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2011 DIGILAW 350 (KAR)

B. Ramappa v. A. Gangamma

2011-03-28

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2011
Judgment :- 1. Purchasers of agricultural land granted to persons belonging to scheduled castes/tribes or depressed classes as were otherwise known prior to such persons being identified or classified as SC/ST under the provisions of Constitution of India, are a disgruntled and disillusioned lot and with the draconian provisions of The Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [for short, the Act], loads the dice against such persons who only fight a losing battle before the authorities and tribunals and only possibility being to prolong the litigation as far as possible, so that the enjoyment of the purchased land is also coextensive with the life of litigation! 2. Present writ petition is no exception, particularly as the petitioners have a few grounds to urge in this writ petition and are advanced in a very articulate manner by Sri V P Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. Facts leading to the present petition are that one Aralihalli Kariyappa had been granted two parcels of lands, one measuring 3 acres 60 cents in Sy No 526H as per grant order dated 9-1-1959 and another parcel of land measuring 96 cents in Sy No 389/1C, both situated at Danayakanakeri village, Hagaribommanahalli taluk of the then Bellary district under the Standing Orders of Board of Revenue of erstwhile Madras state. 4. The grantee was even as per the verification by the revenue authorities, a person belonging to valmiki community and the grants made in the year 1959 and 1960 are governed by the standing orders of the Board of Revenue, State of Madras. 5. Grants of this nature carried a condition that granted land should not be alienated for a period of ten years from the date of grant as is incorporated in one grant order i.e., of the year 1960 but not found in the earlier grant order dated 9.1.1959, but nevertheless, the grant being subject to the Board Standing Orders, is also a grant which is statutorily impressed with this condition. 6. It is such lands which were transacted by the grantee by mortgage of the subject land in favour of one Bukkitgar Huligemma, wife of Ramappa as per mortgage deed dated 2.12.1968. 6. It is such lands which were transacted by the grantee by mortgage of the subject land in favour of one Bukkitgar Huligemma, wife of Ramappa as per mortgage deed dated 2.12.1968. Said Huligemma had filed a suit in OS No.166 of 1973 on the file of the court of the Principle Munsiff, Hospet, for foreclosure which came to be decreed and in the court auction sale, properties were purchased by legal heirs of the very decree holder. Thus, the mortgagee claimed full ownership after having enforced foreclosure of the mortgage and due to the default of the mortgagor and while the matter stood thus, subsequent development is that the Karnataka Act No.2 of 1979 came into effect from 1.1.1979. Though the Act came into force in the year 1979, the legal heirs of the original grantee Aralihalli Kariyappa, one Smt. A Gangamma filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner in Application No.35/2005-06. The application was enquired into but the revenue authorities having impleaded Smt. B Huligemma, wife of S Ramappa as first respondent and Sri. Uppar Hanumanthappa as second respondent and it is strangely indicated that they were represented by counsel but it is not very clear as to whether it was for first respondent – Smt. B Huligemma or second respondent – Uppar Hanumanthappa. It is now submitted at the Bar that Smt. Huligemma had died on 24.8.2000 and she was no more on the date the proceedings was registered by the Assistant Commissioner. 7. However, in the absence of Smt. Huligemma being not represented etc., nevertheless the other respondent purchaser of other parcel of land in Sy.No.389/1C having been represented by counsel, the Assistant Commissioner looked into the material, ultimately found that the subject land being land granted in favour of person belonging to scheduled caste community i.e., valmiki community and having been transferred within period of ten years from the date of the grant, the provisions of the Act are attracted and therefore invalidated the sale transaction, resumed the land to the State and directed restoration to the legal heirs of the original grantee and directed the Tahsildar, Hospet, to take action for the same. 8. The legal heirs of late Huligemma and second respondent before the Assistant Commissioner, namely, Uppar Hanumanthappa, both appealed against this order to the Deputy Commissioner. 8. The legal heirs of late Huligemma and second respondent before the Assistant Commissioner, namely, Uppar Hanumanthappa, both appealed against this order to the Deputy Commissioner. On contest, the Deputy Commissioner examined the version of the appellants before him that the subject grant was not as a person belonging to scheduled caste community, but as a person who did not have holding or sufficient holding; that it had been mortgaged by the grantee in favour of mother of the appellants in the year 1968 and narrated developments thereafter that said suit was filed etc., and as all such developments had taken place even before the Act coming into force, the Act did not apply, there is no scope for the Assistant Commissioner to take action and sought for setting aside the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. 9. On the other hand, the legal heirs of the original grantee contended that even as per the report of the Tahsildar, Hospet, the subject land had been granted to said Ramappa as a person belonging to valmiki community; that the proceedings before the civil court for foreclosure of the mortgage is of no consequence as the Act has a overriding effect even on court decrees; that the Assistant Commissioner held private enquiry in terms of section 5 of the Act and therefore the appeal deserves to be dismissed etc.,. 10. In the wake of such developments, the Deputy Commissioner formulated three points for consideration, [a] Whether the subject lands are granted lands? [b] Whether the grantee is a person belonging to scheduled caste community? and [c] As to whether the transaction i.e., transfer of the mortgage in the year 1968 is one which amounts to violation of the terms of the grant and therefore attracting the provisions of the Act? 11. [b] Whether the grantee is a person belonging to scheduled caste community? and [c] As to whether the transaction i.e., transfer of the mortgage in the year 1968 is one which amounts to violation of the terms of the grant and therefore attracting the provisions of the Act? 11. Based on the reports and records available before him, the Deputy Commissioner answered these questions holding that subject lands are granted lands; that as per the caste certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Hospet, grantee being a person belonging to valmiki community was, in fact, a person belonging to scheduled caste community and the transaction was either in violation of the condition No.3 in grant order itself or the general condition as imposed under the Board Standing Orders that the land should not be alienated within a period of ten years from the date of the original grant and this position being made good without much dispute from the available records, held that the transaction was clearly in violation of section 4[1] of the Act and therefore found no occasion to interface with the order and dismissed the appeal. 12. It is aggrieved by these orders, the present writ petition. 13. As noticed earlier, Mr. 12. It is aggrieved by these orders, the present writ petition. 13. As noticed earlier, Mr. V P Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently urged that the orders are not sustainable for more than one reason; that in the first instance, there was no opportunity to the writ petitioners; that the proceedings initiated against a dead person, namely, mother cannot be of any avail to the detriment of the petitioners who had never had an opportunity; that the provisions of the Act do not get attracted to the transaction of the year 1968, particularly, as grant of the years 1959 and 1960 can never be said to be grant made in favour of scheduled caste community as the community of valmiki to which the grantee belonged to was notified for the first time in the year 1991 in the Presidential Order as scheduled tribe community and even prior to that the writ petitioners having enjoyed the land from the year 1968 as their own, they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession also; that the original grant can never be said to be a grant in favour of person belonging to scheduled caste community as valmiki community had never been identified as scheduled tribe community at that time and therefore inclusion of this community as a scheduled tribe community through the Presidential Order of the year 1991 cannot make any difference to the original grant; that therefore the writ petition should be allowed, orders set aside and at any rate if not totally at least matter to be remanded for according an opportunity to the petitioners to comprehensively state their case before the original authority in an enquiry under section 5 of the Act. 14. On the other hand, Sri. 14. On the other hand, Sri. F V Patil, learned counsel for the first respondent, while supporting the orders passed by the authorities, submits that while it is true that there is a Presidential Order of the year 1991 including valmiki community as a scheduled tribe community, but insofar as grant made in favour of the respondents’ father is concerned, respondents’ father being a person belonging to valmiki community is not disputed and on such premise it also follows that it is a grant in favour of a person belonging to scheduled tribe community for the reason that valmiki community was even before notified as scheduled caste in the State of Madras as per Presidential Notification dated 10.8.1950; that the community being identified as scheduled caste community as per the Presidential Order of the year 1950 itself and the notification being in respect of areas covering the place of residence of the respondents’ father and the subject land also being situated within this area, the Presidential Order of the year 1950 has ensured that valmiki community is a scheduled caste community in that area; that the mere fact that the area in the former Bellary District in Madras State got merged with Karnataka after reorganization of the State cannot make any difference and the Presidential Order of the year 1950 if at all can extend the benefit to other non-notified areas of Karnataka State in faovour of persons belonging to valmiki community but it can never be construed as to deprive the effect which had already been conferred on members of valmiki community in terms of the Presidential Order of the year 1950 in areas to which it had been made applicable and therefore submits that the condition whether in the grant or statutorily imposed under standing orders of the State of Madras, namely, non-alienation for ten years is clearly followed when the subject property is transacted in the year 1968 and consequence necessarily follows and there is no question in the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and therefore urges for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. I have bestowed my attention to the submissions made at the Bar, perused the orders and the record. 16. 15. I have bestowed my attention to the submissions made at the Bar, perused the orders and the record. 16. The Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 is a piece of socio welfare legislation, meant to extend the benefit in favour of persons belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe communities. This is done to ensure a facility or concession shown in their favour by the State is retained and sustained to them and not that they lose it immediately either because of their own ignorance or because of unscrupulous, greedy operators who want to gobble up the land granted in favour of persons belonging to weaker section community. 17. Be that as it may, the undisputed factual position is if the subject land is transferred in the year 1968 and if it is a land which had been granted to any person as a condition of non-alienation for ten years, there is violation of the condition and as discussed above, the valmiki community being a community even otherwise categorized as a scheduled caste community in the area where respondents’ father was residing, the violation clearly attracts the provisions of the Act and the consequence necessarily follow in terms of section 4 of the Act. 18. The result is inevitable and the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner do not have much choice though normally in a proceedings conducted against a dead person is undoubtedly a nullity and of no consequence in law, this logic and consequence holds good in the realm of adversary litigation. Proceedings under section 5 of the Act are not necessarily adversary in nature, but statutory enquiry to be conducted by the Assistant Commissioner for giving effect to the purpose and objects of the Act and for ensuring that granted lands are sustained and retained in favour of persons belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe communities. 19. Proceedings are not directed against an individual but the proceedings take place in respect of land and based on the factual premise as to person who is actually found in possession of the land on the date when the Act comes into force and as to whether violation of the condition of the grant had preceded with occupation by person other that the grantee. 20. 20. While it may be true that the present writ petitioners might not have been given an opportunity to have their say before the Assistant Commissioner, as the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner was one in the name of their mother a person who was no more, but it cannot be said it continues to suffer from this malady as the very petitioners were in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner and had their say before the Deputy Commissioner. An appeal is taken to be a continuation of the original proceedings and at any rate it definitely cures difficulty of want of opportunity as the appellate authority looks into possibilities from the angle of the appellant, non-heard respondent before the original authority and therefore the difficulty is taken care of. 21. One another argument advanced by Sri. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioners that the community i.e., the valmiki community was identified as schedule tribe community in terms of the Presidential Order of the year 1991 and the purchaser or the transferee have perfected their title by adverse possession against the Government should be reckoned from the date of the grant is not an argument that can be accepted for more than one reason. In the first instance, the condition rather violation of condition is one which gives cause. That took place in the year 1968. Possession or adverse possession can only be with actual physical possession and not otherwise. While the predecessors of the writ petitioner at the best can be taken to be in possession from the year 1968 onwards, until and unless that is asserted, an adverse possession adverse to the interest of the Government and uninterrupted enjoyment for a period of thirty years is established, plea of adverse possession being not available, it can only be in the year 1998, such a thing is possible, but, unfortunately for the writ petitioners, legal position changes the moment the Act came into force which is as on 1.1.1979. Until and unless the plea of adverse possession for a period of thirty years is made good against the Government by the time the act came into force, there is no way of the transferee succeeding on this premise. Invalidation of the transaction whether mortgage or subsequent court auction, the purchaser in the foreclosure suit takes place by the operation of law and not by any other act of parties. Invalidation of the transaction whether mortgage or subsequent court auction, the purchaser in the foreclosure suit takes place by the operation of law and not by any other act of parties. The law operates as on 1.1.1979 and transaction once voided it is only giving effect to of that legal position by the subsequent act of the Assistant Commissioner in terms of the provisions of the Act. Just because that is postponed in point of time, it does not mean that the original period can be tagged on to this period to combine the same and to put up defence of adverse possession. Plea of adverse possession does not work by such patchwork but can only be by hostile adverse enjoyment of the subject property adverse to the interest of the real owner and in this case, the real owner being always the Government and therefore period of thirty days being period of limitation and that having not actually happened, plea of adverse possession does not succeed to save the land in favour of the transferee. 22. Viewed from any angle, I do not find any scope for either invalidating the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner or for even remanding the matter to the original authority for a fresh enquiry. A remand order is not passed for the sake of remanding the matter. There should be a real justification and a purpose to be served by the remand order. In the present case, no purpose will ever be served except for observing the ritual of going through motions once more before the authorities etc.,. That cannot be done for the simple reason that The Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 Act being a socio welfare legislation to the benefit of persons belonging to depressed classes, socially deprived community of the society, there is no point prolonging the litigation unendingly and it is the duty of the court that litigation comes to an end as expeditiously as possible as otherwise even by prolongation of the litigation, the purpose of the Act can be defeated. Approach of the courts always must be from the legislative scheme and for aiding the implementation of legislative provisions for fulfilling purpose of legislation. 23. It is for this reason, this writ petition is dismissed. 24. Approach of the courts always must be from the legislative scheme and for aiding the implementation of legislative provisions for fulfilling purpose of legislation. 23. It is for this reason, this writ petition is dismissed. 24. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, parties are left to bear their respective costs. 25. In view of dismissal of the main writ petition, Misc.Cvl.60197 of 2011 for vacating stay is allowed.