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2011 DIGILAW 3649 (MAD)

Anbazhagan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Pallikaranai Police Station, Kancheepuram District

2011-08-11

C.T.SELVAM

body2011
Judgment : 1. Petitioner was convicted of offence under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and fine of Rs 5000/- in default to undergo one month rigorous imprisonment under judgment of the Judicial Magistrate, Alandur passed in C.C. No. 1585 of 2005 dated 20.3.2006. 2. The case initially informed against the petitioner was that the de facto complainant, a lady had preferred a complaint regarding theft of her jewels. At about 1.00 p.m on 20.5.2001, the de facto complainant alighted from a bus and was proceeding to her house. The petitioner, a traffic constable petitioner was regulating traffic. Owing to reference of the complaint she had acquaintance with the petitioner and hence greeted him. Petitioner asked her if she had got back the jewels. She replied in the negative. The petitioner propositioned her stating that if she accepts to be his wife for a day he would get back her jewels. De facto complainant/P.W.1 sought to move away from the place. The petitioner got into an auto driven by P.W.3 and asked her to get in. The same was witnessed‘ by P.W.4. P.W.1 ran to her house and narrated the incident to her husband P.W.2. By such time the petitioner went to her house by the auto. When P.W.2 rebuked him he retorted that he had come there to get water and when he was asked to go away by P.W.2. the petitioner got into the auto driven by P.W.3 and went away. On the complaint of P.W.1 a case was registered in Cr. No. 243 of 2004 under Section 354 IPC. 3. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the petitioner/accused for offence under Section 354 IPC read with 75 Madras City Police Act. The case was tried by the Judicial Magistrate, Alandur. Prosecution examined 5 witnesses and marked 2 exhibits. None were examined on the side of the defence. The Trial Court posted the case for judgment on 19.10.2005. However, on such date judgment was not pronounced as the Trial Court found that ingredients of Section 75 of the Police Act were not attracted. The Trial Court then altered charges in excise of powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C to that of an offence under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998. However, on such date judgment was not pronounced as the Trial Court found that ingredients of Section 75 of the Police Act were not attracted. The Trial Court then altered charges in excise of powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C to that of an offence under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998. The petitioner pleaded not guilty and P.W.1 to 5 were recalled and examined. No further documents were marked on the side of the prosecution. 4. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998 and sentenced him as above stated. The appeal of the petitioner stands dismissed. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) for the respondent. 6. On perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court we find that in altering the charges after having found no material in support of commission of offences under Section 354 IPC and 75 of Madras City Police Act, the Trial Court specifically had found that offending acts of the petitioner had taken place at the house of the de facto complainant. 7. To attract offence under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998 offence must have taken place at a place particularly covered by the Section. A private dwelling house is not one of such places Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998 reads as follows: “4. penalty for (harassment or woman)- whoever commits or participates in or abets (harassment of woman) in or within the precincts of any educational institution, temple or other place of worship, bus stop, road, railway station, cinema theatre, park, beach, place of festival, public service vehicle or vessel or any other place shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than thousand rupees.” This Court by its order dated 25.10.2010 in Crl. O.P. No. 1 3501 or 2010 in Gouresh Mehra v. The State Rep. by Tr has held as follows: “This Court is of the considered opinion that the words ‘any other place‘ found in Section 4 are to be read ‘ejusdem generis‘. The Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 when originally enacted consisted of 10 Sections and came into force on 30.7.1998. by Tr has held as follows: “This Court is of the considered opinion that the words ‘any other place‘ found in Section 4 are to be read ‘ejusdem generis‘. The Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 when originally enacted consisted of 10 Sections and came into force on 30.7.1998. The offences under Section 4-A Harassment death, 4-B been included under subsequent amendments of the year 2002. Confining ourselves to the offence contemplated under Section 4 and looking into the objects and reasons of the enactment not towards informing ourselves of the amplitude of the Act but towards understanding the idea behind it, we find that the enactment was intended as a measure to eradicate eve teasing in public places. The Act informs what would constitute harassment in general terms in Section 3 and while prescribing a penalty for harassment under Section 4 restricts the same to harassment committed at particular places. Proceeding further, we find, that under Section 5 and 6, responsibilities are cast upon persons in charge of educational institutions, temple or other places of worship, cinema theatre or any other precinct and upon the crew of a public service vehicle or vessel. This Court considers it reasonable to hold that Section 4 of the Act was meant to deal with offences occurring in the places informed or in places of like nature. If not so read, the mention of the particular places in Section 4 would be rendered redundant and such could not have been the legislative intent. To put it differently, if the intent was to attract punishment for harassment at any and every place, Section 4 simply could have read as follows: “4. Penalty for harassment of woman— whoever commits or participates in or abets harassment of woman in any place shall be punished............. 7. in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 , it has been explained that the rule of ‘ejusdem generis‘ was that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. It was further observed that it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It was further observed that it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule or law, but it is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. In Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521 , it is informed that the rule of ‘ejusdem generis‘ is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense; that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words. Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes necessary to give a plain and ordinary meaning.” Following the above reasoning, this Court in circumstances where the trial Court found it necessary to alter charges under Section 216 Cr.P.C on the reasoning that the offending action of the petitioner had not been committed in a public place, this Court would set aside the conviction passed by the Courts below. The petitioner/accused is acquitted of the charges. The bail bond executed by the petitioner/accused shall stand cancelled. The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner/accused.