JUDGMENT :- The prayer in the Writ Petition is for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order passed by the second respondent dated 31.12.2010, in so far as it relates to denial of backwages and to direct the Management to pay full backwages from 29.7.2011 till the date of the petitioner’s superannuation. 2. The contempt petition had been filed alleging disobedience of the order and direction issued by this Court in W.P.No.11641 of 2009 dated 5.2.2010. 3. Some factual background would be necessary before we approach the controversy/issue in this Writ Petition. The petitioner was initially appointed as a driver on 28.12.1989 in the erstwhile Pallavan Transport Corporation. After the Metropolitan Transport Corporation was formed, his services were transferred to Metropolitan Transport Corporation. When the petitioner was driving the bus on 29.7.2002, a cyclist crossed the road and in order to avert the accident, the petitioner applied sudden break and due to shock, the petitioner fainted. The Conductor of the bus admitted the petitioner in the Government Royapettah Hospital and it is stated that for a period of five days, the petitioner was unconscious and thereafter he re-gained conscious, but due to shock, he suffered paralysis of his right side and became immobile. The Branch Manager of the Mandaveli Branch is said to have visited the petitioner at the hospital. The petitioner was on earned leave between 30.7.2002 and 20.8.2002 and thereafter applied for medical leave on 10.1.2003 for a period of 121 days i.e. from 21.8.2002 to 19.2.2002. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner was served with two communications on 31.1.2005 and 18.4.2005, directing him to appear before the General Manager. It appears that the petitioner did not respond to the said communications and that resulted in issuance of a charge memo for unauthorised absence from 20.12.2010. The said charge memo appears to have returned unserved with the postal endorsement ‘left’. Subsequently the enquiry officer was appointed and due to the petitioner’s non appearance, the enquiry officer proceeded exparte and submitted a report stating that the charges are proved. The Management issued a second show cause notice on 23.5.2005, which also returned with endorsement ‘left. On 23.1.2006, the petitioner submitted a representation and based on the said representation, he was directed to appear before the General Manager, by proceedings dated 16.3.2006. Ultimately, the petitioner was dismissed from services of the Corporation by order dated 4.5.2006. The Management issued a second show cause notice on 23.5.2005, which also returned with endorsement ‘left. On 23.1.2006, the petitioner submitted a representation and based on the said representation, he was directed to appear before the General Manager, by proceedings dated 16.3.2006. Ultimately, the petitioner was dismissed from services of the Corporation by order dated 4.5.2006. After about 1 ½ years, the petitioner submitted a representation on 30.9.2008 invoking section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities for Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation Act, 1995. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Thereafter, during November 2008, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition before this Court in W.P.No.22736 of 2008. Challenging the order of removal dated 4.5.2006, and for a consequential direction to reinstate the petitioner with all arrears till alternate employment is provided. 5. This Court by an order dated 21.11.2008, disposed of the writ petition with a direction that the petitioner shall file an appeal against the order of removal from service to the Managing Director and it is also open to the petitioner to work out his remedy under the provisions of the Act. 6. The petitioner filed appeals on 10.12.2008 and 3.2.2009 and by an order dated 15.4.2009, the appeal was rejected. Challenging the said order, the petitioner preferred another writ petition being W.P.No.11641 of 2009, wherein a prayer was made to quash the order of dismissal which was confirmed in appeal and for a direction upon the respondents to invoke section 47 of the Act and to provide all benefits as per the Act. This Court after hearing the parties allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the order of removal. For better appreciation, the operative portion of the order is extracted hereunder: "7. Admittedly, this is a case where the petitioner had met with an accident during the course of his employment on 29.07.2002 and thereafter, he was on leave from 20.12.2002. At that stage of the matter, the show cause notice dated 23.05.2005 was issued to the petitioner stating that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 23.01.2006 to the respondent Corporation clearly stating about the accident that took place on 29.07.2002; he became unconscious and treated as an inpatient in the Government Royapettah Hospital and such other matters which prevented him from reporting for duty and requested them to drop action in the matter. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 23.01.2006 to the respondent Corporation clearly stating about the accident that took place on 29.07.2002; he became unconscious and treated as an inpatient in the Government Royapettah Hospital and such other matters which prevented him from reporting for duty and requested them to drop action in the matter. However, it is to be noted that the petitioner did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer, which were recorded ex parte, the impugned order of removal from service came to be passed on 04.05.2006. As against the impugned order of removal, the petitioner preferred an appeal petition through trade union on 15.06.2006 followed by appeal petitions dated 20.09.2008 and 30.09.2008. Since those appeal petitions were not disposed of, the petitioner came before this court by filing W.P.No.27736/2008. This court, after hearing the respondent Corporation and after taking note of the fact that the petitioner made a request to extend the benefit of section 47 of the Act in his appeal petitions dated 20.09.2008 and 30.09.2008, thought it fit to direct the petitioner to file an appeal against the impugned order of the second respondent dated 04.05.2006 to the first respondent within ten days. It was this court, while disposing of the writ petition, observed that it is open to the petitioner to work out his remedy under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner had filed the appeal petition within the time granted by this court on 10.12.2008 and in the said appeal petition, he had stated that when the accident occurred on 29.07.2002, he was on duty; he suffered a stroke; immediately he was admitted in the hospital and his right side was paralysed. On 23.05.2005, a charge memo was issued to him for his unauthorised absence. The petitioner gave an explanation that he suffered stroke while on duty and was undergoing treatment. It has been further stated that this was the reason for the petitioner not being able to participate in the enquiry conducted by the respondent Corporation. Therefore it was contended that if the respondent Corporation had disbelieved the petitioner's ailment or health condition, the appropriate course to be adopted would have been to refer the petitioner to the Medical Board instead of issuing the impugned order of dismissal. Therefore it was contended that if the respondent Corporation had disbelieved the petitioner's ailment or health condition, the appropriate course to be adopted would have been to refer the petitioner to the Medical Board instead of issuing the impugned order of dismissal. In the appeal petition, the petitioner has also raised a plea that he is entitled for protection under section 47 of the Act. However, the Appellate Authority, by a non-speaking order, came to the conclusion that the appeal does not deserve to be considered. The specific ground raised by the petitioner that he suffered stroke on account of the accident that took place on 29.07.2002, which occurred while the petitioner was on duty, was not taken into consideration. In my view, the conduct of the departmental proceedings ex parte itself was unreasonable inasmuch as the petitioner had suffered stroke, which prevented him from attending the departmental enquiry. If for any reason the respondent Corporation disbelieved the contention raised by the petitioner, it was well within their powers under the Standing Orders of the Corporation to direct the petitioner to appear before the Medical Board to ascertain his health condition. However, it is seen that such procedure was not adopted. 8. That apart, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am convinced that the Enquiry Officer ought to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner by adjourning the matter and not proceeding ex parte especially, when it cannot be disputed that the accident had occurred when the petitioner was on duty. Therefore I consider that it is a fit case in which the impugned order of dismissal deserves to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and on the ground that the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Accordingly, the impugned order of dismissal is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. However, it is open to the respondent Corporation to issue fresh notice of enquiry to the petitioner, if they propose to do so. The petitioner is directed to submit a written request to the first respondent herein enclosing all records in support of his contention that he suffered disability and that he is entitled to protection under section 47 of the Act. The petitioner is directed to submit a written request to the first respondent herein enclosing all records in support of his contention that he suffered disability and that he is entitled to protection under section 47 of the Act. If such petition is filed, the first respondent shall take note of the same and act in accordance with law and pass final orders within a period of two months from the date of receipt of such petition. It is needless to state that if enquiry notice is issued to the petitioner, he shall co-operate. No costs. " 9. As noticed above, while allowing the writ petitioner, and setting aside the order of dismissal, liberty was granted to the respondent Management to issue fresh notice of enquiry if they proposed to do so. Simultaneously, a direction was given to the petitioner to submit a written request to the first respondent enclosing all records in support of his claim that he suffered disability and he is entitled to protection under section 47(1) of the Act. On such representation being filed by the petitioner, the first respondent was directed to take note of the same and act in accordance with law and pass final orders within a period of two months. 10. After the Writ Petition was allowed, the petitioner filed Contempt Petition No.978 of 2002 alleging disobedience of the order of this Court. 10. A controversy arose as to how the petitioner’s medical condition has to be assessed and pursuant to the direction issued, the petitioner was referred to the Regional Medical Board on 2.12.2011 for assessing his medical condition. The Medical Board opined that the petitioner is not fit to drive the bus. Thereafter the respondent Corporation passed the order dated 31.12.2010 extending the benefit of section 47(1) of the Act and gave an alternate employment to the petitioner as Assistant (non-technical). However, in the said order, the petitioner was denied backwages. Aggrieved by such portion of the order denying backwage, the petitioner has come before this Court by way of the present Writ Petition. 11. However, in the said order, the petitioner was denied backwages. Aggrieved by such portion of the order denying backwage, the petitioner has come before this Court by way of the present Writ Petition. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner after reiterating the stand taken in the Writ Petition would contend that the petitioner’s condition is very pathetic and he requires an attendant to accompany him and he cannot do any work without the assistance of others and therefore he should be permitted to continue in service, but should not be compelled to attend duty but should be paid full pay and allowance. 12. The learned Standing counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation by relying upon the counter affidavit filed, submitted that the respondent Corporation considered the petitioner’s case sympathetically and though opportunity was granted by this Court to conduct fresh enquiry, such opportunity was not exercised, but considering the medical condition of the petitioner and the opinion of the Medical Board stating that the petitioner is unfit to drive the bus, he has been given alternative light duty as Assistant (non-technical) by the impugned order. It is further submitted that in such cases the incumbent is entitled to salary only from the date of discharge on medical ground. However, since the petitioner was not discharged on medical ground, but was given alternative employment, the petitioner is not entitled for backwges from 29.7.2002 to 31.12.2010. Further, it is stated that there is no necessity to re-assess the disability of the petitioner whether he is fit for light duty or not and there is no provision in the Act to pay full backwages from 29.7.2002 till his superannuation without reporting for duty. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in V.BALASUBRAMANAN Vs. TAMIL NADU STATE EXPRESS TRANSPORT CORPORATION 2011 (2) CLT 584 . 13. Heard the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record. 14. The facts of the case has been noticed in the preceding paragraphs. This Court by an order dated 5.2.2010 in W.P.No.11641 of 2009, set aside the order of dismissal from service. While doing so, liberty was also granted to the Management to issue fresh notice if they so decided to do so and liberty was also granted to the petitioner to seek protection under section 47(1) of the Act. This Court by an order dated 5.2.2010 in W.P.No.11641 of 2009, set aside the order of dismissal from service. While doing so, liberty was also granted to the Management to issue fresh notice if they so decided to do so and liberty was also granted to the petitioner to seek protection under section 47(1) of the Act. The Management rightly did not exercise the liberty granted but took up the case of the petitioner for consideration under section 47 (1) of the Act. The petitioner has also been offered alternate employment as Assistant (non-technical). 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is entitled for salary without doing any work cannot be countenanced. The provisions of the Act are very clear in asmuch as a person who has suffered a disability while in service should not be put to in a disadvantageous position on account of such disability. The opinion of the Medical Board is found in the Original Files produced by the respondent Corporation. It has been stated by the Medical Board that the petitioner is unfit to drive the bus as he has been suffering from paralysis of right upper limb and right lower limb on the basis of the Neuro Medical opinion. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner cannot function as a driver. Considering this aspect, the respondent Corporation has rightly given him a non-technical work as an Assistant. The order dated 31.12.2010, granting such alternate employment also gives pay protection to the petitioner and other benefits arising therefrom. The only bone of condition between the parties is denial of backwages. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to full backwages from the date on which he met with an accident and had became unconscious i.e. on 29.7.2002. This plea is emphatically resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents both on facts as well as by relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of V.BALASUBRAMANAN, referred supra and submitted that the question of payment of backwages would arise only from the date of discharge and since the petitioner has not been discharged from service, but given alternate employment, for the preceding period no backwages is payable. 16. The dates and events have been narrated in the preceding paragraphs. 16. The dates and events have been narrated in the preceding paragraphs. It is seen that the accident took place on 29.7.2002 and from the records placed before this Court, it appears that a leave applied by the petitioner was upto 19.2.2002. It cannot be disputed that the respondent Corporation were not aware of the medical condition of the petitioner. Moreso, when the petitioner had fainted while he was driving the vehicle, it was stated that the Conductor of the bus admitted him in the Goverment Royapettah Hospital. However, one mistake committed by the petitioner is in not responding to any of the communications sent by the respondent Corporation from January 2003. The charge memo charging the petitioner for unauthorised absence from 20.12.2002 was also not acknowledged by the petitioner and the enquiry officer also proceeded exparte. On 23.5.2005, a second show cause notice was sent proposing the penalty of dismissal from service. That notice was also returned unserved. It is nearly after seven months, the petitioner made a representation on 23.1.2006. He was directed to appear before the General Manger on 16.4.2006 and ultimately, dismissed from service on 4.5.2006. Though the order of dismissal was passed in 2006, no steps have been taken by the petitioner till September 2009, when a request was made by the petitioner to extend the benefit under section 47 of the Act. Immediately thereafter in November 2008, the first Writ Petition in W.P.No.27736 of 2008 was filed. 17. Therefore, the respondent Corporation cannot be put up at . a peril for the petitioner’s inaction for nearly six years. However, ultimately this Court in the earlier Writ Petition in W.P.No.11641 of 2009, set aside the order of dismissal from service. Thus considering the above facts, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled to backwages at least from the date when he sought for protection under section 47 of the Act i.e. during September 2008. In fact in the order passed in W.P.No.27736 of 2008, this Court has specifically observed that it is open to the petitioner to workout his remedy under the provisions of the Act. The liberty granted by this Court was availed by the petitioner. However, the respondent Corporation chose to reject the petitioner’s appeal petition though it would have been appropriate for them to have considered the case of the petitioner under section 47 of the Act. The liberty granted by this Court was availed by the petitioner. However, the respondent Corporation chose to reject the petitioner’s appeal petition though it would have been appropriate for them to have considered the case of the petitioner under section 47 of the Act. For reasons best known, the Corporation did not extend the benefit of section 47 of the Act to the petitioner though they were statutorily bound to do so in terms of the provisions of the Act. This resulted in the filing of the second Writ Petition, which was allowed by this Court on 5.2.2010. It is only thereafter, the respondent Corporation extended the benefit of section 47 (1) of the Act and granted light duty to the petitioner with full pay protection and other benefits which the petitioner is entitled to under section 47 of the Act. Therefore, this is a fit case where the petitioner should be entitled for backwages from September 2008 onwards till he was reinstated in service. 18. With the above observation, the Writ Petition is partly allowed, the impugned order is set aside in so far as it denies the backwages and the respondent Management is directed to pay backwages from September 2008 onwards to the petitioner and treat the period of absence from 29.7.2002, till the date of reinstatement for all other purposes including for computing the length of service, etc., except for monetary benefits. 19. In view of the above order, the Contempt Petition is closed. No costs.