JUDGMENT : V. M. SAHAI, J. 1. We have heard Mr. P J Kanabar, learned counsel for the appellant. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 7.3.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.1401 of 2011. The appellant challenged the ex-parte order passed by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner and Labour Court, Surendranagar in Misc.Application No.3 of 2009 dated 31.8.2010. The Commissioner had decided Workmen Compensation (Non-fatal) Case No.106 of 1993 by order dated 26.7.2002 against the appellant with a direction to pay Rs. 97,320/- with a penalty of Rs. 48,660/-, the total of which comes to Rs. 1,45,980/- with 6% interest with effect from 19.6.1991. This amount was to be deposited by the appellant within 30 days from the date of receiving the order of the Commissioner. 2. Before the Commissioner, the appellant remained absent though notices issued by the Commissioner was served on the appellant and no reply was filed by the appellant. Therefore, the Commissioner, after considering the medical certificate dated 14.11.2000 and after considering the evidence of the workman, passed an order dated 26.7.2002 against the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant approached the Commissioner by way of Misc. Application No.3 of 2009 with a prayer to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration. It is relevant to point our here that the respondent workman Rupabhai Ukabhai Sakaria had died during the pendency of the proceedings, therefore, no reply could be filed by him opposing the aforesaid application filed by the appellant for condoning the delay. The appellant did not lead any oral or documentary evidence before the Commissioner to prove the contents of the application for condonation of delay of more than seven years. The appellant filed written arguments which were considered by the Commissioner. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that Notice dated 28.12.1999 was received by the appellant and the assertions made in the application that the notice was not received from the Commissioner was incorrect and against the material on record. The certified copy of the order dated 17.9.2002 was received by the appellant. Subsequently recovery certificate had been issued by the Commissioner on 19.4.2004 to the District Collector, Rajkot. Thereafter, recovery proceedings had been initiated against the appellant and attachment notice was issued to the appellant. Thereafter the appellants have filed restoration application which has been rejected by the Commissioner on 31.8.2010. Subsequently recovery certificate had been issued by the Commissioner on 19.4.2004 to the District Collector, Rajkot. Thereafter, recovery proceedings had been initiated against the appellant and attachment notice was issued to the appellant. Thereafter the appellants have filed restoration application which has been rejected by the Commissioner on 31.8.2010. This order was challenged by the appellant before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge on 7.3.2011 has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court which are extracted as under: "...In Union of India & Ors. v. A. Durairaj (D.) 2011 4 MLJ 345 the relevant discussion made in Para 13 and 14 which are quoted as under : "13. It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or non-selection should approach the Court/Tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a justifiable grievance allows the matter to become stale and approaches the Court/Tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on the basis of such belated application would lead to serious administrative complications to he employer and difficulties to the other employees as it will upset the settled position regarding seniority and promotions which has been granted to others over the years. Further, where a claim is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of cause of action, the employer will be at a great disadvantage to effectively contest or counter the claim, as the officers who dealt with the matter and/or the relevant records relating to the matter may no longer be available. Therefore, even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 14. This is a typical case where an employee gives a representation in a matter which is stale and old, after two decades and gets a direction of the Tribunal to consider and dispose of the same; and thereafter again approaches the Tribunal alleging that there is delay in disposal of the representation (or if there is an order rejecting the representation, then file an application to challenge the rejection, treating the date of rejection of the representation as the date of cause of action). This Court had occasion to examine such situations in Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar AIR 2009 SC (supp) 2158): [ 2010 (2) SCC 59 ] : (2010)1 MLJ 847 and held as follows (para 9 of AIR SCW): "The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. x x x x x When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a Court's direction to consider a representation issues without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. A Court or Tribunal, before directing 'consideration' of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue or dispute, the Court/Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the Court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect." We are, therefore of the view that the High Court ought to have affirmed the order of the Tribunal dismissing the application of the respondent for retrospective promotion from 1976, on the ground of delay and laches." ........... "6.5.In case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1414 , the Apex Court has held in Para.8 as under : "8. There is another aspect of the matter. "6.5.In case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1414 , the Apex Court has held in Para.8 as under : "8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not .be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner. We are further of the view that these circumstances also justify refusal of the relief claimed under Article 136 of the Constitution." 6.6. In case of State of M.P. & Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 : (1986)4 SCC 566 the Apex Court has held in Para.23 as under : "23. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) and the other in Ashok Kumar v. Collector, Raipur, (1980) 1 SCR 491 : ( AIR 1980 SC 112 ). We may point out that in R. D. Shetty's case (supra), even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesis every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." The learned Single Judge, therefore, found that the delay in filing application filed by the appellant could not be condoned in light of the aforesaid decisions. The learned Single Judge has further held as under: ........... "The contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabari before this Court is that acknowledgment, Page 31, does not bear signature of petitioner and Page 42 - second acknowledgment, where also, signature was in dispute, but, it is necessary to note in support of this contention, no one was examined by petitioner before Commissioner who can deny signature of petitioner. Before Commissioner, while conducting delay condone application, no oral evidence was led by petitioner and in support of delay, no documentary evidence has been produced by petitioner and even no reasonable explanation has been given by petitioner. The contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabari that instead of 255 disability as certified in medical certificate, the finding of 100% disability is contrary to medical certificate, but, Commissioner has considered oral evidence of workman which was remained unchallenged and according to evidence of workman, he was totally unfit for doing any kind of work, that itself is proved 100% disability in earning capacity. The Commissioner has rightly examined 100% disability of workman in earning capacity, against which, there is no rebuttal evidence produced by petitioner before Commissioner. Therefore, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabar cannot be accepted. The Commissioner has rightly examined 100% disability of workman in earning capacity, against which, there is no rebuttal evidence produced by petitioner before Commissioner. Therefore, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabar cannot be accepted. In view of lethargic approach, non-cooperative attitude and not given compensation to workman when accident has been occurred with a knowledge to petitioner, therefore, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabar on merits cannot be examined by this Court and delay is not at all explained by petitioner before Commissioner and Commissioner has rightly considered original records of Case No.106 of 1993 and for that, Commissioner has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. Therefore, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Kanabar cannot be accepted, hence, rejected. Therefore, according to my opinion, order passed by Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Surendranagar rejecting delay condone application filed by petitioner is rightly rejected, for that, Commissioner has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. It is necessary to note that for justifying delay or explaining same, there must be some evidence is to be produced by petitioner before Commissioner, but, no such attempt has been made by petitioner. On the contrary, petitioner has remained adamant and such a long delay of seven years definitely cause great prejudice to the right of respondent claimant when workman has expired meantime and after these many years, without explaining delay itself, matter cannot get to be reopened by petitioner. Otherwise, there is no end to such litigation where workman is became victim of accident during the course of employment and that facts were within knowledge of petitioner and after receiving notice from Commissioner, not remained present and amount of compensation is not paid to complainant." 3. Mr. P J Kanabar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that the learned Single Judge has touched the question on merits of the case. He has further urged that the Doctor was not examined to prove the disability and notices were not served on the appellant as there was no signature of the appellant on the acknowledgement. Mr. P J Kanabar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that the learned Single Judge has touched the question on merits of the case. He has further urged that the Doctor was not examined to prove the disability and notices were not served on the appellant as there was no signature of the appellant on the acknowledgement. We find that the learned Single Judge has given cogent reasons for recording the finding that the notices were served on the appellant but the appellant failed to lead any oral or documentary evidence that the notices were not served or the signature on the acknowledgement was not of the appellant or of its employee. So far as the examination of the Doctor is concerned, we are of the opinion that it was not necessary in a matter which proceeded ex-parte against the appellant. The Commissioner was satisfied about the injury mentioned in the certificate, came to the conclusion that it was a case of 100% disability as the respondent was not able to stand up for more than 5 to 10 minutes. So far as the last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on touching the question on merit of the case is concerned, the learned counsel argued the question on merit of the case and it was the legal duty of the Commissioner and the learned Single Judge to deal with the arguments of the counsel for the appellant while deciding the case. 4. For the aforesaid reasons, we agree with the order dated 7.3.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.1401 of 2011 as well as of the Commissioner. The appeal is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. 5. Civil Application No.5112 of 2011. In view of the order passed in the Appeal, Civil Application No.5112 of 2011 does not survive and is accordingly disposed of. Appeal Dismissed.