JUDGMENT :- 1. In all these 13 writ petitions, the petitioner is the Dharmapuri Co-operative Town Bank Limited represented by its Special Officer. All the 13 writ petitions arose out of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour cum Authority under the Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981, Salem. 2. Though the writ petitions were filed in the year 2005, 2009, 2010, the contesting respondents are common in many of the writ petitions. The amount computed related to different periods of suspension. 3. The names of the contesting respondents with designation, the number of the subsistence allowance application filed by them before the second respondent authority, the period for which subsistence allowance claimed, the writ petition number and the differential amount of subsistence allowance ordered by the authority are set out in the tabular column given below:- 4. In these writ petitions, there is no dispute that the contesting respondents were kept under suspension and also there is no dispute regarding the rate of monthly salary paid to them before the date of suspension. The contesting respondents were suspended by the petitioner Society on the alleged ground that the five respondents together misappropriated a sum of Rs.2,87,48,492.30. During the period of suspension, they were paid subsistence allowance on the basis of the Special Bylaws relating to service conditions of employees engaged by the petitioner Bank. The Bylaw No.13(h)provides power to the competent authority to suspend an employee at their discretion and sanction him subsistence allowance at the rate not exceeding one - fourth of his substantive pay during the period of his suspension. It was stated that an employee in any case cannot be kept under suspension for a period not exceeding three months at a time. 5. It was claimed that a criminal case was registered against the contesting respondents by C.C.I.W/C.I.D Wing of Dharmapuri in Crime No.6/2003 for offences under Sections 120 B, 109, 409, 408, 406 r/w 477A of IPC and the matter is pending before the Judicial Magistrate I, Dharmapuri in C.C.No.243 of 2004. Since their suspension was not revoked and the amount of subsistence allowance paid was not in commensurate with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981, (for short PSA Act), the contesting respondents moved the second respondent with various applications under Section 3 of the Act for the period of their suspension. Since their suspension was not revoked and the amount of subsistence allowance paid was not in commensurate with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981, (for short PSA Act), the contesting respondents moved the second respondent with various applications under Section 3 of the Act for the period of their suspension. The PSA Act provides for subsistence allowance at the rate of fifty percent of the wages for the first ninety days, seventy-five percent for the period from ninety days to one-hundred and eighty days and beyond one-hundred and eighty days, it provides for hundred percent of the wages. 6. Therefore, in the batch of case, claims were made for the periods 18.07.2003 to 31.01.2004 claiming the subsistence allowance as per the provisions of the Act. In the second and third batch of cases, they claimed hundred percent as the subsistence allowance was beyond the period of hundred days. 7. The claim applications filed by the contesting respondents were assigned different PSA numbers and notice was ordered to the petitioner Bank. The petitioner Bank filed a counter affidavit raising the following objections: i) Some of the contesting respondents were Managers and Assistant Managers and they are not employees within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the PSA Act. ii) The Bylaws of the Society only provides for one fourth of the subsistence allowance that too at the discretion of the competent authority of the Bank and since the competent authority had calculated subsistence allowance and paid the said amount, the question of claiming any differential amount will not arise. iii) The contesting respondents had committed grave misconduct. By conspiracy, they have swindled the bank to the extent of around three crores and it created bad reputation among the constituents of the bank. Some of them also have withdrawn their Fixed Deposits on coming to know about the large scale swindling and the bank is running at a loss and hence, they are not entitled for any further subsistence allowance. iv) In the second and third batch of writ petitions, the bank also raised the issue that in the first batch of writ petitions filed in the year 2005, this Court had granted stay and therefore, the application ought not to be entertained. 8. iv) In the second and third batch of writ petitions, the bank also raised the issue that in the first batch of writ petitions filed in the year 2005, this Court had granted stay and therefore, the application ought not to be entertained. 8. The second respondent authority tried P.S.A.Nos.15 and 16 of 2004 and passed a common order dated 15.04.2005 computing the amounts in favour of those two respondents (M/s.R.Mohanraj and P.Shanmugam). In that case, those two individuals had examined themselves as P.W.1 and P.W.2. On the side of the Bank, one Karunanidhi was examined. The Bank also filed list of duties assigned to those individuals which was marked as Ex.R1. Even though those two individuals were only holding the post of Assistant and Cashier, yet the Bank raised an objection that they are not employees within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the PSA Act and they are drawing salary of more than Rs.3,500/-. The authority rejected the contention that they are not workman. The authority held that Cashier and Assistant are doing only clerical work and they do not have supervisory powers and hence, they are covered by the provisions of the Act. On the question of the application of By-laws as opposed to the provisions of the Act, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal reported in (1969) 2 SCC 43 . Therefore, the authority rejected the contention raised by the petitioner Bank and computed the amount as per the Rules prescribed under Section 3 of the PSA Act. This gave rise to the first batch of writ petitions. 9. The authority clubbed P.S.A.Nos.17,18 and 19 of 2004 and passed a common order dated 15.04.2005. In those three cases, once again the contesting respondents were examined as P.W.1 and on behalf of the Bank, one Karunanidhi was examined. With reference to the objection that those contesting respondents are not workmen, since they were engaged as Managers and Assistant Manager, it was contended that they belong to the common cadre service and therefore, the Act will not apply and secondly, they are not employees within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the PSA Act. Further, since they were drawing more than Rs.3,500/- they are not workmen as it is excluded under Section 2(a)(ii) of the PSA Act. 10. Further, since they were drawing more than Rs.3,500/- they are not workmen as it is excluded under Section 2(a)(ii) of the PSA Act. 10. The authority after extracting the evidence of R.W.1 found that the post of Manager and Assistant Manager do not come under Section 2(19) of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act defining the term 'Officer' of the Society. The question of control and supervision will be available only to the Board of Directors was accepted by him and he also accepted that the Manager and Assistant Manager were also doing clerical work and they cannot give any charge memo to any subordinates. They also cannot grant any Earned Leave or Casual Leave to any workers. They cannot sanction any amount on their own to their subordinates. The power to sign the Fixed Deposit receipts only available to the Board of Directors and therefore, he found since they are not discharging any supervisory or managerial work, they are also employees within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the PSA Act. The authority held that the Act applies to them and the by-laws do not exclude the application of the Act. With reference to the misappropriation allegedly made by the contesting respondents, it was observed that since the workmen denied of causing loss to the bank and in the absence of any material that issue cannot be gone into in the application for claiming subsistence allowance. 11. The third batch of cases, P.S.A.Nos.16,17,18 and 20 of 2006 were dealt together and a common order was passed dated 26.11.2008. Once again in those batch of cases, the contesting respondents examined themselves as P.W.1 to P.W.4 and on the side of the bank one V.Babu was examined. While the workmen filed the settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the I.D.Act before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour dated 14.10.1999 covering the post of Manager and Assistant Manager for the purpose of revision of wages, to contend that they are also workmen. The said settlement was marked as Ex.P3 in all the subsistence allowance applications. On the side of the petitioner Bank, 4 documents were filed and marked as Exs.R1 to R4. Ex.R1 is the FIR lodged before the Judicial Magistrate I, Dharmapuri, Ex.R2 is the charge sheet filed in C.C.No.243 of 2004 against the contesting respondents. The said settlement was marked as Ex.P3 in all the subsistence allowance applications. On the side of the petitioner Bank, 4 documents were filed and marked as Exs.R1 to R4. Ex.R1 is the FIR lodged before the Judicial Magistrate I, Dharmapuri, Ex.R2 is the charge sheet filed in C.C.No.243 of 2004 against the contesting respondents. Ex.R3 is the duties and responsibilities chart given to the staff and Ex.R4 is the Special Bylaws. 12. Once again before the authority (who is a different person taken charge by then), arguments advanced by the petitioner Bank were rejected. Thereafter, for the third period of suspension, when applications were filed in the year 2008, those applications were taken on file as P.S.Nos.18,19,20,21,23,24,25 of 2008. All those 7 applications were grouped together and a common order was passed on 21.05.2010. In those batch of cases, contesting respondents examined themselves as P.W.1 to P.W.4 and on the side of the petitioner Bank M/s. P.Babu and Vajravel were examined. Similar documents were filed and marked as exhibits on both sides. By that time, another officer had assumed charge in the post of second respondent and by a common order, he had assigned similar reasons and rejected the case of the Management. 13. In view of the common questions involved in all the writ petitions, they were grouped together and a common order is being passed. 14. Before proceeding to deal with the rival contentions, it must be noted that as against the order passed by the second respondent authority an appeal lies to the Appellate Authority under Rule 5(A) of the Tamil Payment of Subsistence Allowance Rules, 1981 within 60 days and under the said provision, a pre-condition of deposit of the amount computed by the original authority has to be made. It is not stated by the petitioner as to why they have never availed the appeal provision. 15. In W.P.Nos.29940 to 29942 of 2005, the order was dated 15.04.2005 and as per the endorsement made by the Bank, it was received by them on 27.04.2004. As per the Rules, the appeal will have to be filed within 60 days whereas the petitions were presented before this Court only on 13.09.2005 which is well beyond the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. 16. As per the Rules, the appeal will have to be filed within 60 days whereas the petitions were presented before this Court only on 13.09.2005 which is well beyond the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. 16. In W.P.Nos.29560 and 29561 of 2005, once again the order is dated 15.04.2005 and was received on 27.04.2005 as per the endorsement and it was presented before this Court on 18.08.2005 and brought up for admission on 14.09.2005 well beyond the limitation prescribed under the Act. 17. In W.P.Nos.8440 to 8443 of 2009, the order is dated 26.11.2008 and as per the endorsement in the seal found therein it was received on 11.02.2009 but presented before this Court only on 28.04.2009 beyond the limitation period. 18. In W.P.Nos.17893 to 17896 of 2010, the order is dated 21.05.2010 and was received by the office of the respondent on 14.07.2010 and the writ petitions were filed on 05.08.2010 within the appeal period. 19. In any event, the attempt by the petitioner Bank not to avail the appellate remedy may be due to the reason that it required pre-deposit. It must be noted in a self contained Act if there is a provision for appeal notwithstanding the requirement of pre-deposit, an aggrieved party must avail the said remedy and cannot come before this Court with a writ petition to bypass the appellate remedy. 20. In this context it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in RajKumar Shivhare Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and anotherreported in 2010 (4) LW 1,wherein the Supreme Court held that the statutory forum is created for redressal of grievance that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained. In that case, an appeal itself was available to the High Court. In repelling that contention, in paragraphs 44 and 45, it was observed as follows: "44. Therefore, principle laid down in the Ratan's case (supra) applies in the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, an appeal itself was available to the High Court. In repelling that contention, in paragraphs 44 and 45, it was observed as follows: "44. Therefore, principle laid down in the Ratan's case (supra) applies in the facts and circumstances of this case. If the appellant in this case is allowed to file a writ petition despite the existence of an efficacious remedy by way of appeal under Section 35 of FEMA this will enable him to defeat the provisions of the Statute which may provide for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of court fees or deposit of some amount of penalty or fulfillment of some other conditions for entertaining the appeal. (See para 13 at page 408 of the report). It is obvious that a writ court should not encourage the aforesaid trend of by-passing a statutory provision. 45. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in Monotosh Saha Vs. Special Director, Enforcement Directorate and another (2008) 12 SCC 359 . That was a decision entirely on different facts. In that decision Saha preferred an appeal before the appellate tribunal with a request for dispensing with requirement of pre-deposit, but the tribunal directed the deposit of 60% of the penalty amount before entertaining the appeal. When an appeal was preferred before the High Court under Section 35 of the FEMA, the same was dismissed by the High Court holding that no case for hardship was made out either before the tribunal or before it. In the background of those facts, this Court observed that since pursuant to this Court's interim order Rs.10 lacs have been deposited with the Directorate, the appellant was directed to furnish further such security as may be stipulated by the tribunal and directed that on such deposit tribunal is to hear the appeal without requiring further deposit." 21. Further, once a remedy by way of appeal is provided and after the expiry of the limitation period attempt cannot be made to this Court to challenge the same to get over the statutory limitation prescribed under the Act. Therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be rejected on this short ground. In any event, since arguments were addressed on the merits of the case, this Court decides to decide the case on the merits of the issues raised therein. 22. Therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be rejected on this short ground. In any event, since arguments were addressed on the merits of the case, this Court decides to decide the case on the merits of the issues raised therein. 22. In these batchof cases, there is no dispute that the contesting respondents were kept under suspension and there is also no dispute regarding the rate of wages paid to them. Though under the Act, the third proviso to Section 3 enables the employer to curtail the subsistence allowance to 50 percent if criminal case is prolonged for reasons directly attributable to the employee, the petitioner has not taken any such defence before the authority. Having not taken any such defence, it is unnecessary to go into the said issue of curtailment of the rate provided under Section 3(1) of the PSA Act. Similarly, under Section 3(2) of the PSA Act, if an employee accepts any employment during the period of suspension, then he looses the right to receive the subsistence allowance and that defence was also not raised either before the authority or before this Court. Therefore, the entire issue hinges upon three factors. 23. The first factor is whether some of the respondents being Manager and Assistant Manager ceased to be employee in terms of Section 2(a) of the PSA Act. In these cases, both and oral and documentary evidence was let in and the authority found that as a matter of fact none of the respondents were exercising either supervisory or managerial power. A categoric finding was rendered that they do not exercise the power of disciplinary action, granting leave, or any payment and they are only doing clerical duty. Even the higher form of supervisory clerical work was done by the Board or the Special Officer. Further in some of the cases, the workmen also filed settlement under Section 12(3) entered into between the Bank and the Union in which revision of scales even to the post held by the contesting respondents such as Manager and Assistant Manager have been dealt with. Therefore, if they are treated as workmen for the purpose of I.D.Act and their service conditions are governed by a settlement under Section 12(3), there is no reason why they should be disqualified in availing the remedy under the PSA Act. Therefore, if they are treated as workmen for the purpose of I.D.Act and their service conditions are governed by a settlement under Section 12(3), there is no reason why they should be disqualified in availing the remedy under the PSA Act. The definition of the term 'employee' under Section 2(a) of the PSA Act is in parimateria with the definition of the workmen under Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act. Therefore, this is an additional factor where this Court is inclined to hold that the objections made by the petitioner about the so called disqualification cannot be countenanced. The authority who is empowered to determine the issue cannot be disturbed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the objection must fail. 24. The second contention that the Bylaws of the Society provided for one fourth of the basic wages for the purpose of suspension and therefore, having paid the said amount, the workmen cannot demand anything more also cannot be accepted in view of Section 5 of the PSA Act. It is necessary to refer to Section 5 of the PSA Act, which is as follows: "5. Saving of certain rights and privileges.- Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or privilege to which any employee is entitled on the date of commencement of this Act under any law for the time being in force or under any contract, custom or usage which is more favourable to him than any right or privilege conferred upon him by this Act." Inasmuch Bylaws do not provide for higher subsistence allowance and in the light of Section 5, the provisions of the PSA Act will prevail over the bylaws of the Society. 25. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal reported in (1969) 2 SCC 43 held that the bylaws of society are in the nature of contract. Paragraph 10 may be usefully extract below:- 10.We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of a cooperative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law. Paragraph 10 may be usefully extract below:- 10.We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of a cooperative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law. It has no doubt been held that, if a statute gives power to a Government or other authority to make rules, the rules so framed have the force of statute and are to be deemed to be incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle, however, does not apply to bye-laws of the nature that a Cooperative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society. They may be binding between the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force of a statute. In respect of bye-laws laying down conditions of service of the employees of a society, the bye-laws would be binding between the society and the employees just in the same manner as conditions of service laid down by contract between the parties. In fact, after such bye-laws laying down the conditions of service are made and any person enters the employment of a society, those conditions of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service specifically forming part of the contract of service. The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. In a number of cases, conditions of service for industries are laid down by Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that, though such Standing Orders are binding between the employers and the employees of the industry governed by those Standing Orders, they do not have such force of law..." In the light of the above, the second contention must fail. 26. 26. The third objection that the Bank had gone into loss and the contesting respondents have committed huge loss to the Bank and facing criminal trial cannot be used as a ground to deny subsistence allowance. The subsistence allowance Act is a special enactment providing for subsistence allowance to employees who are placed under suspension. The pendency of the criminal case need not have deterred the bank from conducting an enquiry and impose appropriate penalty on the basis of any approved misconduct. 27. The Supreme court vide its judgment in Indian Overseas Bank, Anna Salai and anotherv. P.Ganesanreported in (2008) 1 SCC 650 has held that notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case, the employer is required to conduct enquiry by means of disciplinary action. It was further held that mere pendency of criminal proceedings does not mean that the departmental proceedings shall be stayed automatically. The petitioner has not explained as to why no enquiry has been conducted. 28. Even in the judgment in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 the Supreme Court held that even if the disciplinary proceedings are stayed, it should be resumed if the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is unduly delayed. 29. Therefore, there was no impediment for the petitioner Bank to conduct an enquiry and not to allow the contesting respondents from making to file periodical applications claiming subsistence allowance. Assuming for a moment if the Bank wanted to stall departmental action pending criminal case and if the criminal case was delayed on account of the actions initiated by the contesting respondents, then under the third proviso to Section 3(1), the bank could have been justified to restrict the subsistence allowance to 50 percent which fact was not pleaded before the authorities. Therefore, it is made clear that if any future applications are filed, it is open to the Bank to take appropriate defence available under the proviso to Section 3(1) or under Section 3(2) of the Act as the case may be. 30. In view of the above factual matrix and the legal precedents, there is no case made out to entertain the writ petitions. Hence, all the writ petitions will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.