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2011 DIGILAW 386 (GAU)

Union of India v. Nirmal Bhattacharya

2011-04-29

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA, UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2011
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. Heard Mr. A. Nandi, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant Union of India as well as Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel representing the writ Petitioner/Respondent. 2. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.12.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 30 of 2001 by which the writ petition filed by the writ Petitioner was allowed interfering with the order dated 18.10.2000 by which he was dismissed from service and also the order dated 17.1.2001 by which the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF upheld the findings of the inquiry proceeding as well as the order of punishment. 3. The writ Petitioner was a Constable in the CRPF. While he was serving as such he was taken up for a departmental inquiry under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules 1955. The charge levelled against him was that of misconduct/disobedience of order in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act 1949 in that he indulged in heated arguments with his superior officer V.P. Singh, HC/GD and also assaulted him causing minor injuries which was prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. Pursuant to the proceeding initiated thereafter the Petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 18.10.2000. While doing so, the authority perused the departmental inquiry proceeding. In the order of dismissal the authority recorded that the only eye witness to the incident was another Constable/GD Ranglal (P.W. 4). Placing reliance on the testimony of the said witness the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the Petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in service and accordingly by the aforesaid impugned order dated 18.10.2000 dismissed the Petitioner from service. 4. The appeal preferred by the Petitioner to the DIG, CRPF against the order of dismissal was also rejected and accordingly, the Petitioner being aggrieved by the findings of the inquiry, order of dismissal and also the order of the appellate authority filed a writ petition challenging the same. 5. As recorded in the impugned judgment and order, the order of dismissal as well as the finding of guilt recorded against the Petitioner in the inquiry proceeding were assailed on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 3 of the judgment. 5. As recorded in the impugned judgment and order, the order of dismissal as well as the finding of guilt recorded against the Petitioner in the inquiry proceeding were assailed on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 3 of the judgment. The said grounds are- (i) The procedure prescribed under Rule 27(c) of the CRPF Rules 1955 was not followed while conducting the inquiry; (ii) Opportunity of filing written statement as envisaged under Rule 27(4) of the Rules was not given to the Petitioner; (iii) The evidence recorded against the Petitioner having not established the guilt and there being no evidence so as to retain the findings arrived at towards dismissal of the Petitioner from service is bad in law; and (iv) There was infraction of the provisions of Rule 27(7)(d)(1) of the Rules inasmuch as although in the alleged incident along with the Petitioner his superior Head Constable V.P. Singh was also involved, but no common proceeding was drawn up and in fact no proceeding was drawn up against the said superior Head Constable. 6. Dealing with the aforesaid grounds and referring to the provisions of Rule 27 of the Rules, the learned Single Judge has come to the definite finding that the opportunity of filing written statement was not provided to the Petitioner, which was required to be provided to him once he had pleaded not guilty. 7. We have carefully examined the records and we do not find anything to show that the said requirement of Rule 27 was complied with by giving an opportunity to the Petitioner to submit the written statement. 8. The learned Single Judge has also discussed the evidence on record from where it was found that after the heated argument with the Head Constable and the scuffle between them both the Petitioner as well as the Head Constable V.P. Singh suffered injuries as a result of which both of them were sent for medical examination. It has been held that the involvement of both the Constables in altercation as well as physical assault on each other leading to minor injuries being an established fact it was incumbent on the part of the disciplinary authority to conduct a common proceeding as per requirement of Rule 27(7)(d)(1) of the Rules of 1955. Not to speak of such an inquiry even no proceeding was initiated against the said superior officer. 9. Not to speak of such an inquiry even no proceeding was initiated against the said superior officer. 9. The learned Single Judge has also referred to the evidence on record. As noted above, the whole basis of the finding of the authority to impose the penalty of dismissal on the Petitioner is the testimony of purported sole eye witness Rang Lal. Upon examining the evidence on record it has been found that some of the witnesses have even deposed that Rang Lal was not present at the place of occurrence. In this connection, the learned Single Judge has referred to the evidence of Ram Dinesh Pandey. 10. Independent of the above, we ourselves have examined the records of the inquiry which have revealed that both the Petitioner and HC V.P. Singh were sent for medical examination. Both of them sustained simple injuries in the scuffle that took place between them. The Petitioner in his statement denied the charge and to a specific question as to whether he would admit the charge, his reply was in the negative. In view of such non-admission of guilt it was incumbent as per the provision of Rule 27 to give him an opportunity to submit written statement. However, as already noted above, he was not provided with the said opportunity. 11. We have carefully examined the evidence on record. Although Range Lal in his deposition on which the disciplinary authority heavily placed reliance had stated that he had heard noise from the store tent and coming out of the tent he had seen the Petitioner was assaulting said HC V.P. Singh, but on a particular question put to him by the inquiry officer, he had stated that he had heard an altercation because of the quarrel between the Petitioner and the Head Constable. 12. Testimony of this witness will have to be decided in the touchstone of the depositions made by other witnesses. As recorded by the learned Single Judge, it is in the evidence that the witness (P.W. 6) HC Ram Dinesh Pandey in his deposition stated about the heated exchanges between the Petitioner and said HC V.P. Singh. In his deposition rather replying to the question put by the inquiry officer, he categorically stated that nobody was present when the incident took place except Ct Kailash Kumar. In his deposition rather replying to the question put by the inquiry officer, he categorically stated that nobody was present when the incident took place except Ct Kailash Kumar. Thus this witness ruled out the presence of Range Lal who was the sole eye witness. 13. On the basis of the evidence on record the finding arrived at was that the charge against the Petitioner was partially proved. However, this aspect of the matter did not find mention in the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority. 14. Mr. Nandi, learned Central Govt. Counsel placing reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 (State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao); (1995) 6 SCC 749 (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.); (1997) 7 SCC 463 (Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham); (2000) 1 SCC 416 (High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr.) and (2002) 10 SCC 580 (Ajit Jain v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.) submits that the writ court exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit on appeal over the findings recorded by the inquiry and disciplinary authorities. He also submits that the writ court cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record and that if there is some evidence to establish the guilt the same cannot be interfered with like a superior appellate authority. 15. The aforesaid decisions are primarily on the point of principle and procedure involved in conducting a departmental inquiry and the scope and ambit of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matter. 16. Out of the aforesaid decisions, in Ajit Jain (supra) the Apex Court held that in case of infirmity occurring in departmental proceeding, same would vitiate the order of dismissal and in such case the court would be in a position to set aside the order of dismissal and direct that the inquiry proceeding be relegated to the stage where the infirmity had kept in. 17. In the instant case, the procedure adopted in conducting the inquiry proceeding was vitiated for the reasons recorded above. Coupled with this it cannot be said to be a case of sitting on appeal on the evidence on record. 17. In the instant case, the procedure adopted in conducting the inquiry proceeding was vitiated for the reasons recorded above. Coupled with this it cannot be said to be a case of sitting on appeal on the evidence on record. To hold that it is not a case of no evidence at all or a case of perverse finding, the minimum exercise to find out the same in reference to the evidence will have to be carried out. While doing so what had transpired has been noticed above. 18. The learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment and order had dealt with the matter meticulously upon a reference with the entire materials on record. There was infraction of Rule 27 of the Rules in conducting the inquiry proceeding, which vitiated the same. 19. Although pursuant to the setting aside of the order of dismissal of the Petitioner, he is entitled to get re-instatement in service, however, we make it clear that he will not be entitled to any back wages, but will be entitled to notional fixation of pay with continuity in service for all other purposes. The Respondents shall pass necessary follow up order forthwith. 20. For all the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Appeal dismissed