Judgment 1. These appeals arise out of and are directed against the order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. Nos.33120 to 33121 of 2003 and connected cases dated 16.12.2004, wherein the learned single Judge has held that the writ petitions filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) Staff and Workers Federation in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 are maintainable and Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 – Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Karnataka Act No.9/2003’) repealing the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the KCCA Act’) is unconstitutional and invalid and declared as such. The learned single Judge has further held that the Secretary, Karnataka State Transport Authority (for short, ‘STA’), cannot exercise power under Rule 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act and has further issued certain directions to the Government for their guidance. 2. W.A. Nos. 5466 to 5503 of 2004 and W.A. Nos. 63 to 152 of 2005 are filed by persons, who are not parties to the writ petitions, being aggrieved by the order passed in W.P. Nos. 8512 to 8513 of 2004 dated 16.12.2004, wherein the learned single Judge has held that repeal of the KCCA Act is unconstitutional. 3. W.A. Nos. 56 to 61 of 2005 are filed by respondents 6 to 9 in W.P. Nos. 33120-33121 and 33237 to 33239 of 2003 and four other persons, who are not parties to the said writ petitions and W.A. Nos. 1472 to 1475 of 2005 are filed by persons who are not parties to the writ petitions, being aggrieved by the common order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 dated 16.12.2004, wherein Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act has been held to be unconstitutional. 4. W.A. Nos. 170 to 196 of 2009 are filed by the STA and Road Transport Authority (for short, ‘RTA’) and the State of Karnataka being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 33120 to 33121 of 2003 and W.P. Nos. 33237 to 33239 of 2003 connected with W.P. Nos. 4. W.A. Nos. 170 to 196 of 2009 are filed by the STA and Road Transport Authority (for short, ‘RTA’) and the State of Karnataka being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 33120 to 33121 of 2003 and W.P. Nos. 33237 to 33239 of 2003 connected with W.P. Nos. 48429 to 48438, 46814, 46815, 46816, 46817, 49936, 49937, 51804 to 51807 of 2003 and 8512 to 8513 of 2004 dated 16.12.2004, wherein the learned single Judge has held that the repeal of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003 is unconstitutional. The appellants have also challenged the order of the learned single Judge holding that the Secretary of STA cannot grant permits. 5. W.A. Nos. 5425 to 5429 of 2004 are filed by the KSRTC., being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 40338 to 40342 of 2004 dated 17.11.2004, wherein the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the Secretary, STA, cannot issue permits on behalf of the STA. 6. W.A. Nos. 20/2005, 23/2005, and 24/2005 are filed being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 27344/2003, 31515/2003 and 46558/2003 respectively dated 18.11.2004, wherein the learned single Judge has followed the decision of this Court in W.P. No. 40339 of 2004 connected with W.P. No. 40338/2004 and other cases and has held that the Secretary, STA cannot grant permits and set aside the permits. 7. The learned single Judge in the common order passed in W.P. Nos. 33120-33121 of 2003 and connected cases dated 16.12.2004 has also framed a point for determination as to whether the Secretary, STA., has got power to issue permit and answered the same by holding that the Secretary, STA., is not authorized to issue permit on behalf of the STA and wherefore, all these appeals are considered together and disposed of by this common order. In order to appreciate the facts of these cases, it is sufficient if the facts as averred in W.P. Nos. 8512/2004 and 8513/2004 are considered as the averments made in the other writ petitions are similar and identical to the averments made in the said writ petitions. 8. W.P. Nos. In order to appreciate the facts of these cases, it is sufficient if the facts as averred in W.P. Nos. 8512/2004 and 8513/2004 are considered as the averments made in the other writ petitions are similar and identical to the averments made in the said writ petitions. 8. W.P. Nos. 8512 to 8513 of 2004 are filed by the KSRTC., Staff and Workers’ Federation (hereinafter called ‘the Federation’) and another employee of the KSRTC., seeking for quashing of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9/2003, wherein, KCCA Act has been repealed. According to the averments made in the writ petitions, the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Karnataka Vs. Ranganatha Reddy ( AIR 1978 SC 215 ) and Vijayakumar Sharma Vs. State of Karnataka (AIR 1990 SC 2032) and when once the validity of the KCCA Act, which was enacted for implementing the directions contained in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India, has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the said Act has been operating successfully for 27 years, the same could not have been repealed. The repeal of KCCA Act would prejudicially affect the KSRTC., and its employees, the writ petitioners. It is also averred that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act is contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the said Act would override the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case (referred supra) and the provisions of the KCCA Act could not have been repealed under the Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003 as the said Section is contained in the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Act and wherefore, the Karnataka Act No. 9/2003 is without legislative competence. It is also averred that repeal of the KCCA Act would not in any way achieve the objects of Article 39-A of the Constitution of India and on the contrary, it would violate Articles 16 and 14 of the Constitution of India and the KSRTC., itself could have been directed to improve the services instead of repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act, which would enable the operators to obtain the contract carriage permits leniently as a matter of right and would be prejudicial to the interest of the KSRTC and its employees. 9. 9. Respondents 1, 2 and 4 in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 filed the statement of objections denying the averments made in the writ petitions that the repeal of KCCA Act would overrule the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as averred in the writ petitions. Mere fact that the provisions of the KCCA Act was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not by itself be a ground, which would disentitle repealing of the said Section and the question of overruling the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not arise and the question of removing the defect pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would also not arise as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity and has not struck down the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional. It was also averred that the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are not violated and no ground is made out to hold that the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional. 10. Respondents 5 and 6 in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 filed objections statement inter alia contending that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of repeal of KCCA Act as the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved by the repeal of the KCCA Act and KSRTC had to challenge the same and wherefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability alone. 11. Petitions in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 filed a rejoinder reiterating the averments made in the writ petitions and denying the averments made in the objections statement and prayed for overruling of the objections. 12. W.P. Nos. 33120 to 33121 of 2003, 33237 to 33239 of 2003 were filed by the KSRTC, challenging the permits issued by the respondents to the private operators and the conditions imposed therein contending that Annexures ‘A1’ to ‘A5’ to the writ petitions granting contract permits to respondent Nos. 3 to 7 to operate from Dharmasthala to Mangalore, B.C. Road to Mangalore, Puttur to Mangalore, Belthangady to Karkala and Mangalore to Uppinangady vice-versa and other routes, which are now saved are liable to be set aside as the said routes are covered under the Scheme. 3 to 7 to operate from Dharmasthala to Mangalore, B.C. Road to Mangalore, Puttur to Mangalore, Belthangady to Karkala and Mangalore to Uppinangady vice-versa and other routes, which are now saved are liable to be set aside as the said routes are covered under the Scheme. It is further averred that the order impugned in the writ petitions has been passed without affording opportunity to the petitioner – Corporation and without considering the relevant factors and no steps have been taken to curb misuse of permits by the operators and the operators have not obtained contract carriages and are in fact, operating as State Carriages. Since the jurisdiction of the Secretary, STA., to grant permits is challenged, the writ petitions are filed without filing revision before the STA. 13. W.P. Nos. 33120 to 33121 of 2003, 33237 to 33239 of 2003 were resisted by the contesting respondents contending that in view of the repeal of the KCCA Act, the grant of permit has become real and if there is any violation of the conditions imposed while granting the permit, it is open to the KSRTC., to make application for cancellation of the permit and the question of hearing the KSRTC., while granting permits to respondents 2 to 7 would not arise and permits have been granted in accordance with law and the Secretary, STA., was authorized to issue permits. 14. Writ Petition Nos. 40338 to 40342 of 2004 were filed by the KSRTC., seeking for quashing of the proceedings in Nos. KA/CC/995/STA, KA/CC/996/STA, KA/CC/997/STA, KA/CC/998/STA and KA/CC/999/STA dated 29.07.2004 made by the third respondent – Joint Commissioner for Transport and Secretary, STA on the ground that the Secretary, STA., cannot grant permission on behalf of the STA. The learned single Judge, by order dated 17.11.2004, held that the Secretary, STA., cannot grant permit. 15. Writ Petition Nos. 27344/2003 and 46558/2003 were filed by M/s. Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation (Salem Division – II) Limited being aggrieved by the resolutions passed by the first respondent – Secretary, STA., dated 31.05.2002 and 07.08.2002 respectively. Following the aforesaid order of the learned single Judge dated 17.11.2004 passed in W.P. Nos. 40338 to 40342 of 2004 and connected cases, the resolutions passed by the first respondent – Secretary, STA., impugned in the writ petitions were quashed by order dated 18.11.2004. 16. Having regard to the pleadings in W.P. Nos. Following the aforesaid order of the learned single Judge dated 17.11.2004 passed in W.P. Nos. 40338 to 40342 of 2004 and connected cases, the resolutions passed by the first respondent – Secretary, STA., impugned in the writ petitions were quashed by order dated 18.11.2004. 16. Having regard to the pleadings in W.P. Nos. 8512-8513 of 2004 and connected cases, the learned single Judge framed the following points for determination in W.P. Nos.33120-33121 of 2003 and connected cases: a) Whether the KSRTC and other corporations have got alternative remedy to question the grant of permits and the writ petitions are not maintainable? b) Whether the grant of permits in favour of contesting permit holders respondents are in accordance with section 2(7) read with Section 74 of the M.C. Act? c) Whether the Secretary of KSTA can exercise the powers under Rule 56 of the K.M.V. Rules to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the M.V. Act? d) Whether the contract carriages are operating as stage carriages? e) Whether the petitioner KSRTC Staff and Workers Federation is aggrieved person and it has no locus standi to challenge the impugned provision of Section 3 of the M.V. Act No. 9/2003, which has repealed KCCA Act? f) Whether the repeal of KCCA Act is legal and valid without removing the effect and basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and another decision in Vijayakumar Sharma though they are binding upon the State of Karnataka under Article 141 of the Constitution of India? g) Whether the State Government was justified in repealing the KCCA Act, when it was enacted to discharge the directive principles of the State Policy in compliance with the constitutional obligations as envisaged in the preamble and Part IV of the Constitution of India, which is the basic feature of the Constitution, infringing the monopoly right created for KSRTC? h) Whether the Circular bearing No. STAB/PR-02/2003-04 dated 5-4-2003 issued for incorporating terms and conditions in the permits is in conformity with Section 74 of the M.V. Act? After considering the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the learned single Judge has answered the above points for determination as follows:- (a) The writ petitions are maintainable even though there exist alternative remedy as jurisdiction is challenged. After considering the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the learned single Judge has answered the above points for determination as follows:- (a) The writ petitions are maintainable even though there exist alternative remedy as jurisdiction is challenged. (b) The permits issuedin favour of the contesting permit holders are not in accordance with Rule 7 read with Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act. (c) The Secretary, STA., cannot exercise power under the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act. (d) In the affirmative. (e) (f) and (g) by holding that the repeal of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003 is unconstitutional. (h) in the negative and accordingly, passed the following order:- “(a) Writ petitions mentioned in para (i) in the first paragraph are allowed and the contract carriage permits issued in favour of private operators are quashed. (b) W.P. No. 51604/2003 referred in para (iv) is dismissed. (c) W.P. Nos. 8512 to 8513 of 2004 mentioned in para (v) are allowed and Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No. 9/2003 repealing CCA Act is struck down as the same is violative of Article 39(b) (c) of the Constitution of India and decisions of the Apex Court and therefore unconstitutional. (d) W.P. Nos. 30657 to 30660 & 52160 to 52161 of 2003 referred to in para (ii) are dismissed. (e) W.P. Nos. 44359 & 46514 to 46515 of 2003 referred to in para (iii) are disposed of as unnecessary as question of operating contract carriages does not arise in view of quashing of the provision of Section 3 of Act of 9/2003 by repealing KCCA Act.” Before parting with the case, the learned single Judge also made observations for the future guidance of the Government and being aggrieved by the said order of the learned single Judge, the above referred appeals are filed. 17. We have heard the learned Advocate General, learned senior counsel and learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned senior counsel / learned counsel appearing for the respondents in appeals. 18. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State – appellant No. 1 in W.A. Nos. 17. We have heard the learned Advocate General, learned senior counsel and learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned senior counsel / learned counsel appearing for the respondents in appeals. 18. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State – appellant No. 1 in W.A. Nos. 170 to 196 of 2009 submitted that the impugned order of the learned single Judge in so far as it declares that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional is erroneous and calls for interference in these appeals. He submitted that the validity of the repeal Act can be challenged on the ground of lack of legislative competence of the government or on the ground that the Act repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act violates any of the fundamental rights or constitutional rights conferred upon the petitioner. The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8512-8513/2004 – Federation cannot be said to be really aggrieved person. Even assuming that it is an aggrieved person and has locus standi to file the writ petition, competence of the State to repeal the KCCA cannot be disputed as the State Government, which has competence to pass KCCA Act has power to repeal the same also. Mere fact that the provisions of the KCCA Act has been confirmed by the decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case (referred supra) would not in any way affect the power of the State Government to repeal the said Act. The constitutional validity of the KCCA Act was challenged in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case and the same was upheld and wherefore, the question of deleting the reason for which the Act was enacted would not arise as the said question would arise only where the Act is held to be unconstitutional on a particular reasoning and unless the said reasoning is removed, the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court cannot be overruled by the Legislature. In the present case, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court had confirmed the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case, it is clear that the same would not in any way affect the power of the State Government to repeal the same. In the present case, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court had confirmed the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case, it is clear that the same would not in any way affect the power of the State Government to repeal the same. Mere fact that the assent of the President had been obtained for enacting the KCCA Act, would not necessarily require the State Government to obtain the assent of the President as repeal would not involve any conflict and in fact, would resolve the conflict. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge that: the repealed Act was enacted for giving effect to the directive principles of the State policy; to protect the right of the State Transport Authority and wherefore, the same could not have been repealed; repeal of the KCCA Act, would overrule the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case; repeal of the KCCA Act would not in any way improve the situation as the State Transport Authority could itself have enhanced the Transport service and provided proper transport facility to the commuting public; the KCCA Act was in force for 27 years and nobody complained about the functioning of the Act and the object with which the said Act was repealed does not survive as this Court cannot substitute the wisdom of the legislature in taking a decision about the repeal of an enactment, can never be ground for holding that repealing of the KCCA Act is unconstitutional. The learned Advocate General has relied upon several decisions in support of his contention that: the reasons given by the learned single Judge are not grounds for setting aside an enactment, which has been passed by the legislature having legislative competence, repealing a particular Act, and that the assent of the President is not necessary for the enactment repealing the KCCA Act and the question of relegating power under the provisions of the KCCA Act, would not arise where the constitutional validity is upheld and the State has power to repeal the Act. The learned Advocate General further submitted that no ground whatever is made out for declaring the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act as unconstitutional. The learned Advocate General further submitted that no ground whatever is made out for declaring the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act as unconstitutional. Therefore, the order of the learned single Judge in so far as it declares that the repeal of the KCCA Act is unconstitutional, is liable to be set aside. 19. Sri M.C. Narasimhan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner – Federation in W.P. Nos.8512 and 8513 of 2004 submitted that the Federation has locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003, wherein, the provisions of the KCCA Act has been repealed. The learned senior counsel reiterated the grounds urged before the learned single Judge and in support of his contention, he has relied upon the decisions which were relied upon by the learned single Judge and submitted that the members of the Federation are the employees of the KSRTC., and they would be affected by repealing of the KCCA Act and wherefore, they are aggrieved persons and the validity of the KCCA Act was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that it gives effect to the directive principles of Article 39(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India and the same does not violate any of the fundamental rights. The KCCA Act would not have been repealed by the State Government when the Act was in force for 27 years without any complaint. He further submitted that the repeal of the KCCA Act which would enable the unscrupulous private operators to misuse the permits under the Act and this would affect the business of the Federation, members of which are the employees of the KSRTC. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the said repeal is also contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court could not have been overruled by repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the said repeal is also contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court could not have been overruled by repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003. The learned senior counsel has taken us through the judgments which he had relied upon in support of his contention to the effect that the Federation of the employees has locus standi to challenge the enactment repealing the KCCA Act as repeal of the said Act would have adverse impact on them and also the other contentions, which would be referred to while considering the decisions that are found to be relevant. 20. Sri S.P. Shankar, the learned senior counsel appearing for appellants in W.A. Nos. 1472-1475/2005 submitted that in view of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which has made the issue of permits liberal as compared to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and even after the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the State Transport Authority has been conferred with certain privileges and it also confers STA with power to frame scheme for the State undertaking and in view of the fact that the KCCA Act prohibited issue of contract carriage permits for contract carriages and the same was contrary to the liberalized policy under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the object of introducing the KCCA Act was to acquire the vehicles and permits, which were being unauthorizedly used as contract carriages and since the acquisition was completed and purpose of the KCCA Act has served, to keep in tune with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the repeal of the KCCA Act was necessary and the same is not unconstitutional. 21. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petitions, wherein they have challenged the order of the learned single Judge holding repeal of the KCCA Act as unconstitutional, submitted that the said order of the learned single Judge is erroneous and adopted the arguments of the learned Advocate General and the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A. Nos. 1472-1475 of 2005. 22. 1472-1475 of 2005. 22. The learned counsel appearing for the operators, who have filed appeals and who are not parties in the writ petition, being aggrieved by the declaration made by the learned single Judge regarding the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act, also reiterated the submissions of the learned Advocate General and the senior counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A. Nos. 1472 to 1475 of 2005 and submitted that the order of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside in so far as it declares the provisions of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act as unconstitutional. 23. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for respondents that the KSRTC., could not have directly approached this Court without approaching the Appellate Tribunal regarding the conditions imposed in the permit and the learned single Judge was not justified in holding that despite alternative remedy available to them, they can directly file the writ petition before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and that the Secretary to STA has no power to grant permit and it is only STA which can grant permit. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, who have preferred appeal being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge dated 16.12.2004 and also the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. Nos. 40338-40342 of 2004 and connected cases dated 17.11.2004 holding that the Secretary to STA could not have granted the permit submitted that the said finding of the learned single Judge is erroneous and liable to be set aside. 25. Having regard to the contentions urged by the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the parties as referred to above, the points that would arise for our determination in these appeals are: 1. Whether the finding of the learned single Judge that the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Staff and Workers Federation had locus standi to file that writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of repeal of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 by the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003) is justified or calls for interference in these appeals? 2. 2. Whether the finding of the learned single Judge holding that the repeal of the KCCA Act by Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 is unconstitutional and liable to be declared as such, is justified or calls for interference in these appeals? 3. Whether the finding of the learned single Judge that the Secretary to the State Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to issue permits and to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, is justified or calls for interference in these appeals? 4. Whether the order passed by the learned single Judge impugned in these appeals dated 16.12.2004 and the orders of the learned single Judge dated 17.11.2004 and 18.11.2004 are justified or calls for interference in these appeals? We answer the above points for determination as follows:- Point No.1: The finding of the learned single Judge is justified. Point No.2: The finding of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside and we hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is constitutional and the writ petitions filed by the Federation are liable to be dismissed. Point No.3: The finding of the learned single Judge is justified. Accordingly, W.A. Nos. 5425 to 5429 of 2004 and W.A. Nos.20, 23 and 24 of 2005 are liable to be dismissed. Point No.4: In view of our answer to points 1 to 3, we hold that the orders passed by the learned single Judge dated 17.11.2004 and 18.11.2004 are justified and the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 16.12.2004 in so far as it declares that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is unconstitutional, is liable to be set aside and we hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is constitutional and to that extent, W.A. Nos. 170 to 196 of 2009, W.A. Nos. 5466 to 5503 of 2004, W.A. Nos. 63 to 152 of 2005, W.A. Nos. 56 to 61 of 2005 and W.A. Nos. 1472 to 1475 of 2005 are entitled to be allowed as per the final order, for the following: REASONS 25. Point No.1: The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 170 to 196 of 2009, W.A. Nos. 5466 to 5503 of 2004, W.A. Nos. 63 to 152 of 2005, W.A. Nos. 56 to 61 of 2005 and W.A. Nos. 1472 to 1475 of 2005 are entitled to be allowed as per the final order, for the following: REASONS 25. Point No.1: The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8512 and 8513 of 2004 is the Federation and it is the contention of the respondents that the Federation has no locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of the deletion of the provisions of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003. It is clear from the provisions of the KCCA Act that under the said Act, all the Contract Carriages along with the vehicles and the staff were taken over and absorbed in the KSRTC. It cannot be denied that repeal of the KCCA Act would now enable issuance of Contract Carriage Permits, which could not have been possible but for the repeal of the Act. The members of the Federation are the employees of the KSRTC., and wherefore, the contention that the Federation has no locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is untenable and accordingly, it is held that the Federation has locus standi as rightly held by the learned single Judge and accordingly, we answer the point No.1 for determination in the affirmative. 27. Point No.2: This point for determination pertains to repeal of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003. The material on record would clearly show that the KCCA Act was enacted in 1976 with the following objects and reasons: “A large number of contract carriages were being operated in the State to the detriment of public interest and were also functioning stealthily as stage carriages. This had to be prevented. Article 39 (b) and (c) enjoins upon the State to see that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth to the common detriment. In view of the aforesaid it was considered necessary to acquire the contract carriages run by private operators. Accordingly the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1976, was promulgated. In view of the aforesaid it was considered necessary to acquire the contract carriages run by private operators. Accordingly the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1976, was promulgated. The Bill seeks to replace the Ordinance.” The constitutional validity of the KCCA Act was challenged and was ultimately upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case (referred supra) holding that the provisions of the KCCA Act were constitutional. The said Act was repealed by the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003) and the objects and reasons assigned thereto are as follows:- “214. The principal problem in the transport sector is that supply is woefully short of the growing demand for public transport services. This mismatch has put the common citizen to considerable difficulty and inconvenience. The inadequacy of passenger services run by State Transport Undertaking has resulted in several distortions including unregulated and clandestine operation of Motob Cab, Maxi Cab and private bus operators and considerable dilution of traveling comfort. The brunt of this is being borne by the rural population. 215. Over loaded in maxi cabs causing serious accidents, substituting brazenly for nationalized buses; goods vehicles like trucks and tractors designed for agricultural operations taking on passenger load on routes in adequately served by the State Transport Undertakings and roof top traveling is rampant. 216. The tax Reforms commission has examined this problem in considerable details and I quote “In adequacy of public transport facilities due to various factors seems to be creating conditions of artificial scarcity. Unless private operation is permitted to optimum operation of passenger services and consequent improvement in comfort and safety standards unlikely. 217. The Tax Reforms Commission has therefore, made a strong case for encouraging private operators to operate the services to the maximum possible extent in view of the recommendation of the planning commission report, the contract carriage acquisition Act has been repealed in the interest of passengers comfort and safety. This has paved way for operation of Contract Carriage service throughout the state.” The validity of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 was challenged in the writ petition before the learned single Judge by the Federation. This has paved way for operation of Contract Carriage service throughout the state.” The validity of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 was challenged in the writ petition before the learned single Judge by the Federation. It is well settled that an Act is presumed to be constitutional unless the petitioners aver and prove that the same is unconstitutional on the ground that the Legislature, which had passed the enactment has no legislative competence or that it is contrary to the right conferred under Part III of the Constitution of India or constitutional principles. 28. The learned single Judge has held that the petitioners have proved that the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 is unconstitutional for the following Reasons: “1. The provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act, which has been constitutionally upheld in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case (referred supra) would amount to nullifying the decisions of the Apex Court in the said cases. The learned single Judge held that there is no power or authority available to the State Government to repeal the Act, the constitutional validity of which has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. If at all the Government wants to provide relief to the general public, it should have thought of alternative law or amendment to the relevant statutes. 2. The KCCA Act had received the assent of the President of India and the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act was not sent for the assent of the President of India. The KCCA Act was enacted under Entry No.42 of concurrent list III of VII Schedule of the Constitution of India and the same could not have been repealed by the State under Entry No.57 of List II of VII Schedule without the assent of the President. 3. The KCCA Act was in force for the last 27 years. When it was in force, no contract carriage permits were granted either by the STA or RTA in the State until it was abolished. Despite that, there were alternative transport services such as Maxi Cabs, Tempo Travellers, Auto-Rickshaws etc. Consequent upon upholding of the KCCA Act by the Apex Court, the private operators kept quiet and nobody raised any voice. Even in the absence of contract carriages, life of the citizens in the State was normal. 4. Despite that, there were alternative transport services such as Maxi Cabs, Tempo Travellers, Auto-Rickshaws etc. Consequent upon upholding of the KCCA Act by the Apex Court, the private operators kept quiet and nobody raised any voice. Even in the absence of contract carriages, life of the citizens in the State was normal. 4. Assuming that there was inadequate public transport facility, that could not have been the ground for the State Legislature for repealing the KCCA Act. The State Government should have taken steps to see that the State owned Transport undertaking Corporations function effectively to achieve the object and intentment of the KCCA Act as the said Corporations are under the control, Administration and Management of the State Government. 5. By repealing the KCCA Act, nothing happened except paving way for operating contract carriages which is not only contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court but also the preamble and directive principles of the State policy under the Constitution. In order to augment the situation, instead of repealing the KCCA Act, grant of more and more permits to the State owned Transport undertaking Corporations directing them to operate their services would have solved the problem of the public commuters. This endeavor has not been done by the State Government and therefore it cannot blame the corporations. 6. On the other hand, contract carriages are re-introduced by repealing the KCCA Act, which is not permissible in law, as it tantamounts to taking away the basic feature of the Constitution. The Apex Court in exercise of its judicial review power under the Constitution of India has upheld the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act after careful consideration and interpretation of the provisions of the said Act.” The learned single Judge further held that in view of the reasons assigned by him as referred to above, the objects and reasons sought to be achieved by repealing the KCCA Act can never be achieved by repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act and wherefore, the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act was unconstitutional. 29. 29. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have to consider as to whether the above said finding of the learned single Judge declaring Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 as unconstitutional, is justified or calls for interference in these appeals. It is well settled that mere fact that the constitutional validity of the Act has been upheld i.e., in the present case, the KCCA Act has been upheld in Ranganathareddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case (referred supra), would not in any way fetter the power of the State Legislature to repeal the provisions of the KCCA Act. Even the question of making good the reasoning of the Supreme Court or the defect pointed out does not arise. On the other hand, where the provisions of the KCCA Act has been declared as unconstitutional pointing out certain deficiencies and defects, unless those deficiencies are rectified and the defects are removed, the Act cannot be re-enacted, which would not be the case in case, where the constitutional validity of the Act has been upheld as in the present case, where the provisions of the KCCA Act were held to be constitutional by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case. 30. It is well settled that a power to make a law with respect to the topics committed to Parliament or State Legislatures carries with it a power to repeal a law on those topics. Subject to any constitutional restriction, the general rule is that “the power of a legislative body to repeal a law is coextensive with its power to enact such a law,” and a Legislature which has no power to enact a law on a particular subject-matter has also no power to repeal the same (Ramakrishna Vs. Janpad Sabha, AIR 1962 SC 1073 ). It is also well settled that a Legislature, however, has no power to bind itself or its successor as to the course of future legislation for to acknowledge such a power will mean that a Legislature can curtail its own or its successor’s powers which are conferred by the Constitution and which cannot be restricted or taken away except by an amendment of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh Vs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh Vs. Union of India and others ((2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1) has laid down as under:- “36. Parliament in its plenary power, can make an outright repeal which will not only destroy the effectiveness of the repealed Act in future, but also operate to destroy all existing inchoate rights and pending proceedings. This is because the effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it completely from the record, except to the extent of savings. If Parliament specifically excludes any saving clause in a repealing Act, or severely abridges the provision for savings, which it has the power to do, the effect would be that after the repeal of the statue, no proceeding can continue, nor can any punishment be inflicted for violation of the statue during its currency.” Therefore, in view of the above said reasoning, it is clear that the reason assigned by the learned single Judge that since the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act had been upheld in Ranganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s (referred supra), the same cannot be repealed, cannot be sustained. Similarly, the reasoning of the learned single Judge that the KCCA Act had received the assent of the President of India and the repealing Act i.e., the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 is unconstitutional for want of the assent of the President of India, cannot be sustained. It is well settled in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in John B James and Others vs. B.D.A. ( 2001 (1) Kar.L.J. 364 ) that when there is conflict between the enactment of the State and the Legislature, the same has to be referred to the President of India for the assent of the President and repeal of an enactment would never create any conflict and wherefore, the question of obtaining the assent of the President for repealing the KCCA Act though it had received the assent of the President of India does not arise. There is also no merit in the reasoning of the learned single Judge that the repeal of the KCCA Act is without legislative competence as the same is not done in exercise of the power under Entry 42 of the concurrent list III of VII schedule of the Constitution of India and the same has been passed under Entry 57 of list II of VII schedule as it is clear that the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 (Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003) pertain not only to the amendment of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act but also repeal of the KCCA Act under Section 3 of the said Act. While introducing the bill, separate statement of objects and reasons have been assigned in respect of repeal of the provisions of the KCCA Act as follows:- “It is considered necessary to amend the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1957) and to repeal the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1976) to give effect to the proposals made in the Budget Speech and matters connected therewith. Certain consequential amendments are also made. Hence, the Bill.” Therefore, it is clear that the competence of the Karnataka State Legislature, which had passed the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act cannot be disputed and the same is traceable to Entry 42 of VII Schedule, the Entry under which the KCCA Act, 1976 had been enacted, namely, Acquisition and requisitioning of property. Therefore, the reasoning of the learned single Judge that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is beyond legislative competence cannot be sustained. Therefore, the reasoning of the learned single Judge that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is beyond legislative competence cannot be sustained. So far as the other reasons assigned by the learned single Judge for holding that the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional i.e., the statement of objects and reasons sought to be achieved under the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act would not be achieved; it would have been better if more permits were provided by the State Government to the State owned Transport Undertaking Corporations; the KCCA Act was in force for 27 years and there was no objection from the private operators and life of the citizens would be normal even in the absence of the contract carriages, cannot at all be accepted as they are not relevant factors to find out the constitutional validity of the Act. It is well settled that when once the petitioners have failed to prove either legislative incompetence of the State Legislature in passing the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 or the fact that the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 violates a fundamental right or any constitutional principle or any constitutional right, the question of declaring Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act as unconstitutional does not arise. It is well settled that the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge as referred to above, cannot be a ground for holding that the provisions of Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 is unconstitutional as it is not within the province of this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the legislature to find out as to whether the objects and reasons assigned by the Legislature would be really achieved by the repeal of the KCCA Act and as to whether better alternative steps could have been taken instead of repealing the provisions of Section 3 of the KCCA Act as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 SC 724 ) as follows: “It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the legislature concerned. Dependent upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised. The motives of the legislature in passing a statue is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether the legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statue before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the courts.” It may also be noted that it is not the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners that repealing of the KCCA Act would in any way affect their fundamental right or any constitutional right or any constitutional principle, but, it is their case that the KCCA Act was enacted for implementing the directive principles of the State policy under Article 39(a) of the Constitution of India and the same was held to be constitutional and not violating Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranaganatha Reddy’s case and Vijayakumar Sharma’s case and wherefore, Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional as the same would amount to overruling the said judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This contention has also been rejected while considering the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. Under the circumstances, we hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is constitutional and the writ petitions filed by the Federation are liable to be dismissed and the finding given by the learned single Judge in the writ petitions filed by the Federation to the effect that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003 repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional is liable to be set aside. 31. Point No.3: This point relates to the question as to whether the Secretary to STA, can exercise power of the STA under Rule 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 31. Point No.3: This point relates to the question as to whether the Secretary to STA, can exercise power of the STA under Rule 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules to discharge the functions under Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The same question would also arise for determination in W.A. Nos.5425 to 5429 of 2005 and W.A. Nos.20, 23 and 24 of 2005, wherein also, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the Secretary to the STA., cannot exercise the functions of the STA and remanded the matter to the STA to consider the proceedings in accordance with law. The judgment in the main matter is contained in W.P. No.40339/2004 c/w W.P. Nos.40338/2004, 40340 to 40342/2004 and connected cased disposed of on 17.12.2004, which in turn, has been followed in W.P. Nos.27344/2003, 31515/2003 and 46558/2003 disposed of on 18.11.2004. The learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 33237 to 33239 of 2003 and connected cased disposed of on 16.12.2004 has also held that the Secretary, STA., has no authority to exercise power of the STA and answered the point for determination as referred to above. 32. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the respondents, whose permits have been set aside by the learned single Judge after remand, have obtained permits from the STA., and only during the relevant period, the Secretary to the STA/RTA has been authorized to issue permits and therefore, the said practice has been discontinued and the STA and RTA are issuing permits and wherefore, the above said appeals filed by KSRTC., are liable to be dismissed. 33. It is clear from the material on record that Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with the general provisions as to applications for permits, which reads as follows:- “69. 33. It is clear from the material on record that Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with the general provisions as to applications for permits, which reads as follows:- “69. General Provision as to applications for permits:- (1) Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles: Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles: Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in the case of any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under that sub-section shall be made to the State Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business.” Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act regarding the grant of Contract Carriage Act reads as follows:- “74. Grant of contract carriage permit:- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 73, grant a contract carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit: Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any area not specified in the application. (2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:- (i) that the vehicles shall be used only in a specified area or on a specified route or routes; (ii) that except in accordance with specified conditions, no contract of hiring, other than an extension or modification of a subsisting contract, may be entered into outside the specified area; (iii) the maximum number of passengers and the maximum weight of luggage that may be carried on the vehicles, either generally or on specified occasions or at specified times and seasons; (iv) the conditions subject to which goods may be carried in any contract carriage in addition to, or to the exclusion of, passengers; (v) that, in the case of motor-cabs, specified fares or rates of fares shall be charged and a copy of the fare table shall be exhibited on the vehicle; (vi) that, in the case of vehicles other than motor-cabs, specified rates of hiring not exceeding specified maximum shall be charged; (vii) that, in the case of motor-cabs, a specified weight of passengers’ luggage shall be carried free of charge, and that the charge, if any, for any luggage in excess thereof shall be at a specified rate; (viii) that, in the case of motor-cabs, a taximeter shall be fitted and maintained in proper working order, if prescribed; (ix) that the Regional Transport Authority may, after giving notice of not less than one month,- (a) vary the conditions of the permit; (b) attach to the permit further conditions; (x) that the conditions of permit shall not be departed from save with the approval of the Regional Transport Authority; (xi) that specified standards of comfort and cleanliness shall be maintained in the vehicles; (xii) that, except in the circumstances of exceptional nature, the plying of the vehicle or carrying of the passengers shall not be refused; (xiii) any other conditions which may be prescribed. (3)(a) The State Government shall, if so directed by the Central Government, having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct a State Transport Authority and a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of contract carriages generally or of any specified type, as may be fixed and specified in the notification, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less than five lakhs. (b) Where the number of contract carriages are fixed under clause (a), the Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for the grant of permit in respect of any such contract carriage, have regard to the following matters, namely:- (i) financial stability of the applicant; (ii) satisfactory performance as a contract carriage operator including payment of tax if the applicant is or has been an operator of contract carriages; and (iii) such other matters as may be prescribed by the State Government: Provided that, other conditions being equal, preference shall be given to applications for permits from- (i) the Indian Tourism Development Corporation; (ii) State Tourism Development Corporations; (iii) State Tourism Departments; (iv) State Transport Undertakings; (v) Co-operative societies registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment for the time being in force; (vi) ex-servicemen.” Rule 54 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 prescribes the conduct of business of transport authorities. Rule 56 of the K.M.V. Rules deals with delegation of powers by the State Transport Authority and the same reads as under:- “56. Delegation of powers by State Transport Authority:- (1) The State Transport Authority may, by a general or special resolution recorded in its proceedings, delegates:- (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx (d) its power to grant a permit other than a stage carriage permit on an application made to the chairman or Secretary or any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of a Regional Transport Officer with reference to the notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 69;” It is clear from the above said provisions of the Act and the Rules that the STA., comprises of High ranking officials and the said functions, which are required to be discharged by the STA., cannot be delegated to the Secretary as the Secretary to STA., cannot discharge the functions of the STA in granting permits. In fact, before the learned single Judge having regard to the provisions of the K.M.V. Act, the learned Advocate General had also fairly conceded that the STA cannot delegate its power of issuing permits to the Secretary. Valid reasons have also been assigned in the order of the learned single Judge, which is challenged in W.A. Nos.5425 to 5429 of 2005 and W.A. Nos.20, 23 and 24 of 2005 as to why the power of issuing permits cannot be delegated to the Secretary after quoting the provisions of the K.M.V. Act and the K.M.V. Rules as referred to above. The learned single Judge has held that when the jurisdiction to grant permits is conferred successfully on the STA and the RTA., as the case may be, looking into the scheme of the K.M.V. Act, it cannot be delegated to the Secretary, STA., or RTA., as the intention of the Legislature is very much clear that RTA and STA should be headed by persons who have had judicial experience as grant of permit is a quasi judicial function and not pure administrative function and the said function cannot be delegated to the inferior Ministerial officer and the authority in which discretion is vested has to exercise its own judgment because the Legislature has placed trust in its judgment. Therefore, the finding of the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos.33237 to 33239 of 2003 and connected cases disposed of on 16.12.2004 and the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P. 40338 to 40342 of 2004 dated 17.11.2004, which has been followed in Writ Petition Nos.27344/2003, 31515/2003 and 46558/2003 disposed of on 18.11.2004 is justified. The learned single Judge after holding that the permit cannot be granted by the Secretary to the STA/RTA has passed the following order in the above said judgment dated 17.11.2004. “(i) Rules-55 & 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules-1989 are declared as nullity in law and Ultra Vires of the Motor Vehicles Act and consequently, they are struck down. (ii) The State Transport Authority has jurisdiction to consider and dispose of the applications for grant of “Contract Carriage Permits” and “Stage Carriage Permits”. (iii) Secretary of STA/RTA cannot be delegated with power of issuing contract carriage/stage carriage permits and to perform the duties of RTA/STA under Rules 55 & 56 of Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules. (ii) The State Transport Authority has jurisdiction to consider and dispose of the applications for grant of “Contract Carriage Permits” and “Stage Carriage Permits”. (iii) Secretary of STA/RTA cannot be delegated with power of issuing contract carriage/stage carriage permits and to perform the duties of RTA/STA under Rules 55 & 56 of Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules. And consequently The Resolution passed by the Karnataka State Transport Authority, Bangalore in its meeting held on 20-12-1995/21-12-1995 vide Sl. No. 19 of Sub. No. 25/95-96 delegating the power to its Secretary to consider the applications for grant “Contract Carriage Permits” is declared as without authority of law and consequently, the same is quashed. (iv) The impugned orders passed by the Secretaries of Regional Transport Authority/Karnataka State Transport Authority, granting/renewing the “Stage Carriage Permits” / “Contract Carriage Permits” in favour of the respondents-private operators in all these writ petitions are quashed. (v) The private operators can operate their contract carriages after obtaining permits in accordance with law, as the existing schemes framed by the State Government do not prohibit them to do so. (vi) The Contract Carriage Operators cannot ply their buses as stage carriages. The concerned authorities of the State Government are directed to initiate action against erring contract carriage permit holders in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above. (vii) However, keeping in mind, the inconvenience that would be caused to public at large and as the Respondents-private operators are operating their “Contract Carriages” since long time pursuant to the impugned orders/permits, they are permitted to operate their services for a period of three months from today subject to payment of taxes, despite the aforesaid order. The private operators-respondents are at liberty to approach the concerned Regional Transport Authority/State Transport Authority as the case may be for getting the permits afresh, in accordance with law, within four weeks from today. (vii) In case if the applications are filed by the Respondents-private operators for grant of fresh permits, the Regional Transport Authorities or State Transport Authorities or State Transport Authority as the case may be directed to dispose of those applications on merits after hearing KSRTC, within three months from today.” Accordingly, the said appeals W.A. Nos.5425 to 5429 of 2004 and W.A. Nos.20, 23 and 24 of 2005 are liable to be dismissed. 34. 34. Point No.4: In view of our answer to points 1 to 3, we answer point No.4 by holding that the orders passed by the learned single Judge dated 17.11.2004 and 18.11.2004 are justified and the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 16.12.2004 in so far as it declares that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is unconstitutional, is liable to be set aside and we hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka Act No.9/2003 repealing the provisions of the KCCA Act is constitutional and to that extent, W.A. Nos.170 to 196 of 2009, W.A. Nos.5466 to 5503 of 2004, W.A. Nos.63 to 152 of 2005, W.A. Nos.56 to 61 of 2005 and W.A. Nos.1472 to 1475 of 2005 are entitled to be allowed and accordingly, we pass the following Order:- i. W.A. Nos.5425 to 5429 of 2004 and W.A. Nos.20, 23 and 24 of 2005 are dismissed. ii. We hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No.9/2003) repealing the provisions of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 is constitutional and to that extent, W.A. Nos.170 to 196 of 2009, W.A. Nos.5466 to 5503 of 2004, W.A. Nos.63 to 152 of 2005, W.A. Nos.56 to 61 of 2005 and W.A. Nos.1472 to 1475 of 2005 are allowed.