JUDGEMENT Birendra Pd.Verma, J. 1. This intra Court appeal under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.4.1997, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in F.A. No. 355 of 1975, whereby while allowing the aforesaid first appeal, the judgment and decree dated 9.7.1975, passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Buxar, in Title Suit No. 86 of 1967/40 of 1974, was set aside and suit of the plaintiffs-appellants has been dismissed. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants herein brought Title Suit No. 86 of 1967 in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge-2 , Ara on 23.11.1967, which was subsequently transferred to the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Buxar, and was re-numbered as Title Suit No. 40 of 1974. In the aforesaid title suit, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that 20.85 acres of lands situate at Mauza-Basudhar, P.S.-ltarhi, District- Buxar, originally in the district of Sahabad, appertaining to Tauzi No. 6118, detailed in Schedule-5 of the plaint, were their zirat lands and after vesting of the Zamindari in the State of Bihar, they acquired status of statutory occupancy raiyat. The plaintiffs further sought a declaration that the defendants have no title over the suit lands and the plaintiffs were illegally dispossessed by the defendants from the same and, therefore-, they prayed for a decree for recovery of possession over the suit land, after ejecting defendant 1st set to 3rd set (hereinafter referred to as contesting defendants). Besides that, plaintiffs prayed for past and future mesne profits and an order of injunction, restraining the defendants from doing any overt act with respect to the suit land. 3. The suit was contested by the contesting defendants and a joint written statement was filed on behalf of defendants no. 1 to 4, 6, 7, 11, 14 to 16, 22, 24 to 26 and 33 to 35 denying the claim of the plaintiffs and praying therein for dismissal of the suit with costs. Separate written statements were filed on behalf of minor defendants by their respective Guardians Ad Litem (G.A.L.) praying therein for dismissal of the suit. On contest the suit was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 9th July, 1975 by learned Subordinate Judge, Buxar, which has been reversed and set aside by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the first appeal filed by the contesting defendants. On contest the suit was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 9th July, 1975 by learned Subordinate Judge, Buxar, which has been reversed and set aside by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the first appeal filed by the contesting defendants. Hence, this L.P.A. at the instance of the plaintiffs. 4. In order to appreciate the points involved in the present appeal for its adjudication, it would be appropriate to portray the case of the parties as per their pleadings, which is discussed hereinbelow. 5. The case of the plaintiffs- appellants herein, in short, is that the lands of tauzi no. 6118 of Mauza-Basudhar, was under the proprietorship of Parmeshwar Singh, Ram Lakhan Singh and Paramjota Kuari, the ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th set. Prior to vesting of Zamindari, they remained in possession over the same as proprietors and landlords, and after vesting of Zamindari in the State of Bihar, the suit land had remained as their Sir-zirat lands. Ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th set executed three usufructuary mortgage deeds (Rehan deeds), firstly on 12th June, 1893 in favour of one Ratan Singh with respect to 19 bighas of land for Rs. 950/- only, secondly on 11th Jeth 1300 Fasli (middle of the year 1893) in favour of one Shirtaj Hajam with respect to 10 bighas of land for Rs. 500/- and thirdly on 27th February, 1898 in favour of Ratan Hajam, Sirtaj Hajam and Anmol Hajam with respect to 14 bighas of land for Rs. 700/-. It is claimed that mortgage deed dated 12th June, 1893 was redeemed in the year 1929, whereas mortgage deed dated 11th. Jeth 1300 Fasli (middle of the year 1893) and mortgage deed dated 27th February, 1898 were redeemed in the year 1940. After such redemption, the plaintiffs and defendants 6th set came back in possession over the lands covered by those usufructuary mortgage deeds and after vesting of Zamindari, they claim to have become statutory occupancy raiyats. However, it has been admitted in the plaint that during the cadestral survey proceed, ing lands of khata nos. 341, 345, 346 and 348, which are part of ScheduIe-5 of the plaint, were recorded by mistake in the name of ancestors of contesting defendants, as they were their ploughmen. It is claimed that the defendants 4th set are the heirs of Shirtaj Hajam, Ratan Hajam and Anmol Hajam,. 341, 345, 346 and 348, which are part of ScheduIe-5 of the plaint, were recorded by mistake in the name of ancestors of contesting defendants, as they were their ploughmen. It is claimed that the defendants 4th set are the heirs of Shirtaj Hajam, Ratan Hajam and Anmol Hajam,. whereas defendants 5th set is the heir of Ratan Singh.. It has been admitted in the plaint that defendants 6th sets are the co-sharers and descendants, of common ancestors of the plaintiffs. 6. It is also the claim of the plaintiffs that even after vesting of Zamindari in the State of Bihar, the suit land remained as Sir-zirat of plaintiffs and defendants 6th set. They acquired the status of statutory occupancy raiyats. Though the contesting defendants were never in possession over the suit land, but they started creating problems since 1958 on the basis of wrong entry in the cadestral survey records in the name of their ancestors. The contesting defendants filed rent commutation case before B.D.O., Itarhi, which was decided in their favour. Appeal filed against that order was also dismissed. A case was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs before the Additional Collector, Ara, but that was still pending. Whereafter, a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was initiated with respect to suit land, which was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C, but that was finally decided against the plaintiffs on 31st July, 1965 and being emboldened by that order, the plaintiffs were dispossessed by the contesting defendants on 1.8.1965. 7. The contesting defendants, in their joint written statement referred to above, challenged the maintainability of the suit of the plaintiffs on various grounds. However, they also admitted that the plaintiffs and defendants 6th sets are descendents of their common ancestors and their ancestors were the proprietor of Tauzi No. 6118. According to them, the suit land was settled in favour of their ancestors by the ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th sets and accordingly, forefathers of the contesting defendants were coming in continuous possession over suit land since long. The claim of possession of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th set was categorically denied. According to them, the suit land was settled in favour of their ancestors by the ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th sets and accordingly, forefathers of the contesting defendants were coming in continuous possession over suit land since long. The claim of possession of the plaintiffs and defendants 6th set was categorically denied. According to the defendants, during the cadestral survey proceeding the suit lands were found in actual, physical and cultivating possession of the forefathers of the contesting defendants, therefore, they were recorded as occupancy raiyats/bhaulidars in the cadestral survey khatiyan with respect to the suit lands. It is specifically claimed that neither the forefather of the plaintiffs nor the alleged mortgagees were ever found in possession over the suit land. It is also specifically pleaded that ancestors of the contesting defendants were never ploughmen of the ancestors of the plaintiffs. Jagdamba Singh (defendant no. 39), admittedly a co-sharer of the plaintiffs even according to the genealogical table given by the plaintiffs at schedule-l of the plaint and admittedly having half share in the suit land, executed deed of ekrarnama admitting the title and possession of the contesting defendants over the suit land. On the basis of these pleadings, besides others, prayer was made for dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants. 8. In support of their respective cases, the oral as well as documentary evidence were adduced by the plaintiffs as also contesting defendants. 21 witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs, whereas 35 witnesses were examines by the contesting defendants. Documents marked as Exts.-1 to 13 were produced by the plaintiffs, whereas documents marked as Exts.-A to M/1 were produced by the contesting defendants. 9. Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, in his elaborate submissions, has assailed the validity and correctness of the judgment and decree passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the First Appeal preferred by the contesting defendants-respondents herein reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. He has assailed the judgment of a learned Single Judge primarily on these two grounds: (A). The judgment of the learned Single Judge is not in accordance with law and suffers from non-consideration of evidence. (B). The documents of unimpeachable characters have not been properly considered and have been wrongly ignored. He has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (i). He has assailed the judgment of a learned Single Judge primarily on these two grounds: (A). The judgment of the learned Single Judge is not in accordance with law and suffers from non-consideration of evidence. (B). The documents of unimpeachable characters have not been properly considered and have been wrongly ignored. He has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (i). AIR 1974 SC 2048 (Smt. Asha Devi V/s. Dukhi Sao and Another), (para-2). (ii). (2005)7 SCC 190 (Ishwar Dutt V/s. Land Acquisition Collector and Another), (para-33). (iii). (2007)6 SCC 737 [:2008(1) PLJR (SC)235| (Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan V/s. Damodar Trlmbak Tanksale (Dead) and Others) (para- graph-14). (iv) (2008)4 SCC 182 (Thimmaiah V/s. Shabira and Others). (Paragraph- 11) (v). (2008)10 SCC 497 (Jagdish Singh V/s. Madhuri Devi), (paragraphs 17 and 28). 10. Mr. Kamal Nayan Chaubey, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants-respondents herein, in his elaborate submissions, has fully supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in the First Appeal and prayed for dismissal of the present appeal, consequently, dismissal of the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants herein, primarily on the following grounds: (A) Cadestral Survey Record objectively prepared by the revenue authorities and Cadestral Survey Khatiyan having been finally published as far back as in the year 1911 recognizing rights of the ancestors of the contesting defendants as occupancy raiyats/ bhaulidars have not been challenged by the plaintiffs-appellants herein and the proceedings under the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the B.T. Act. in short) would be presumed to be correct under the mandate of Section 103-B(3) of the B.T. Act. (B) Sheet-anchor of the plaintiffs with respect to the suit land is.3 mortgage deeds (Ext.-6 series) and their subsequent redemption is based on the assumption that same were belonging to Tauzi No. 6118, but, in fact, mortgage deeds (Ext.-6 series) were executed by the ancestors of the plaintiffs with respect to lands of Tauzi No. 6119 and, therefore, the very basis of the claim of the plaintiffs is misconceived. (C) Total area of the suit land bearing Tauzi No. 6118 is 20.85 acres=33 bighas and 8 kathas, whereas in 3 mortgaged deeds (Ext.-6 series) about 43 bighas of lands are involved, which falsifies the whole claim of the plaintiffs with respect to suit land. (D) Jagdama Singh, defendant no. (C) Total area of the suit land bearing Tauzi No. 6118 is 20.85 acres=33 bighas and 8 kathas, whereas in 3 mortgaged deeds (Ext.-6 series) about 43 bighas of lands are involved, which falsifies the whole claim of the plaintiffs with respect to suit land. (D) Jagdama Singh, defendant no. 39, admittedly the co-sharer of the plaintiffs, having half share in the lands of Tauzi No. 6118, by executing 3 deeds of Ekrarnama (Exts.-C, C/1 and C/2) has admitted the right, title and possession of the contesting defendants over the suit lands and this falsifies the claim of the plaintiffs with respect to the suit land. (E) The judgment and decree of the trial court having been set aside by a learned Single Judge, on the cogent grounds, the present L.P.A. is fit to be dismissed in the light of the ratio laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Barhu Ram and Others V/s. Butai Ram and Another, reported in 1999(2) BLJ 818 [: 1999(3) PLJR 52], (para-15). 11. Before proceeding to decide the case on merits, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of L.P.A., arising out of a First Appeal. Against a Full Bench judgment of our own High Court, in the case of Asha Devi V/s. Dukhi Sao and Others, reported in AIR 1965 Patna 472, the matter was taken to the Apex Court. In the aforesaid Full Bench judgment, two Judges took a view that finding of facts recorded by the learned Single Judge are binding on them and they cannot go into those question of facts in Letters Patent Appeal. However, one of the Judges, constituting that Full Bench, gave a dissenting judgment. In that background the Honble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Asha Devi vs. Dukhi Sao (supra) laid down the law regarding the scope of L.P.A. in paragraph-2 of the judgment and relevant portion, of which is reproduced hereinbelow: ".........Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court is analogous to Clause-15 of other Chartered High Courts namely Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or Clause-10 of the Allahabad High Court. There is no dispute that an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of that Court in appeal from a judgment and a decree of a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The only question is whether the power of a Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court or its analogous provisions in the Letters Patent of other High Courts is limited only to a question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure or has it the same power which the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The limitations on the power of the Court imposed by Ss. 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made applicable to an Appellate Court hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge of that High Court in a first Appeal from the judgment and decree of the court subordinate to the High Court for the simple reason that a Single Judge of the High Court is not a court subordinate to the High Court. This Court in Ladli Prasad vs. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., 1964(1) SCR 270 =( AIR 1963 SC 1279 ) had occasion to observe that a Single Judge deciding- a first appeal may be a court immediately below the court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal, but it is not a court subordinate to the High Court..........." 12. A Constitution Bench of the Five- Judges of the Hohble Apex Court in Alapati Kasi Viswanatham V/s. A. Sivarama Krishnayya, C.A. No. 232 of 1961 disposed of on 11.1.1963, unfortunately an unreported judgment, had also directly dealt with this question. A Constitution Bench of the Five- Judges of the Hohble Apex Court in Alapati Kasi Viswanatham V/s. A. Sivarama Krishnayya, C.A. No. 232 of 1961 disposed of on 11.1.1963, unfortunately an unreported judgment, had also directly dealt with this question. Fortunately, the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench was noticed in the case of Asha Devi vs. Dukhi Sao (supra) and some part of it was reported therein, out of which following portions would be relevant in the present context and is reproduced hereinbelow: "......A Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a first appeal to the High Court is not exactly equivalent to a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore it cannot be held that a Letters Patent Appeal of this kind can only lie on a question of law and not otherwise. The matter would have been different if the Letters Patent Appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court. In these circumstances it will be open to the High Court to review even findings of fact.in a Letters Patent Appeal from a first appeal heard by a learned Single Judge, though generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below. But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned Single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. The contention of the appellant therefore that the Letters Patent Bench was not in law entitled to reverse the concurrent findings of fact must be negatived." 13. A Division Bench of our own High Court in. the case of Barhu Ram and Others vs. Butai Ram and Another (supra) has also dealt with the scope of L.P.A. in paragraph-15 of the judgment and relevant partition of which is reproduced hereinbelow: ".........While it is true that the special jurisdiction of this Court under Letters Patent does not inhibit the court from going into questions of fact as well as questions of law, it is equally well settled that findings of fact may be set aside by this Court only if there are good reasons to do so. The appellants must be able to demonstrate before this Court that the findings of fact are either perverse or palpably unreasonable and therefore unsustainable. If the trial court and the appellate court have correctly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded findings which can be said to be reasonable, there will be no justification for setting aside such findings of fact........." 14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court as also by our own High Court, it is apparent that it would be open, to the High Court while exercising the powers under Letters Patent Jurisdiction, to review even finding of facts recorded by a learned Single Judge in the First Appeal, but if findings of facts are based on reasonable ground, then generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb such finding of facts. However,, it is always open to a Letters Patent Bench to review question of law and question of facts involved in the appeal and have not been decided on a sound reasonings, or the conclusion arrived in the first appeal was either perverse or not sustainable in the eye of law. 15. Now, coming to the merit of the appeal, it is common case of the parties that during the Cadestral Survey proceedings Khatiyan (Ext.-K series) were prepared in the name of ancestors of the contesting defendants and they were shown to be occupancy raiyats/bhaulidars. It is needless to say that in exercise of its powers under Section 101 of the B.T. Act the State Government may direct for holding survey for preparation of record of rights by revenue officers. In the present appeal, it has been admitted by the parties that the cadestral survey proceeding was taken up and finally cadestral survey khatiyan was prepared and published in the year 1911 recording the ancestors of the contesting defendants as raiyats/ bhaulidars. In the present appeal, it has been admitted by the parties that the cadestral survey proceeding was taken up and finally cadestral survey khatiyan was prepared and published in the year 1911 recording the ancestors of the contesting defendants as raiyats/ bhaulidars. If either the ancestors of the plaintiffs or their alleged mortgagee were in possession over the suit land, then in that case they could have been recorded as raiyats in the cadestral survey records and if they were at all aggrieved with wrong entry in the cadestral survey records, then it was open to them to file a suit under Section 106 of the B.T. Act before a Revenue Officer, after final publication of the records of rights under sub-section (2) of Section 103-A of the B.T. Act. Even in case of failure in the aforesaid suit, a revision could have been filed under Section 108 of the B.T, Act. But admittedly neither the ancestors of the plaintiffs nor the alleged mortgagees ever filed any suit either in terms of Section 106 or any revision under Section 108 of the B.T. Act. Therefore, the cadestral survey khatiyan (Ext.-K series) published in the year 1911 in terms of Section 103-A(2) of the B.T. Act attained its finality and would be a conclusive evidence that the ancestors of contesting defendants were. raiyats with respect to the suit (and. Section 103-B(3) of the B.T. Act attaches the presumption of correctness with respect to such record of rights, so published under Section 103- A(2) of the B.T. Act. 16. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs-appellants that the suit lands are covered by three usufructuary mortgage deeds executed by their ancestors and the ancestors of defendants 6th set. First usufructuary mortgage deed was executed on 12th June, 1893 in favour of Ratan Singh (Ext.-6/A) with respect to 19 bighas of lands. Second usufructuary mortgage deeds (Ext.-6/B) was executed on 11th Jeth 1300 Fasli (middle of year 1893) in favour of Shirtaj Hajam with respect to 10 bighas of land and 3rd usufructuary mortgage deed (Ext.-6/C) was executed on 27.2.1898 with respect to 14 bighas of land. The appellants claim that first usufructuary mortgage deed was redeemed in 1929 and second and third usufructuary mortgage deeds were redeemed in 1940 and after such redemption, the plaintiffs and defendants 6th sets came in possession over the suit land. The appellants claim that first usufructuary mortgage deed was redeemed in 1929 and second and third usufructuary mortgage deeds were redeemed in 1940 and after such redemption, the plaintiffs and defendants 6th sets came in possession over the suit land. They have presumed that the lands covered by the aforesaid three mortgage deeds to be the lands of Tauzi No. 6118. However, in view of the submissions made on behalf of the contesting respondents, I have examined the aforesaid three mortgage deeds (Ext.-6 series) and found that these mortgage deeds were with respect to lands covered by Tauzi No. 6119 and not Tauzi No. 6118 as claimed by the plaintiffs-appellants. This also goes to the root of the matter. If the mortgage deeds were executed with respect to lands of Tauzi No. 6119, then the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants with respect to lands of Tauzi. No. 6118 has to fail and consequently the present appeal has to be dismissed. 17. The claim of the plaintiffs-appellants with respect to suit land became doubtful on yet another ground. According to them, after redemption of three mortgage deeds (Ext.-6 series) they alongwith defendants 6th sets came back in possession over the suit land. The total area involved in the three mortgage deeds (Ext.-6 series) is about 43 bighas, whereas the plaintiffs-appellants have sought declaration of their title only with respect to 20.85 acres=33 bighas and 8 kathas. It is not the case of the plaintiffs-appellants that they were forcibly dispossessed only from some part of lands of Khata Nos. 341, 345, 346 and 348 and over some part of the lands they still remained in possession. In view of the apparent contradictions regarding area of land involved in the three mortgage deeds and the lands detailed in schedule-5 of the plaint, it appears that the plaintiffs are not sure about their own case and their entire case is based on assumption and surmises. 18. The claim of the plaintiffs-appellants with respect to suit land becomes doubtful on yet another ground. It is admitted case of the parties that the plaintiffs and the defendants 6th set are descendants of their common ancestor having half and half share. According to the case of the plaintiffs-appellants, after redemption of three mortgage deeds they alongwith defendants 6th set came in possession over the suit land. Surprisingly, defendant no. It is admitted case of the parties that the plaintiffs and the defendants 6th set are descendants of their common ancestor having half and half share. According to the case of the plaintiffs-appellants, after redemption of three mortgage deeds they alongwith defendants 6th set came in possession over the suit land. Surprisingly, defendant no. 39, Jagdama Singh, a cosharer of the plaintiffs, had executed two Ekrarnama deeds on 30.9.1958 (Exts.-C and C/1) and third Ekramama deed dated 8.2.1966 (Ext.-C/2) admitting therein that the defendants and their ancestors are coming in possession over the suit lands. The plea of the plaintiffs that aforesaid Jagdama Singh, having fallen in bad habit, went in the company of the contesting defendants does not inspire confidence. One fails to understand as to why he would have executed aforesaid three ekrarnama deeds relinquishing his own rights also over the suit land. 19. Now coming to oral evidence of P.Ws. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, it is apparent that their evidences are not very consistent and are contrary to each other and at times contrary to own pleadings of the plaintiffs-appellants. They have not positively stated that the plaintiffs or the mortgagees were in possession over the suit land since the time of cadestral survey proceedings till their alleged forcible dispossession on 1.8.1965. Thus, on the basis of inconsistent evidence of P.Ws., referred to above, claim of the plaintiffs- appellants with respect to suit land cannot be accepted. D.Ws. 6, 10, 11, 23, besides others, have specifically deposed that defendants or their ancestors are coming in exclusive possession over the suit land since long. 20. For the reasons recorded above, it is apparent that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and decree cannot be said to be perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law. In fact, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge is reasonably possible. This Court does not find any cogent reason to interfere with the findings recorded and conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge and, accordingly, judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge is upheld. 21. In the result, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. S.K.Katriar, J. 22 I agree.