Judgment : Per M. VENUGOPAL, J. 1. These two writ appeals have been preferred by the appellant/Bank as against the common order dated 7.6.2011 in W.P. No. 11177 of 2008 and W.P. No. 23748 of 2008 passed by the learned single Judge. 2. The learned single Judge, while passing orders in W.P. Nos. 11177 and 23748 of 2008 dated 7.6.2011, has, among other things, observed that ‘the attempt made by the Bank (sic) to forestall the recovery by the Provident Fund and Employees‘ State Insurance-Departments is misconceived and further, the long arm of the Court cannot go to the rescue of the Bank, who do not have any legal or statutory right to thwart the impugned proceedings‘ and resultantly, dismissed the writ petitions. 3. Being dissatisfied with the common order dated 7.6.2011 passed by the learned single Judge, the appellant/Bank has projected the instant appeals before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant/ Bank submits that the learned single Judge has committed an error in proceeding on the basis that the issues involved in the writ petitions are one of the priority of secured creditor vis a vis the 1st respondent (Employees State Insurance Corporation /Employees Provident Fund Organisation) over the assets of the 4th respondent/Company towards its liability and wrongly dismissed the writ petitions on the basis that the statutory charge created in favour of the 1st respondent has priority over the charge created in favour of the Appellant/ Bank. 5. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank that the learned single Judge has correctly recorded‘ the argument of the appellant/Bank that the claim of the 1st respondent in the instant appeals and that of the 1st respondent/Organisations are over the Bank guarantee of Rs. 1 Crore furnished by the 3rd respondent pursuant to the order of this Court dated 10.12.2007 in W.A. No. 50 of 2007. But the total claim of the respondents works out to over and above of Rs. 2,01,79,916/- and therefore, the appellant/Bank cannot invoke the Bank guarantee and pay the demanded amount to the 1st respondent. 1 Crore furnished by the 3rd respondent pursuant to the order of this Court dated 10.12.2007 in W.A. No. 50 of 2007. But the total claim of the respondents works out to over and above of Rs. 2,01,79,916/- and therefore, the appellant/Bank cannot invoke the Bank guarantee and pay the demanded amount to the 1st respondent. But, this aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned single Judge in view of the fact that the Bank guarantee itself is liable to be returned to the 3rd respondent on production of satisfactory proof of settlement of the claims of the 1st respondent and other statutory authorities and workmen. 6. Added further, the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank projects an argument that the appellant/Bank cannot invoke the Bank guarantee and pay the said amount to the claimants including the 1st respondent and also that it is open to the Claimants to approach this Court by projecting necessary applications in W.A. No. 50 of 2007 for appropriate relief. 7. Proceeding further, the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank takes a plea that the appellant/Bank is entitled to bring the secured assets for sale subject to encumbrance on the condition that it is the responsibility of the auction purchaser to clear all the dues which is a permitted option not only under the but also under SARFAESI Act. 8. Lastly, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank that the 1st respondent has not taken any legal steps which is permissible under the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 to recover its dues and instead it is illegally demanding the amount from the appellant/Bank. As such, the action of the 1st respondent is an excessive exercise of the jurisdiction. 9. 1n the affidavit in W.P. No. 11177 of 2008, the appellant/Bank, through its Chief Manager/Constituted Attorney, has, among other things, averred that the Bank guarantee is being held by it in trust for all the Claimants until further orders from this Court and that the Claimants have to take up their claims with the 4th respondent and recover their respective dues etc. Further, it is also stated that the appellant/Bank cannot entertain the claim of individuals and also that-it is not holding any money belonging to the 4th respondent. Further, it is also stated that the appellant/Bank cannot entertain the claim of individuals and also that-it is not holding any money belonging to the 4th respondent. As a matter of fact, it is holding the Bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the order dated 10.12.2007 passed in W.A. No. 50 of 2007 by this Court. 10. Moreover, the appellant/Bank has also stated in W.P. No. 11177 of 2008 that on 18.1.2008 received a letter from the 2nd respondent/Recovery Officer of Employees State Insurance Corporation, Nungambakkam, Chennai claiming a sum of Rs. 37,09,722/- towards interest payable by the 4th respondent on behalf of the ESI dues. The appellant/Bank submitted a reply dated 28.1.2008 informing the 2nd respondent/Recovery Officer of Employees State Insurance Corporation, Chennai that the 4th respondent (Proprietor Haritex, Coimbatore) has not deposited any amount and he has furnished only a bank guarantee to the extent of Rs.1 Crore pursuant to the order dated 10.12.2007. Even before this letter could be sent, the 2nd respondent/Recovery Officer, ESI Corporation, Chennai issued a summons as per Rule 83 of the II Schedule to the Income Tax, 1961 calling upon the Chief Manager of the appellant/petitioner/Bank to appear before him on 4.2.2008. The summons received on 30.1.2008. 11. On 4.2.2008, the Chief Manager of the Bank appeared before the 2nd respondent and explained that the Bank guarantee has been furnished as a security for payment to various statutory authorities and contingent liabilities including that of the workmen. The appellant/petitioner/Bank specifically made a statement that it cannot act on the basis of the demand of the 2nd respondent without an order from this Court. On the same day viz., 4.2.2008, the appellant/Bank furnished a reply to the letter dated 25.1.2008 detailing the claims made by various departments and once again called upon the 2nd respondent to approach this Court for necessary orders. In the said letter, the Bank explained the various claims received from the statutory authorities which all in aggregate exceeds Rs. 1 Crore. 12. However, the 2nd respondent/Recovery Officer, ESI Corporation, Chennai passed an order on 31.3.2008 which has been received on 8.4.2008 calling upon the appellant/petitioner/Bank to remit a sum of Rs. 37,09,722/- from and out of the Bank guarantee of Rs. 1 Crore within three days on receipt of the order. 1 Crore. 12. However, the 2nd respondent/Recovery Officer, ESI Corporation, Chennai passed an order on 31.3.2008 which has been received on 8.4.2008 calling upon the appellant/petitioner/Bank to remit a sum of Rs. 37,09,722/- from and out of the Bank guarantee of Rs. 1 Crore within three days on receipt of the order. In short, the 3rd respondent/Recovery Officer is forcing the appellant/petitioner/Bank to pay money to the 2nd respondent by adopting arm-twisting method. to cover up his omissions or commissions. The 3rd respondent/Recovery Officer has furnished a letter on 14.8.2007, which is silent about the further liability of the 4th respondent (Proprietor, Haritex, Coimbatore) towards ESI dues. The 3rd respondent who is holding the office of the 2nd respondent issued a notice as per Section 45 (G) of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 on 21.4.2008 calling upon the 6th respondent to freeze the current account maintained by the appellant/petitioner/Bank with the said respondent. Therefore, the appellant/petitioner/Bank has preferred the present writ of certiorari in calling for the records relating to the order bearing No. TN/RECY/51-5613-11 dated 31.3.2008 on the file of the 2nd respondent and to quash the same. 13. The respondents 1 to 3 in the counter filed in W.P. No. 11177 of 2008 has inter alia stated that the Haritex has so far paid only the contribution amount of Rs. 37,21,930/- out of the total due of Rs. 74,31,652/- leaving a balance amount of Rs. 37,09,722/- which is a part of the statutory due. Also, as per Section 94 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 contribution etc. due to the ESI Corporation have priority over the other depbts. 14. That apart, it is the stand of the respondents 1 to 3 that the appellant/petitioner/Bank is well aware of the fact that the huge statutory dues pending to be settled by the 4th respondent, the purchaser towards Employees‘ State Insurance Corporation and however, in the 2nd respondent‘s letter dated 5.11.2007 addressed to the Bank, the Recovery Officer has clearly made that the notices of demands have been issued for the statutory dues of Jawahar Mills, the 5th respondent, as per Rule 2 and 16(1) of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 which becomes operative with serving of notice by the Recovery Officer. Moreover, since an amount of Rs. Moreover, since an amount of Rs. 1 Crore has already been deposited by way of Bank guarantee with the appellant/petitioner/Bank, it is explicit that this amount is towards ESI and PF dues. ESI has made its claim far ahead of anyone and in furtherance of Section 94 of the ESI Act the amount of Rs. 37,09,722/- is payable to Employees State Insurance Corporation. The purchaser has failed to discharge his liabilities to the ESI Corporation. The guarantee provided by the purchaser is towards the settlement of ESI and PF and when the defaulter failed to pay the dues to the ESI Corporation, the Recovery Officer, exercising his powers as per Section 45-G (3)(x) of the Employees State Insurance Act, in its order dated 31.3.2008, directed the appellant/petitioner/Bank to pay from out of the Bank guarantee of Rs. 1 Crore the amount of Rs. 37,09,722/-, the unpaid statutory due by the defaulter purchaser to ESI Fund A/c No. 1 within three days on receipt of the orders etc. 15. The appellant/petitioner/Bank, in W.P. No. 23748 of 2008 through its Chief Manager, has averred that on 18.1.2008 had received a letter from the Employees State Insurance claiming a sum of Rs. 37,09,722/- towards interest payable by the 3rd respondent on account of the ESI dues etc. 16. On 29.7.2008, the 1st respondent called upon the Petitioner to remit a sum of Rs. 1,64,70,194/-towards the alleged dues of the 3rd respondent on account of the 4th respondent. The appellant/Bank furnished a reply dated 14.8.2008 explaining to the 1st respondent that he did not hold any money on behalf of the 1st respondent and called upon the 1st. respondent to either take up the matter with the 3rd respondent or approach this Court in W.A. No. 50 of 2007 for suitable orders. The 2nd respondent passed an order on 28.8.2008 calling upon the Petitioner to invoke the Bank guarantee and remit the amount to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the appellant/Bank has filed the Writ of Certiorari in calling for the records pertaining to the order bearing No. TN/SRO/SLM/131/Recovery/2008 dated 28.8.2008 on the file of the respondents 1 and 2 and to quash the same. 17. Therefore, the appellant/Bank has filed the Writ of Certiorari in calling for the records pertaining to the order bearing No. TN/SRO/SLM/131/Recovery/2008 dated 28.8.2008 on the file of the respondents 1 and 2 and to quash the same. 17. It transpires that in Writ Appeal No. 50 of 2007, the appellants and the respondents therein have filed a Joint Compromise Memo dated 10.12.2007 and prayed this Court to receive the said Memo and to dispose of the Writ Appeal. Further, they have also prayed for vacating all the interim orders passed on various dates in various Miscellaneous Petitions. Significantly, in the said Joint Memo filed by the parties, Clause (ix) and (x) read hereunder: “(ix) The 1st respondent has already paid the entire contribution to ESI and P.P. Authorities. The request for the waiver of Penal Interest and Damages is pending with the said authorities. Towards the said claim and other contingent liabilities the 1st respondent agrees to give bank guarantee to the extent of Rs. 1 Crore and on furnishing of such bank guarantee the 2nd and 3rd respondent shall issue the sale certificate in respect of the movable properties in favour of the 1st respondent and deliver possession. Until such time the bank guarantee is given there shall be a charge on the movable properties in respect of the claim made by EPF and ESI authorities and towards contingent liability. The said certificate in respect of the said movable properties shall be issued only after furnishing the said bank guarantee or on production of proof of full satisfaction. (x)The bank guarantee as may be furnished by the 1st respondent may be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondents 2 and 3 on production of sufficient proof of full satisfaction of all dues payable under the Tender Notification Dt. 29.3.2005.” 18. This Court, on 10.12.2007 has disposed of W.A. No. 50 of 2007, by taking on record the Joint Compromise Memo filed by the parties and marked the said Compromise Memo as “X” for identification. It also vacated the interim order passed on 10.1.2007 and further granted liberty to the 2nd and 3rd respondents therein to issue the Sale Certificate to the auction purchaser or his nominee/s. 19. It also vacated the interim order passed on 10.1.2007 and further granted liberty to the 2nd and 3rd respondents therein to issue the Sale Certificate to the auction purchaser or his nominee/s. 19. The 2nd respondent (Recovery Officer, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Chennai) has passed an order as per Section 45 (G) of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 dated 31.3.2008 advising the appellant/Bank to pay Rs. 37,09,722/- from and out of the Bank guarantee of Rs. 1 Crore. 20. On 28.8.2008, the 1st respondent in W.P. No. 23748 of 2008 viz. , the Employees‘ Provident Fund Organisation has addressed a letter to the Chief Manager of the appellant/Bank, Salem requiring the appellant/Bank to invoke the Bank Guarantee remitted by the purchaser and advise South Indian Bank Limited, Coimbatore to honour its claim. 21. On going through the common order dated 7.6.2011 in W.P. Nos. 11177 and 23748 of 2008 passed by the learned single Judge, it is quite evident that the learned single Judge, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and by placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Limited v. Provident Fund Commissioner (2009) 10 SCC 123 : 2010-I-LLJ-644 : LNIND 2009 SC 1884 : (2009) 8 MLJ 758 , dismissed the writ petitions by, inter alia, opining that the appellant/Bank has no legal or statutory right to thwart the impugned proceedings. 22. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of Section 75 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 which reads hereunder: “75. 22. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of Section 75 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 which reads hereunder: “75. Matters to be decided by Employees‘ Insurance Court.- (1) If any question or dispute arises as to- (a) whether any person is an employee within the meaning of this Act whether he is liable to pay the employee‘s contribution, or (b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of an employee for the purposes of this Act, or (c) the rate of contribution payable by a principal employer in respect of any employee, or (d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect of any employee, or (e) the right of any person to any benefit and as to the amount and duration thereof, or (f) Substituted by Act 44 of 1966, Section 32, for Clause (ee) (w.e.f. 28.1.1968) ((ee) any direction issued by the Corporation under Section 55-A on a review of any payment of dependants‘ benefits, or) (Clause (f) omitted by Act 44 of 1966, Section 32 (w.e.f. 28.2.1968) (g) any other matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employer and an immediate employer, or between a person and the Corporation or between an employee and a principal or immediate employer, in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Act, Inserted by the Employees‘ State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2010 (18 of 2010), Section 15 (w.e.f. 1.6.2010) (or any other matter required to be or which may be decided by the Employees‘ Insurance Court under this Act), such question or dispute Inserted by Act 44 of 1966, Section 32 (w.e.f. 28.1.1968) (subject to the provisions of sub-section (2-A)) shall be decided by the Employees‘ Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 23. Also, Section 75 sub- Section 3 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 enjoins as follows: “No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by Substituted by Act 44 of 1966, Section 32, for “the Employees‘ Insurance Court” (w.e.f. 28.1.1968) (a Medical Board, or by a Medical Appeal Tribunal or by the Employees‘ Insurance Court).” 24. It is to be borne in mind that all the procedures of the Code of cannot be bodily imported by the Employees‘ Insurance Court as it is a special statute. The application of is limited to the matters mentioned in the Section itself. 25. We also aptly recall Section 7-1 of the Employees‘ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 which speaks of ‘Appeals to the Tribunal‘ and the same, is as follows: “7-1. Appeals to the Tribunal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government, or any authority, under the proviso to sub-section (3), or sub-section (4), of Section 1, or Section 3, or sub-section (1) of Section 7-A, or Section 7-B (except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof), or Section 7-C, or Section 14-B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such order. (2)Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed.” 26. Likewise, Section 7-A of the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, is concerned with “Determination of moneys due from employers.” The Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers which are vested in the officers mentioned in Section 7-A of the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. After amendment to Section 7-B of the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 with effect from 1.7.1997, the appropriate authority under the Act can review its order, in the considered opinion of this Court. Section 7-D of the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 refers to “Employees‘ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal.” Section 7-3 of the Act contemplates “Procedure of Tribunals.” 27. It is a well settled principle of law that an Appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings as per Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Appellate Authority shall have the same powers and shall perform, as nearly as may be, the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the code of Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein, and sub-section (2) of Section 7 J-3 has conformed to this principle. 28. 28. The term ‘proceeding‘ in Section 7-J of the Act is a comprehensive one and it means a prescribed cause of action for enforcing a legal right. Further, it is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the relevant statute, and indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted, as per decision in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lai Kishori Lal AIR 1982 SC 818 : (1982) 1 SCC 525 . 29. The proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal are deemed to be judicial proceedings which term includes any proceedings in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath, though such definition cannot be said to be exhaustive. As inquiry is judicial if the object of it is to determine jural relations between one person and another or with a group of persons, or between him and the community in general. 30. In order to be a judicial, a proceeding must relate in some way to the administration of the justice or to the ascertainment of any right or liability and that all proceedings of a Judge are, therefore, not necessarily judicial as per decision in Dhani Ram v. S.D. Judge AIR 1965 HP 25 , unless it is a proceeding in which judicial functions are performed and a final decision affecting either a right or liability of one or the other party is given as per decision in Tanaglrao v. H.J. Chiny, (1969) 71 Bom. L.R. 732. 31. It is the specific plea of the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank that the writ petitions filed by the Bank is maintainable in law even though an alternative remedy under Employees‘ State and Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act is available to the Bank before the statutory authorities. To put it differently, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/Bank that the existence of an alternative remedy to approach the statutory authorities under Employees‘ State as well as Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act is not a bar for the appellant/Bank to canvass about the impugned orders passed by the said statutory authorities before this Court in writ proceedings. 32. InPulicar Mills Limited, rep. 32. InPulicar Mills Limited, rep. by Managing Director, Thiruchengode v. E.S.I. Corporation represented by Director-General, New Delhi and Others 2005-III-LLJ-388 , the Division Bench of this Court has dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground of the existence of an alternative as per Section 75 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act. Likewise, in Tirupur Exports, Madras v. Deputy Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Madras 1995-I-LLJ-39, the writ petition is held to be not maintainable when there is an existence of an alternative statutory remedy. 33. In Vellipalayam Co-operative Milk Supply Society, rep. By its Special Officer v. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation LNIND 2004 Mad 584 : 2004-II-LLJ-885 : 2004 LLR 887 (Madras) : (2004) 3 MLJ 315 , this Court has held that “Employees‘ State , 1948 being a social welfare legislation has to be interpreted liberally extending the benefits to the concerned workers.” 34. The Employees‘ State Insurance Court and not the High Court can determine the dispute about the applicability of the Employees‘ State , as per decision in Ashok Leyland Limited and Others v. Deputy Tahsildar (Recovery Cell), Collectorate, Hyderabad and Another 2001-LLR-1087 (Andra Pradesh). 35. In Employees State Insurance Corporation, Jaipur v. Bharat Motors Sri Ganga Nagar 2001-L.L.R.-49 : 2000-II-LLJ-1502 , it is observed that ‘it is only the Regional Director who can determine the Employees State Insurance contribution and not the Employees State Insurance Inspector.‘ 36. In State through Manager, Employees State Insurance Corporation Gulburga V. Karanthi Kumar and Another 2005- L.L.R. -376 (Kant), it is held that ‘once the establishment is covered under Employees State , it becomes liable to pay contributions.‘ 37. It is not out of place for this Court to cite the decision of this Court in Kumbakonam Milk Supply Co-operative Society, rep. by its Secretary v. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Madras 2003-III-LLJ-416 wherein, in paragraph 11, it is observed as follows at p. 419 of LLJ: “11. The Employees‘ State is a piece of social welfare legislation enacted primarily with the object of providing certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and also to make provisions for certain other matters incidental thereto. In an enactment of this nature, the endeavour of the Court should be to interpret the provisions liberally in favour of the persons for whose benefit the enactment has been made….” 38. In an enactment of this nature, the endeavour of the Court should be to interpret the provisions liberally in favour of the persons for whose benefit the enactment has been made….” 38. InEssorpe Mills Limited v. Central Provident Fund Commissioner and Others 2001-II-LLJ-24, this Court has held that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had not availed of the remedy of statutory appeal as per Section 7-1 of the E.P.F. Act, 1952.‘ 39. For redressal of grievances, an employer can file an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 instead of filing writ petition in High Court as per decision in Convent of Jesus and Marry v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Dehradun 2005-L.L.R.-517 (Uttr.H.C). 40. InMohan v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Another 2002-III-LLJ-779 at page 780, it is held as follows (Held): “The High Court rejected also another contention of the petitioner, namely, that the mode of recovery specified in Section 8-B(1)(b) could not be resorted to, unless the other modes of recovery were exhausted. The High Court observed that the modes specified in Section 8-B(1)(a)(b) and (c) were alternative modes and not exclusive of each other. It was open to the Recovery Officer to resort to any one of the modes.” 41. InAllahabad Bank and Others v. S.K. Bhattacharya and Others (1999) 3 L.L.N. 140 : 2000-I-LLJ-945, it is held that ‘the provident fund authorities should investigate the objections filed by the banks to which the property to be sold has been mortgaged in terms of rule 11 of Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, 1961, read with Section 8-G of the Provident Funds Act and till the objections of the petitioners-banks have been investigated and adjudicated there will be no sale of disputed property.” 42. InVenkatesh D.R. V. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad and Another 2004-III-LLJ-952, para 9, it is observed as follows at p. 955 of LLJ: “9. When the establishment or the employer fails to pay the PF arrears under the Act, the properties of the establishment can be attached and brought to sale. Even after selling the property, it is found that the sale proceeds are insufficient for receiving the whole amount of arrears, the properties of the employer can be attached and brought to sale. When the establishment or the employer fails to pay the PF arrears under the Act, the properties of the establishment can be attached and brought to sale. Even after selling the property, it is found that the sale proceeds are insufficient for receiving the whole amount of arrears, the properties of the employer can be attached and brought to sale. In such a case, after bringing the properties of the employer, the funds are sufficient for recovering the PF arrears, no further action needs to be taken. The Legislature makes the employer personally liable for paying the PF arrears only in the event of the properties of the establishment being insufficient. The personal liability, therefore, is not straightaway attracted etc…” 43. In Otis Elevator Employee Union S. REG and Others v. Union of India and Others 2004-I-LLJ-217 : 2003 (99) FLR 1179, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 223 of LLJ: “17. The Act is a social welfare legislation to ‘provide for the institution of Provident Fund, Pension Fund and Deposit Linked Insurance Fund for employees in factories and other establishments‘. If the legislation is not patently arbitrary, this Court will not monitor implementation of such policy unless the same is discriminatory or arbitrary. Since the Scheme is for the welfare of employees, the same cannot be held to be violative of the. 18.… The grievance of discrimination or arbitrariness on account of attracting the wrath of Article 14 cannot be sustained and hence, we cannot interfere with the Scheme framed by the Government. Employees‘ writ petitions challenging the validity of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1996 and Employees‘ Pensions Scheme, 1995 were dismissed by the High Court and their claims for exemption from the Scheme were also rejected. We upheld the view taken by the High Courts and dismiss these petitions. The validity of the scheme is upheld. These writ petitions and transferred cases are dismissed accordingly.” 44. In the decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Provident Fund Commissioner and Others (1990) 1 SCC 68 : 1994-III-LLJ (Suppl)-1136, at page 71 in paragraph 9, it is laid down as follows at p. 1138 of LLJ: “9. It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath. It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath. He has the power requiring the discovery and production of documents. This power was given to the Commissioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person.” 45. Admittedly, in the Joint Compromise Memo filed by the parties in W.A. No. 50 of 2007 before this Court, the statutory authorities under the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 as well as Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are not parties to the proceedings. As per the ingredients of Section 94 of the Employees‘ State , 1948, Contributions, etc., due to the Corporation is to have priority over other debts. 46. In view of the fact that the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 as well as Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are a Social Welfare beneficial legislation and also because of the fact that the appellant/Bank has a viable, effective and efficacious alternative remedy of approaching the statutory authorities, by way of preferring appropriate Appeals as per Section 75 of the Employees‘ State Insurance Act, 1948 and also as per Section 7 -1 of the Employees‘ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, we are of the considered view that the writ petitions filed by the appellant/Bank are not maintainable in law. We also hold that the learned single Judge has rightly held that the appellant/Bank cannot thwart the impugned proceedings and the said decision does not suffer from any serious material irregularity or patent illegality. Consequently, the writ appeals fail. 47. In the result, the writ appeals are dismissed with a total cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) to be paid to the Madras Society for the Protection of Children, New No. 891, Old No. 288, P.H. Road, Old Washermanpet, Chennai-21 for wasting the valuable public time of the Court, knowing pretty well that the Bank is fighting a losing battle. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) to be paid to the Madras Society for the Protection of Children, New No. 891, Old No. 288, P.H. Road, Old Washermanpet, Chennai-21 for wasting the valuable public time of the Court, knowing pretty well that the Bank is fighting a losing battle. The common order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 11177 and 23748 of 2008 dated 7.6.2011 is affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in these Appeals. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.