N. Mani v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police CBCID
2011-07-26
K.B.K.VASUKI
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The first accused is the petitioner herein. The revision is filed against his conviction and sentence for the offences under Sections 381, 419, 467, 468, 471 r/w 468 and 420 IPC passed by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court. 2. The accused along with three others was charged for the offences referred to above as if the accused, who was during the relevant point of time, employed as driver in Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital, along with three others by names Ganesan, who was employee of State Bank of India, Treasury Branch, Chennai, Ramachandran and Rajendran, conspired together to commit an act of forgery and cheating and in continuation of such conspiracy, Ganesan stolen the cheque in question and handed it over to Rajendran, from whom the accused received and fabricated it by altering the payee name and the cheque number and presented it in the bank as genuine one and encashed it through new account opened in MCC bank in fictitious name A.Rajan and misappropriated the sum of Rs.16,930/-thereby committed the acts constituting the offences as referred to above. 3. The criminal prosecution initiated against the four accused is subsequently split up in respect of Ramachandran and Rajendran and the case is proceeded against A1-Mani and A2-Ganesan in CC.No.7872 of 1996. 4.
3. The criminal prosecution initiated against the four accused is subsequently split up in respect of Ramachandran and Rajendran and the case is proceeded against A1-Mani and A2-Ganesan in CC.No.7872 of 1996. 4. The prosecution has, in order to prove the guilt of the accused examined the staff attached to both banks, State Bank of India, Treasury branch and MCC, who are associated with the preparation of the cheque and issuance of cheque and the payee/official to whose account the cheque is issued, bank officials, who are responsible to open new account and to maintain accounts in the bank, to receive and to process cheque in question and to give credit to the cheque amount in the current account and to pay it to individuals and higher officials of both banks, State Bank of India and MCC, where the account is opened in fictitious name and cheque is encashed and amount is collected and the complainant and the investigation officer as PW1 to PW18 and produced the cheque in question, covering letter along with the cheque sent to the actual payee, counterfoil of the cheque, remittence, acknowledgment, application form given in the name of A.Rajan for opening new account, remittance challan for deposit of amount for opening new account, challan for crediting the amount into account, withdrawal slip for withdrawing money, admitted and disputed specimen signatures and hand writings obtained from the accused by the Investigation Officer for comparison and expert report along with reasoning, complaint and FIR as Exs.P1 to P15. No oral and documentary evidence is adduced on the side of the accused. 5. The trial court on the basis of the oral evidence of the witnesses and their identification of the accused A1 in the identification parade and by mainly relying upon Ex.P13 and Ex.P14 handwriting expert opinion along with his reasoning, found A1-Mani guilty of the offences and acquitted A2 Ganesan. Aggrieved against the same, A1 preferred CA.No.265 of 2004 and the appellate court accepted the findings and reasonings of the trial court and confirmed its findings and judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial court. Hence, this criminal revision by A1 before this court. 6. Heard the rival submissions made on both sides. 7.
Aggrieved against the same, A1 preferred CA.No.265 of 2004 and the appellate court accepted the findings and reasonings of the trial court and confirmed its findings and judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial court. Hence, this criminal revision by A1 before this court. 6. Heard the rival submissions made on both sides. 7. The main allegations raised against A1 are that A1 opened new account in fictitious name of A.Rajan in MCC bank and altered the payee name and cheque number and then presented the cheque in the said account and encashed the same. As already stated, the trial court found the accused guilty mainly on the basis of two factors: (i) identification of the accused as that of the person who opened new account in fictitious name and withdrew the money and (ii) handwriting expert opinion about the similarity of the admitted signature of A1 Mani with disputed signatures. 8. It is not in dispute that A1-Mani was during the relevant point of time employed as driver in Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital; whereas, A2-Ganesan was an employee of SBI, Treasury Branch, Chennai, from where, according to prosecution, Ex.A1 cheque in question is removed, fabricated by altering the payee name and cheque number and thereafter presented as genuine in different bank by opening new account in fictitious name and was encashed and amount was withdrawn. Though the allegations in the complaint proceeds as if the cheque was removed from drawer office by A2-Ganesan and from whom A1-Mani received the same, A2-Ganesan was acquitted, but the source of custody of the cheque in the hands of A1 in any other manner is neither alleged nor established. 9. As A1 was, as already referred to, an employee of Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital, he was admittedly not known to either of the officials or staff attached to drawer office i.e. Pay and Accounts office, drawee of the cheque i.e. Health department, SBI and MCC bank, as such, proof of participation of A1 in any of the acts mentioned above can be firstly by way of his identification by competent witnesses.
Having regard to the nature of the allegations raised against A1, the competent witnesses, who could be able to identify A1 is either the officials of MCC bank, where A1 allegedly came in person and opened an account in fictitious name and the police officials in whose presence the sample signature of A1-Mani is allegedly taken by PW18/Investigation 10. According to PW9-Prabakaran, then Assistant manager, MCC bank in-charge of savings account branch, the duties assigned to him was to pass cheques and to make verification of corresponding challan ledger and also disbursement of cash etc. It is spoken by him that one Rajan opened savings account in their bank on 19.10.1992 by duly submitting filled up applications containing sample signatures and he was introduced by one of the existing customers residing in the given address having S.B.A/c.No.5956 and PW9 sent it to PW16-Chandrasekaran for verification and after verification, savings account No.5998 was opened in the name of Rajan and he deposited Rs.50/- in his account and PW9 passed the cheque in question after due verification of the ledger and he gave withdrawal slip for Rs.16,900/- on 22.10.1992. In addition to his oral evidence, the application for opening new account, challan for deposit of Rs.50/-, remittance challan for remitting Rs.16,930/-in his account and withdrawal slip for Rs.16,900/- are produced as Ex.P6, Ex.P7, Ex.P8 and Ex.P9 through PW9. PW10 has also deposed in corroboration of the evidence given by PW9. It is in his evidence that he is employed as Senior Assistant in the same bank and the duties assigned to him are to maintain the cash chit and he received Rs.50/- from A.Rajan for opening new account and he entered the particulars regarding the account name and the quantum of the amount in respect of this withdrawal in the relevant records. 11. PW16-Chandrasekaran is the then Manager of the bank who also supported the evidence of PW9 and it is deposed by him that PW9 brought the application form of Rajan along with the introducer form for opening new account, thereafter savings account was opened in Account No.5998 and he came to know about the act of fabrication of cheque and other acts and the actual name of such account holder as Mani only in 1993.
Thus, the witnesses PW9, PW10 and PW16, who according to the prosecution, actually saw the person, who visited the bank for the purpose of opening new account in the name of A.Rajan, though supported the prosecution case that A1Mani is the person concerned, none of the witnesses identified A1-Mani as the person who actually came to the bank and opened account in fictitious name and presented the fabricated cheque in question and withdrew the amount from the account so opened. 12. Though PW9 and PW10 would say that they will be able to identify the said person who came to the bank in the name of A.Rajan, they were not asked to identify A1 as the person concerned. PW16 also stated that the said person who opened account in the name of Rajan is in open court and he did not identify which of the two accused is the person who impersonated as one Rajan. In the absence of one such identification by either of PW9, PW10 and PW16, no seriousness can be attached to their oral evidence in support of the prosecution theory that A1-Mani came to the bank and opened new account in fictitious name of A.Rajan and withdrew cash to the tune of Rs.16,900/-. It is also note worthy to mention that PW9 and PW16 do refer to one of their customers through whom A.Rajan was introduced, but the customer/introducer was, for the reasons best known to the prosecution, neither cited nor examined as one of the prosecution witnesses before the court. When admittedly the miscreant is known to their existing customer, he is more competent to identify the real offender. Whereas, the best evidence is withheld and on the failure of the other prosecution witnesses to identify A1 as that of the offender, that part of the prosecution version cannot be attached any reliance. 13. The other incriminating material on which the trial court accepted the prosecution theory that A1 opened the account in the fictitious name is the identification parade held by the concerned Judicial Magistrate, but neither the Judicial Magistrate who held the identification is examined as one of prosecution witnesses nor his identification proceedings is marked as one of prosecution side Exhibits.
The other incriminating material on which the trial court accepted the prosecution theory that A1 opened the account in the fictitious name is the identification parade held by the concerned Judicial Magistrate, but neither the Judicial Magistrate who held the identification is examined as one of prosecution witnesses nor his identification proceedings is marked as one of prosecution side Exhibits. However, the trial court has, at the end of page 13 and beginning of page 14 of its judgment, rendered a finding that PW5 identified A1-Mani in the identification parade held by the concerned Judicial Magistrate. Such a course adopted by the trial court in rendering such a finding without examining the concerned Judicial Magistrate and without receiving the identification parade proceedings as one of the exhibits through the competent witness, is highly deplorable. Such course to omit to produce relevant document and make the witness available for cross examination by the accused is unknown to and is against the procedure laid down under law and is in violation of the rights available to the accused. 14. Further, the witness PW5 who is the officer attached to SBI, Treasury Branch and cheque passing officer is brought to the witness box only to speak about passing of the cheque with alterations. PW5 did not make any statement regarding the so called identification of A1- Mani, as such, the trial court has grossly erred in relying upon the so called identification of A1-Mani by PW5 in the so called identification parade. Thus, here is the case, wherein the prosecution miserably failed to prove source of custody of cheque in question with A1 and identification of A1 as that new account holder in fictitious name of A.Rajan for the purpose of encashing and misappropriating huge sum under the cheque in question. 15. Excluding the oral evidence of the witnesses as above referred to, and prosecution theory of identification of A1 Mani by witnesses, the other incriminating document relied upon by the trial court to base its order of conviction is Ex.P13 hand writing expert opinion along with Ex.P14 reasoning sheet given by PW17-Kasi to the effect that Ex.P11 and Ex.P12 specimen signatures obtained from Mani and the signatures in the bank documents for opening new bank account are one and the same. PW13 and PW14 attached to Indian bank are the attesting witnesses for obtaining specimen signatures from A1-Mani.
PW13 and PW14 attached to Indian bank are the attesting witnesses for obtaining specimen signatures from A1-Mani. Out of two witnesses, PW13-Pethachi did not support the prosecution case and declared to be hostile. According to him, he was along with PW14-Assistant Manager, Radhakrishnan taken to CBCID office at Radakrishnan Salai, Mylapore from Indian Bank, Mylapore and at CBCID office, their signatures are obtained in the papers containing sample signature of Rajan and Arumugam. He did not support the prosecution version that he stood as one of the witnesses for collecting the sample signature from A1-Mani. It is true that PW14-then Assistant Manager, Indian Bank, Mylapore stated that CBCID, Superintendent of police came to their bank on 11.01.1994 and PW13-Pethachi and PW14-Radhakrishnan were taken to CBCID office at 252, Linghi Chetti Street, Chennai-1, where A1-Mani was present in compliance with the conditional bail order and Mani was asked to give sample signatures as A.Rajan and Arumugam and Pannerselvam in Tamil and English and his signatures were obtained and the signatures of PW13 and PW14 were also obtained in all the sheets as attesting witnesses. But, he did not identify A1-Mani as the person from whom the signatures are obtained. Rather, he is not able to identify A1 from whom the sample signatures are said to be obtained in his presence. He has in the course of his cross examination disowned any knowledge about identity of A1 Mani. He would further say that there were three persons in the police stations and police obtained signatures from them. Thus, the evidence of PW14 is also of no useful to the prosecution. 16. In so far as the collection of sample signatures is concerned, the same is admittedly collected by PW18-investigation officer in CBCID office in the course of his investigation, while the accused appeared in person in the office of CBCID in compliance with the conditional bail order granted to him. It is admittedly collected and sent for comparison by PW18/Investigation Officer on his own in the course of his investigation and not on the strength of any order passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate Court. 17.
It is admittedly collected and sent for comparison by PW18/Investigation Officer on his own in the course of his investigation and not on the strength of any order passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate Court. 17. It is seriously argued by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the investigation officer has no authority to collect the specimen signature and to send it to handwriting expert in the course of his investigation without any order of the court and such course adopted by the Investigation Officer is not in accordance with any procedure and is irregular and unlawful and any report obtained in respect of such signature cannot be attached any evidentiary value that too, to base any order of conviction. This court finds much legal force in the argument so advanced on the side of the accused. 18. In this regard, the relevant provisions of law to be looked into are Section 73 of the Officer and they are examined as PW9-Prabakar, PW10-Rajendran, PW16 Chandrasekaran attached to MCC bank and PW13-Pethachi and PW14-Radhakrishnan/officials of Indian Bank. Indian Evidence Act and Sections 4 and 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. For better appreciation, the same are extracted hereunder: "Sec.73 of Indian Evidence Act: Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved- In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. (This section applies also, with any necessary modifications, to finger-impressions.) Sec.4 of Identification of Prisoners Act: Taking of measurements, etc., of non-convicted persons- Any person who has been arrested in connection with an offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year or upwards shall, if so required by a police officer, allow his measurements to be taken in the prescribed manner.
Sec. 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act: Power of Magistrate to order a person to be measured or photographed- If a Magistrate is satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), it is expedient to direct any person to allow his measurements or photograph to be taken, he may make an order to the effect, and in that case, the person to whom the order relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place specified in the order and shall allow his measurements or photograph to be taken, as the case may be, by a police officer: Provided that no order shall be made directing any person to be photographed except by a Magistrate of the first class: Provided further, that no order shall be made under this section unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection with such investigation or proceeding." 19. The nature and the scope of the authority of the court and the police officer and the stage at which the same can be invoked is dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court, our High Court and other High Courts in catena of Judgments referred to hereunder. (i) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in AIR 1980 SC 791 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra) observed as follows: "Though a direction by the Magistrate to the accused to give his specimen writing when the case is still under investigation would surely be in the interests of the administration of justice, the language of S.73 of the Evidence Act does not enable the Magistrate to give such a direction when the case is still under investigation. The section contemplates pendency of some proceedings before a Court. It does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the court. Further, Section 73 of the Evidence Act makes no distinction between a Civil Court and a Criminal Court........................
It does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the court. Further, Section 73 of the Evidence Act makes no distinction between a Civil Court and a Criminal Court........................ While we agree with Mr.Rana that a direction by the Magistrate to the accused to give his specimen writing when the case is still under investigation would surely be in the interests of the administration of justice, we find ourselves unable to agree with his submission that S.73 of the Evidence Act enables the Magistrate to give such a direction even when the case is still under investigation.... The second paragraph of Sec.73 enables the Court to direct any person present in Court to give specimen writings 'for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare' such writings with writings alleged to have been written by such person. The clear implication of the words 'for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare' is that there is some proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary for the Court to compare such writings. The direction is to be given for the purpose of 'enabling the court to compare' and not for the purpose of enabling the investigating or other agency 'to compare'. If the case is still under investigation there is no present proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary to compare the writings. The language of S.73 does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the Court. Further, S.73 of the Evidence Act makes no distinction between a Civil Court and a Criminal Court. Would it be open to a person to seek the assistance of the Civil Court for a direction to some other person to give sample writing under S.73 of the Evidence Act on the plea that it would help him to decide whether to institute a Civil Suit in which the question would be whether certain alleged writings are those of the other person or not? Obviously not.
Obviously not. If not, why should it make any difference if the investigating agency seeks the assistance of the Court under S.73 of the Evidence Act on the plea that a case might be instituted before the Court where it would be necessary to compare the writings?" The Hon'ble Apex Court expressed such a view on the construction of Section 73 of Evidence Act by adopting the view taken by our High Court in the judgment reported in AIR 1970 Mad 85 (T.Subbiah v. S.K.D.Ramaswamy Nadar). The Supreme Court did not agree with the contrary view taken by the High Court of Patna and the High court of Andhra Pradesh in the judgments reported in AIR 1962 Pat 255 (Gulzar Khan v. State) and 1971 Crl. LJ 1591 (B.Rami Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh). The Hon'ble Apex Court in the same judgment also dealt with the power of the Court under section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. The Supreme court, while appreciating Section 5 in the light of definition of 'measurements' as including 'finger impressions and foot-print impressions' under section 2(a) of the Act, observed in para 6 as follows: "6.There are two things to be noticed here. First, signature and writing are excluded from the range of S.5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act and second, 'finger impressions' are included in both S.73 of the Evidence Act and S.5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. A possible view is that it was thought that S.73 of the Evidence Act would not take in the stage of investigation and so S.5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act made special provision for that stage and even while making such provision, signature and writings were deliberately excluded." The Apex court concluded its decision by suggesting suitable legislation on the analogy of section 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act to provide for the investiture of Magistrates with the power to issue directions to any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures and writings.
(ii)The Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with evidentiary value of expert opinion regarding specimen writings given by the accused, when there was no enquiry or proceeding pending before the Sub Divisional Magistrate in the judgment reported in 1998 SCC (Cri) 1609 (Amarjit Singh v. State of U.P.), wherein, the specimen writings of the accused was obtained with the directions of the Sub Divisional Magistrate. The direction was so issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, when no inquiry or trial was pending before him. The Supreme Court in para 7 of the judgment expressed its view to the effect that "the specimen writings obtained with the directions of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, were not meant to assist the 'Court to form its opinion' as envisaged by section 73 of the Evidence Act and the specimen writing, under the circumstances, could not be used against the appellant and such lacuna affects the relevancy of the evidence of the expert in the case". The supreme court while taking such view, drew the support of the decision of the Supreme court reported in 1994 (5) SCC 152 (Sukhvinder Singh v. State of Punjab). (iii)The Supreme Court and the Division Bench of our High court have also in the following cases, upheld the authority of the police officer under section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act to take measurements of the accused including finger print impressions. (a) In the judgment reported in 1978 Crl LJ 1251 (Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan), the Supreme court rejected the contention that the specimen finger print impressions illegally obtained by the police not before the Magistrate without any direction must be ruled out of evidence of expert. The Supreme court was pleased to hold that the police were competent under Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act to take specimen finger prints of the accused and it was not necessary for them to obtain any order from the Magistrate for obtaining such specimen finger prints. (b)The Apex court in the judgment reported in 1991 Crl. LJ 2903 (Mukimuddin v. The State) while rejecting specimen signatures collected from the accused, while he was in custody, as not admissible in evidence, was of the view that the same reasoning cannot be applied to finger print impressions of the accused being obtained by the police.
(b)The Apex court in the judgment reported in 1991 Crl. LJ 2903 (Mukimuddin v. The State) while rejecting specimen signatures collected from the accused, while he was in custody, as not admissible in evidence, was of the view that the same reasoning cannot be applied to finger print impressions of the accused being obtained by the police. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex court and our High court in the judgments cited above, refused to attach any evidentiary value to the expert opinion relating to specimen signatures obtained from the accused and sent for expert opinion without any order from the Magistrate and it is negatived on the sole ground that the specimen writings were not obtained as per the procedure laid down under the relevant provisions of law. (iv) The Division Bench of our High court in the judgment reported in 2010(1) MLJ (Crl) 937 (Thangaraj and others v. State by the Inspector of Police, Perundurai Police Station, Erode District) rejected similar contention that the material irregularity is committed by the Investigation Officer in taking sample finger prints of the accused for the purpose of comparison to establish the offence on the same ground that it falls under Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. However, the Supreme Court recorded a note of caution in the judgment reported in 1997 (10) SCC 44 (Mohammed Aman and another v. State of Rajasthan) by observing that though under Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, the police is competent to take fingerprints of the accused, it was eminently desirable that they are taken before or under the order of a Magistrate to dispel any suspicion as to its bona fides or to eliminate the possibility of fabrication of evidence. 20. Thus, the observations of the Supreme Court and our High court in the above judgments would undoubtedly go to show that it is only the courts, who are empowered under section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act to direct collection of specimen signatures, writings and seal from any accused for the purpose of comparison to establish the offence, when the accused appeared before the court in connection with any proceeding pending before the same.
Whereas, Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act empowers the court to pass similar direction to allow measurements or photograph to be taken from the accused in the course of any investigation or proceedings before the same and specimen signature, hand writing and seal are consciously excluded from Section 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act. The only provision of law empowers the police officer to take measurement of the accused in the course of investigation is under section 4 of the Act and the measurement does not include specimen signature and writing. As the specimen signature and writing herein is collected and sent for expert opinion in the course of investigation by the police officer without any order obtained from the competent court and not during pendency of any proceedings before the same and not when the accused appeared for any proceeding before the Court, the same is without any authority and is not in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Act, as such, no evidentiary value can be attached to the hand writing expert opinion in respect of such specimen signatures and writings. 21. Even assuming it to be true that the specimen signatures and hand writings are obtained from A1 Mani lawfully and in accordance with the procedure and there is no reason to ignore the opinion of the handwriting expert supporting the case of the prosecution that A1 Mani committed the act of forgery by altering the payee name and date in the cheque and by opening the account in fictitious name for the purpose of presenting the fabricated cheque as genuine and encashed and misappropriated the money for his own use, the next question arises for consideration herein is as to whether the expert opinion can be the sole basis for deciding guilty or otherwise of the accused for the charges framed against him. 22. In the foregoing paragraphs, the first ground based on which the finding of conviction i.e., identification of the accused as that of the person who opened a new account in fictitious name and who presented the fabricated cheque, encashed it, got the money credited into such new account and withdrew the money, is held to be not established. In that event, the other incriminating substance available against the accused is Ex.P13 expert opinion and Ex.P14 reasoning sheet.
In that event, the other incriminating substance available against the accused is Ex.P13 expert opinion and Ex.P14 reasoning sheet. This Court after due analysis of the evidence available before this Court, found that there is no other independent and reliable evidence to corroborate the opinion of handwriting expert about the participation of the accused in the commission of any of the acts in the manner as referred to above. 23. In the absence of such corroborating evidence, the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused seriously argued that it is not safe to rely upon without other reliable independent evidence, the uncorroborated evidence of handwriting expert to base an order of conviction. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused has in order to fortify his contention cited the following catenna of judgments of Apex Court, our High court and other High courts. (i) AIR 1957 SC 381 Ram Chandra V. State of UP - unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence; (ii) AIR 1963 SC 1738 in Iswhari Prasad Misra V. Mohamead Isa; 2003 1 CTC 223 Madras in K.Dhanasekaran V. State by Inspector of Police, CBCID, Erode -Evidence of expert opinion is not corroborated by either clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conviction based on uncorroborated opinion liable to be set aside; (iii) AIR 1964 SC 529 Constitution Bench, Shasi Kumar Banerjee V. Subodh Kumar Banerjee -experts evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is useful to see if it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence; (iv) AIR 1964 SC 1326 Fakruddin V. State of M.P, -it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial; (v) AIR 1973 SC 1346 in Bhagwan Kaur V. Shri Maharaj Krishnan Sharma and others -the evidence of handwriting expert unlike that of the fingerprint expert is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities have been quite often noticed.
The court should, therefore be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting expert; (vi) AIR 1954 SC 136 in Kishore Chandra V. Ganesh Prasad) conviction based on mere comparison of handwriting must at best be indecisive and yield to positive evidence in the case; (vii) AIR 1977 SC 1091 (Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab) -the science of identification of finger prints is absolutely reliable and perfect as compared to imperfect nature of science of handwritings and signatures; (viii) AIR 1980 SC 531 (Murarilal v. State of M.P) -though there was neither rule of law nor any rule of prudence, which has crystalized into a rule of law, the opinion of the handwriting expert never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated and the science of identification of handwriting, being in imperfect nature, the approach should be one of caution; and (ix) 1996 CLJ 3237 SC in S.Gopal Reddy V. State of AP; 1995 SCC (Crl.) 837 in Inderjit Singh and others V. State of Punjab and others; AIR 1992 SC 2100 in State of Maharastra Vs. Sudhdeo Singh and another; 1977 Crl. LJ pg.711 in Magan Bihari lal V. the State of Punjab -expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution. 24. That being the factual and legal position regarding the science of identification of handwriting, no serious reliance can be attached to Ex.P13 expert opinion. Thus, this Court, for the discussion held above, is of the view that both the grounds on which the trial court as well as the lower appellate court found the accused guilty, have no legal basis and contrary to well settled legal position and are legally and factually unsustainable and the finding is hence totally perverse and legally vitiated and the same deserves interference by this Court. 25. In the result, the criminal revision is allowed by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 18.4.2005 made in CA.No.256 of 2004 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-III, Chennai and the judgment dated 14.6.2004 made in CC.No.7872 of 1996 on the file of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and the revision petitioner/A1 is acquitted from the charges. The bail bond if any executed by the petitioner shall stand cancelled and the fine amount if any paid by the accused shall be refunded to him.