated on merits, by proceeding further. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to post the Election Petition on 9.8.2011.