Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 3503 (MAD)

P. Mahendran v. S. Jothilakshmi

2011-08-01

V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH

body2011
JUDGMENT :- 1. This revision is directed against the judgment and decree passed in RCA.No.9 of 2009 and the fair and executable order passed in M.P.No.567 of 2009 dated 02.08.2010 in directing the eviction of the revision petitioner on the ground of requirement of premises under additional accommodation. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner / landlady before the Rent Controller are as follows:- The petitioner purchased the petition premises from one Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan on 09.02.2007 under registered sale deed along with the adjacent portion. The respondent was tenant under the erstwhile owner on a monthly rent of Rs.950/- excluding consumption charges for residential purpose. The petitioner and her vendor informed the respondent to vacate the petition premises on or before 31.01.2007. The respondent stated that he could vacate only in May 2007. He assured that he would pay monthly rent to the petitioner from the date of sale deed and would also vacate by end of May 2007. Thus, the respondent attorned tenancy orally to the petitioner. However, the respondent failed to pay monthly rent from 09.02.2007 to the petitioner in spite of repeated demands and notice dated 06.07.2007. Hence respondent committed default from 09.02.2007 to 08.07.2007 amounting to Rs.4,750/-. Further, the petitioner is living in the small portion adjacent to the petition premises which is insufficient for her family. The petitioner's son requires separate room for studying. The petitioner's hardship is more than the hardship of the respondent, if eviction is not ordered. Further the respondent is having three dogs and they are barking loudly during night hours and disturbing other occupiers of the building and the neighbours and thereby causing nuisance. The respondent has not complied with the demands of legal notice dated 06.07.2007 and has not even replied. Hence, this petition. 3. The brief facts of the case of the respondent / tenant before the Rent Controller are as follows: The respondent was a tenant of Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan from 01.12.2003. Advance of Rs.8500/- has been paid to the landlady. The respondent did not receive any notice from his erstwhile landlady to vacate the petition premises. The respondent has paid monthly rent of Rs.850/- to the landlady till the date of counter and also received rental receipts. Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan assured him that he need not vacate the premises and should pay the rent to her as usual. The respondent did not receive any notice from his erstwhile landlady to vacate the petition premises. The respondent has paid monthly rent of Rs.850/- to the landlady till the date of counter and also received rental receipts. Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan assured him that he need not vacate the premises and should pay the rent to her as usual. The landlady informed the respondent that she has filed complaint against the petitioner with the Assistant Commissioner of Police to revoke the sale agreement between herself and the petitioner, since the petitioner has not complied with the agreement. The respondent is living in the premises owned by Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan. The petitioner is living adjacent to the premises. The respondent is having pet animals from the inception of tenancy and no one has complained about the same. The respondent has to receive the sum of Rs.8,500/-which is the advance paid by him. He has also spent Rs.3,600/- as electricity charges and Rs.3,000/- for repairs. Hence, the landlady has to settle Rs.15,000/- to terminate the tenancy. Therefore, the petition has to be dismissed. 4. The brief facts averred in the additional counter of the respondent / tenant before the Rent Controller are as follows: Many averments found in the main counter are reiterated. The respondent continued to pay monthly rent to erstwhile landlady Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan, as he was not aware of the sale in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has given statement in writing before the Police Authorities admitting her liability for balance sale consideration to Tmt.Vijaya Govindarajan and the erstwhile landlady was allowed to continue collection of monthly rent from the respondent. When there has been claim for monthly rent from two persons, the respondent continued to pay the rent to his original landlady. Immediately, on the orders of this Court, the respondent paid the monthly rent to the petitioner and has been paying the subsequent rents without default. The petitioner is under legal liability to settle the advance amount paid by the respondent to the erstwhile landlady. If the advance amount is adjusted against the alleged arrears, there cannot be any default, on the date of filing the Rent Control Original Petition. There is a single electricity connection for the portions occupied by the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent alone is paying the electricity charges till date. If the advance amount is adjusted against the alleged arrears, there cannot be any default, on the date of filing the Rent Control Original Petition. There is a single electricity connection for the portions occupied by the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent alone is paying the electricity charges till date. The petitioner is bound to pay the electricity charges consumed by her from 19.02.2007 to April 2008. The petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs.6663.50 being 50% of the total consumption charges. The said sum should also be adjusted towards the monthly rents payable by the respondent. The respondent is residing in the petition premises along with his wife, two sons and two daughters, since 01.12.2003 and his children are studying. Whereas the petitioner is residing with only her husband and son. Her daughter is married and living in her husband's house. The respondent is not in a position to spend more towards monthly rent. Hence, the hardship of the respondent will be more than the advantage gained by the petitioner. Portions occupied by the petitioner and the respondent are similar in area. The respondent is having the dogs even before the purchase of the premises by the petitioner. If she felt that the dogs are a nuisance, she would not have purchased the property or would have directed the vendor to give vacant possession. In fact the petitioner is creating all sorts of nuisance to the respondent by dumping waste basket in front of his entrance, blocking the drainage, preventing free entry by parking two wheelers etc., The claim of the petitioner is not bona fide and hence this petitioner to be dismissed. 5. The learned Rent Controller examined the landlady as PW.1 and two other witnesses as P.Ws.2 and 3 and had admitted Exs.P1 to P3 on the side of the landlady. The learned Rent Controller had also examined the respondent / tenant and yet another witness as RW.1 and RW.2 and had admitted Exs.R1 to R11 on the side of the respondent. After the perusal of the evidence adduced on either side, the learned Rent Controller was convinced the requirement of the premises on the ground of additional accommodation, but rejected the grounds of wilful default and nuisance and thereby ordered eviction of the tenant from the demises premises. 6. After the perusal of the evidence adduced on either side, the learned Rent Controller was convinced the requirement of the premises on the ground of additional accommodation, but rejected the grounds of wilful default and nuisance and thereby ordered eviction of the tenant from the demises premises. 6. The tenant had preferred appeal in RCA.No.9 of 2009 questioning the order of the learned Rent Controller and the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority had clubbed yet another petition filed in M.P.No.567 of 2009 for reception of additional evidence and had confirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller and also dismissed the application for reception of additional documents. 7. Challenging the said order passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, the present Revision has been filed by the tenant. 8. Heard Mr.R.Venkatavaradhan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner / tenant and Mr.R.Karunakaran, learned counsel for the respondent / landlady. 9. For convenience, the parties are referred to as landlady and tenant, in this judgment. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner / tenant would submit in his argument that the Rent Control Appellate Authority was not correct in confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller that the landlady bona fide required the premises towards his additional accommodation. He would further submit in his argument that the building leased out to the tenant was a distinct one and the landlady of the tenant was a different person, whereas the premises wherein the present landlady is residing in a different tenement even though the Door Number is one and the same. He would further submit in his argument that the premises where the present landlady is residing was not belonging to the then landlady of the tenant, who was examined as RW.2. He would also submit in his argument that the premises, even though contains the same Door Number, was divided into three parts distinctively and the said property cannot be identified as a single unit. He would further submit in his argument that the provision of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act would not be attracted since it is not owned by a single landlady and recently only, the present landlady had purchased the same and clubbed both the buildings as belonging to her. He would further submit in his argument that the provision of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act would not be attracted since it is not owned by a single landlady and recently only, the present landlady had purchased the same and clubbed both the buildings as belonging to her. He would further submit in his argument that the concept of requirement of premises for additional accommodation will not apply to the present case, since the demised premises described in the Rent Control Original Petition is different from that of the premises where the present landlady is residing. He would also bring it to the notice of this Court, a judgment of this Court reported in (1998) III CTC 457 (Jothi Ammal..vs.. Kulandai Vadivel) in support of his arguments. Yet another judgment of this Court reported in (1996) 2 LW 555 (S.Devan / V.Krishnan / K.Salim Ahmed ..vs.. N.Palaniappan) has also been cited for the same proposition of law. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 302 (Gangaram..vs.. N.Shankar Reddy) was also drawn to the notice of this Court in respect of non-applicability of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, where the landlady was occupying another adjoining building belonging to the landlady. He would further submit in his argument that the tenant was keeping the dogs within the premises of the building and it was not kept in the corridor nor in the pathway used by the landlady and others. He would also submit in his argument that he had obtained licence for dogs as pet animals and he has been administering vaccines to the said dogs periodically and no harm is done to anybody, much less the dogs are barking during night hours disturbing the neighbours. He would also submit in his argument that such possession of dogs would not in any way amount to nuisance in view of the judgment of this Court reported in (1957) 2 MLJ SN 14 (Govindaswami Naicker, petitioner ). He would therefore request the Court that even otherwise this Court is considering the plea of nuisance, the judgment passed by the learned Rent Controller as confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority will hold good since there cannot be any nuisance by simply keeping the dogs after obtaining proper licence. He would therefore request the Court that even otherwise this Court is considering the plea of nuisance, the judgment passed by the learned Rent Controller as confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority will hold good since there cannot be any nuisance by simply keeping the dogs after obtaining proper licence. He would therefore request the Court that the finding of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority that the demises premises is required by the landlady towards her additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act may be set aside and the Rent Control Appeal may be allowed and thus the present Revision may be ordered by interfering with the order passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. He would also submit in his argument that the additional evidence produced, in order to show the occupation of the tenant in the building and the building in which the landlady is living are separate properties and they are having separate assessment to property tax, are very much necessary for coming to a conclusion that the properties are separate and to show that the application of Section 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation would not arise. The Appeal ought to have been allowed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, but it was unfortunately dismissed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent / landlady would submit in his argument that the order of eviction passed against the tenant on the ground of additional accommodation by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller is perfectly all right since the said property was admittedly a single unit and the same was sold after dividing into three parts and the sister of then landlady had purchased one property and the present landlady had purchased the said property from the sister of the then landlady of the tenant and she also purchased the property of her sister and is residing in the said property which is a very small area in which she could not reside conveniently and therefore she is required of the premises leased out to the tenant towards additional accommodation. He would further submit in his argument that both the properties were originally belonged to the same person and it has become the property of the landlady by virtue of her purchase and admittedly, the Door Number of all the three portions is one and the same and the electricity connection for the premises, in which the landlady is residing, and the demised premises are one and the same and they cannot be considered as separate units. He would further rely upon a judgment of this Court reported in (1997) 2 MLJ 496 (Kuthalingam..vs.. Jahir Hussain) for the principle that even though the Door Numbers are different and the tenements are comprising in a single building, the requirement of the landlady who is residing in one premises, who asks for the other premise is bona fide and there can be no impediment for claiming the same under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. He would also cite yet another judgment of this Court reported in (2005) 5 CTC 549 (Vairam and others ..vs.. M.S.R.Nageswaran)for the principle that the landlady and tenant should be in occupation of the same structure or building to attract Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and it does not matter if the building bears separate Door Numbers and separate entrances to different portions. He would also submit in his argument that the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has not considered the ground of nuisance and the possession of the dogs would certainly amount to nuisance of barking and howling and also emitting foul odour in keeping the dogs in a small portion. He would further submit in his argument that he is entitled to raise such a plea in the Revision even though he has not preferred any separate Revision against the finding of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. He would also rely upon the judgment reported in 1989 (1) LW 34 (S.D.Subramaniam Chettiar..vs.. C.J.Manivannan) for the principle that the right of the respondent in a Civil Revision Petition to support the order of the lower Court on certain grounds while agitating the finding of the lower Court which went against him under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC. He would also rely upon the judgment reported in 1989 (1) LW 34 (S.D.Subramaniam Chettiar..vs.. C.J.Manivannan) for the principle that the right of the respondent in a Civil Revision Petition to support the order of the lower Court on certain grounds while agitating the finding of the lower Court which went against him under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC. He would also submit in his argument that the reception of additional evidence would not be germane in this case since the evidence of RW.1 would go to show that all the three portions were having a single Door Number and the same Door Number is continuing for all the three portions and the portion in which the tenant and the landlady are residing have a single electricity connection and the reading is done in common for both the premises. He would also submit in his argument that the judgment of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, concurring with the order passed by the learned Rent Controller in arriving to a conclusion of upholding the ground of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is purely on merits over facts and in such circumstances, the Revisional Court should exercise much care in reversing the concurrent order passed by both the Forums. For that principle, the judgment of this Court reported in 2001 (3) CTC 206 (Karur Ghee Stores represented by Mr.V.Periasamy..vs.. N.Palaniappan and another) is relied upon. He would therefore, request the Court that the concurrent finding reached by both the learned Rent Controller and the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority may be confirmed and the Revision Petition may be dismissed. 12. After giving anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides and on perusal of the relevant records, evidence produced before the learned Rent Controller, the judgments of both the Forums below and the grounds raised in the Revision, this Court finds that the following points are necessary for consideration and conclusion:- 1) Whether the Revision petitioner / tenant is liable to be evicted under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act ? 2) Whether the concurrent findings of both the Forums below are liable to be interfered with and the judgment of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority is to be set aside ? 2) Whether the concurrent findings of both the Forums below are liable to be interfered with and the judgment of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority is to be set aside ? 3) Whether the respondent / landlady is entitled to agitate the finding of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in rejecting the ground of 'nuisance' for evicting the tenant ? 4) To what relief the Revision petitioner / tenant is entitled ? 13. Point Nos. 1 and 2 : The Revision Petition was filed by the tenant against the finding of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in confirming the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller on the ground of additional accommodation by the landlady under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The learned Rent Controller found that the landlady was residing in a small portion adjacent to the demised premises and the requirement of the demised premises for the petitioner's / landlady's son's occupation was found to be bona fide and the relative hardship was not in favour of the tenant, but advantage for the landlady was more than the hardship caused to the tenant and the said finding was also confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. However, the tenant as the revision petitioner has questioned the concurrent finding by stating that the premises in which the landlady is now residing, was not belonging to the then landlady of the tenant, but it is a separate property purchased from the sister of the then landlady (RW.2) and the three portions even though was assigned a single Door Number, were owned by different owners and therefore, it cannot be treated as a single unit and the landlady was in possession of one of its portions sought for the tenement as additional accommodation as if it was comprising in the same premises. For that, tenant had relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 302 (Gangaram..vs.. N.Shankar Reddy). The relevant passage would be thus:- "7. .... What S.10(3)(c) envisages, is the oneness of the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different buildings, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant. For that, tenant had relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 302 (Gangaram..vs.. N.Shankar Reddy). The relevant passage would be thus:- "7. .... What S.10(3)(c) envisages, is the oneness of the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different buildings, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant. The significant words used in S.10(3)(c) are "the landlord who is occupying only a part of a building" and "any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building". Surely no one can say that two adjoining buildings bearing different door numbers, one occupied by the landlady and the other by the tenant would make them one and the same building if they are owned by one person and separate buildings if they are owned by two different persons. A practical test which can be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form part of the same building or two different buildings would be to see whether one of the two buildings can be sold by the landlord and the purchaser inducted into possession of the premises sold without the landlord's possession and enjoyment of the premises in his occupation being affected." 14. A judgment of this Court followed the said principle as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, was reported in 1996 (2) LW 555 (S.Devan/V.Krishnan/K.Salim Ahmed ..vs.. N.Palaniappan), which would be thus:- "6. .... It is the case the landlord filed eviction petition to evict the tenants in respect of two shops wherein two different door numbers, though they are in the same building. The petition was filed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The contention raised therein was that the petition filed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is not maintainable. ......... If this principle is to be applied in this case, it is not the case of the petitioners that each shop bearing separate door number cannot be sold by the landlord independently and the purchaser cannot be put in possession without the landlord's possession and enjoyment being affected. ......... If this principle is to be applied in this case, it is not the case of the petitioners that each shop bearing separate door number cannot be sold by the landlord independently and the purchaser cannot be put in possession without the landlord's possession and enjoyment being affected. When each shop is having separate door number and each had been treated as a separate unit, it is always open to the landlord to sell each shop as a separate unit and hand over possession to the purchaser for his immediate occupation and enjoyment without affecting the landlord's occupation of another shop bearing separate door number. Hence, even on the basis of this judgment, the petitioners' contention that the landlord has to file the petition for eviction only under Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act, cannot be accepted". 15. The said principles laid down in the above judgments would go to show that even though Door Numbers are separate, it should be considered regarding the oneness of the building and oneness of the ownership need not be considered to find out the applicability of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. As far as this case is concerned, the admission given by the tenant in his evidence that the Door Number of both the portions are one and the same bearing Door No.32. It is the further admission of the tenant as RW.1 that originally the portion in which the landlady was residing and the demised premises and yet another premises were comprised in Door No.32 and were sold by dividing into three, to the then landlady of the tenant,viz., Vijaya Govindarajan and her sister Latha Maheswari and the present landlady had purchased from both the sisters in a single sale deed and became the owner of the premises in which the tenant was residing and the premises where the landlady is now residing. In the said circumstances, the building in which the landlady is residing and the demised premises of the tenant are one and the same building even though, the ownership of the said premises were held by different persons for some time. The application of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court would help the landlady and not the tenant. The application of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court would help the landlady and not the tenant. The documents filed by the tenant, to show separate assessment done by the civic authorities, would not in any way help the tenant for showing the Court that the portions were considered as different building in view of the separate assessment of property tax. There is no dispute that the building was originally assigned Door No.32 and it is being continued, to be so. The landlady who is the owner of the demised premises is occupying one portion and seeks the other portion, for her additional need which cannot be taken out of the scope of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. 16. In the judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (2) MLJ 496 (Kuthalingam..vs.. Jahir Hussain) it has been held as follows:- "2. ........ It is not in dispute that the landlord is occupying Door No.31 in the very same premises. The appellate authority, on the basis of the evidence let in, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the requirement by the landlord for additional accommodation is bona fide. The finding rendered by the appellate authority, in my opinion, is purely based on facts and also on the basis of the evidence tendered and therefore, the said finding is not liable to be interfered with." ......... "When the two portions bearing Door No.30 and 31 are admittedly in one building and the requirement of the landlord is also bona fide, there can be no impediment on the part of the landlord from asking for additional accommodation in the same building." 17. In yet another judgment of this Court reported in 2005 (5) CTC 549 (Vairam and others ..vs.. M.S.R.Nageswaran), it has been considered as follows:- "12. .... ... Applying the above interpretation given to the ''building', if we analyse the present case, the irresistible conclusion that should be drawn by this Court is, that the landlord and the tenants are occupying the same building, though for the purpose of the Act, each portion is called 'building of its own'. Therefore, the landlord is entitled to invoke Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, which is also further strengthened by the ruling of this Court in Kuthalingam v. Jahir Hussain, 1997 (2) LW 470 ." 18. Therefore, the landlord is entitled to invoke Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, which is also further strengthened by the ruling of this Court in Kuthalingam v. Jahir Hussain, 1997 (2) LW 470 ." 18. Applying the principles laid down by this Court, when we approach the present case, I could see that the premises occupied by the landlady and the premises in possession of the tenant are part and parcel of the same building and they are very adjacent and the landlady is the present owner of both the properties. All the above circumstances would strengthen the claim of the landlady seeking vacant possession of the demised premises in the occupation of the tenant towards additional accommodation. 19. The learned counsel for the landlady has also relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2001 (3) CTC 206 (Karur Ghee Stores represented by Mr.V.Periasamy..vs.. N.Palaniappan and another) in which this Court has held thus:- "11. ... (10) ...... Above all, one also has to see the extent to which this Court can interfere under Section 25 of the Act. It has been repeatedly held the revisional jurisdiction is not akin to a full-fledged appeal and the Judge sitting in revision must be very careful about launching on a independent re-appreciation of the evidence and to substantiate the findings of the Rent Control Authorities with another when the materials before the Court equally sustain the conclusion arrived at by the authorities below. Unless there is misapplication of law or a legally wrong approach or grave and substantial injustice, the Revisional Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and their satisfaction regarding bona fide need and relative hardship." 20. On the foot of the principles laid down by this Court, the learned counsel for the landlady would submit in his argument that the bona fide requirement of the landlady towards the premises held by the tenant was upheld by both the Courts below and the relative hardship has also been dealt with by the learned Rent Controller and it was also confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority and this Court being a Revisional Court need not re-appraise the evidence and to reach a decision on the basis of such appraisal. He would also submit that the relative hardship of the tenant are minimal and the bona fide requirement of the landlady towards the premises were established through evidence and therefore, the requirement of the premises held by the tenant is absolutely bona fide for the landlady and therefore, there is no need for interference with the order passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. 21. On a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the landlady, I could see that the area in occupation of the landlady is very small, when compared with the area held by the tenant. The evidence would go to show that the landlady is badly in need of the premises to accommodate her children, otherwise she has to search for an alternate accommodation, when her property is very much adjacent to the portion where she is now living. It could also be found that the tenant could always find a place for an alternate accommodation when he is vacating the premises and if the landlady is driven for seeking other premises for the children, it would invite much prejudice to the landlady at the unfair advantage accrued to the tenant. The demised premises in the occupation of the tenant is only for the purpose of residence. The tenant could reside in any place in that area or in any other place by seeking a suitable accommodation for housing his family and there could not be any hardship for the tenant in doing so. The hardship of the landlady would be much high, if she is driven to search some other place for her children. Therefore, the relative hardship theory is only in favour of the landlady and it shows the bona fide requirement of the landlady for the premises. Therefore, I have no hesitation to uphold the decision reached by the learned Rent Controller, which was confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. Accordingly, both the points are decided in favour of the landlady / respondent. 22. Point No.3: The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlady would go to show that even though, the landlady did not prefer any revision against the finding reached by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, she could ask for the revision of the same and to pray for an order of eviction on the said ground. 22. Point No.3: The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlady would go to show that even though, the landlady did not prefer any revision against the finding reached by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, she could ask for the revision of the same and to pray for an order of eviction on the said ground. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent / landlady would submit that the ground of nuisance raised by the landlady was rejected by both the forums below, however, the said findings reached by both the Forums are not correct. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that even though, the tenant was having the licence to rear dogs as pet animals, the dogs were barking and howling during night hours and the emission of foul odour could not, in any way, be cured by obtaining any licence. However, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that this Court in the earlier years had laid the law as reported in 1957 (2) MLJ SN 14 (Govindaswami Naicker , petitioner ) as follows:- "The mere possession of a dog or even dogs by the tenant will not by itself constitute a nuisance within the meaning of Rent Control Act. It would, of course, be a different matter if the tenant were to convert the house into a kennel and breed dogs or keep ferocious dogs which would be a source of fear and annoyance to the co-tenants." 23. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that the licence obtained by the tenant for rearing dogs would be sufficient for avoiding the nuisance caused by such animals. After appraising the factual aspects, both the Forums below had come to a conclusion that there was no nuisance caused by rearing dogs in the residential portion. According to the judgment of this Court as reported in 2001 (3) CTC 206 (Karur Ghee Stores represented by Mr.V.Periasamy..vs.. N.Palaniappan and another), the concurrent finding of the Courts below need not be disturbed, unless the said decision was contrary to law. I do not find any defect in finding the fact in respect of the nuisance as against the law laid down. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the landlady. I do not find any defect in finding the fact in respect of the nuisance as against the law laid down. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the landlady. Accordingly, this point is decided in favour of the revision petitioner / tenant. 24. Point No.4: For the discussions held above, I am of the view that the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority directing the eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement of premises for the landlady on additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is absolutely unassailable and therefore, the Revision preferred by the revision petitioner / tenant is liable to be dismissed. 25. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed and the order of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller is hereby set aside. Time for vacating and handing over the premises by the revision petitioner / tenant is three months. The Revision Petitioner is directed to file undertaking affidavit as required under law, within a period of one week. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.