Elipe Dharma Rao, J.:-The petitioner is the Head of Department, Department of Preventive and Social Medicine of the Jawaharlal Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education and Research, Puducherry (‘JIPMER’, in short). For certain alleged irregularities and misconducts, by two different proceedings dated 8.10.2010, the petitioner was not only placed under suspension, but was also issued with a charge memo, with four charges. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged both the suspension order and the charge memo before the first respondent Tribunal. Hence, he has come forward to file both these writ petitions, challenging the orders passed by the Tribunal. 2. The case of the petitioner is that over a period of time, the respondents 3 and 4 (Mr.K.S.V.K.Subbarao, Director and Dr.K.S.Reddy, Dean of JIPMER respectively) had been towing together and hatching a plan to keep the petitioner away from the Institute, so that they can do whatever they want. He further stated that he has given complaints dated 31.5.2010 and 17.6.2010 to the second respondent, who had also agreed to conduct an enquiry against the respondents 3 and 4 and though an enquiry was conducted, the minutes of the meeting were declined to be furnished to the petitioner by the third respondent and hence, the petitioner himself drew the minutes from out of his memory and sent them to the third respondent, which were not disputed by the third respondent/Director. The petitioner further states that in such circumstances, the enquiry on his petition should be conducted by the 2nd respondent, but, on pure imagination, the charge memo has been issued signed by the third respondent against whom he (the petitioner) has already preferred complaint with the second respondent. He has further stated that the respondents 3 and 4, in order to see that the issues relating to them does not crop-up, have pre-empted by engineering to issue the order of suspension and the charge memo. Thus, in a nut shell, the main ground of the petitioner in these two writ petitions is that the entire action of the respondents is vitiated on account of bias and mala fides. 3. The second respondent filed a common counter affidavit, rebutting all the allegations made by the petitioner. Thus, in a nut shell, the main ground of the petitioner in these two writ petitions is that the entire action of the respondents is vitiated on account of bias and mala fides. 3. The second respondent filed a common counter affidavit, rebutting all the allegations made by the petitioner. It is the case of the respondents that there is no bias or mala fide action on their part and this fact has been properly analysed by the Tribunal and hence, no interference of this Court is called for. 4. We heard, at length, the arguments of Ms.R.Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.Mohan Parasaran, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the second respondent and Mr.Parthasarathy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 3 and 4 in both these matters. 5. As has been referred to by us supra, the prime contention of the petitioner, in challenge to the suspension order and the charge memo. issued against him, is that both the said actions of the respondents are the result of bias and mala fide intention, as the third respondent, against whom he made allegations, has signed both the suspension order and the charge memo and in fact, the order of suspension and the charge memo have emanated from the report given by Dr.V.I.Mathan Committee, in which the third respondent was also a member. It has also been argued on his behalf that Dr.V.I.Mathan Committee was primarily constituted to go into the complaint lodged by the petitioner against the third respondent and the various irregularities happening in JIPMER. 6. Ms.R.Vaigai, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions, has argued that since the action of the respondents is a clear case of bias and mala fide intention, which has been deprecated by the upper forums of law time and again, the impugned orders of suspension and charge memo need to be quashed. In support of her arguments, the learned counsel has taken us through various documents filed in the typed set of papers, including various complaints sent by the petitioner against various persons, including the respondents 3 and 4 to the second respondent. The learned counsel would rely on the following judgments: 1. A.K.Kraipak And Others vs. Union Of India And Others [ 1969(2) SCC 262 ]; 2. The learned counsel would rely on the following judgments: 1. A.K.Kraipak And Others vs. Union Of India And Others [ 1969(2) SCC 262 ]; 2. Ranjit Thakur vs. Union Of India And Others [ (1987) 4 SCC 611 ]; 3.DR.(MRS.) Kirthi Deshmankar vs. Union Of India And Others [ (1991) 1 SCC 104 ]; 4. Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan vs. Kamala Prasad Shukla And Others [1995 SUPP (1) SCC 21]; 5. State Of W.B. And Others vs. Shivananda Pathak And Others [ (1998) 5 SCC 513 ]; 6. Badrinath vs. Government Of Tamil Nadu And Others [ (2000) 8 SCC 395 ]; 7. Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant And Others [ (2001) 1 SCC 182 ]; 8.Cantonment Executive Officer And Another vs. VIJAY D.Wani And Others [ (2008) 12 SCC 230 ]; 9. A.U.Kureshi vs. High Court Of Gujarat And Another [ (2009) 11 SCC 84 ]; 10. Mohd. Yunus Khan vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others [ (2010) 10 SCC 539 ]. 7. All these judgments of the Honourable Apex Court deal with the aspect of ‘bias’. 8. In the first judgment cited above, reported in 1969(2) SCC 262 , a Five Judge Constitutional Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: “The real question is not whether he was biased, for it is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias and a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. In deciding the question of bias human probabilities and ordinary course of conduct must be taken into consideration.” “Where a complaint is made before a court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened the court to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” “If the decision of the Selection Board is vitiated, the final recommendation made by the Union Public Service Commission must also be vitiated, for they cannot be dissociated from the selections made by the selection board which is the foundation for the recommendations of Union Public Service Commission.” 9. In the second judgment cited above, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: “It is the essence of a judgment that it is made after due observance of the judicial process, that the court or tribunal passing it observe at least the minimal requirements of natural justice and is composed of impartial persons acting fairly and without bias and in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial “coram non-judice”. The test of real likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely and whether the authority concerned was likely to be disposed to decide the matter only in a particular way. What is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however honestly, “Am I biased?”; but to look at the mind of the party before him. In the present case having regard to the antecedent events, the participation of the officer concerned (respondent 4) in the court-martial rendered the proceedings coram non-judice.” 10. In the third judgment cited above, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 104 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “.... It was not necessary to establish bias. It is sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it is shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias.” 11. In the fourth judgment cited above, reported in 1995 supp.(1) SCC 21, the Honourable Apex Court has held: “There is a distinction between a defect in the enquiry and a lapse which almost destroys the enquiry. Where the lapse is of the enquiry being conducted by an officer deeply biased against the delinquent or one of them being so biased that the entire enquiry proceedings are rendered void, the appellate authority cannot repair the damage done to the enquiry. Where the lapse is of the enquiry being conducted by an officer deeply biased against the delinquent or one of them being so biased that the entire enquiry proceedings are rendered void, the appellate authority cannot repair the damage done to the enquiry. Where one of the members of the Enquiry Committee has a strong hatred or bias against the delinquent of which the other members know not or the said member is in a position to influence the decision making, the entire record of the enquiry will be slanted and any independent decision taken by the appellate authority on such tainted record cannot undo the damage done. Besides where a delinquent is asked to appear before a committee of which one member is deeply hostile towards him, the delinquent would be greatly handicapped in conducting his defence as he would be inhibited by the atmosphere prevailing in the enquiry room. Justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. It would not so appear to the delinquent if one of the members of the Enquiry Committee has a strong bias against him. However, the bias must be strong and hostile and not a mere allegation of bias of a superior having rebuked him in the past or the like.” (emphasis supplied by us) 12. In the fifth judgment cited above, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 513 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “Bias may be defined as a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or predetermination to decide a case or an issue in a particular manner, so much so that such predisposition does not leave the mind open to conviction. It is, in fact, a condition of mind, which sways judgments and renders the judge unable to exercise impartiality in a particular case.” “It may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias. But the courts, for this reason, cannot be said to be in a crippled state. There are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case or applying the tests of “real likelihood of bias” or “reasonable suspicion of bias”. “Reasonable suspicion” test looks mainly to outward appearances while “real likelihood” test focuses on the court’s own evaluation of the probabilities.” “Bias has many forms. It may be pecuniary bias, personal bias, bias as to subject-matter in dispute, or policy bias etc. “Reasonable suspicion” test looks mainly to outward appearances while “real likelihood” test focuses on the court’s own evaluation of the probabilities.” “Bias has many forms. It may be pecuniary bias, personal bias, bias as to subject-matter in dispute, or policy bias etc. The present case deals with a new form of bias, namely, bias on account of judicial obstinacy. “ 13. In the sixth judgment cited above, reported in (2000) 8 SCC 395 , the Honourable Apex Court has observed in the following lines: “75. The leading case on the question of reasonable likelihood of bias is the one in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr.Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School [ (1993) 4 SCC 10 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1106: (1993) 25 ATC 449]. This Court held in that case that the test was one of “real likelihood” of bias even if such bias was not in fact the direct cause. It was held there, a real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. The question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. The test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. It was stated: (SCC p.21, para 11): “The test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” The above ruling is an authority also for the view that though the plea is not raised during the inquiry proceedings, if it is raised in the High Court, it is sufficient as it goes to the root of the question and is based on “admitted and uncontroverted facts” and does not require any further investigation of facts.” (emphasis by us) 14. In the seventh judgment cited above, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: “The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom – in the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias, the administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular court, Tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and in that regard the Locabail case [Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., 2000 QB 451] was rightly decided.” 15. In the eighth judgment cited above, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 230 , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: “Question of bias is always a question of fact. The court has to be vigilant while applying principles of bias as it primarily depends on facts of each case. The court should only act on real bias not merely on likelihood of bias.” “In the present case, so far as the members of the Committee who conducted a disciplinary inquiry were also the members of the Cantonment Board where the report was to be considered, decided and whether to accept it or not, and finding the respondent guilt or not. The fact was that these three persons who conducted inquiry were also members of the Board and that Board was to take a decision in the matter whether the report submitted by the enquiry committee should be accepted or not. Participation of these three members in the Committee has given rise to real apprehension in the mind of the respondent that he will not get a fair justice in the matter because three members who submitted the report would be interested to see that their report should be accepted. The bias in this case cannot be said to be unreal, it is very much real and substantial and the respondent was not likely to get a fair deal by such disciplinary committee.” “A person cannot be a judge in his own cause. The bias in this case cannot be said to be unreal, it is very much real and substantial and the respondent was not likely to get a fair deal by such disciplinary committee.” “A person cannot be a judge in his own cause. Once disciplinary committee finds an incumbent guilty; they cannot sit in the judgment to punish the man on the basis of opinion formed by them. Objectivity is the hallmark of judicial system in India. The very fact that the disciplinary committee which found the respondent guilty participated in the decision-making process for finding him guilty and to dismiss him from service is bias which is apparent and real.” 16. In the ninth judgment cited above, reported in (2009) 11 SCC 84 , the Honourable Apex Court has observed that ‘the High Court Judge who was a member of the Disciplinary Committee (on administrative side) which proposed appellant’s (a judicial officer) dismissal, should not have subsequently heard (on judicial side) appellant’s application against dismissal, for the reason that proposal made by the Disciplinary Committee was a vital component of the process by which the High Court recommended to the State Government that the appellant should be dismissed.’ 17. In the tenth judgment cited above, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: “29. Thus, the legal position emerges that if a person appears as a witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an enquiry officer nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority. This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Anyone who has personal interest in the disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders the order null and void.” 18. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Anyone who has personal interest in the disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders the order null and void.” 18. Relying on the above judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that since the petitioner is all along complaining against the third respondent, the report of the committee headed by Dr.V.I.Mathan, former Director, CMC, Vellore, (wherein the third respondent was also a member) which paved way for action against the petitioner, should not have been taken into consideration by the respondents and therefore, such of the action of the respondents resulting in suspension and issuance of charge memo to the petitioner are all vitiated, being perpetrated as a result of bias and mala fide intention of the third respondent and other respondents. 19. On the other hand, Mr.Mohan Parasaran, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India would argue that the Committee headed by Dr.V.I.Mathan, former Director, CMC, Vellore, was constituted to look into various complaints made by the petitioner against others and at that time, there was no complaint made by the petitioner against the third respondent and the said Committee, affording all reasonable opportunities to the petitioner, with personal discussion with him, has ultimately found that there is no iota of truth in any of the allegations made by the petitioner in his complaints, but has pinpointed certain gross derelictions and violations committed by the petitioner in his official capacity. This report, along with many other documentary evidence, culminated in initiation of present disciplinary action against the petitioner. The learned Additional Solicitor General would further argue that since the very proceedings initiated before the Tribunal are premature as the petitioner has rushed to the Tribunal even before completion of the enquiry proceedings and without even participating in the enquiry proceedings and that Mr.P.C.Hota (the 5th respondent in W.P.No.9616 of 2011), an independent person and not connected with the second respondent Institute and the former Chairperson of Union Public Service Commission has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer to inquire into all the charges made against the petitioner, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court. He has further argued that petitioner has filed the O.As. He has further argued that petitioner has filed the O.As. before the Tribunal only with a view to thwart the in-house inquiry. It has also been argued by him that all opportunities will be afforded to the petitioner in the enquiry and if the charges are held proved, punishment will be imposed only by the Governing Body of the Institute as per the provisions of the JIPMER regulations, 2008 and not by the third respondent and the decision of the Governing Body can be appealed against to the Institute Body whose composition is indicated in Section 5 of the JIPMER Act, 2008. He further argued that as per the provisions of Rule 23 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 read with Schedule VIII of the JIPMER Regulations, the appellate authority for deciding any appeal by faculty members of the Institute is the Institute Body and the petitioner has chosen not to either avail the remedy of appeal before the appropriate authority or to appear before the independent enquiry officer but has chosen to approach directly for judicial review, which should not be encouraged. In support of his arguments, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India, would cite the following judgments: 1.Union Of India And Others vs. Upendra Singh [ (1994) 3 SCC 357 ]; 2. Tansport Commissioner, Madras-5 vs. A.Radha Krishna Moorthy [ (1995) 1 SCC 332 ]; 3. Union Of India And Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 ] and 4. Union Of India And Others vs. Alok Kumar [ (2010) 5 SCC 349 ]. 20. In the first judgment cited above, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be.” 21. In the second judgment cited above, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “The truth and correctness of the charges was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into – more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. Even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/ charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence, i.e., where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision-making process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law.” 22. In the third judgment cited above, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “It is well settled that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice.” “A writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” “Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” “Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.” 23. In the fourth judgment cited above, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 349 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: “Earlier, in some of the cases, the Supreme Court had taken a view that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself prejudice and no other de facto prejudice needs to be proved. In regard to statutory rules, the prominent view was that violation of mandatory statutory rules would tantamount to prejudice but where the rule is merely directory, element of de facto prejudice needs to be pleaded and shown. With the development of law, rigidity in these rules is somewhat relaxed. Instance of de facto prejudice has been accepted as an essential feature where there is violation of non-mandatory rules or violation of natural justice as it is understood in its common parlance. In a departmental inquiry, where the department relies upon a large number of documents majority of which are furnished and an opportunity is granted to the delinquent officer to defend himself except that some copies of formal documents had not been furnished to the delinquent, the onus is upon the employee to show that non-furnishing of these formal documents has resulted in de facto prejudice and he has been put to a disadvantage as a result thereof. Departmental enquiry cannot be held to be vitiated merely because the enquiry officer was a retired officer, for the reason that the respondents have not shown that they have suffered prejudice because of appointment of retired railway officers as enquiry officers.” “73. From the records before us, it appears that the circular issued by the Vigilance Department was actually asked for by the delinquent officer in the application filed before the Tribunal and even in the reply filed before the High Court. From the records before us, it appears that the circular issued by the Vigilance Department was actually asked for by the delinquent officer in the application filed before the Tribunal and even in the reply filed before the High Court. It is nowhere stated what was the relevancy of this alleged CVC note, whether it had actually been taken into consideration and, whether it had caused prejudice to the delinquent officer. All these ingredients are not satisfied in the records before us. It is a settled rule of departmental proceedings that it is for the delinquent officer to specifically raise such an issue and discharge the onus of prejudice. The concept of prejudice, we shall discuss shortly. But for the present, we are only discussing its factual aspect and the law relating thereto...” “76. From the aforenoticed facts it is clear that there is nothing on record to show that the alleged CVC notes have actually been taken into consideration and that the same have affected the mind of the disciplinary authority while considering the defence of the delinquent officer and imposing punishment upon him. Unless such notes were actually considered and had some prejudicial effect to the interest of the delinquent officer, it will not be necessary for the court to interfere in the departmental enquiry proceedings on that ground.” 24. Relying on the above judgments, the learned Additional Solicitor General would argue that since it is only the show-cause notice and the suspension order that are being challenged by the petitioner, the petitioner should be directed to take part in the enquiry proceedings, by dismissing these two writ petitions, being not maintainable, since being premature. 25. Since the maintainability of these two writ petitions has been questioned by the learned Additional Solicitor General on the ground that they are pre-mature, we have to first consider whether these two writ petitions are maintainable. Maintainability: 26. No doubt, ordinarily no writ will lie against a charge-sheet or a show-cause notice, as has been repeatedly held by the Honourable Apex Court, like the one in Union Of India And Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 ]. But, at the same time, there is no complete bar regarding filing and entertaining of such writ petitions. No doubt, ordinarily no writ will lie against a charge-sheet or a show-cause notice, as has been repeatedly held by the Honourable Apex Court, like the one in Union Of India And Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 ]. But, at the same time, there is no complete bar regarding filing and entertaining of such writ petitions. If the Court finds that the impugned charge-sheet or show-cause notice has been slapped on a particular person, wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason, the writ petition is very well maintainable. In the case on hand, though the petitioner is challenging the charge-sheet issued to him, he challenges the same on the ground of bias, which is a question of fact to be gone into. If the element of bias is proved, it will cut the root of the case of the respondents, thus paving way for the petitioner to claim a clean chit. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we have no hesitation to hold that both these writ petitions are very well maintainable. Bias: 27. The material on record would show that based on various complaints made by the petitioner, the second respondent has constituted a Committee under the chairmanship of Dr.V.I.Mathan, former Director, CMC, Vellore. Page No.2 of the typed set of papers filed by the second respondent would show that ‘President, JIPMER has passed an order that a Committee under chairmanship of Dr.V.I.Mathan, former Director, CMC, Vellore will look into the representations and submit a report within a month.’ This order of the second respondent is dated 29.4.2010. The members of the Committee, as could be seen from Page No.2-A of the same typed set of papers, are: 1.Dr.Jayaprakash Muliyil, HoD of Community Medicine, CMC, Vellore 2.Dr.Lalit Nath, former HoD of Community Medicine, AIIMS 3.Dr.Rajesh Kumar, Professor & HoD of Public Health School, PGIMER, Chandigarh and 4.Dr.K.S.V.K.Subba Rao, Director, JIPMER. 28. The members of the Committee, as could be seen from Page No.2-A of the same typed set of papers, are: 1.Dr.Jayaprakash Muliyil, HoD of Community Medicine, CMC, Vellore 2.Dr.Lalit Nath, former HoD of Community Medicine, AIIMS 3.Dr.Rajesh Kumar, Professor & HoD of Public Health School, PGIMER, Chandigarh and 4.Dr.K.S.V.K.Subba Rao, Director, JIPMER. 28. The above Committee, barring Dr.Rajesh Kumar, who could not attend as he was out of country, met at JIPMER, Pondicherry on 9th and 10th July, 2010 (with prior notice to all the concerned on 6.7.2010, as could be seen from Page No.28 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner and to the petitioner himself under an individual note dated 1.7.2010, available at Page No.26 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner) and framed the following issues for discussion with the petitioner: (Available at Page No.34 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner) “1.Allegations that there was delay and discrimination against the Department of PSM in considering and implementing several suggestions regarding change in the undergraduate curriculum. 2. Accusations that the Dean was lying by denying that he had ‘assured’ the Department of PSM that the Post Graduate seats would be increased, that he was also lying in denying knowledge of the PGDPHM course initiated by PHFI. There was a further accusation of personal bias of the Dean against the HOD PSM in the matter of supplementary undergraduate examination in May 2010. 3. Willful delay by the Dean in implementing the JIPMER School of Public Health. 4. Repeated allegations that the HOD PSM was discriminated against because he belonged to the OBC. 5. Recent occurrence of disharmony and conflict in the Department of PSM, with the HOD demanding disciplinary action against his three seniormost faculty cancelling weekly Departmental meetings and reassigning duties with the junior faculty being given undergraduate and post graduate teaching responsibility and the Professor being assigned only administrative duties for stores and library.” 29. The Committee had thorough discussion with the petitioner and thereafter arrived at the following conclusions: “The Committee found no evidence that there has been systematic bias and discrimination against Dr.Bala Soundarssannane or the Department of Preventive and Social Medicine. In fact this Department is treated on par with all other Departments in the Institution. The Committee had thorough discussion with the petitioner and thereafter arrived at the following conclusions: “The Committee found no evidence that there has been systematic bias and discrimination against Dr.Bala Soundarssannane or the Department of Preventive and Social Medicine. In fact this Department is treated on par with all other Departments in the Institution. However the Committee is concerned about the acts of indiscipline by Dr.Bala Soundarssannane which can be detailed as follows: 1. Letter no.JIP/PSM/Gaz/10 dated 16-4-2010 was sent to the Director JIPMER and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Govt.of Pondicherry. This letter with an official file number and on official stationery with the seal of the Head of the Department of Preventive and Social Medicine, is a direct violation of discipline and service rules. The letter also accuses the Dean of malafides and requests Police action. Dr.Bala Soudarssannane subsequently (JIP/PSM/Gaz./10 dated 29-4-2010) claimed that the original letter was a personal one as a father, but even this second letter is on official stationery with seal and file number. 2. The persistent written and verbal accusations of discrimination, lying and bias against the Dean is a serious act of indiscipline. The Committee has not found any shred of evidence against the Dean. The accusations were repeated several times before the Committee by Dr.Bala Soudarssannane and when he was requested to substantiate with proof he was unable to do so. 3. The unhappy situation in the Department is the direct result of Dr.Bala Soudarssannane misusing his position as Head of the Department of Preventive and Social Medicine to put pressure on his subordinate staff to testify on his behalf in a private criminal case. They are fully within their rights to refuse to testify. Letter No.JIP/PSM/Gaz./Partiality/10 dated 11-5-2010 (Paragraph 8-14) clearly establishes the intent and anger of Dr.Bala Soudarssannane which has created the present situation. The external members of the committee are academicians and Public Health professionals and are deeply concerned at the situation in the Department which is the direct result of the misuse of power by the Head of the Department, Dr.Bala Soudarssannane. At the end of our discussions we gave an opportunity to Dr.Bala Soudarssannane to discuss our findings and concerns. We requested him to outline to us what remedial measures he would like to take, especially with regard to his colleagues in the Department of PSM. Unfortunately he had nothing to offer. At the end of our discussions we gave an opportunity to Dr.Bala Soudarssannane to discuss our findings and concerns. We requested him to outline to us what remedial measures he would like to take, especially with regard to his colleagues in the Department of PSM. Unfortunately he had nothing to offer. We hope that you and the administration will find a quick and suitable way to deal with the problems of indiscipline and misuse of power by the Head of the Department.” 30. A close scrutiny of the issues framed and the conclusions arrived at by the Committee, would show that the petitioner’s complaints on many aspects have been analysed by the Committee and the so-called complaints made by the petitioner to the second respondent about the third respondent (Dr.K.S.V.K.Subba Rao, Director, JIPMER) is not the subject matter before the said Committee, wherein the third respondent himself is a member. 31. In fact, the complaints dated 8.2.2010 and 22.2.2010 sent by the petitioner to the Director, JIPMER (third respondent), marking copies of the same to the President of the JIPMER, available at page Nos.1 and 4 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner, did not bear any allegation against the third respondent/Director. But, they contain allegations against the fourth respondent, who was not a member in Dr.V.I.Mathan’s Committee. As has been pointed out supra, the Committee has been constituted on 29.4.2010 by the President of the JIPMER. The inclusion of the name of the third respondent in this Committee was not questioned by the petitioner at that point of time. 32. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that in the letter dated 31.5.2010 addressed to the President of the JIPMER, the petitioner has sought enquiry against many persons, including the respondents 3 and 4 herein. 33. The said letter dated 31.5.2010 has been placed before us from pages 13 to 22 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner. This letter has been sent through the Director/the third respondent by the petitioner to the President of the Institute. Though, this letter contained allegations against many persons, including the fourth respondent, no allegation of any sort, has been made against the third respondent by the petitioner, except including the name of the third respondent in the list of ‘FC officers of JIPMER on whom the enquiry is requested’. Though, this letter contained allegations against many persons, including the fourth respondent, no allegation of any sort, has been made against the third respondent by the petitioner, except including the name of the third respondent in the list of ‘FC officers of JIPMER on whom the enquiry is requested’. But, here also there is no request from the petitioner to the President of JIPMER to drop the third respondent from the Dr.V.I.Mathan’s Committee or anything of that sort. The petitioner received the notice dated 1.7.2010, requiring him to appear before the Committee on 9th and 10th July, 2010. Only after receipt of such a notice, by the letter dated 8.7.2010 (available at Page No.30 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner), addressed to the Chairman of the Committee Mr.V.I.Mathan, he made allegations not only against the third respondent but also against others. It is to be pointed out that no specific allegation has been made against the third respondent by the petitioner and further more, interestingly, here also, there is no request by the petitioner to drop the third respondent from the Committee. 34. The petitioner participated in the Committee’s discussion on 9th and 10th July, 2010 and thereafter also sent so many communications, on 10.7.2010, 12.7.2010 and 13.7.2010 (available at page Nos.48,59 and 50 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner) to the third respondent/Director and the President of JIPMER, in continuation of the proceedings of Dr.V.I.Mathan’s committee. Even here, there is no mention about the so-called bias of the third respondent. But, everywhere, the petitioner has spitted venom against the fourth respondent Dr.K.S.Reddy. 35. When, at no point of time, it is the claim of the petitioner that the third respondent/Director should walk out of the Dr.V.I.Mathan’s Committee, which has in fact been constituted to go into various allegations made by the petitioner against many persons, the other argument advanced on the part of the petitioner that the third respondent should have recused himself from out of the Committee cannot be appreciated. 36. There cannot be and should not be any doubt that none could be the Judge of his own cause. 36. There cannot be and should not be any doubt that none could be the Judge of his own cause. In the case on hand, the plea of bias made by the petitioner against the third respondent is on the ground that he being the member of the V.I.Mathan’s Committee, which is the reason for issuance of charge-sheet against him, besides placing him under suspension, should not have signed the charge-sheet and the suspension order. 37. We have extracted the findings of the V.I.Mathan’s Committee above. At no point of time, it was the plea of the petitioner to remove the third respondent/Director from the said Committee. The Committee report was not challenged by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the question of the third respondent/Director, becoming a Judge of his own cause does not arise, because it is not the finality of the decision of the enquiry or anything of that sort that has been communicated by him, but only an order of suspension and the charge-sheet, contemplating enquiry against the petitioner with some imputations, in his official capacity as the Director of the Institute. A different person has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer. It would have been a completely different thing, had the third respondent himself was nominated as the Enquiry Officer. Only in such circumstances, the petitioner would have had the opportunity of calling the third respondent ‘a Judge of his own cause’, so as to nullify the actions of the respondents as ‘biased’ or ‘mala fide’. 38. It is also to be pointed out that the said Dr.V.I.Mathan Committee’s report is one among many other documents, whereupon reliance has been placed by the disciplinary authority, for issuing the impugned charge-sheet against the petitioner. Therefore, viewing from any angle, we are unable to find any merit in the contention of the petitioner that the third respondent has acted in a biased manner against him. 39. We also want to point out that the petitioner is alleging that since he belong to OBC, all forward community people are discriminating him. It is the case of the respondents that the review of the Service Records of the petitioner did not substantiate that he belong to OBC. 39. We also want to point out that the petitioner is alleging that since he belong to OBC, all forward community people are discriminating him. It is the case of the respondents that the review of the Service Records of the petitioner did not substantiate that he belong to OBC. To contravene this, the petitioner has submitted that the JIPMER itself had appointed him as the Liaison Officer of the OBC community by order dated 12.6.1997, which show that he belong to Other Backward Class Community. Whether the petitioner belong to a particularly community or not is another pure question of fact, which should be assessed on a thorough analysis of various materials. It is not the issue before us for consideration. However, we cannot take the appointment of the petitioner as Liaison Officer of the OBC community, as a proof of his community as OBC, particularly in view of the fact that he has not produced any community certificate issued by any competent authority to substantiate his plea that he belong to OBC. The material on record would also show that the petitioner made many allegations (also filed a private criminal defamation suit) against one Dr.R.Raveendran, saying that he is a Forward Community man and indulged in discrimination against the petitioner, but, in fact, the said Dr.R.Raveendran is an OBC and OBC Liaison Officer of JIPMER. We are informed that subsequently, the said complaint was withdrawn by the petitioner. From this want comes to be known is that the fight of the petitioner is against the officers and not against the so-called discrimination to his community. The petitioner also has not established any prejudice caused to him for non-supply of any particular document. In fact, it is premature to consider this plea, at this stage, where the petitioner has not at all appeared before the Enquiry Officer. 40. A deep scrutiny of the entire materials placed on record would undoubtedly establish the fact that the petitioner is a petition monger and used to pick up of quarrels with everybody he is working – whether as subordinate officer or as a superior officer and this tendency of the petitioner has disturbed the congenial atmosphere of the JIPMER. All these aspects would lead us to a firm conclusion that the petitioner has invented this plea of bias and mala fide only to thwart the ongoing enquiry proceedings. All these aspects would lead us to a firm conclusion that the petitioner has invented this plea of bias and mala fide only to thwart the ongoing enquiry proceedings. Instead of resorting to this type of delay tactics, the petitioner should have daringly approached the Enquiry Officer, to prove his innocence or uprightness, as being claimed by him. 41. The findings of the enquiry would be placed before the Governing Body, constituted as per Section 10 of the JIPMER Act, 2008, consisting of (1) Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; (2) Director General of Health Services, Government of India; (3) Financial Advisor, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India etc. Even the decision of this Governing Body is appealable to the Institute Body. It should be mentioned that the Enquiry Officer should conduct the enquiry in a fair and unbiased manner and in the manner known to law and the petitioner is directed to extend his full cooperation to the Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry at the earliest. Since we are directing the petitioner to take part in the enquiry, we are not going into various explanations offered by the petitioner to the imputations made against him by the respondents in the charge-sheet as it is for the Enquiry Officer to consider at the time of enquiry. It is made clear that the petitioner is entitled to rake up all such pleas before the Enquiry Officer, including the ones raised in these writ petitions. 42. When serious imputations are made against the petitioner, it cannot be said that the official respondents have committed any error in placing him under suspension, pending enquiry. Therefore, we find no merit in the contentions raised on the part of the petitioner. The judgments of the Honourable Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner would in no way help his case as on dissection of the materials placed on record, we arrived at a clear finding that there is no bias and no prejudice of whatsoever has been caused to the petitioner and that the petitioner could very well participate in the enquiry. Result: In the result, both these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. Result: In the result, both these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. The Enquiry Officer/5th respondent in W.P.No.9616 of 2011 is directed to complete the enquiry within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and submit his report to the concerned authority. The petitioner is directed to render his complete cooperation to the completion of the enquiry. It goes without saying that none of the observations made by us in this order shall be either driving or decisive factor for the Enquiry Officer or any of the authorities concerned with the disciplinary proceedings.