Judgment : 1. This Criminal Original Petition is filed by the State against the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate in Crl. M.P. No. 5068 of 2011 thereby rejecting the petition filed by the State for police custody of the respondents 1 and 2 who are arrayed as A1 and A2 in Nolambur Police Station Crime No. 758 of 2011. 2. The complaint is lodged at Nolambur Police:Station on 1.8.2011 by one P.Selvamani claiming himself to be the owner of the portion of the land measuring 1 ground comprised in S. No. 81, Nolambur Village. The allegations raised in the complaint are that he purchased the property from one Gupta during 2002 and he obtained due building permission from the competent authority. While so, an ex parte injunction order was passed by Poonamallee Court against the complainant and 120 others in respect of 20 acres forming part of which is his one ground site and on enquiry, they came to know that ex parte order was obtained by one Gowrisankar, who is the benami of Ex. MLA Ranganathan, in his capacity as power agent and that the injunction order was obtained on the basis of fabricated kist receipts. When the complainant and others approached the Court, the order of status quo was granted. When the order of status quo is in force, Gowrisankar and his henchmen numbering 15 at the instance of Ex. MLA Ranganathan, came to his land on 18.9.2009 and put up sheds and also fixed one Board and the complainant along with others met MLA and they were criminally intimidated to leave the property by receiving 25% of the amount paid by them as sale consideration. By saying so, the complaint is filed against 7 persons by names (i) Gowrisankar (ii) Ranganathan, MLA (iii) Danasingh (iv) Jayapaul (v) Albert (vi) Rathinavathi and (vii) Juliet Gnanavathi. As per the particulars mentioned in the FIR the copy of which is enclosed at page 1 of the typed set of papers, it was received at 3.00 pm on 1.8.2011 and it was immediately registered in Nolambur Police Station Crime No. 758 of 2011 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 447, 427, 387, 506(ii), 465, 468, 471 and 420 IPC and the investigation was immediately commenced. The perusal of the Case Diary produced before this Court further reveals that the statements of 22 persons are obtained on the same day and A1 to A5 are arrested on 2.8.2001, while A1 and A2 are arrested from their respective houses in the early morning hours, A3 to A5 are arrested in public place and they were produced before the Judicial Magistrate Court and remanded for judicial custody on 3.8.2011. 3. The State filed an application on 3.8.2011 under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C seeking police custody of the accused 1 and 2 for their custodial interrogation for collecting further particulars and other materials regarding the alleged act of fabrication of documents. After the petition was entertained, the accused are produced before the Court. When enquired, they expressed their unwillingness to go under police custody and the Judicial Magistrate Court after hearing both sides, passed an order rejecting the police custody petition on the ground that the documents in question are the public documents and the genuineness of the same can be ascertained from the department concerned and the police custody for interrogation of the accused is not necessary. Hence, this Criminal Original Petition before this Court by the State invoking the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 4. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would in this Criminal Original Petition seriously reiterate the same grounds as raised in the petition under this Crl.O.P. It is further argued by the Additional Public Prosecutor that the grounds on which the petition rejected are manifestly erroneous illegal and improper and against the interest of justice and unless and otherwise, the order is set aside and custody of the accused is handed over to the police for interrogation, the same is likely to prejudice further investigation in this case. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 would vehemently oppose the request for police custody. The correctness of the order passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate is also defended as well founded one. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 would vehemently oppose the request for police custody. The correctness of the order passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate is also defended as well founded one. In addition, the legal objection raised is against the maintainability of this Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 that as the right of the police to have custody of the accused is, by virtue of the impugned order, once for all lost, the same is to be construed as final order in respect of the proceedings and the correctness of the same can be challenged only by way of revision and the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be invoked to challenge the order impugned herein. 6. Both the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, have in support of their respective contentions, as to whether the order under challenge is to be construed as interlocutory order or final order and as to whether the same is revisable or not, cited the following authorities. The authorities cited on the side of the petitioner/State are (i) MadhuLimaye v. The State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978) SCC (Cr) 10 : LNIND 1977 SC 302 (ii) Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni AIR 1992 SC 1768 : 1992 SCC (Crl) 554 : LNIND 1992 SC 397 : (1993) 1 MLJ (Crl) 354 (iii) State represented by Inspector of Police and Others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate AIR 2004 SC 2282 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1722 : LNIND 2004 SC 597 : (2004) 1 MLJ (Crl) 1001 (iv) K.K. Patel and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another AIR 2000 SC 3346 : (2000) 6 SCC 195 : (2001) SCC (Cr) 200 : LNIND 2000 SC 889 , (v) S. Mahaveer v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, CCB, Chennai LNIND 2010 Mad 5956 : (2011) 3 MLJ (Crl) 466 (vi) unreported order dated 29.7.2011 in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 9334 of 2011 MHC (State v. Thalapathi and 3 Others). 7. by the Inspector of Police, CCB, Chennai LNIND 2010 Mad 5956 : (2011) 3 MLJ (Crl) 466 (vi) unreported order dated 29.7.2011 in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 9334 of 2011 MHC (State v. Thalapathi and 3 Others). 7. The authorities cited on the side of the respondents 1 and 2 are (i) V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI AIR 1980 SC 962 : (1980) SCC (Cri) 695 : LNIND 1979 SC 488 : (1980) 1 MLJ (Crl) 664 (ii) Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, South Zone Unit, Chennai-20 v. Ramlal Gujar 2010 (1) MWN (Crl) 63. 8. Regarding the maintainability of this Original Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or any Sessions Court is derived from Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure. While Section 397(1) deals with revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and Sessions Court in general, Section 397(2) imposed a bar upon the exercise of revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. There are decisions wherein proposition is laid down as to the nature of the orders and laid down regarding three types of orders i.e., (1) interlocutory order (2)final order and (3) intermediate order. The larger bench of 3 judges of the Supreme Court in the judgment in MadhuLimaye v. The State of Maharashtra (supra) had an occasion to deal with the question as to the nature of the orders falling within the above three kinds. The four judges larger bench of the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (supra) has laid down the proposition regarding the tests to be applied to ascertain the nature of the order in question as to whether the same is interlocutory or final order, which reads as follows: “(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order; (2)that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order; (3)that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because in our opinion, the term ‘interlocutory order’ in the Code of Criminal Procedure has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi–final orders; (4)that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the right of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the Court so that nothing is left to be done by the Court thereafter; (5)that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order, the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.” 9. In MadhuLimaye v. The State of Maharashtra (supra), the Supreme Court has analysed this aspect in detail by referring to various judgments in this regard. While doing so, the Supreme Court has differed with the view expressed in the oldest case in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King Kania AIR 1949 FC 1 that the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is invariably converse of the expression ‘final order’. The Supreme Court has in Madhu Limaye case, also extracted the observations laid down in the earlier judgments and also reproduced the definition of ‘final order” and ‘interlocutory order’ as defined IN Halsbury’s Laws Of England at pages 742 to 745 in paras 1606 to 1608, which reads as follows: “In para 1606:...a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. In para 1607 it is said: In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed “final”. In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment and merely directs how the declaration of right already given in the final judgment, are to be worked out, is termed “interlocutory”. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals”. 10. The Supreme Court has in the same authority elaborately dealt with the scope of revisional and inherent power of the High Court and the circumstances under which it can be invoked and the extent to which the bar imposed under Section 397(2) is to be applied. The Supreme Court has at para 10 further held that nothing in the Code which would include sub section 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C (revisional power) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C”. The Supreme Court thereafter has laid down the following principles in relation to exercise of the inherent power of the High Court: “(1) That the power is not to be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2)That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3)That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.” 11. The Supreme Court has in the course of its discussion further observed that the interlocutory orders need not be understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term ‘final order’ and the interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be converse of an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. It is further observed that there may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple and there are some kinds of order that may fall in between the two and the same does not attract the bar under sub-section (2) of 397. Our Supreme Court in the judgment in K.K. Patel and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another (supra) held as follows: “In deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) CrPC, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code”. 12. In Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra), the issue regarding the power of the Court to order for police custody or judicial custody came up for consideration and the Supreme Court in para 13 has held that “the Judicial Magistrate can in the first instance authorise the detention of the accused in either police or judicial custody from time-to-time but the total period of detention cannot exceed fifteen days in the whole. Within this period of fifteen days, there can be more than one order changing the nature of such custody either from police to judicial or vice-versa”. 13. In the judgment in State represented by Inspector of Police and Others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate (supra) cited on the side of the petitioner State, the question as to whether the order granting police remand is interlocutory order or final in nature is raised. The Supreme Court has laid down that the order is being purely interlocutory in nature and no revision is hence maintainable. The Supreme Court has in para 13 observed that “the order of remand cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner and it cannot be categorised even as an ‘intermediate order’ and the order is therefore, a pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.PC, a revision against the said order is not maintainable”. 14. 14. Though the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 would attempt to make a distinction between the order refusing police custody and the order granting police custody, the nature of the decision, in my considered view, does not bring either of the orders under the category of final order as the order of rejection passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate does not conclusively determine the right of the State to seek custodial interrogation of the accused in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra) as earlier referred to, wherein the principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that there can be more than one order changing the nature of detention of the accused either from police to judicial or vice-versa within the period of 15 days. In that event, the right of the police to seek police custody is not finally determined by reason of the order of the trial Court and hence, the same cannot be treated as final order. Whether order rejecting the police custody or granting the police custody, the same cannot put an end to the main proceedings, but it is only likely to have the effect of determining the particular proceedings which is more in the nature of subordinate matter. 15. The legal proposition that emerges from the conjoined reading of the observation of the Supreme Court in the judgments in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (supra) and MadhuLimaye v. The State of Maharashtra (supra) and other cases referred to above is that the right of the police to seek police custody of the accused for interrogation within 15 days period of detention, is not limited to one time as the police can approach the concerned Court for either police or judicial custody more than once within first 15 days detention period, as such the order rejecting the petition for police custody cannot be construed as final order, but has to necessarily be construed as Interlocutory order. 16. 16. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (supra) and V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (supra) also, the Apex Court has, after detailed discussion laid down that the legislature put the bar on the exercise of the revisional power of the High Court and also Sessions Judge in relation to any interlocutory order and then the inherent power will come into play. Our High Court has also in the recent judgments in S. Mahaveer v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, CCB, Chennai (supra) (C.T. Selvam, J.) and unreported order in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 9334 of 2011 dated 29.7.2011 (R. Mala, J.) observed that the order refusing or granting police custody is only an interlocutory order and it is not revisable and can be challenged by invoking inherent power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited the judgment in Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, South Zone Unit, Chennai-20 v. Ramlal Gujar (supra) in support of their contention that the order rejecting the police custody is final order and revisable. It may be true that the High Court has in the same entertained revision against the order refusing police custody. But the question as to the nature of the order and the maintainability of the revision are not raised and decided therein and hence, the same cannot be called in aid against the maintainability of the criminal original petition for challenging the order impugned herein. 18. In view of the legal position as discussed above, no revision is maintainable against the interlocutory order and as there is no other provision of law in Cr.P.C, for getting redressalof the grievance of the aggrieved party in the case of rejection of the application for police custody of the accused, inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C will come into play and the same can be invoked to challenge the same. Considering the nature of the order passed herein, the order under challenge has to be construed as interlocutory order, as such, by virtue of the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against the same is curtailed and as there is no other specific provision of law under Code of Criminal Procedure to challenge the correctness of the same, the Criminal Original Petition filed by the petitioner invoking the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is legally permissible. Hence, the objection raised against the maintainability of the Criminal Original Petition is hence negatived. 19. On facts, the averments raised in the complaint are referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. The perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the petition for custodial interrogation, enclosed at pages 4 to 7 of the typed set of papers would reveal that the police custody of the accused is sought for on the following 4 grounds: (i) police custody is essential for interrogation to ascertain the manner in which and the persons with whose assistance, forged kist receipts are created (ii) to record the confession statement of the accused if they are willing to give one such statement and to seize the materials on the strength of such confession statement (ii) to obtain sample signature and hand writing of the accused for investigation (iv) to ascertain the involvement of any other persons in the commission of the offence. 20. Before going into the allegations raised in the complaint, the few facts which are relevant for consideration herein are as follows: The property in question which is the subject matter of the complaint originally belonged to one N.K. Kirubai Nayagam and he died during 1977 leaving behind the accused 3 to 7 and one more son by name Jayasingh and legal heirs of his deceased son K. Dhanasingh as his legal heirs. It appears that after the death of original owner, the suit came to be filed among the legal heirs in O.S. No. 2427 of 1994 and compromise was effected involving all the legal heirs in respect of the property in question and compromise decree was passed. In pursuance of the same, Jayasingh and the legal heirs of the deceased son, sold the property to one third party and the third party inturn sold it to more than 200 persons. In pursuance of the same, Jayasingh and the legal heirs of the deceased son, sold the property to one third party and the third party inturn sold it to more than 200 persons. Long after the sale, the other legal heirs, who are arrayed as A3 to A7 in this Crime number, filed O.S. No. 23 of 2008 on the file of Sub Court, Poonamallee for declaration that the earlier compromise decree is null and void and not acted upon and for further relief of partition of the property among all the legal heirs of Kirubai Nayagam. The suit was filed against the other legal heirs and also all the subsequent purchasers. The accused A3 to A7 herein as the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 23 of 2008 have also obtained an order of injunction against all the defendants. When the order of ad interim injunction is served upon the other defendants, some of them filed C.R.P. No. 2913 and 3006 of 2008 invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in which serious objections are raised against the documents including kist receipts produced in the suit and the documents i.e. Kist receipts are alleged to be forged in the present complaint. The High Court has by order dated 5.8.2009 dismissed both the revisions by directing the Trial Court to dispose of the suit in O.S. No. 23 of 2008 within 6 months from the date of receipt of the copy of order and by giving opportunity to the revision petitioners to agitate their rights by filing necessary application claiming relief in accordance with law. While dismissing the CRPs, the High Court has in paras 27 and 28 referred to the kist receipts and observed that the matter as regards the terms of compromise and the discrepancies found in the documents i.e., kist receipts, could be gone into by the trial Court and this Court could not discuss the issue under Article 227 of the Constitution and the revision petitioners can agitate their claim by filing necessary application in accordance with law and also regarding the maintainability of the suit. The attention of this Court is also drawn to the fact that the wife of the de facto complainant herein viz., Anna Sree Selvamani and Annamalai Avenue (Nolambur) Plot Owners Association represented by its President one D. Mahaswaran having the de facto complainant as one of its members are the petitioners 31 and 58 in the CRPs. (The copy of the order is also produced on the side of the respondents for perusal of this Court.) It is further submitted that as against the order passed in CRPs, one of the petitioners i.e. Annamalai Avenue (Nolambur) Plot Owners Association, 58th petitioner has preferred S.L.P. Nos. 3471 and 3472 of 2009 and the matter is now seized of by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has passed an order to maintain status quo and also passed an order of interim stay of all further proceedings in the suit. The nature of the proceedings and the order passed therein and the stage of the same as mentioned above is not denied herein. As a matter of fact, the order of injunction and the order ofstatus quo without more particulars are also referred to in the complaint. 21. The present complaint came to be filed by one of the members of the association, who is also the husband of one of the revision petitioners in CRPs. The complaint is filed during the pendency of SLP before the Supreme Court more or less on the same issue and in respect of the same property, when the order of status quo as ordered by the Supreme Court is in force. The complaint says as if the cause of action for giving the complaint arose on 18.9.2009 which is one month after the disposal of CRPs. The present complaint is filed against not only the respondents 1 and 2 herein, but also against the plaintiffs in the civil suit who are the legal heirs of the original owner of the property in dispute and they are arrayed herein as accused 3 to 7. 22. It is well laid down principle of law regarding the police custody is concerned that ‘it amounts to infringement of right of an individual, more particularly fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India’. However, there are certain exceptions by way of reasonable restrictions and on such restriction is the grant of Police custody while investigation is pending. However, there are certain exceptions by way of reasonable restrictions and on such restriction is the grant of Police custody while investigation is pending. The Division Bench of our High Court in the judgment in State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Q Branch CID, Dharmapuri v. Sundarmoorthy, 2007 (2) MWN (Cr.) 414 while dealing with the mode of disposal of the application for police custody and the factors for consideration in the same, observed that any application for grant of police custody must be strictly considered on materials as it involves the fundamental right and personal liberty of an individual and the provisions are to be strictly understood and complied with. 23. It was observed so, in the earlier judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in G.K. Moopanar and Others v. The State of Tamil Nadu 1990 LW 113 . The single Judge of our High Court has in para 8 of the judgment in S. Mahaveer v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, CCB, Chennai (supra) reproduced Rule 76 of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1958 dealing with remands, which reads as follows: “76. Remands: (1) Magistrates shall not grant remands to police custody unless they are satisfied that there is good ground for doing so, and shall not accept a general statement made by the investigating or other Police Officer to the effect that the accused may be liable to give further information. A request for remand to Police custody shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting out briefly the prior history of the investigation and the likelihood of further clues which the Police expect to derive by having the accused in custody, sworn to by the investigating or other Police Officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police. Magistrates may decide after perusal of the affidavit.” The request for police custody of the accused 1 and 2 as sought for herein is to be hence appreciated in the light of the legal and factual aspects as referred to above. 24. The perusal of the case diary produced on the side of the petitioner herein would reveal that the de facto complainant along with his complaint has neither produced any document of his title norkist receipts which is alleged to be forged in the complaint. 24. The perusal of the case diary produced on the side of the petitioner herein would reveal that the de facto complainant along with his complaint has neither produced any document of his title norkist receipts which is alleged to be forged in the complaint. Whereas, the petitioner/state has in the present case, acted so swiftly and accepted the truth of the averments raised in the complaint without even ascertaining prima facie genuineness of the same and without even looking into the documents alleged to be forged. The opinion so formed by the Investigating Officer is only on the basis of the oral statement of the witnesses and the entire case diary does not refer to any single document basing on which the opinion is so arrived at. Whereas, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has sought to sustain the same by producing the copy of one document purported to be the report of Tahsildar, Ambattur in his Na.Ka. No. 4548/2011/A6 dated Nil.7.2011 addressed to the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, V7 Nolambur Police Station, which is to the effect that the kist receipts for faslis 1405, 1406 and 1407 bearing nos. C77/509489 etc. on the basis of verification of the corresponding kist receipt books, are found to be not genuine one. 25. The cursory glance at this report along with the copy of the kist receipts referred to in the complaint would reveal that it is given by way of reply to the letter of the Investigating Officer dated 20.7.2011. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would seriously rely upon this document in support of the averments contained in the complaint that the kist receipts are fabricated. Whereas the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 would draw the attention of this Court that when the complaint is given on 1.8.2011, the question of obtaining any report from the Tahsildar dated Nil.7.2011 and the question of relying upon the same does not arise herein. To which, the reply given by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that the earlier complaint was given by one association to the Chief Minister’s Cell and other higher Government officials and in the course of enquiry upon the same, the report is so obtained from the Tahsildar. To which, the reply given by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that the earlier complaint was given by one association to the Chief Minister’s Cell and other higher Government officials and in the course of enquiry upon the same, the report is so obtained from the Tahsildar. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is unable to furnish the particulars regarding the dates on which the complaint is received and enquiry is commenced and as to whether the enquiry is pending or the complaint is closed or if it is closed, the outcome of the same. The perusal of the case diary would reveal that no reference is at all made about any earlier complaint to either of the authorities mentioned above and about the letter of the Investigating Officer dated 20.7.2011 and the reply report of the Tahsildar dated Nil.7.2011 in the proceedings as referred to. As a matter of fact, the copy of the kist receipts and the copy of the report do not admittedly form part of the materials collected by the Investigating Officer in this case. That being the factual state of affairs, there is absolutely no material at this stage or the materials available are insufficient to say that the kist receipts are forged document and further clues are to be collected from the respondents 1 and 2 through their custodial interrogation regarding the manner of commission of alleged act of fabrication. 26. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the respondents, custodial interrogation cannot be sought for obtaining particulars in respect of other co-accused and for obtaining voluntary confessional statement of the accused and for drawing sample signature and hand writing of the accused. The grounds so raised seeking police custody does not deserve any merits and acceptance. Further, the matter is already seized of by the appropriate civil forum and the issue regarding the genuineness of the document in question which do not stand in the name of the respondents 1 and 2, is also the subject matter of the controversy in issue before the civil forum and the matter is also at present seized of by the Supreme Court in SLP and the order of status quo passed by the Apex Court is in force. The nature of the document being kist receipts, the question of fabrication can also be ascertained through collection of evidence from the department concerned. The nature of the document being kist receipts, the question of fabrication can also be ascertained through collection of evidence from the department concerned. Viewing from any angle, the request for police custody of the respondents 1 and 2 for custodial interrogation is unwarranted and is based on no material and the same is rightly rejected by the trial Court. This Court does not find any infirmity, illegality or perversity in the order impugned herein. The petitioner is hence disentitled to get any relief in this Criminal Original Petition. 27. In the result, the criminal original petition is dismissed.