Judgment Rajesh H.Shukla, J.—The present second appeal has been filed prior to the amendment in Code of Civil Procedure in 1976 as well as pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court laying down guidelines that question of law has to be framed by the court for entertaining the second appeal under Section 100 of CPC. However, the points or issues which have been raised are required to be focused and the appellant has, though not specifically formulated the issues, the issues which require consideration of this court in the present second appeal are (a) whether it is established that the document exhibit 62 was executed and what is the evidential value? (b) even if the document exhibit 62 is executed, what would be the effect for the purpose of deciding further controversy with regard to the title? (c ) whether ithe concurrent findings of facts arrived at by both the courts below with regard to the fact that there was no right, title, interest in the land in question and it was not mortgaged and therefore there was no question of any right of redemption, can be said to be erroneous? 2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the appellant-original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 69/70 before the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Mundra, for redemption of mortgage property on the grounds mentioned in the suit. After appreciating the evidence and hearing the learned advocates for the parties, the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Mundra-Kutch at Bhuj, vide judgment and order dated 29.8.1973, dismissed the suit. Therefore, Regular Civil Appeal No. 117/73 came to be preferred before the District Court (lower appellate court) challenging the said judgment. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the lower appellate court vide judgment and order dated 19.7.1976 confirming the order of the trial court. Therefore, the present second appeal has been preferred on the grounds set out in this appeal, inter alia, that both the courts below have erred in not holding that the suit mortgage was not proved. It is also contended that the lower appellate court has erred in not giving weightage to the agreement, Exh. 62, which proved the ownership of the plaintiff’s ancestors. It is also contended that the agreement, Exh. It is also contended that the lower appellate court has erred in not giving weightage to the agreement, Exh. 62, which proved the ownership of the plaintiff’s ancestors. It is also contended that the agreement, Exh. 62, is an ancient document and the presumption about the execution and genuineness of the document could have been raised under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. 3. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik submitted that the appellant is the original plaintiff and the suit was filed for redemption of the mortgage. He submitted that the case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff made a mortgage of the said property with the right of redemption. He submitted that the mortgage deed has been executed on Ashad Sud 3, Samvat Year 1991 and the term of the mortgage was 15 years for consideration of 300 koris. 4. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik submitted that, however, the two mortgagees have sold the property by executing a sale deed dated 26.4.1968 and therefore it has given rise to this litigation. He submitted that Regular Civil Suit No. 69/70 came to be filed by the appellant-original plaintiff for redemption and possession of the suit property as he was ready and willing to discharge the burden of making payment of the amount. He referred to Exh. 62 which is a writing for execution of mortgage and submitted that this document is an ancient document which ought to have been considered and proper weightage ought to have been given. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik submitted that as per Section 90 of the Evidence Act the presumption has to be made about the execution and genuineness of the document if the document is 30 years old. He submitted that both the courts have erred in not considering this document or giving proper weightage to it, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. He submitted that both the courts below have failed to appreciate that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay for the right of redemption. 5. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of B. Bhairon Prasad vs. Ablak Singh, reported in AIR 1934 Allahabad 529. and submitted that as observed in this judgment, the mortgage deed was 30 years old which was considered as admissible in evidence. 5. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of B. Bhairon Prasad vs. Ablak Singh, reported in AIR 1934 Allahabad 529. and submitted that as observed in this judgment, the mortgage deed was 30 years old which was considered as admissible in evidence. He submitted that as observed, the document must be presumed to have been duly executed and it includes presumption as to the authority of the person signing for him. 6. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik has also referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of Shed Ahamad vs. Ibrahim and ors., reported in AIR 1919 Calcutta 741, and submitted that as observed in this judgment, the presumption could arise under Section 90 of the Evidence Act when the deed is executed by an illiterate person whose signature has been made by some other person on his behalf and still it is admissible as valid. He referred to the judgment and submitted that the evidence clearly suggests about the transaction of mortgage and the evidence of Valji who is examined supports the case of the appellant-plaintiff. 7. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik submitted that the proceedings before the Mamlatdar in revenue proceeding, which has been discussed and relied upon, is also erroneous as the Mamlatdar cannot decide about the title in the revenue proceedings. He, therefore, strenuously submitted that both the courts below have committed an error in throwing the burden on the appellant-plaintiff to prove that the mortgage was made. He submitted that the document and other evidence about transaction of mortgage which if established would suggest that the appellant-plaintiff had a right of redemption. He submitted that the court has to consider the preponderance of probabilities based on documentary evidence on record and the issue is required to be decided. He submitted that the courts below have failed to consider such documentary evidence and other evidence and has also committed an error in appreciating the evidence which has resulted in miscarriage of justice and therefore the present second appeal may be allowed. 8. In view of these submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present second appeal can be entertained or not. 9. It is well-accepted that the scope of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of CPC in second appeal is very limited. 8. In view of these submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present second appeal can be entertained or not. 9. It is well-accepted that the scope of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of CPC in second appeal is very limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Gurudev Kaur & ors. vs. Kaki & ors., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 , has laid down guidelines that unless there is substantial question of law, the High Court should not interfere in second appeal. It has been observed, “The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as “substantial question of law” which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become “third trial on facts...” The Hon’ble apex court in this judgment in Para 70 has considered the scope and ambit of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of CPC after the Amendment in 1976 and has specifically observed, i. The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; ii. The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; iii. A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; iv Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. 10. Therefore, as could be culled out, the guidelines have made it clear that the scope of exercise of discretion in second appeal is limited, though the court can examine gross error of misconception committed by the courts below in applying the correct law. Therefore, it is required to be considered whether there is any misconception of law or whether the approach of the courts below in applying the correct principles of law is proper or not. 11. The appreciation of evidence and finding of facts based on documentary evidence is again a matter which is required to be considered as to whether the courts below have misdirected while appreciating the evidence which could go to the root of the matter. Therefore, the High Court is not required to consider and appreciate the evidence again, but is required to consider whether the appreciation of evidence is proper and is not perverse. Therefore, the High Court is not required to consider and appreciate the evidence again, but is required to consider whether the appreciation of evidence is proper and is not perverse. In other words, whether the approach and application of law is erroneous, or construing the provision of law or document has been consistent with the provision of law or not is required to be considered. 12. In the facts of the present case, both the courts below have discussed with regard to the transaction of mortgage at length. There is no quarrel with the proposition canvassed by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik that once the transaction of mortgage is there, the right of redemption would always be there and the redemption or mortgage has to be proved in context of the evidence on record. 13. In the facts of the present case, the lower appellate court has clearly given the finding that “this witness does not say that he was in need of money and, therefore, he mortgaged this property”. It has been specifically observed referring to this aspect of mortgage and discussion has been made by the lower appellate court referring to the evidence of both the witnesses. It has been observed, “According to the case pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaint the installments were paid up in Samvat Year 1991 i.e. 9 years after the date of the mortgage exhibit 62, which prima facie falsifies the very basis of the plaintiff’s case. It is not believable that the plaintiff’s ancestors would wait for such a long period of 9 years for receiving the amount, which they had specifically agreed to receive in only monthly installments by 30 koris.” 14. Further, it has been observed that the plaintiff’s grand-father Narshi Tejshi was a very rich man in the Jain community of Mundra Taluka and he possessed immovable properties and he also maintained the books of accounts. Therefore, after considering this evidence it was observed that if he was such a rich man, he would not borrow money on security of his own field. Therefore, the lower appellate court has observed, “There is absolutely no evidence on record to show that Narshi Tejshi and Valji Bhanji were ever in the past co-owners of the suit fields. Therefore, after considering this evidence it was observed that if he was such a rich man, he would not borrow money on security of his own field. Therefore, the lower appellate court has observed, “There is absolutely no evidence on record to show that Narshi Tejshi and Valji Bhanji were ever in the past co-owners of the suit fields. It is not in dispute that during the State Times records wee being maintained in respect of the suit property, but the plaintiff has not produced any such record for proving the title of his ancestors at the relevant time. However, Valji Bhanji has been examined at exhibit 84. He has deposed that he was co-owner with plaintiff’s grand-father in respect of the disputed fields. He has deposed that the ancestors of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 had advanced 300 koris by installments to the witness and to Narshi Tejshi. He says that 50 koris were paid initially and the rest of the amount was to be given by installments. He says that the installments of the mortgage money were paid and, therefore, he and Vallabhji Narshi executed the document exhibit 62. Here this witness is not telling the truth when he says that Vallabhji Narshi, father of the plaintiff, executed mortgage deed. The plaintiff’s case is that his grandfather Narshi Tejshi and this witness had executed the document of mortgage. Thus, there is a clear departure between the deposition of the plaintiff and this witness Valji Bhanji on the point of the persons who executed mortgage deed. According to the plaintiff his grandfather Narshi Tejshi and this witness Valji Bhanji had executed the mortgage deed whereas witness Valji Bhanji says that he and plaintiff’s father Vallabhji had executed the document. This witness Valji Bhanji has betrayed colossal ignorance on material points concerning the mortgage deed. He says that he does not know who wrote the mortgage deed. Now, if he had been a party to that document quite naturally he would know the scribe. He does not say as to who had attested the said mortgage deed.” 15. At the same time, witness Bhimji Bagamal, who is examined at exh. 79, has only stated about having signed the document, exh. 62. He has also stated that the field belonged to Narshi Tejshi, grandfather of the plaintiff. He has stated in the cross-examination that he had signed, exh. At the same time, witness Bhimji Bagamal, who is examined at exh. 79, has only stated about having signed the document, exh. 62. He has also stated that the field belonged to Narshi Tejshi, grandfather of the plaintiff. He has stated in the cross-examination that he had signed, exh. 62, at the house of Narshi Tejshi in the year 1982 and has specifically stated that he does not know whether Narshi Tejshi has mortgaged the property and he does not know that he had mortgaged the property for borrowing the money. 16. Similarly, Valji Bhanji in his deposition, exh. 84, has stated that he had scribed the document, exh. 62(63). He has stated that he had executed the writing, exh. 63, relinquishing the right in favour of the plaintiff’s father. He has specifically stated that exh. 62 was executed by father of the plaintiff and it was mortgaged. 17. Further, there is a specific observation on the objection raised with regard to the entry made in the revenue record by the plaintiff and the revenue proceedings. It is clearly observed that the Mamlatdar made a detailed inquiry and the order was passed by the Mamlatdar in the said proceedings which is produced at exhibit 67. There is also a discussion with regard to this aspect as follows: “This shows that in 1952, the name of Rayab Alarakhiya appears as the person in possession and cultivation of the field. In the year 1954 there was second measurement and at that time in the Sud Book the name of Umar Rayab and Osman Rayab have been sown as the persons in cultivation and the Government is shown to be the owner. For 1956-57 also the name of Rayab Alu is shown as the tiller and this had continued upto 1961-62. For 1962-63 the names of Umar Rayab and Osman Rayab are shown as tillers, which position had continued upto 1967-68. All these observations made by the Mamlatdar in his order are not challenged in any way. The plaintiffs have not produced any other evidence to show that what is stated by the Mamlatdar is not true. The Mamlatdar has made a very detailed inquiry and has correctly come to a conclusion that the plaintiff or his ancestors were never the owners of this field. The plaintiffs have not produced any other evidence to show that what is stated by the Mamlatdar is not true. The Mamlatdar has made a very detailed inquiry and has correctly come to a conclusion that the plaintiff or his ancestors were never the owners of this field. He has traced the history in respect of this land, right from 1945 AD to 1968 AD and throughout this period at no point of time the plaintiff’s father or grandfather had been shown in the Government records as owners or mortgagors.” 18. Another aspect that the plaintiff has contended is with regard to the mortgage deed and the payment. However, the courts below and particularly the lower appellate court have discussed referring to Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act with regard to the entries in the books of accounts. It has been specifically discussed that the plaintiff must show that the books of accounts were regularly maintained and not a word has been said about regular maintenance of books of account or the entries. Therefore, it has been clearly observed that if khata is not proved and if the books of accounts were maintained, the khatavahi must be there which the plaintiff has not produced. Thus, when the Rojmel also is not produced and there is discussion about this aspect, it cannot be said that the finding is perverse when there are concurrent of findings of facts on appreciation of such evidence by the courts below. 19. It is in this background the submissions of learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik with regard to the transaction of mortgage is required to be considered. Though he has submitted that the transaction had taken place, the very basis or foundation of such transaction has not been established. Much reliance placed by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik to support his submission about the transaction of mortgage referring to the document exhibit 62 that it should be believed was also considered by the courts below in light of the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiffs as discussed above and therefore the very basis or foundation of the mortgage having been created is not believed or accepted on such evidence. The submission with regard to such transaction being reflected in the books of account is also not found to be valid. The submission with regard to such transaction being reflected in the books of account is also not found to be valid. The finding arrived at by both the courts below therefore does not call for any interference in exercise of limited scope of discretion under Section 100 in second appeal. It is in the realm of appreciation of evidence and when the courts below have appreciated and considered the entire evidence, it cannot be said that they have misdirected in their approach or have committed an error in construing the provisions of law or the document. 20. The submission made by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik that the document of mortgage exh. 62 is an old document and therefore as per Section 90 of the Evidence Act it should have been believed to be genuine is required to be considered. It is required to be appreciated that every document is required to be established or proved as required under the Evidence Act and in absence of any evidence when an old document is produced from the proper custody as provided in the law, it may be admissible in evidence. When there is specific discussion and evidence with regard to the very execution of such document and when the persons who are said to have scribed or signed have been examined and signed have not supported the plaintiff’s case, the said document cannot be accepted as valid, though it could be considered as admissible in evidence for the purpose of appreciating the entire evidence. Had it been a case that such a document is corroborated/supported by the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff, then it could have been a different aspect. 21. Therefore, when the witnesses have not supported the said document or the transaction, merely because such a document is stated to be an old one, the presumption under Section 9O of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted and brushing aside the direct evidence of the witnesses, sole reliance on such document cannot be placed for the purpose of deciding the issue of redemption of the mortgage. 22. Further, in any case, the scope of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of CPC in second appeal would be limited and, therefore, when there are concurrent findings of facts based on the aforesaid evidence and discussion, the court would not be inclined to entertain the present second appeal. 23. 22. Further, in any case, the scope of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of CPC in second appeal would be limited and, therefore, when there are concurrent findings of facts based on the aforesaid evidence and discussion, the court would not be inclined to entertain the present second appeal. 23. A useful reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anathula Sudhar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs and ors., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 594 , wherein in Para 31 it has been held that “the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, firstly, in re-examining questions of fact, secondly, by going into the questions which were not pleaded and which were not the subject-matter of any issue, thirdly, by formulating questions of law which did not arise in the second appeal, and lastly, by interfering with the well-reasoned judgment of the first appellate court which held that the plaintiffs ought to have filed a sit for declaration.” In the facts of the present case also, when there are concurrent findings of facts with regard to the issues which have been raised, the High Court, in second appeal, would not be justified in re-examining such questions of facts and going into the questions which have not been posed before the trial court or the lower appellate court. 24. The reliance placed by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik on the judgment in the case of B. Bhairon Prasad (Supra) as well as in the case of Shed Ahamad (Supra) would not be of any help to the appellant. As a matter of fact, as stated in the judgment in the case of B. Bhairon Prasad (Supra), the discussion would clearly suggest that there was some acknowledgment of the mortgage and there was an evidence supporting the mortgage in that case and therefore the observations have been made. In the facts of the present case, on the contrary, the oral evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff does not support the mortgage and therefore this judgment will not be of any help to the appellant. 25. The reliance placed by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik on the judgment in the case of Bai Sakinabai D/o Taherali Mohamadali & ors. 25. The reliance placed by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Naik on the judgment in the case of Bai Sakinabai D/o Taherali Mohamadali & ors. vs. Gulam Rasuil Umarbhai Shaikh, reported in 1981 GLR 389 , again for the purpose of Section 90 of the Evidence Act regarding execution of document cannot also be accepted. 26. In the circumstances, the present second appeal cannot be entertained and it deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated.