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2011 DIGILAW 375 (PNJ)

Haryana Glue Works, Palwal v. Kapoor Singh

2011-01-31

K.KANNAN

body2011
JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- Both the appeals are connected, the former for damages caused to the vehicle which was owned by the claimant and the latter for injuries suffered in an accident. Both the claim petitions were dismissed. The subject matter of appeal in FAO No.399 of 1988 is out of a claim lodged at the instance of M/s Haryana Glue Works represented through the Managing Partner Narain Singh. The contention was that the accident had taken place by the negligent driving of the driver of the truck. The petition was dismissed without going into the merits on the ground that claimant had not been shown to have been registered under the Partnership Act and Section 69 of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 constitutes a bar on enforcement of claim. Section 69 of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 reads as follows:- “69.Effect of non-registration - (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect— (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, to realise the property of an insolvent partner. (4) This section shall not apply— (a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in [the territories to which this Act extends], or whose places of business in [the said territories]are situated in areas to which, by notification under [section 56], this Chapter does not apply, or (b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.” 2. A statutory bar is applicable only in a suit to enforce a right claiming from a contract or conferred as a right under the Partnership Act itself. The right that accrues to a firm not under the contract, but as a consequence of a tort, such as by the result of negligent driving of another person then Section 69 of the Act itself will not be attracted. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and it must be so consrued that any narrow interpretation must be averted unless there is a specific bar constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act itself. I would understand the claimant could be any person who suffers a damage arising out of a use of a motor vehicle. If a firm had been a registered owner of the vehicle and the motor vehicle Act itself did not provide for restriction of who the owner could be then, I will not allow dismissal of the claim on the only ground that the owner had not been shown to be a registered firm. The owner is defined under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which reads as follows:- “(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement” 3. It is an inclusive definition that a law requires that motor vehicle should stand registered in such a person’s name. If the vehicle had stood in the name of the firm then enforcement of claim through such a owner for a damage caused by the accident cannot be denied. The dismissal of the claim petition on the ground that the firm had not been registered is, therefore, not correct in law and the reasoning of the Tribunal for such a dismissal is set aside. 4. The accident has occurred on a highway and the vehicle, according to the owner, had been recently repaired and the vehicle had been seriously damaged only by the negligent conduct of the driver of the truck. The driver of the truck himself was examined, but the Tribunal reasoned that the evidence given on behalf of yet another claimant whose appeal is a subject in FAO No.400 of 1988 was a minor and he ought to have driving the vehicle himself. The Tribunal was literally adopting a reasoning which was nobody’s case. Even if Mange Ram were to be taken as a driver, even then there is no presumption of liability that a minor is responsible for the accident and negligence must always be attributed to him. There could be no presumption that a minor or person who did not have a valid driving licence could be presumed to be a tort-feasor. 5. I would under circumstance reverse the finding of the Tribunal that Mange Ram was the driver of the vehicle or that the negligence cannot be attributed to the driver of the truck. On the other hand, I find the driver responsible for the accident and will proceed to determine the compensation under the respective cases as under. 6. In FAO No.399 of 1988 the claimants have produced three bills Exs.P7, P-8 and P-12 which totalled Rs.4305. There was also evidence of a motor mechanic who was said to have been engaged in carrying out the repairs and Rs.6700/- had been charged by him. The total amount under all these heads totalled to Rs.11,005, which I will round it of to Rs.11,000/-. There was also evidence of a motor mechanic who was said to have been engaged in carrying out the repairs and Rs.6700/- had been charged by him. The total amount under all these heads totalled to Rs.11,005, which I will round it of to Rs.11,000/-. There had been an estimation of claim for damages, but I would not find that to be relevant in a case where bills had been produced for the actual expenses incurred and I would hold that the claimants were entitled to an award for Rs.11,000/- with interest at 7.5% from the date of petition till the date of payment. 7. As regards the claim of compensation for injuries the contention was that the claimant had suffered a fracture and that he had been under treatment and he had incurred an expenditure of about Rs.5000/- for medical expenses. He carried a limp in his leg and said to have suffered permanent disability. The lower Court records are not available and apart from the fact that he has been referred as having suffered multiple injuries, I cannot assess what is the nature of disability and whether a limp in his leg was permanent or merely temporary. I would accord additional amount of Rs.5000/- for pain and suffering and assess the compensation at Rs.10,000/- as payable. This amount shall also attract interest @ 7.5% from the date of petition till the date of payment. The liability shall be, in both cases, on the insurance company for the truck, namely, Oriental Insurance Company who is arrayed as respondent No.4 in both the appeals. 8. The appeals are allowed to the above extent. -----------0.K.B.0-----------