Judgment : 1. These petitions are filed by the petitioners therein after invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records pertaining to the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 pending investigation on the file of the first respondent, Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Team XV, Egmore, Chennai and to quash the same. 2. Based on the complaint lodged by the second respondent (in all the petitions) dated 26.4.2010, the first respondent had registered the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 on 19.7.2011, under Sections 403 , 406 Sections 403 , 406 , 418 and 420 of Indian Penal Code against 12 accused. The petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011 is A10. The petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011 is A12. The petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 are A3, A4, A5 & A8. The petitioners in Crl.O. P.No. 18683 of 2011 are A2 and A9 and the petitioner in Crl. O.P.No. 19057 of 2011 is A11. 3. As per the rank arranged in the first information report, the first accused Rev. Aruldas James is reported to have passed away. The 6th accused Rev. Ft. K. J. Francis is no more (since deceased). The 7th accused Mr.M.K.Kabir is reported to have been filed a petition in Crl.O.P.No. 17895 of 2011 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings as against him, but that petition has not been brought before this Court. Barring Al, A6 and A7, the petitions filed by the remaining accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are available before this Court for disposal. The gravamen of the case of prosecution: 4. Sir John DeMonte, a Roman Catholic and a rich Portuguese merchant was the inhabitant of the then Madras in the early 1800‘s. He owned extensive movable and immovable properties in respect of which he had executed his last will and testament on 19.7.1820 creating various bequests, but bequeathing his very large immovable properties for charity. He had also created a Codicil dated 21.4.1821, making small amendments to the said will dated 19.7.1820. The then Supreme Court of the Judicature at Madras had granted probate to the said will on 18.5.1821. 5. He had also created a Codicil dated 21.4.1821, making small amendments to the said will dated 19.7.1820. The then Supreme Court of the Judicature at Madras had granted probate to the said will on 18.5.1821. 5. During his life time he had founded several religious and charitable establishments and to mentioning among them is the Junior Seminary at Santhome, Hospital at Luz and the Church at Poonamallee. Sir John Demonte bequeathed his properties to the trust and his desire to be followed by Bishop or Vicar General of St.Thome and his successor shall carry his last wish. The Archbishop of Madras – Mylapore had become the successor of the Bishop of St.Thome and still he is the trustee of the property. 6. As per Clause 27 of the last will and testaments of Sir John Demonte, none of the property, nor any immovables so bequeathed shall be sold. The executors and the trustees are empowered to lease all the immovable properties on the best and most advantageous terms that could be obtained and the amounts so received would be used for pious and charitable purpose. Therefore, the power to lease the properties is enjoined in the constructive trust so created by the said will. 7. The 31st clause of the will set out the manner of the management of the trust and how the income from the trust properties should be used and how the trustee and the managers are answerable. The properties thus bequeathed for charity by Sir John DeMonte includes 257 grounds and 81 cents in Bens Garden (Boat Club Road) in Raja Annamalaipuram, and 186 grounds of land in DeMonte Colony on St. Mary‘s Road, TTK Road in Alwarpet are very high value properties in Chennai. 8. Firstly, in the month of June 2000, Ft. P.J. Lawrence Raj (A3), one of the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 had become the property administrator of the Archdiocese. Soon thereafter, he had illegally put the Bens Garden Property in the possession of Mr. Jeppiar (A10) petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011 in gross violation of the terms of the will and the trust. Mr. Jeppiar (A10) continues to be in possession and is commercially enjoying the same. It is not being used for any charitable or pious or for any altruist purpose. Jeppiar (A10) petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011 in gross violation of the terms of the will and the trust. Mr. Jeppiar (A10) continues to be in possession and is commercially enjoying the same. It is not being used for any charitable or pious or for any altruist purpose. This illegal delivery of possession was followed by an illegal agreement signed between the Archbishop and Holy Satellite Township Ltd., (Holy Land) and Sathyabama Institute of Science and Technology both belonging to Mr. Jeppiar (A10) in December 2001, in respect of 100 grounds and 50 grounds of land in Bens Garden respectively for a period of 50 years for a consideration of Rs. 2,00,00,000/-which was given by Mr. Jeppiar (A10), to the trust while signing the agreement. 9. Mr. M.K. Kabir (A7) legal advisor and Mr. Kumar (A8) property builder, were having direct and distinct commercial interest in alienating the Bens Garden property to Mr.Jeppiar. The property committee was instrumental in the agreement to lease the trust property in favour of Mr. Jeppiar and put him in illegal possession. 10. As required by Section 36 of The Indian Trust Act, 1882 a sanction ought to have been taken from the Madras High Court before the possession was parted with, but this was not however done. When this sanction was sought in O.P. No. 219 and 220 of 2002, it was rejected by the Madras High Court by its order dated 6.3.2006. In pursuant to the said order, the trust had refunded the amount of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- to Mr. Jeppiar (A10) in early 2007 which was also accepted by him. However, he has been continuing to be in possession of the said property with the connivance of the Archbishop and the present property administrator. 11. Secondly, former Archbishop Rev. Dr. Aruldas James had signed an illegal agreement With Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011 in early 2002 after obtaining Rs. 1,00,00,000/- and Ft. Lawrence Raj (A3) former property administrator had put him in illegal possession of 50 grounds in the Bens Garden for a period of 50 years without even approaching the Madras High Court. Mr. M.G.M. Maran continues in the illegal possession with the connivance of the Archbishop and the present property in charge. 12. Thirdly, that on 12.11.2001, Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, present Archbishop and trustee had received a sum of Rs. Mr. M.G.M. Maran continues in the illegal possession with the connivance of the Archbishop and the present property in charge. 12. Thirdly, that on 12.11.2001, Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, present Archbishop and trustee had received a sum of Rs. 5 Crores from A12 Mr. Nitesh Shetty, petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011, without the sanction of the Madras High Court and entered in to a memorandum of understanding with Nitesh Estates to lease out 8.26 acres of land in Bens Garden presently in the illegal occupation of Mr. Jeppiar (A10) for a period of 66 years. 13. It is reliably learned that the Archbishop/trustee had done so since he had diverted/misappropriated the amount of Rs. 5,00,00,000/-which he had received from Nitesh Estate and he is unable to return the same. 14. Fourthly, the land measuring 186 grounds of very high value in DeMonte Colony in Alwarpet has also been illegally used in non-charitable and non-pious and non-altruist resulting crores of rupees not being available to the poor. Investigation would reveal the commitment of various offences. Thus the accused persons/trustees cited above, who were entrusted with the aforesaid properties, and who also had dominion over the said properties have dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use or the use of their accomplices or have dishonestly used or disposed off the said properties in violation of direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged. By all these acts, not only are the conditions in the Will of DeMonte being violated but Section 36 of The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 read with Section 7 of The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act 1920 are also violated. 15. The second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasahayam has lodged the above complaint mainly on the following allegations; (a) Criminal breach of trust pertaining to immovable properties of the value of hundreds of crores of rupees, which properties are meant to be used for the welfare of the poor, indigent widows and orphans, (b) Misappropriation of funds belonging to the Trust, (c) Other offences under various relevant Sections of the, 16. It appears from the records that originally the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasahayam, had lodged a complaint dated 26.4.2010 before the Commissioner of Police, Chennai against all the accused persons. It appears from the records that originally the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasahayam, had lodged a complaint dated 26.4.2010 before the Commissioner of Police, Chennai against all the accused persons. Since the Commissioner of Police had not taken any action to register a case based on his complaint, he had chosen to file a petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 before this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, seeking a direction against the Commissioner of Police, Chennai City and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch, Egmore Chennai to forward his complaint dated 26.4.2010 to their appropriate subordinate to register a case, investigate and to take action according to law. On hearing the learned counsel for the second respondent as well as the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the state, this Court has passed an order on 8.7.2010. 17. In Paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the said order, the following observations have been made by this Court; “2. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) submits that the enquiry has been conducted on the complaint and finding no cognizable offence could be made out, the respondents have closed the matter as civil in nature. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would seek a copy of the closure report. The same shall be furnished by the respondents within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the petitioner shall be at liberty to take recourse to such proceedings and as remedy is available to him under law.” 18. In the closure report dated 31.5.2010, in respect of the complaint dated 26.4.2010 the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch has stated as follows; The English translated version of the relevant portion of the vernacular language is given below; “The petitioner was enquired personally on the petition presented by him. On enquiry prima facie case was made out in respect of the offences punishable under Section 403 and 418 Section 403 and 418 of I.P.C. Since both the offences are non cognizable, no case could be registered. Hence, the petitioner was advised to approach the civil Court for appropriate remedy.” 19. It also appears from the records that after the disposal of the petition in Crl. Hence, the petitioner was advised to approach the civil Court for appropriate remedy.” 19. It also appears from the records that after the disposal of the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010, on 8.7.2010, with an observation that the police have closed the matter as civil in nature, the second respondent has filed another petition before this Court in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011, against the Commissioner of Police, Chennai City, Egmore, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch and the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch on the same cause of action seeking a direction to the respondents to register an FIR and investigate the complaint dated 26.4.2010 which was closed by the third respondent in the above petition on the ground of civil in nature. 20. When the petition was listed on 7.7.2011, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) took two weeks time for getting instruction from the respondent police. In the meanwhile the Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Team XI, Egmore, Chennai has registered the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 on 19.7.2011 under Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 IPC as against 12 accused based on the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010 which was earlier closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 31.5.2010. This fact was intimated to the Court on 27.7.2011 when the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 came up for hearing. On taking note of the registration of the case on the complaint dated 26.4.2010, this Court on 27.7.2011 has closed that petition with the following observation. “The Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) has submitted that a case has been registered on the basis of the complaint given by the petition in Crime No. 301 of 2011 by the Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Chennai for alleged offences under Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC against 12 accused. In view of the submissions made by the Learned Government Advocate, this criminal original petition is closed.‘ Subsequently, M.P. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 are closed.” 21. Questioning the legal propriety of the registration of the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 based on the complaint dated 26.4.2010, which was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police dated 31.5.2010, the petitioners have approached this Court with the present petitions after invoking the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the same. 22. Questioning the legal propriety of the registration of the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 based on the complaint dated 26.4.2010, which was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police dated 31.5.2010, the petitioners have approached this Court with the present petitions after invoking the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the same. 22. Heard Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior Counse appearing for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011, Mr. Gopinath, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011, Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011, Mr. S. Ananthanarayanan learned counsel for the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18683 of 2011, Mr. M. Rajasekaran the learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011 as well as Mr. A.N. Thambidurai, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent-State and Mr. P.T. Perumal learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to Police (in all Crl.O.Ps). 22-A. Before we enter into the merits and demerits of the case it may be appropriate to make a mention here that all the learned counsels, appearing for the petitioners who have collectively sought the relief of quashing the criminal proceedings in the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011, have spelt out that after the closure of the complaint dated 26.4.2010 lodged by the second respondent/complainant by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch, Chennai on 31.5.2010 and after the disposal of the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 by this Court on 8.7.2010, directing the second respondent/complainant to seek remedy from the civil forum, if at all the respondent/complainant wanted to proceed against the petitioners, the appropriate course left open to him was to take recourse under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They have also conjointly submitted that after the closure of the complaint on the ground of no cognizable offence was made out as well as the case was civil in nature by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 31.5.2010, it should not have been reopened and that the registration of the case after the period of 1 year, 1 month and 18 days was unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence liable to be quashed. 23. As per the first information report Rev. Dr. 23. As per the first information report Rev. Dr. Aruldas James, Archbishop has been shown as the first accused. In fact he had passed away as early as on 30.8.2004. As revealed from the complaint, he was functioning as the Archbishop of Madras-Mylapore from 31.7.1994 to 30.8.2004 on which date he had passed away. The second respondent, who is the complainant to the police has also admitted this fact in his complaint. However, this complaint seems to have been registered against a dead person which is ab initio not maintainable. Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, who is functioning as the Archbishop of Madras, Mylapore has succeeded Rev. Dr. Aruldas James and he has assumed office from 22.5.2005. From that date onwards he has been functioning as the trustee of the Sir John DeMonte trust and continues to be so. In the first information report he has been shown as accused No. 9. 24. One Rev. Father K.J. Francis (Administrator SHS) has been shown as accused No. 6. But as revealed from paragraph No. 10. of page 3 of the complaint, he has also been shown as deceased. Without noticing all these facts the Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch has registered the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 against another deceased person. Hence, the complaint as. against A6 is also ab initio not maintainable. The 9th accused, Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, Archbishop and the second accused Rev. B. Lawrence Pious have jointly filed the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011. Similarly, A3 Father Lawrence Raj, A4 Rev. Father Andrews, A5 Rev. Father Thomas Simon, A8 Mr. Kumar have jointly filed the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011. 25. Mr. Ananthanarayanan, learned counsel has submitted that once the complaint dated 26.4.2010, was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 31.5.2010 on the ground that the allegations were civil in nature and the second respondent was advised to take recourse from the civil forum, the registration of the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 on the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010, was absolutely wrong, unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure and no reason was assigned by the first respondent police for reopening the complaint which was closed earlier. He has also raised a question as to when this Court had closed the petition in Crl. He has also raised a question as to when this Court had closed the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 filed by the second respondent, on the ground of civil in nature, where is the question of registering a case based on the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010, which was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, on the ground of nonavailability of cognizable offences? 26. The learned counsel Mr. Ananthanarayanan, has also invited the attention of this Court to the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 which was also filed by the second respondent for the very same relief which was sought by him in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 which was disposed of as aforestated. When this petition came up for hearing on 27.7.2011, the Government Advocate (Crl. Side) had made a submission saying that a case had been registered on the basis of the complaint lodged by the second respondent in Crime No. 301 of 2011 by the Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Chennai for the alleged offence under Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC against 12 persons. In view of the submissions made by the Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2010 was closed accordingly. 27. It is significant to note here that in his closure report dated 31.5.2010, the Assistant Commissioner of Police has stated that on the enquiry on the complaint lodged by the second respondent the offences under Sections 403 and 418 IPC were only made out and since those offences were non-cognizable in nature no criminal case could be registered and hence, the second respondent was advised to take recourse from the Civil Court. 28. Mr. S. Ananthanarayanan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18683 of 2011 and Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 have vehemently questioned the legality of the registration of the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 based on the referred complaint dated 26.4.2010. 29. It is pertinent to note here that the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2010, the second respondent has stated in paragraph No. 20 that: “in view of the above, if my complaint is not re-investigated in proper manner-great in justice will result unless reinvestigation is ordered. 29. It is pertinent to note here that the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2010, the second respondent has stated in paragraph No. 20 that: “in view of the above, if my complaint is not re-investigated in proper manner-great in justice will result unless reinvestigation is ordered. The guilty will be escaping from the clutches of law.” 30. In this connection the learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Kumar has adverted to that the second respondent had sought for only re-investigation of his complaint which was closed on 31.5.2010 by the Assistant Commissioner of Police and when the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 was pending disposal, the first respondent had been to the extent of registering the case suo motu without even awaiting for the order of this Court which might be passed in the above said petition. He has also submitted that the conduct of the first respondent was in total negation of the procedural law which was liable to be quashed. He has also added that the liberty given by this Court in its order dated 8.7.2010, and made in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 was misconstrued by the second respondent. In the above said order this Court had granted liberty to the second respondent to take recourse to such proceedings and as remedy is available to him in law i.e., under civil forum on receipt of the closure report from the respondents. He has also submitted that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C, could not be invariably exercised in extraneous matters. He has also maintained that in fact the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 ought not to have been admitted and it should have been dismissed in liminie as the request of the second respondent was rejected in the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 at the threshold. 31. As it appears from the will dated 19.7.1820 and the Codicil dated 21.4.1821 which was probated by the Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras on 18.5.1821, the properties bequeathed for charity by Sir John DeMonte includes 257 grounds and 81 cents in Bens Garden (Boat Club Road) in Raja Annamalaipuram, and 186 grounds of land in DeMonte Colony on St. Mary‘s Road, T.T.K. Road in Alwarpet. 32. Mr. Mary‘s Road, T.T.K. Road in Alwarpet. 32. Mr. Ananthanarayanan, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Clr.O.P.NO.18683 of 2011 has contended that as per the allegations of the complaint the leasing out of the property to Mr. Jeppiar (A10) was done by the former Archbishop Rev. Dr. Aruldas James (Al) (since deceased), in the year 2001.Whereas the petitioner viz., Rev. A.M. Chinnappa had succeeded the position of the Archdiocese Madras-Mylapore on 25.5.2005 and hence, he was neither a party nor a signatory to the proceedings. He has also maintained that after taking charge as the Archbishop, the petitioner Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had corresponded with Mr. Jeppiar (A10) as early as on 5.3.2007 requesting him to hand over the vacant possession of the property. The petitioner had also taken strenuous efforts and even personally visited the college of Mr.Jeppiar and given a letter in his hand writing requesting for handing over the possession followed by letters dated 8.7.2010, 27.9.2010 and ultimately he had taken over the possession of the said property on 29.10.2010. He would submit further that in fact it was the office of the Archbishop which asked Mr. Jeppiar (A10) to keep the property under his custody on receipt of discrete information that certain anti social elements were scheming to squat on the property by raising temporary huts on the vacant site, nevertheless, the property was handed over to the trust as on 29.10.2010. 33. Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel while advancing his arguments on behalf of the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 has submitted that the petitioners viz., Father Lawrence Raj, Father John Andrews and Father Thomas Simon (A3, A4 and A5) were only members of the property committee and they were appointed by the sole trustee of the John DeMonte trust, namely the Archbishop Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, who with the large interest of the administration had constituted this property committee wherein even non-Christians were also involved in the office as advisors. He would submit further that the petitioners in Crl. O.P.No. 18475 of 2011 were on the same footing as on the 7th accused viz., Mr. M.K. Kabir, who is a senior lawyer practicing in the High Court, Madras. 34. He has also submitted that the petitioner Mr. He would submit further that the petitioners in Crl. O.P.No. 18475 of 2011 were on the same footing as on the 7th accused viz., Mr. M.K. Kabir, who is a senior lawyer practicing in the High Court, Madras. 34. He has also submitted that the petitioner Mr. Kumar (A8) was called upon by the property committee to give opinion regarding the construction of the campus fencing and other minor works to be carried out and that he had no role or say in any of the decision making process and he had been falsely implicated with ulterior motive by the second respondent. 35. Mr. B. Sriramalu, learned senior counsel appearing for R. Karthikeyan who is on record for Mr. Jeppiar (A10) petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18183 of 2011, has submitted that the power to lease the properties was enjoined in the constructive trust so created by the will executed by Sir John DeMonte and that the Clause 27 of the will and testament of Sir John DeMonte prohibited the sale of the properties and a cursory reading of the complaint would reveal that unless the property of the trust had been sold the allegations in the complaint was baseless. He has also added that as regards the 212 grounds which was surrendered by Parry & Co. it was decided by previous Archbishop to use the same and to utilize the income derived there from for various pious and charitable objects in the name of the trust. It was with this objective, development proposals of Bens Gardens, Chamiers Road, Chennai was called for. The Archbishop constituted a property committee which comprised of various persons including Mr. L.M. Menezes. When it was decided to give the property to one of the developers Mr. Menezes resigned contending that a lease for 99 years will amount to sale as it was contrary to the provisions of the . His resignation was accepted on 8.4.2000. He has also added that it was thereafter the controversy was created regarding leasing of the property. 36. He has further submitted that as the original proposal to Sterling Horticulture and Research Ltd., did not materialise, fresh tenders were called for from prospective offerrers to lease the property and thereafter on 6.12.2001 a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into with Mr. Jeppiar for leasing the property for -a period of 50 years. 36. He has further submitted that as the original proposal to Sterling Horticulture and Research Ltd., did not materialise, fresh tenders were called for from prospective offerrers to lease the property and thereafter on 6.12.2001 a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into with Mr. Jeppiar for leasing the property for -a period of 50 years. In terms of the MOU and as enjoined in law, petitions in O.P. Nos. 219 and 220 of 2002 were filed under Section 7 of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1925 seeking permission from the this Court to lease the said property. However by an order dated 6.3.2006 this Court had declined to grant sanction. 37. It is manifest from the records that Rev. Dr. Aruldas James the then Archbishop Madras-Mylapore and Sole Trustee of the Estate of Sir John DeMonte had filed two petitions in O.P. No. 219 and 220 of 2002 against the Holy Satellite Town Ltd., by its Chairman and Managing Director Mr. Jeppiar and Sathyabama Institute of Science and Technology, Deemed University by its Chancellor Mr. Jeppiar under Section 7 of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act 1920 read with. Order 14 Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules praying to sanction and approve the deed of agreement to lease entered into between the petitioner and the respondent dated 6.12.2001. 38. On perusal of the above original petitions it appears that the petition in O.P. No. 219 of 2001 was filed in respect of the land and buildings bearing Nos. 1, Boat Club Road, and 75 Chamiers Road, Chennai-600 028, comprised in R.S. No. 3923 of Mylapore, Block No. 86, admeasuring an extent of 100 grounds, and O.P. No. 220 of 2002 was filed in respect of the land and buildings being the Eastern portion of 74 Chamiers Road, Chennai 600 28 and the Northern portion of 73 Chamiers Road, Chennai 600 028, comprised in R.S. No. 3923 of Mylapore, Block No. 86, admeasuring an extent of 50 grounds. 39. This Court after hearing both sides had dismissed the above said two petitions declining to grant sanction with the following observations: “However, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that while refusing sanction and approval of those agreements, it would be fit and proper that the properties have got to be leased out for the reasons. already taken into account by this Court on the earlier occasion referred to above, so that it would be beneficial to the Trust. Under the circumstances, though this Court is convinced with the reasons adduced by the petitioner for leasing out the properties, relief of granting permission to the petitioner to call for tenders through the Advocate Commissioner in these O.Ps. cannot be ordered since both these O.Ps. Have been filed seeking limited relief of sanction and approval of two agreements in question. However, the petitioner is at liberty to approach this Court for necessary and appropriate reliefs by making necessary application, if so advised.” 40. Mr. B. Sriramalu has also admitted that of this Court dated 6.3.2006 declining sanction, the trust had handed over the amount of Rs. 2 crores to the petitioner Mr. Jeppiar (A10) and that he was no longer in possession of the property. 41. It may be quite relevant to note here that the second respondent/de facto complainant has also admitted in his complaint that the trust had handed over the amount of Rs. 2 crores to Mr. Jeppiar (A10). It may also be important to note here that on 29.10.2010, the property was handed over to the trust which was acknowledged by Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa in his letter dated. 29.10.2010 addressed to Mr. Jeppiar (A10). The letter dated 29.10.2010 reads as follows; “Respected Sir, Greetings from the Arch Diocese of Madras-Mylapore! The Property Committee and I wish to place on record our gratitude acknowledge of your services in protecting the Bens Garden property from encroachers and from being misused by unsociable elements. After Parry & Company surrendered the major portion of the Property and despite the Hon‘ble High Court negating to sanction the lease in favour of Holy Satellite Township and Sathyabama Institute of Art and Science, you volunteered to safe-guard the property from anti social elements and being misused for objectionable activities. It was an immense service as the valuable property stands protected. We also place on record your vacating the premises forthwith at the request of the Trust. We thank you for the same. Your Servant in Christ Most Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa SDB Archbishop of Madras – Mylapore” 42. It was an immense service as the valuable property stands protected. We also place on record your vacating the premises forthwith at the request of the Trust. We thank you for the same. Your Servant in Christ Most Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa SDB Archbishop of Madras – Mylapore” 42. From the records as well as from the last will and testament of Sir John DeMonte it has been expressly approved by this Court that the trustee is empowered to lease the property on the most advantageous terms that could be obtained and the amounts so received would be used for pious and charitable purpose. 43. It is also revealed from the records that one Mr. L.N. Menezes and two others had instituted a suit in C.S. No. 156 of 2002 on the file of this Court for formulating a scheme apart from various other reliefs claiming themselves to the interesting persons in the trust. The leave which was granted by the learned single judge of this Court was subsequently revoked and the same was also confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court which was 2004 1 LW 133 . 44. For filing the suit in C.S. No. 156 of 2002, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a leave was granted by this Court on 27.2.2002 on the application filed by the plaintiffs in O.A. No. 567 of 2002. When the matter stood thus, the second defendant in that suit had filed an application in O.A. No. 3081 of 2002 to revoke the order dated 27.2.2002 passed in application No. 567 of 2002 granting leave to the plaintiffs therein to institute the suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Another application in O.A. No. 3668 of 2002 was also filed by the plaintiffs to implead ‘Sir John DeMonte Trust‘ represented by the trustee Archbishop as 10th defendant in the suit. Both the above said applications were simultaneously heard and disposed of in the common order dated 6.1.2003 and thereby the application in O.A. No. 3081 of 2002 was allowed and leave already granted was vacated. The application filed by the plaintiffs in O.A. No. 3668 of 2010 was dismissed. 45. Both the above said applications were simultaneously heard and disposed of in the common order dated 6.1.2003 and thereby the application in O.A. No. 3081 of 2002 was allowed and leave already granted was vacated. The application filed by the plaintiffs in O.A. No. 3668 of 2010 was dismissed. 45. In Page No. 8 of the said order, the learned single judge has observed as follows; “The plaintiffs are said to be eminent persons in the society, but nothing is stated as to how they are persons interested so far as the Trust is concerned. No case has been made out to sustain the suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. The Trust has got power to lease out the property and it cannot be questioned by persons who have no interest. Moreover the first defendant already instituted O.P. No. 219 and 220 of 2002 seeking permission of the Court to lease out the property under certain terms and conditions and, as such, only after getting approval of the Court, the lease of the property would be made in favour of any party. The suit has been laid only to pre-empt the leasing of the property in favour of the 7th defendant, The first plaintiff was one of the members in the property committee and he participated in various meetings and ultimately, tendered his resignation on 21.3.2000 and it was also accepted. The suit itself is vexatious in nature. It is intended only to harass the defendants. Moreover, the suit is laid with an intention to vindicate some personal grievance in public.” 46. It is also manifest from the records that the second respondent/complainant to the police has filed a petition in O.P. No. 296 of 2010 seeking for disclosure, of various information regarding the trust on 22.3.2010 which is subjudice before this Court. 47. Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned counsel who is on record for the petitioner, while advancing his arguments on behalf of Mr. Jeppiar (A10) would submit that the second respondent had himself admitted in the complaint that the properties could be leased out on the most advantageous terms in accordance with Clause No. 27 of the Last Will and Testament of Sir John D‘Monte and accordingly the property was only sought to be leased to Mr. Jeppiar (A10) would submit that the second respondent had himself admitted in the complaint that the properties could be leased out on the most advantageous terms in accordance with Clause No. 27 of the Last Will and Testament of Sir John D‘Monte and accordingly the property was only sought to be leased to Mr. Jeppiar and permission was sought under Section 7 of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act before this Court prior to the leasing of the property and it was also admitted by the complainant that on such permission being negatived, the amount of advance paid has been refunded to Mr.Jeppiar by the trust and thereafter he had no connection with the trust either directly or indirectly and he was also, not in possession of any properties of the trust and consequently the question of grabbing the property by Mr. Jeppiar or he being under illegal possession did not arise and even today the trust was in the possession of the property. 48. The learned senior counsel has also added that the petitioner Mr. Jeppiar was inadvertently shown as a member of the property committee because he had attended a meeting to explain the project envisaged by him to be executed in the property after getting sanction and approval from this Court. It was because of this inadvertent mistake this Court had dismissed the petitions in Crl. O.P. Nos. 219 and 220 of 2002, which were filed under Section 7 of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1925. The inclusion was detrimental and not beneficial to him and hence the allegation that Mr.Jeppiar had attempted to grab the property etc., was false and it was only to harass him the present complaint was filed against him. 49. The learned senior counsel has also added that Mr. Jeppiar had ceased to be a member of the property committee from 2002 itself. The property committee was reconstituted and various other eminent persons had been inducted in the committee as members. He has also maintained that from 2003 onwards, they were only advising the management and administration of the trust properties. Yet from 2003 panel none of the committee members had been included in the complaint and the said committee members had been in the helm of affairs both within respective Benz Garden property and De monte Colony property. 50. He has also maintained that from 2003 onwards, they were only advising the management and administration of the trust properties. Yet from 2003 panel none of the committee members had been included in the complaint and the said committee members had been in the helm of affairs both within respective Benz Garden property and De monte Colony property. 50. He has also added that the second respondent/de facto complaint had deliberately and with ulterior motive had chosen to complain about the committee members who ceased to exist as members and had nothing to do with the properties of the trust. 51. With regard to the allegations that the former Archibishop Most Rev. Arul Das James (A1) (since deceased) after obtaining Rs. 1,00,00,000/- in early 2002 had signed an illegal 50 years agreement to lease with one Mr. M.G.M. Maran, who is the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011. Mr. S. Ananthanarayanan, learned counsel appearing for Mr. S. Xavier Arulraj, learned counsel on record for the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18683 of 2011, has submitted that from the above averments it was very clear that the transaction, like the earlier transaction was entered with the previous Archbishop as early as in the year 2002 and hence Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa was not a party to the above said transaction. 52. The learned counsel has also submitted that the trust had withdrawn the earlier lease with Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11 and petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011) and he had now filed an original suit before this Court in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 and this suit was still pending adjudication and therefore the second respondent/de facto complainant had been refrained from further submissions in the matter as the Court had seized of the matter. 53. Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. S. Xavier Arulraj, learned counsel who is on record for the petitioners (A3, A4, A5 and A8) in Crl. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 has submitted that regarding the lease of property to Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11 and petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011) was concerned, the petitioners viz. Fr. Lawrence Raj (A3), Fr. John Andrew (A4), Fr. Thomas Simon (A5) and Mr. O.P. No. 18475 of 2011 has submitted that regarding the lease of property to Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11 and petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011) was concerned, the petitioners viz. Fr. Lawrence Raj (A3), Fr. John Andrew (A4), Fr. Thomas Simon (A5) and Mr. Kumar (A8) were not in the board and moreover the transaction was now the subject matter of the original suit pending before the High Court in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 and the suit was still pending adjudication and hence the above said petitioners had nothing to do with the above transaction. 54. Mr. M. Rajasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 19057 of 2011 has submitted that no stretch of imagination it could be said that the offences of criminal breach of trust, misappropriation and cheating could be made out against Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) on the basis of the allegations levelled in the complaint. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 403 , 406 Sections 403 , 406 , 418 and 420 I.P.C. were completely absent against him even if the allegations contained in the complaint was taken to be true for the sake of argument. 55. The learned counsel has also canvassed that the company viz. M.G.M. Diamond Beach Resorts Pvt. Ltd., representing the petitioner Mr. M.G.M. Maran had entered into a memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002 with Rev. Dr. Arul Das James, representing the Estate of Sir John De Monte for lease of land and building measuring 50 Grounds in Benz Garden comprised as 14 Grounds 765 sq.ft., on the southern portion at No. 73, Chamiers Road and 35 Grounds 1635 sq.ft., at No. 72, Chamiers Road for the period of 50 years subject to certain terms and conditions set out in the memorandum of understanding. 56. The learned counsel during the course of his argument has invited the attention of the Court to Clause ‘B‘ and ‘C‘ of the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002. Clause ‘B‘ reads as follows: “B. Pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding the parties of the First and Second Part shall enter into an appropriate/regular agreement with mutually agreed covenants.” Clause ‘C‘ reads as follows: “C. The agreement referred to in B above, when entered into is subject to the accord of sanction. Clause ‘B‘ reads as follows: “B. Pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding the parties of the First and Second Part shall enter into an appropriate/regular agreement with mutually agreed covenants.” Clause ‘C‘ reads as follows: “C. The agreement referred to in B above, when entered into is subject to the accord of sanction. and approval by the High Court of Madras and the Appropriate Authority under the Income Tax Act and party of the first part shall make all the necessary arrangements for obtaining the requisite permission from the High Court and the authorities for implementing this agreement.” 57. The learned counsel has also submitted that the Company of Mr. M.G.M. Maran in order to show his bona fide intentions and its interest in the demised property, even prior to the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002 had tendered a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- under cover of a letter dated 19.11.2001 vide cheque No. 456226, dated 19.11.2001 drawn on Global Trust Bank as part of the consideration towards the lease of property and the balance of Rs. 50,00,000/- would be given on the date of signing of the agreement. He has also added that the balance of Rs. 50,00,000/-was also paid by cheque bearing No. 143000, dated 29.11.2001, drawn on Global Trust Bank, Chennai. Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002, the petitioner‘s company was put in possession of the property and ever since then the petitioner‘s company had been in possession of the property. 58. The learned counsel would submit further that having paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- as stipulated in the memorandum of understanding, the company of Mr. M.G.M. Maran kept sending repeated requests and reminders to the trust to comply with its obligations under the memorandum of understanding and to take appropriate steps to obtain the necessary sanctions and approvals. 59. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Clause ‘I‘ of the memorandum of understanding, which contemplates the payment schedule. It reads as follows: “I. In addition to the amounts mentioned in Clause G above, the party of the second part shall also pay to the party of the first part a sum of Rs. 59. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Clause ‘I‘ of the memorandum of understanding, which contemplates the payment schedule. It reads as follows: “I. In addition to the amounts mentioned in Clause G above, the party of the second part shall also pay to the party of the first part a sum of Rs. 12,50,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Crores fifty lakhs only) as advance payment of rentals as detailed above.” Clause ‘I‘ further reads that “I. Upon completion of construction in accordance with the sanctioned plans, designs, details and specifications, the premises becomes ready and fit for occupation and is habitable as certified by the Corporation of Chennai, the party of the first part shall execute and register at the cost and expense of the party of the second part, the lease deed or deeds as required by the party of the second part in respect of the schedule ‘C‘ mentioned property for a period of 50 years and the said deed will be in terms of the draft lease deed attached hereto.” 60. Clause ‘ P‘ of the memorandum of understanding it default clause. It reads as follows: “P. In the event of this agreement become unenforceable by reason of any refusal by the authorities to accord sanction or any approval for the project, then the party of the first part shall bear all the expenses relating to the Court fee, counsel fees, and any other incidental expenses incurred for obtaining the permission of the High Court of Madras and the Appropriate authority under the Income Tax Act and the party of the second part will bear all the initial expenses incurred in preparation of the plans, estimates, details and the specification and the entire fees of the architect and engineers and all the expenses for obtaining sanction and permission of all other statutory bodies. In such an event, all the amounts received by the Party of the First Part from the Party of the Second Part in accordance with Clause G and I supra shall forthwith be refunded to the Party of the Second Part subject to the adjustments mentioned under this clause.” 61. In Schedule “C” of the memorandum of understanding the property, which is proposed to be leased out to Mr. M.G.M. Maran has been described. 62. In Schedule “C” of the memorandum of understanding the property, which is proposed to be leased out to Mr. M.G.M. Maran has been described. 62. The learned counsel has continued further that under the above circumstances, the petitioner‘s company (Mr. M.G.M. Maran‘s company) by its letter dated 2.2.2007 again requested the trust to complete the necessary formalities with regard to the lease of the demised property as contemplated under the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002 without any further delay. The trust without reference to the above said letter, issued a letter dated 5.3.2007 purportedly returning the initial advance/security deposit of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only) making untenable and unsustainable statements to the effect that the High Court had refused permission of this lease would also fail (if it had been sought) and demanded to hand over the possession of the land. 63. The learned counsel has also submitted that the burden of obtaining necessary sanctions/approvals rested on the Trust and hence Mr. M.G.M. Maran‘s company had issued a detailed reply dated 20.3.2007 and thereby ‘refused to accept the refund of the initial advance/security deposit and also insisting that the Trust should comply with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 2.1.2002. He has also added that thereafter there were exchange of letters dated 24.3.2007 and 10.4.2007. 64. The learned counsel has also maintained that since the trust was not willing to comply with its obligations under the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002, Mr. M.G.M. Maran‘s company was left with no other alternative excepting to file a original suit in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 against the trust before this Court seeking a direction to the trust for executing an appropriate lease deed in favour of the petitioner‘s company with regard to the demised property as per the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002 and also sought for a permanent injunction against the trust. 65. It appears from the records that the trust has filed written statements in the above said suit and after formulating necessary issues the parties to the suit have filed their respective proof affidavits. 66. The learned counsel has also invited the attention of this Court to the draft issues filed on behalf of the trust. 65. It appears from the records that the trust has filed written statements in the above said suit and after formulating necessary issues the parties to the suit have filed their respective proof affidavits. 66. The learned counsel has also invited the attention of this Court to the draft issues filed on behalf of the trust. The first issue, which has been drafted by the trustees, as to “whether the memorandum of understanding dated 2.1.2002 is an enforceable contract or it contemplated further act to be done. From the above context, it is made clear that in sofar as the transaction between the petitioner Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) and the trust is concerned, the suit in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 is pending adjudication before this Court. 67. Under this circumstance, the learned counsel would submit that it was very unfortunate that Mr. M.G.M. Maran had been roped in as an accused in the criminal complaint dated 26.4.2010 and on the basis of which a case had been registered by the first respondent on 19.7.2011 after a lapse of nearly 15 months. 68. With regard to the allegation that the property was leased out to Nitesh Estates Pvt., Ltd., (Nitesh Shetty, Managing Director of Nitesh Estates Ltd., A12, petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011), Mr. S. Anantha- narayanan, learned counsel appearing for Mr. S. Xavier Arulraj, learned counsel who is on record for the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 18683 of 2011, has submitted that it was neither unilaterally decided by Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa Archbishop nor by the property advisory committee, on the other hand all due steps were taken and advertisements were given in the following papers on the following dates including public notices: (a) 6.6.2007 Advertisement in Tamil News Paper ‘Dina Malar‘, (b) 6.6.2007 Advertisement in the Hindu, News Paper, (c) 7.6.2007 Advertisement in Indian Express, News Paper, (d) 8.6.2007 Advertisement in Economic Times, News Paper, (e) 30.11.2007 Copy of the Public Notice, In this connection, he would submit further that all these notices in both the vernaculars have been made only in box numbers and not even the identity of the property owners have been disclosed. 69. In the public notice, it was advertised that: “The said offer will be subject to scrutiny by the trustee and the terms and conditions to be stipulated. 69. In the public notice, it was advertised that: “The said offer will be subject to scrutiny by the trustee and the terms and conditions to be stipulated. It will be subject to the approval and sanction to be granted by the Hon‘ble High Court of Madras under the Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920. The sealed covers may be sent on or before 31.7.2007 by 5.00 p.m. The lease period was advertised to be for a period of 63 years.” 70. The learned counsel has also added that from the above context it was very clear that there was no shady transaction as imagined by the de facto complainant and that the entire transaction was transparent and in accordance to known legal and acceptable procedures. There was no hankypanky transaction. 71. The learned counsel has also added that all the sealed tenders were opened and chronologically serialized as per the highest bidder downwards and the property committee decided to allot the trust property to Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd., as they were the highest bidder offering 630 crores as lease amount and they had deposited Rs. 5,00,00,000/- by the bankers cheque and the same had been deposited with the trust and it was still in custody of the trust account. 72. The learned counsel has also continued that there had been correspondence between trust and Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd., from 12.1.2009 till 14.7.2011, wherein the trust had recalled the lease given to Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd., vide their letter dated 14.7.2011. He has also maintained that no property was entrusted to Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd., and this fact had been borne-out by letter dated 14.7.2011 and there was only a Memorandum of Understanding entered between the parties and no lease agreement whatsoever had been entered. 73. The learned counsel has submitted further that Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd., were unable to meet the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding as they had tie-up with international investors and international banks, however, due to the sudden global recession they could not honour their original commitments and sought time and also payment would be made in easy instalments, however, the trust had categorically denied stating that they could not concede to their demands and called off the Memorandum of Understanding. 74. 74. The learned counsel has also submitted that due to international banks the allegation is absolutely false that the trust suffered loss to the tune of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- and that it was in the trust account as on today and accumulating interest for the trust and no property had been handed over to Nitesh Estates Pvt. Ltd. 75. On the same line, Mr. Gopinath, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. V.K. Sathiamurthy, learned counsel who is on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011 (A12) has submitted that the petitioner Mr. Nitesh Shetty was the Managing Director of Nitesh Estates Ltd., a company registered under the , 1956 having its office at Bangalore and that the company was engaged in the business of development and construction of real estate, commercial and hospitality sector. The company was in this field of business for the past seven years and it was financially sound and its annual turnover was around Rs. 120 Crores. 76. The learned senior counsel would maintain that in pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, a sum of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five crores only) was paid by way of demand draft as detailed hereunder: 77. After receiving the above demand drafts, the trust had also issued receipts in the name of the Estate of the Late Sir John D‘Monte in favour of the Company. He would submit further that the award of offer as well as the Memorandum of Understanding was subject to scrutiny by the trustee and the terms conditions stipulated therein. It was also subject to the approval and sanction to be granted by the High Court of Madras under the Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920. 78. The learned senior counsel has also maintained that the entire transaction and the memorandum of understanding were reduced into writing and the petitioner and the company had not violated the terms of the memorandum of understanding. It is also pertinent to note here that the petitioner‘s company had not been put in possession of the property till date. 79. The learned senior counsel has also submitted that in pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, the Archbishop of Mylapore viz. Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had to take appropriate steps to implement the memorandum of understanding by approaching this Court seeking its permission and approval for the said project/lease of the said property. 79. The learned senior counsel has also submitted that in pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, the Archbishop of Mylapore viz. Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had to take appropriate steps to implement the memorandum of understanding by approaching this Court seeking its permission and approval for the said project/lease of the said property. He would submit further that on obtaining the approval from the High Court of Madras by the Archbishop, the Company had to pay the consideration of Rs. 630 Crores as interest free non-refundable security deposit. 80. On perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that proper advertisements were made in news papers calling for tenders and only after noticing the public notice the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011 had offered his tender. On perusal of the memorandum of understanding, in Subclause iii to Clause ‘A‘, it is covenanted as follows: “iii. When the income accruing to the Trust from the grant of the Schedule A Property in favour of Parry & Co., Ltd., became insufficient to maintain and run the various charitable and philanthropic institutions, the Trustee called upon the said Parry & Co., Ltd., to surrender the Schedule A property and to also assist the Trust in funding the formation of a layout and construction of buildings therein, against which the said Parry & Co., Ltd., would retain a smaller extent of land In the Schedule A property on lease basis.” 81. In Clause ‘B‘ it is stipulated that: “B. In terms of Clause 27 of the Last Will and Testament of Sir John D‘Monte, granting express permission to the Trustee to give out, on lease basis, all the houses, gardens and grounds on the best and most advantageous terms that could be obtained by the Trustee, the Trustee published advertisements in newspapers on 6th, 7th and 8.6.2007, calling for sealed offers, to be submitted on or before 31.7.2007, for the lease of 150 Grounds in the remaining property, more particularly described in the Schedule ‘C subject to the approval of the Hon‘ble High Court of Madras.” 82. Clause ‘C‘ covenanted as follows: “C. The Proposed Lessee herein offered to pay a sum of Rs. 630,00,00,000/-(Rupees Six Hundred Thirty Crores only) as an Interest Free Non-Refundable Security Deposit together with a monthly Lease Rent of Rs. Clause ‘C‘ covenanted as follows: “C. The Proposed Lessee herein offered to pay a sum of Rs. 630,00,00,000/-(Rupees Six Hundred Thirty Crores only) as an Interest Free Non-Refundable Security Deposit together with a monthly Lease Rent of Rs. 1,00,000/-(Rupees Only Lakh only) and to develop the Schedule C property into a premium luxury mixed use development comprising of retail, hospitality and commercial buildings and complexes, together with all facilities and amenities, all of which would vest in the Trust on the determination of the lease of efflux of time.” 83. In page No. 5 of the memorandum of understanding, the lease arrangement subject to prior sanction/approval has been described. In Paragraph No. 1.1 it is stated that: “It is made clear, specifically, stated by the Trustee that the proposed lease arrangement in respect of the Schedule C property and in favour of proposed lessee, as contemplated herein, is subject to the express sanction/approval of the Hon ‘ble High Court of Madras. The Trustee shall take appropriate steps and file appropriate proceedings to obtain such sanction/approval from the Hon‘ble High Court of Madras.” 84. In Paragraph No. 1.2 it is stated that: “The proposed Lessee shall meet all costs that would be incurred by the Trustee towards filing for and seeking the sanction/approval of the Hon ‘ble High Court of Madras, subject to a maximum amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees‘ Five lakhs only). The Trustee -will, promptly, furnish to the proposed lessee all bills and supporting documents accounting for/justifying the expenses and costs actually incurred by the Trustee in this regard.” 85. At Page No. 9 of the memorandum of understanding in Paragraph No. IV Interest free nonrefundable security deposit to the tune of Rs. 630,00,00,000/- (Rupees Six hundred and thirty crores Date D.D. No. Bank In the name of Amount Rs. 12.11.2007 674197 Corporation Bank Sir John D‘Monte Trust 1,00,00,000 2.1.2008 666716 Corporation Bank Sir John D‘Monte Trust 4,00,00,000 only) has been stipulated. In page No. 10, in Para ‘b‘ it is stated that: “A further sum of Rs. 630,00,00,000/- (Rupees Six hundred and thirty crores Date D.D. No. Bank In the name of Amount Rs. 12.11.2007 674197 Corporation Bank Sir John D‘Monte Trust 1,00,00,000 2.1.2008 666716 Corporation Bank Sir John D‘Monte Trust 4,00,00,000 only) has been stipulated. In page No. 10, in Para ‘b‘ it is stated that: “A further sum of Rs. 4,00,00,000/-(Rupees Four crores only) to be paid by the Proposed Lessee to the Trustee, as and by way of further Earnest Money Deposit within a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date of the execution of this MOU or one week prior to the filing of the Petition for approval of the Hon ‘ble High Court of Madras for the grant of the lease in favour of the Proposed Lessee as contemplated herein, whichever is later and the balance sum of Rs. 625,00,00,000/- (Rupees Six hundred and twenty five crores only) to be paid by the Proposed Lessee to the Trustee on the date of the execution of the Lease Deed as contemplated herein below. “ 86. The learned senior counsel has also adverted to that in its normal course of business, Nitesh Estates Ltd., had decided to go in for Initial Public Offering (IPO). In its Draft Red Herring Prospectus (DRHP) dated 25.11.2009, the Company had mentioned about the memorandum of understanding with the trust and about its projects. The DRHP also mentioned categorically that the grant of lease was subject to the approval of the High Court. Despite these terms being categorically mentioned in the DRHP, based on the advise of the company‘s Book Running Lead Managers, this memorandum of understanding was mentioned as RISK FACTOR 5 clearly setting out the risks involved and the company did not seek to make any unlawful gain or any unjust enrichment out of this memorandum of understanding. 87. In page No. 15 of Final Prospectus of Nitesh Estates Ltd., under Clause 5 it is stated that: “Our entering into a lease agreement pursuant to a memorandum of understanding dated 12.11.2007 executed with the Archdiocese of Madras, is subject to the sanction and final order of the High Court of Madras”. 88. 87. In page No. 15 of Final Prospectus of Nitesh Estates Ltd., under Clause 5 it is stated that: “Our entering into a lease agreement pursuant to a memorandum of understanding dated 12.11.2007 executed with the Archdiocese of Madras, is subject to the sanction and final order of the High Court of Madras”. 88. It is also stated in Paragraph No. 3 of Clause 5 therein that: “Further, as indicated above, our Company will enter into a valid lease agreement with the Archdiocese to develop the Bens Garden property upon receipt of the sanction and final order of the High Court of Madras and upon receipt of a clear title report certifying that the Bens Garden property on long term lease in favour of our Company. In addition the Archdiocese have indicated to the Company through their letter dated 19.10.2009 that they shall make an application to the High Court of Madras to seek their approval for entering into the lease agreement with our Company only after our Company has received commitment from its lenders to finance the deposit payment under the MOU for the development of the property.” 89. In the last paragraph of Clause 5, it is stated that: “We cannot assure you that we will secure the required financing in a timely manner or at all. Furthermore, after securing any financing, we cannot assure you that the High Court of Madras will pass the order in our favour in a timely manner or at all. Thus, we may be unable to complete this project in a timely manner or at all and any such delay may adversely impact our business.” 90. In this connection the learned senior counsel has submitted that in sofar as A12 was concerned they entered only on lease agreement for a project and that no allegation could be levelled against them that they had committed the offences as alleged in the complaint of the second respondent. He would submit further that since A12, who is the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 18331 of 2011 had entered into a lease with the trust no cognizable offence could be made out against them alleging that they had committed breach of trust. Further, he would submit that in sofar as A12 was concerned totally he was a third party and he had nothing to do with the allegation levelled in the complaint. 91. Further, he would submit that in sofar as A12 was concerned totally he was a third party and he had nothing to do with the allegation levelled in the complaint. 91. The learned senior counsel has continued further that on perusal of the complaint, no offence was made out against Mr. Nitesh Shetty, because the entire transaction and memorandum of understanding was legal, open and transparent and there was no secret clause in the memorandum of understanding. He has also submitted that the property was still in the control and possession of the Archbishop of Mylapore viz. Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa and that the petitioner had not underscored or undervalued the property in any manner whatsoever. 92. The learned senior counsel has also submitted that fear of alienation of the property was unfounded as the memorandum of understanding as well as any agreement in future was subject to the scrutiny and approval of the High Court. He has also added that calling for tenders and acceptance of the tenders was the prerogative of Archbishop and that the petitioner understood after going through the procedural formalities the company was called and after discussion an MOU was signed on 12.11.2007 and pursuant to which a sum of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- was paid to Sir John D‘Monte Trust, for which proper receipts had been issued. 93. The learned senior counsel would submit that there was no concealment or suppression of facts in the prospectus issued, submitted to the SEBI through its Merchant Bankers (Book Running Lead Managers). The invitation and the acceptance of the offer by the general public in subscribing to the shares of the company was not totally dependant on the memorandum of understanding alone due to the past track records, merit and financial stability of the company. 94. The learned senior counsel would submit further that as alleged in the complaint by the second respondent the so called ‘Comfort Letter‘ was neither comfortable to the trust nor to the petitioner Mr. Nitesh Shetty, but it seemed to be too comfortable to the complainant. 95. As seen from the first information report Mr. M.K. Kabir, a practising lawyer in the High Court has been shown as A7. In the complaint, it is stated he is one of the members of the Archdiocese property committee. It is also alleged that Mr. M.K. Kabir was the legal advisor and Mr. 95. As seen from the first information report Mr. M.K. Kabir, a practising lawyer in the High Court has been shown as A7. In the complaint, it is stated he is one of the members of the Archdiocese property committee. It is also alleged that Mr. M.K. Kabir was the legal advisor and Mr. Kumar (A8) has also been shown as a property dealer-cum-builder. Further, the second respondent has alleged in the complaint that A10 Mr. Jeppiar, A7 Mr. M.K. Kabir and A8 Mr. Kumar are the lay members and they had direct and distinct commercial interest in alienating the Benz Garden property to Mr. Jeppiar (A10). It is also alleged that the very committee was instrumental in the agreement to lease the trust property in favour of Mr. Jeppiar and putting him in illegal possession. It is also alleged that all members of the committee had acted in tandem to assist Mr. Jeppiar to grab the property and have committed the offence of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust and criminal misappropriation of property. 96. A7Mr. M.K. Kabir has also filed a petition in Crl. O.P. No. 17895 of 2011 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court to quash the criminal proceedings as against him in the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011. It is brought to the notice of the Court that this Court has already granted an interim stay only in respect of Mr. M.K. Kabir in its Order dated 27.7.2011 and made in Crl. M.P. No. 1 of 2011 in Crl. O.P. No. 17895 of 2011. 97. Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/complainant to the police while advancing his argument has invited the attention of this Court to Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 of the affidavit of the second respondent/complainant filed in support of the petitioner in. Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011. In Paragraph No. 13 of his affidavit, the second respondent has contended that: “Contents of the complaint clearly-state that criminal breach of trust has been committed in respect of the Trust properties in a dishonest manner for dishonest use of the commercial accomplices of the trustees. Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011. In Paragraph No. 13 of his affidavit, the second respondent has contended that: “Contents of the complaint clearly-state that criminal breach of trust has been committed in respect of the Trust properties in a dishonest manner for dishonest use of the commercial accomplices of the trustees. Those in charge of property management have grabbed the same and the properties are being illegally used for non-charitable, non-pious and non-altruistic purposes resulting in crores of rupees not becoming available to the poor for the welfare of whom the properties have been bequeathed.” 98. In paragraph No. 14 he has contended that: “In the ‘closure report‘ respondents have stated that my complaint makes out criminal cases under Sections 403 and 418 Sections 403 and 418 of I.P.C. and that being non-cognizable offences, they are unable to register FIR and wants me to pursue the matter in civil Court. The police have deliberately ignored the fact that Sections 403 I.P.C. and 405 I.P.C. are similar offences and 403 I.P.C. can be invoked when movable property is involved as stipulated in the Section itself. As my main complaint relates to immovable property, Section 405 /406 would also apply. In other words, once police concede that an offence has been committed, as is clear in the ‘closure report‘, in addition to Section 403 , Section 405 /406 which is cognizable, will apply. The legal position is clear and what the police is attempting to do is to protect, shield and defend the guilty for reasons only known to the respondents.” 99. After referring the prayer portion of the affidavit of the second respondent in the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011, Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned, counsel for the second respondent would contend that the second respondent had filed only one complaint dated 26.4.2010 and that no question of lodging of second complaint would arise. He would submit further that since the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 had been registered on the basis of the complaint lodged by the second respondent dated 26.4.2010, it could not be heard to say that the complaint itself was not maintainable or not sustainable under law. 100. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Clauses 27th, 30th and 31st of the Last Will and Testament of Sir John D‘Monte. 101. 100. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Clauses 27th, 30th and 31st of the Last Will and Testament of Sir John D‘Monte. 101. In so far as Clause 32nd is concerned, it is significant to note here that the second respondent/complainant has not alleged anything against the accused persons that they had committed any such offences with regard to the Government Bonds, Promissory Notes and other Securities belonged to the estate of Sir John D‘Monte. Under this circumstance, Clause 32nd has no much of consequence while disposing the present petitions. 102. The learned counsel has also invited the attention of this Court to the directory of Archdiocese of Madras-Mylapore pertaining to the year 2001. In Clause VIII of the directory the names of the Chairman and Members of Archdiocesan properties committee have been given, in which, the names of A1 to A7 (as per first information report) have been mentioned. 103. The learned counsel has also argued that Section 6 of the Trust Act contemplated that “a Trustee, who fails to comply with an Order passed under Section 5(5), would be deemed to be committed a breach of trust.” 104. The learned counsel has also submitted that as decided by this Court in O.P. No. 296 of 2010, dated 19.8.2011, the second respondent/complainant to the police Mr. M.G. Devasahayam was a person having interest in the trust. He has also taken this Court to the observations made by this Court in the Order dated 19.8.2011 and made in O.P. No. 296 of 2010. In which in Paragraph No. 27, this Court has observed that: “Therefore, (i)in view of the finding already recorded in the order dated 6.3.2006 in A. No. 748 of 2004 in O.P. Nos. 219 and 220 of 2002; and (ii)also in view of the marked distinction between the provisions of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act and Section 92(1) of the Code, I am of the view the petitioner will certainly fall within the definition of the expression ‘any person having an interest in the trust‘.” 105. Having cited the above order of this Court, the learned counsel would submit that the second respondent/complainant to the police Mr. M.G. Devasahayam was certainly having competency to lodge the complaint against the accused persons for having committed breach of trust and misappropriation of trust funds. 106. While advancing his arguments, Mr. Having cited the above order of this Court, the learned counsel would submit that the second respondent/complainant to the police Mr. M.G. Devasahayam was certainly having competency to lodge the complaint against the accused persons for having committed breach of trust and misappropriation of trust funds. 106. While advancing his arguments, Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent has also brought to the notice of this Court on the minutes pertaining to Bens Garden meeting held on 18.9.2007. It appears from the records that in the Bens Garden meeting held on 18.9.2007 the committee had appointed Fr. John Andrew, Fr. Divianathan, Mr. Kandasamy and Mr. A.F. Rajan to formulate the questionnaire relating to the nature of the company, its financial status, stability and goodwill and the capability to shoulder the project to be implemented and requested the team to formulate and send the details to the highest bidder and proceed with the negotiation. If the highest bidder fails to accept the terms and conditions then the second highest offerer may be considered. The committee fixed the last date as 0.9.2007 for getting reply from the highest bidder. 107. Then the learned counsel has also spoken to about the letter dated 21.8.2011 written by one Mr. A.F. Rajan, one of the members of the committee, who had attended the Bens Garden meeting held on 18.9.2007, to the second respondent/complainant to the police. In this letter, he has stated that: “On going through the documents submitted in the above subject matter to the Hon‘ble Madras High Court, as copies of Minutes of Sir John D‘Monte Trust Committee/Benz Garden Committee, I note that the same are unsigned and are not bona fide recordings of the above said committee.” 108. In this connection, the learned counsel has also submitted that this was also a subject matter of investigation based on the complaint lodged by the second respondent/complainant to the police. 109. The learned counsel has also argued about the resolution passed by the committee. The said resolution has been placed at Page No. 125 of the typed set submitted on behalf of the petitioners. On perusal of this resolution it appears that this has been specifically passed by the committee pertaining to Nitesh Estate Pvt. Ltd., (Mr. Nitesh Shetty A11). 109. The learned counsel has also argued about the resolution passed by the committee. The said resolution has been placed at Page No. 125 of the typed set submitted on behalf of the petitioners. On perusal of this resolution it appears that this has been specifically passed by the committee pertaining to Nitesh Estate Pvt. Ltd., (Mr. Nitesh Shetty A11). The resolution reads as follows: “It is unanimously resolved not to proceed further the Bens Garden Property with Nitesh Estate Pvt. Ltd., since they have not acted as per the MOU dated 12.11.2007 and they have not taken any steps to pay the balance amount as per the MOU and now they are seeking modification in the above said MOU for making payments by installment basis. Hence, it is hereby decided to pay back advance money to Nitesh Estate with bank interest and cancel the MOU. If any legal steps has to be taken and the same may be permitted to proceed with. “ 110. Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel has further continued that A11 Mr. M.G.M. Maran was always a business man and the memorandum of understanding entered into with him by the trust came into operation in the year 2002 and in consequence thereof 50 Grounds came to be in possession of A11. He would further submit that all the petitioners/accused had colluded together and committed breach of trust and hence they have to be dealt with according to law. 111. On perusal of the records, it appears that on 16.7.1997 the development proposals in respect of Bens Garden was formed. It also appears that a meeting was convened on 13.2.1997 at Bens Garden. In the said meeting it also appears that the second respondent/complainant had participated in the interaction session and explained to the members about the project management, short listing final presentation, selection/appointment of project management team by the trust. His suggestion includes identification and selection of project developer by the project management team with approval by the trust and taking subsequent steps to completion of commercial operations of the project. It is also pertinent to note here that the Archbishop of Madras-Mylapore is the sole trustee of Sir John D‘Monte trust. 112. Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to the police has also submitted that the petitions in Crl. O.P. Nos. It is also pertinent to note here that the Archbishop of Madras-Mylapore is the sole trustee of Sir John D‘Monte trust. 112. Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to the police has also submitted that the petitions in Crl. O.P. Nos. 15002 of 2010 and 15359 of 2011 were filed by the second respondent/complainant for registration of the first information report based on the complaint lodged by him dated 26.4.2010. He has also conceded that the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 was disposed of on the grounds of civil nature based on the closure report filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police. In this connection, he would state that in the closure report of the police dated 31.5.2010 it was stated that offences under Sections 403 and 418 were made out and since those offences were non-cognizable, the second respondent was advised to take recourse through the Civil Court. 113. The learned counsel has also added that the second petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 was filed with fresh allegation seeking registration of First Information Report‘on the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010. He has also added that there was no hard and fast rope to register a case based on the complaint, which was earlier closed. He would submit further that the complaint dated 26.4.2010 lodged by the second respondent was not closed on mistake of fact. But, it was closed without any investigation. 114. He has continued further that when Section 403 I.P.C. was made out in trust property matters Section 405 I.P.C. would come into play automatically and hence the offence would be punishable under Section 406 I.P.C, which was a cognizable one. 115. With regard to the locus standi of the second respondent/complainant to lodge the complaint over the issue of Sir John D‘Monte trust properties, he would submit that the second respondent/complainant was a retired I.A.S. Officer. He served in the Indian Army before civil service. He was born in Catholic and he was a member of Catholic Church. He was also a member of project development consultancy for the administration of trust in 1997 and at that time the companies like L&T, Raheja, Sterling, Infracon etc., shown interest. Whileso, he was watching the activities of the De Monte Trust property dealings and mis-dealings. 116. He was born in Catholic and he was a member of Catholic Church. He was also a member of project development consultancy for the administration of trust in 1997 and at that time the companies like L&T, Raheja, Sterling, Infracon etc., shown interest. Whileso, he was watching the activities of the De Monte Trust property dealings and mis-dealings. 116. The learned counsel would submit further that as per the Order of the High Court in O.P. Nos. 219 and 220 of 2002 persons like the second respondent/complainant, who were in catholic faith and worship were not necessary parties, but they were certainly interested parties. He has also added that the second respondent was a public spirited high profile well respected person and author of bootes on Jayaprakash Narain and he was a close friend of Mother Teresa as well as associated with NGOs and Government Committees. 117. With regard to the incriminating facts pertaining to A1 to A8, he would submit that A2 to A8 and A10 were the property committee members and empowered to deal with the trust properties. From 2000 to 2004 A1 and the then property committee members A2 to A8 and A10 were responsible for the shady deals and quid pro quo understandings and handing over illegal possession to A10 and A11 under the guise of Memorandum of Understanding and on payment of pittance. 118. He would submit further that A9 Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had made violations for the personal gains and the possession of 150 grounds and buildings were handed over for illegal considerations. Even prior to the date of memorandum of understanding possession was handed over to him. He has also added that the properties were allowed to be exploited commercially from 2001 to 2011 and even after return of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- in the year 2007, Mr. Jeppiar was allowed to enjoy the property till September, 2011. 119. The learned counsel would submit further that the High Court had rejected the original petitions viz. O.P. Nos. 219 and 220 of 2002 for leasing out the property to Mr. Jeppiar A10 on the ground that he was a member in the Property Committee, which decided in his favour. Secondly, the advertisement was given only six days time. Though the order passed on 6.3.2006, no appeal was preferred against the Order of the High Court. He would submit further that thereafter Mr. Jeppiar A10 on the ground that he was a member in the Property Committee, which decided in his favour. Secondly, the advertisement was given only six days time. Though the order passed on 6.3.2006, no appeal was preferred against the Order of the High Court. He would submit further that thereafter Mr. Jeppiar (A10) had retained possession till 27.9.2010 (i.e. after the complaint dated 26.4.2010 and after filing of Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010, which was disposed of on 8.7.2010). 120. The learned counsel has also added that the property was not put to best and most advantageous rent and heavy income to the trust was lost as there were better offers in 1997 by L&T, Raheja etc. 121. The learned counsel has also submitted that the memorandum of understanding was entered into with Mr. Jeppiar A10 as he had approached the clergy and not by way of tender process. He had paid a sum of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- under memorandum of understanding and enjoyed 150 grounds for eleven years. 122. The learned counsel would submit further that A1 to 10 had connived and conspired to put the trust property to personal use with no income to the trust, but good income to the clergymen concerned. 123. With regard to A11 Mr. M.G.M. Maran, the learned counsel has submitted that A11 was given illegal possession of 50 grounds even prior to the signing of memorandum of understanding. The first payment of Rs. 50,00,000/-and the second payment of Rs. 50,00,000/- were received by the trust even prior to the signing of memorandum of understanding. He has also added that the so called memorandum of understanding placed the burden on A1 to A6 and A9 to approach the High Court for permission under Section 36 of the Indian Trust Act. But, till date no steps were taken by A2 to A6 and A9 to approach the High Court. 124. The learned counsel would submit further that the ultimate aim of A9 was to give the property on long lease of 50+50=total 100 years as reflected in the memorandum of understanding and this amounts to more than selling away the property. 125. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the suit in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 filed by A11 Mr. 125. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the suit in C.S. No. 501 of 2007 filed by A11 Mr. M.G.M. Maran, he had blamed A2 to A6 and A9 and contended that it was the responsibility of A2 to A6 and A9 to approach the High Court for seeking sanction and approval. 126. With regard to A12 Mr. Nitesh Shetty, he would submit that he was a small property developer in Bangalore. He had linked with Bangalore Bishop and also established link with A9 and A2 to A6 and as such they had formed a nexus to illegally utilize this property. He would submit further that his tender letter dated 30.7.2007 was received at the last moment. His tender letter for the development of 150 grounds for Rs. 630 Crores was not properly processed. He has also argued that against the legal advice given by a senior counsel it was decided in his favour without due diligence. 127. Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel would submit further that A12 Mr. Nitesh Shetty never had any fund and his payment of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-was contemplated in the memorandum of understanding. But, the receipt of Rs. 4,00,00,000/-was not in accordance with Clause IV(6) of memorandum of understanding. Though A12 had paid a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- for the expenses to approach the High Court it was not properly utilised so far for the said purpose. That amount was misused. 128. He has also submitted further that it was a collusive game between A9 and A2 to A6 and A12 for mutual illegal benefits and that A12 had utilised the memorandum for raising share fund by IPO. He would submit further that A9, A2 to A6 were acknowledging the expenditure of Rs. 15,00,00,000/-and therefore A12 would also move the Court as like A11 for endlessly using the property. 129. This case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 has been registered on 19.7.2011 by one Mr. Anbazhagan, Inspector of Police attached to Central Crime Branch, Team XV, Egmore Chennai against the petitioners and others, alleging that they had committed the offences punishable under Section 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC. The First Information Report reveals that the occurrence had been taking place between the year 2001 and 2010. Anbazhagan, Inspector of Police attached to Central Crime Branch, Team XV, Egmore Chennai against the petitioners and others, alleging that they had committed the offences punishable under Section 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC. The First Information Report reveals that the occurrence had been taking place between the year 2001 and 2010. In column No. 3(b) of the First Information Report it is stated that the information was received by the first respondent on 19.7.2011 at 18:35 hours. In column No. 12, the contents of the First Information Report has been appended in which it is stated that “received the complaint from Mr. M.G. Devasagayam, IAS (Retired) 103, Ceebros Bayview, 4th Seaward Road, Valmiki Nagar, Tiruvanmiyur, Chennai – 600 041 addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Chennai endorsed by Commissioner of Police vide current Ref. No. 1225/DC/CCB/GEN/2011 – No. 144/ACLG/ CCB/GEN/2011. 130. The complaint seems to be a hand written one, by the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasagayam addressed to the Commissioner of Police Chennai City on 26.4.2010. Hence, it is crystal clear that the complaint has not been lodged for the first time on 19.7.2011 but earlier it was lodged on 26.4.2010. The same complaint dated 26.4.2010 was already closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 31.5.2010, on the ground that though on enquiry prima facie the offences under Sections 403 and 418 were made out, since those offences were non-cognizable, no case could be registered and therefore the complainant was advised to take recourse from the Civil Court. This fact was submitted before this Court by the Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) when the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 was taken for hearing. On considering the submissions made by the Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) that the petition under Section 482 was closed as civil in nature and the second respondent was also directed to take recourse to such proceedings as remedy is available to him under law. 131. Being not satisfied with the disposal of the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 on 8.7.2010, as aforestated, the second respondent had filed another petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 after invoking the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C with the very same prayer which he had sought in the above said petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 on 8.7.2010, as aforestated, the second respondent had filed another petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15359 of 2011 after invoking the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C with the very same prayer which he had sought in the above said petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010. When the petition was pending, again the Learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) has submitted before this Court that a case was registered in Crime No. 301 of 2011 on the basis of the complaint lodged by the second respondent in Crime No. 301 of 2011 by the Central Crime Branch, Chennai for the alleged offences under Section 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC, against 12 accused persons and in view of the submissions made by the Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) that petition was also closed as on 27.7.2011. 132. It is pertinent to note here that once the complaint was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 31.5.2010, the same complaint dated 26.4.2010 was taken up and a case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 was registered by the first respondent viz. Inspector of Police attached to CCB, Chennai on 19.7.2011 i.e., after 1 year, 1 month and 18 days. While advancing his arguments the learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Kumar has described the conduct of the respondent police as sheer abuse of process of law and that the doctrine of policing had been completely misused and they had created an impression that the law could be flexed in accordance with the whims and fancies of persons having much influence. He has also adverted to that the second respondent had exerted all his authority to make the police particularly, the Commissioner of Police to make them to obey his command. He has also maintained that if it was allowed then the people would be losing confidence on the functioning of the policing system. 133. Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the procedure for investigation. Subclause (b) to sub-section 1 of Section 157 contemplates that: “if it appears to the officer in-charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.” 134. 133. Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the procedure for investigation. Subclause (b) to sub-section 1 of Section 157 contemplates that: “if it appears to the officer in-charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.” 134. As discussed earlier, the earlier complaint dated 26.4.2010, was closed as no cognizable offence was made out and it was also closed as the matter is of civil in nature and when such being the case the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent has miserably failed to explain the circumstances as to why the closed complaint was again taken up and how the case was registered. 135. As well observed in Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab 1986 CrLJ 2070 : 1987 (1) Crimes 277, 279 (P & H) the condition precedent to the commencement of an investigation under this Section (under Section 157) is that the First Information Report must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under this Section. It was held that their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. 136. On coming to the instant case on hand, from the closure report of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch dated 31.5.2010, it is revealed that no cognizable offence was made out from the complaint dated 26.4.2010 lodged by the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasagayam. The present case viz., Crime No. 301 of 2011 has been registered based on the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010 which was earlier closed subsequently. Once it was decided that no cognizable offence was made out and closed on whose order or whose direction it was reopened and a case was registered? This has also not been explained by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent. Equally, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has also miserably failed to explain the delay of 1 year, 1 month and 18 days in registering the case on a demised complaint. 137. This has also not been explained by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent. Equally, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has also miserably failed to explain the delay of 1 year, 1 month and 18 days in registering the case on a demised complaint. 137. The investigation of a cognizable offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track for investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Under Chapter XIV of the Code a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of . It needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will be tantamount to recognition of ‘Divine Power‘ which no authority on earth can enjoy. This has been observed by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 426 : LNIND 1990 SC 732 . 138. Mr. S. Ashok Kumar learned senior counsel has submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC were not made out against the petitioners. To attract Section 43 of IPC two ingredients have to be satisfied. 1. Dishonest, misappropriation of property. 2. Such property must be movable. 139. 138. Mr. S. Ashok Kumar learned senior counsel has submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 403, 406, 418 and 420 of IPC were not made out against the petitioners. To attract Section 43 of IPC two ingredients have to be satisfied. 1. Dishonest, misappropriation of property. 2. Such property must be movable. 139. On coming to the proviso to Section 403 of IPC it enacts; “Section 403 – Whoever dishonestly missappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 140. The offence under Section 403 is non-cognizable. In this connection the learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Kumar has submitted that there was no substance in the averments that the property was dishonestly misappropriated or dishonestly converted to the own use of the petitioners and that the only transaction as far as this petitioners is concerned were that they signed a MOU only after an advertisement to a higher bidder, and on the advise of the Property Advisory Committee the entire transaction was transparent. He would submit further that the allegations against A12 Mr. Nitesh Shetty were concerned the MOU was signed as he was the highest bidder and on accepting a sum of Rs. 5 crores as the transaction was taken place on the advice of the Property Advisory Committee in a transparent manner and the above said 5 crores was in the bank account still with the trust. He would submit further that there was no misappropriation or dishonest conversion on behalf of the trust. 141. The criminal breach of trust has been defined under Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. It contemplates that “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits criminal breach of trust.” 142. The subtle difference between Section 403 and Section 405 of IPC is that Section 403 deals with movable property and there is no question of any entrustment or having any dominion over the property. He would submit further that the petitioners viz., A3, A4 and A8 had no dominion over the property and that there had been no misappropriation or dishonest conversion of their own use of that property or that they dishonestly disposed or that property in violation of any direction of law or legal contract either express or implied. 143. He has also submitted that to attract the offence under Section 420 IPC the definition under Section 415 of IPC had to be taken into account. Section 415 of I.P.C reads as follows; “Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.” 144. To attract the offence under Section 420 of the following ingredients are very much essential. i. There must be deception i.e., the accused must have deceived some one. ii. That by such deception the accused must induce a person; (a) to deliver any property; or (b) to make, alter or destroy the whole or part of the valuable security or anything which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable property. (iii) That the accused did so dishonestly. 145. However, to establish the offence under Section 420 IPC the prosecution must prove that the accused person has cheated some one but also that by doing so he has dishonestly induced the person who was cheated to deliver any property etc. 146. The terms “wrongful gain” and “wrongful loss” and “gaining wrongfully” and “losing wrongfully” have been defined in Section 23 of IPC as follows: Wrongful Gain –Wrongful gain is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. Wrongful Loss –Wrongful loss is the unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. Wrongful Loss –Wrongful loss is the unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. Gaining wrongfully. Losing wrongfully –A person is said to gain wrongfully when such a person retains wrongfully, as well as when such persons acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property. 147. Similarly the terms “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” have been defined under Sections 24 and 25 Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Penal Code as follows: Section 24– Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”. Section 25– A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise. 148. In this connection the learned senior counsel Mr. S. Ashok Kumar has also submitted that it was crystal clear that to attract an offence under Section 420 IPC there should be dishonest or fraudulent representation and deception which resulted in wrongful loss to one and wrongful gain to another and that there was no wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person in this case. 149. He would submit further that in so far as the company Nitesh Estate (A12) was concerned it was falsely stated in the complaint that the money was deposited in the trust account. He has also added that it was not the concern of the de facto complainant but it was for Nitesh Estate to be concerned about this. He has also continued that this would go to show that the vicious and malicious attitude of the de facto complainant who was hellbent to malign the reputation of the Archbishop and the office of the Archbishop for their personal vendetta for having been ousted out from the Property Committee. 150. He has also maintained that as observed by the learned single judge of this Court in C.S. No. 156 of 2002 on 6.1.2003 that there was nothing to indicate that the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasagayam was having interest in the trust. He was not at all a member of the trust. 151. 150. He has also maintained that as observed by the learned single judge of this Court in C.S. No. 156 of 2002 on 6.1.2003 that there was nothing to indicate that the second respondent Mr. M.G. Devasagayam was having interest in the trust. He was not at all a member of the trust. 151. He would submit further that the Hon‘ble Apex Court had time and again stressed the point that disgruntled litigants should not be allowed to indulge in arm-twisting methods in converting civil litigations into criminal offences and entertaining such complaints would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and the Court should be passionate to render justice and render real and substantial justice to which the Courts are and the common mans interest has to be protected. 152. Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance upon following decisions; 1. Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others AIR 2008 SC 251 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 259 : LNIND 2007 SC 1179 : (2008) 1 MLJ (Crl) 1469 . In this case the Division Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India headed by his Lordship Mr. K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, Chief Justice of India as he then was has held that; “Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i)to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii)to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii)to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this Section itself. Authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used for harassment or for vendetta or with an ulterior motive pressurise the accused.” 153. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used for harassment or for vendetta or with an ulterior motive pressurise the accused.” 153. It is also held that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 154. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. N.E.P.C India Ltd. and Others AIR 2006 SC 2780 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cr) 188 : LNIND 2006 SC 537 : (2007) 1 MLJ (Crl) 473 , the Apex Court has enlisted the circumstances under which a criminal complaint can be quashed after invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Apex Court has also directed the Courts to exercise the power under Section 250 Cr.P.C. more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. 155. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 156. In B. Suresh Yadav v. Sharifa Bee and Another AIR 2008 SC 210 : (2007) 13 SCC 107 : LNIND 2007 SC 1238 : (2008) 1 MLJ (Crl) 1427 the Supreme Court has held that on facts the dispute between the parties was a civil dispute. Criminal prosecution for the alleged offence under Sections 415/420 amounted to abuse of process of law and hence the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 157. The learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Ashok Kumar has also submitted that the first respondent had thoroughly and completely investigated the case and referred the complaint as civil in nature and this Court was also pleased to record the above vide Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 dated 8.7.2010 with the finding that the petitioner shall be at liberty to take recourse to such proceedings as remedy is available to them under law. In this connection he would submit further that the respondent police had no power to seek fresh investigation. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 dated 8.7.2010 with the finding that the petitioner shall be at liberty to take recourse to such proceedings as remedy is available to them under law. In this connection he would submit further that the respondent police had no power to seek fresh investigation. He has also adverted to that neither under Section 173(2) nor under 173(8) of Cr.P.C. enables the second respondent to seek fresh investigation which was alien to the criminal jurisprudence. 158. The only prudent course open to him was as stipulated in the Apex Court judgment made in (1996) 11 SCC 582 , wherein it was held that recourse could be had under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the pronouncement of the above order by this Court. However, hoodwinking the said order the petitioner had abused the process of this Court and had filed the second application for reinvestigation for which there is no provision in the criminal procedure code. 159. He would submit further that by registering the first information report, the office of the Archbishop Madras – Mylapore viz., the office of Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had been tarnished and the reputation and sanctity of the church had been destroyed by a frivolous complaint made by a disgruntled litigant viz. the de facto complainant who had no locus standi to lodge a complaint against the trust when he was neither the trustee nor the beneficiary of the trust. 160. In so far as the petitioner in Crl. O.P. 18183 of 2011, Mr. Jeppiar (A10) is concerned, Mr. B. Sriramulu the learned senior counsel has advanced his arguments that in any case it had been clearly established that the petitioner had no fraudulent or dishonest intention to commit the offence and the complaint was also lacking all those aspects and the registration of the present complaint tantamounted to re-open and re-investigation which was not permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure and in view of the above the complaint was liable to be quashed. 161. He has also submitted that in terms of Clause 27 of the last will and testament of Sir John DeMonte the trust property was only sought to be leased to the petitioner Mr. 161. He has also submitted that in terms of Clause 27 of the last will and testament of Sir John DeMonte the trust property was only sought to be leased to the petitioner Mr. Jeppiar and when the permission was sought under Section 7 of The Religious and Charitable Act before this Court prior to leasing the same it was negated and the amount of advance paid by the petitioner had been refunded by the trust and the same was also accepted by the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner had no connection with the trust either directly or indirectly and the petitioner herein was also not in possession of the trust and consequently the question of the petitioner Mr.Jeppiar grabbing the property or being in illegal possession of the property does not arise and even today it was admitted fact that the trust was in possession of the property. He has also submitted that the procedure contemplated under the law was followed and hence the question of acting in tandem to commit offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust or criminal mis-appropriation of property did not arise and hence the complaint was liable to be quashed. 162. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the following decisions; 1. Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. and Others AIR 2003 SC 1069 : (2003) SCC (Cr) 703 : LNIND 2003 SC 108 2. V.Y. Jose and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another (2009) 3 SCC 78 : LNIND 2008 SC 2435: (2009) 2 MLJ (Crl) 711 3. Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar and Another (2005) 10 SCC 336 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cr) 49, and 4. All Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and Another AIR 2008 SC 247 : (2007) 4 SCC 776 : LNIND 2007 SC 1227, 163. In the first case viz., Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. and Others (2003) 3 SCC 11 in paragraph No. 19 the Apex Court has held as follows; “19. The High Court has held that the Petitions filed by the appellants for quashing the complaint and the FIRs registered against them are pre-mature. The question which arises is that where the complaint or the FIR does not disclose commission of a cognizable offence, whether the same can be quashed at the initial stage? The High Court has held that the Petitions filed by the appellants for quashing the complaint and the FIRs registered against them are pre-mature. The question which arises is that where the complaint or the FIR does not disclose commission of a cognizable offence, whether the same can be quashed at the initial stage? This question was examined by this Court in State of West Bengal and Others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982) SCC (Cr) 283 : LNIND 1982 SC 34 : (1982) 1 MLJ (Crl) 359 and it was held that the First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report (FIR) which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. It was further held that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. The same question has been considered in State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lai and Others, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992) SCC (Cr) 426 : LNIND 1990 SC 732 and after considering all the earlier decisions, the category of cases, in which the Court can exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice, were sumarised in para 108 of the Report and sub-paras 1 to 3 thereof are being reproduced hereinbelow : (SCC p.37 8, para 102) “1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. donot disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. donot disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.” 164. In the second case viz., V.Y. Jose and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another (supra), the Supreme Court has explained the circumstances as to when the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised. It is held that Section 482 Cr.P.C. serves a salutary purpose that a person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a number of years although no case has been made out against him. Besides Section 483 casts a duty of High Court to supervise the functioning of the trial Courts. Therefore, a matter which essentially involves dispute of civil nature should not be allowed to become subject matter of criminal proceedings which may be resorted to as a short cut to execution of a non-existent decree. In this case the complainant alleging cheating filed against appellants whereas the case in fact involved civil dispute relating to a contract. Under this circumstance it was held that the High Court ought to have exercised its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 165. While penning down the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench his Lordship Hon‘ble Mr. Justice S.B. SINHA in paragraph No. 27 has quoted the ruling of the Apex Court made in All Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and Another (supra). At page 281 para 16 it is held thus; “16. For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Superior Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice.” In paragraph No. 28 his Lordship has also held that; “A matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be the subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter being not a shortcut of executing a decree which is nonexistent. The Superior Courts, with a view to maintain purity in the administration of justice, should not allow abuse of the process of Court. It has a duty in terms of Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to supervise the functionings of the trial Courts.” 166. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar and Another (supra), challenging the first information report, the appellant moved the High Court on 11.3.1998 by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the first information report and the consequent police investigation in which at the time of issuing notice police investigation was stayed but ultimately by the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the application whereafter a petition for grant of special leave to appeal was filed before this Court in which on 6.10.1988 leave was granted and police investigation was stayed. By virtue of the interim order passed by the High Court as well as this Court the police investigation has remained stayed for a period of six years and the same could not proceed further. 167. After analysing the materials on record the Apex Court in paragraph No. 7 has held as follows; “7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either to constitute an offence. 167. After analysing the materials on record the Apex Court in paragraph No. 7 has held as follows; “7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either to constitute an offence. Under the aforesaid Section, it is inbuilt that there has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence. Categorical and microscopic examination of the F.I.R. certainly does not reflect any such dishonest intention ab initio on the part of the appellant. Section 506 I.P.C. deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance have been defined in Section 503 I.P.C. but the FIR lodged by the complainant does not show or reflect that any such threat to cause injury to person or of property was ever given by the appellant to the complainant.” In Paragraph No. 18 it is held that: “18. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by this Court in the most of quoted judgment in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra), where seven cardinal principles have been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have been committed, by the accused is taken. The case in hand unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the Court, at least after having gone through the F.I.R., which discloses only a civil dispute.” In Paragraph No. 19 it is held that: “19. The appellant cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole of a criminal prosecution for long, number of years, even when admittedly a civil suit has already been filed against the appellant and Complainant-respondent No. 4, and is still subjudice. In the said suit, the appellant is at liberty to contest the same on grounds available to him in accordance with law as per the leave granted by Trial Court. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the complainant has not been able to show that at any material point of time there was any contract, much less any privity of contract between the appellant and respondent No. 4 – the Complainant. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the complainant has not been able to show that at any material point of time there was any contract, much less any privity of contract between the appellant and respondent No. 4 – the Complainant. There was no cause of action to even lodge an FIR against the appellant as neither the Complainant had to receive the money nor he was in any way instrumental to telecast “GOD TV” in certain areas of Ahmedabad. He appears to be totally a stranger to the same. Appellant‘s prosecution would only lead to his harassment and humiliation, which cannot be permitted in accordance with the principles of law.” 170. In this connection, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior counsel would also submit that the second respondent, who was the complainant to Police was totally a stranger to the trust administration, neither he was a trustee nor a member of the trust administration. But, in order to wreck vengeance and with malicious intention, he had lodged this complaint against the petitioners for which he was not having any locus standi or competency. 171. Apart from this, Mr. M. Rajasekaran appearing for the petitioner Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) would submit that if the first information report did not disclose the commission of the cognizable office, the Court would justify and quash the investigation. 172. In support of his intention, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision in State of West Bengal and Others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others and State of West Bengal and Others v. Sanchaita Investments and Others, AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982) SCC (Cr) 283 : LNIND 1982 SC 34 : (1982) 1 MLJ (Crl) e59. In this case, the scope and application of Section 157 Cr.P.C. has been clearly explained. The Apex Court has also held that the Police investigation under Section 157 Cr.P.C. can be commenced only if F.I.R. Prima facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence, where such offence is not disclosed, the Court is justified in interfering with the investigation and quashing the same. 173. The learned counsel has also, in support of his contention, placed reliance upon an another decision in Eicher Tractor Ltd. and Others v. Harihar Singh and Another, 2009-1-L.W. (Crl.) 284 : LNIND 2008 SC 2199 . 173. The learned counsel has also, in support of his contention, placed reliance upon an another decision in Eicher Tractor Ltd. and Others v. Harihar Singh and Another, 2009-1-L.W. (Crl.) 284 : LNIND 2008 SC 2199 . In this case also an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court against the Order of a learned single Judge of Allahabad High Court dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the appellants for quashing the proceedings initiated on the basis of complaint filed by respondent No. 1 and the order of learned Civil Judge, taking cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 420 , 468 Sections 420 , 468 and 471 I.P.C. and issuance of summons to the appellants. The contention on behalf of the appellant before the Hon‘ble Supreme Court was that the background facts clearly show that the proceedings were initiated with a view to harass the appellants and as a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by the appellants. Under this circumstance, it was held by the Apex Court that “Case at hand squarely falls within the parameters indicated in category (7) of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra)case.” In Paragraph No. 7, the Apex Court has referred the decision in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra). After referring this decision, the Apex Court has held that: “A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: (SCC pp.378-79, Para 102) (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 174. Countering the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to the police would submit that though the petitioner Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa was the trustee of Sir John DeMonte trust, the penal provisions under Section 406 I.P.C. could very well be attracted against the trust. 175. The learned counsel would submit that under Section 506 I.P.C., the punishment prescribed was imprisonment of either description for a term which may-extend to three years of fine or both. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the trust could not be proceeded against under Section 406 I.P.C as, it was the case of the prosecution that the trust had the mens rea because it had acted through the 9th accused Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa and others i.e. the office bearers of the property administration committee. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a decision in Sri Aurobindo Society and Another v. State LNIND 1984 Mad 113 : (1984) 1 MLJ (Crl) 315. 176. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa and others i.e. the office bearers of the property administration committee. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a decision in Sri Aurobindo Society and Another v. State LNIND 1984 Mad 113 : (1984) 1 MLJ (Crl) 315. 176. In sofar as the proviso to Section 405 I.P.C. is concerned, he would submit that the prosecution need not prove misappropriation and it was for the accused to prove in his defence. To support this view, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision in State of H.P. v. Karanvir, AIR 2006 SC 2211 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cr) 460 : (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl) 759. 177. The learned counsel has also submitted that the Paragraph Nos. 17 and 18 of the complaint lodged by the second respondent would speak about the offence of criminal breach of trust and hence Section 405 I.P.C. would1 definitely be attracted. 178. Mr. P.T. Perumal, the learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to police, in support of his contention has also placed another decision in Nayak Prahladbhai Bhogilai v. State of Gujarat LNIND 2000 Guj 549. In this case, the accused was working as Secretary of Mandali (Cooperative Society). The allegations levelled against him were that he had misappropriated the amount belonging to Mandali for his own use. Apart from this, “it was also alleged that the accused was also entrusted with books of account of Mandali and authorised to keep only Rs. 1,000/- on hand. It was also alleged that he had retained the said amount for his own household expenditures and that he had dishonestly misappropriated the funds of the co-operative society. Hence, he was charged with Section 408 I.P.C. 179. This Court has carefully gone through the above cited decision and of view that this case is not made applicable to the instant case on hand. 180. In Madhosingh and Others v. Smt. Kamla Devi and Others, 1992 Cri. L.J. 1858 : LNIND 1991 Bom 561, the complainant, who was a member of housing society entrusted his plot admeasuring 3600 sq.ft., with the executive committee and paid the price thereof. The executive committee wilfully sold half of the said plot to a third person and handed over to the complainant the sale deed for 1800 sq.ft., only. L.J. 1858 : LNIND 1991 Bom 561, the complainant, who was a member of housing society entrusted his plot admeasuring 3600 sq.ft., with the executive committee and paid the price thereof. The executive committee wilfully sold half of the said plot to a third person and handed over to the complainant the sale deed for 1800 sq.ft., only. Under this circumstance, it was held that though civil remedy was available, Criminal Court could not be prevented from taking cognizance of offence under Section 405 I.P.C., which is. punishable under Section 406 I.P.C. 181. In Ram Narain Poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation with Pramod Kumar Manocha v. Central Bureau of Investigation with Vinayak Narayan Deosthali v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Others with Harshad S.Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ambuj Sushil Kumar Jain, AIR 2003 SC 2748 : (2003) SCC (Cr) 869 : 2003 Cri. L.J. 4801 : LNIND 2003 SC 26 , a Division Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court headed by his Lordship Mr. Justice M.B. SHAH has explained the scope and application of Sections 409 and 405 Sections 409 and 405 I.P.C. and also explained as to how the criminal breach of trust is having distinct feature from criminal misappropriation. The Apex Court has held that: “Section 405 defines criminal breach of trust. The offence like the offence of criminal misappropriation is characterised by an actual fraudulent appropriation of property. There is not originally wrongful taking or moving as in the case of theft but the offence consists in wrongful appropriation of property, consequent upon a possession which is lawful. The offence is distinguishable from criminal misappropriation because subject of it is not the property which by some casual act or otherwise, but without criminal means comes into the offender‘ s possession; but the property which is entrusted to the offender by the owner or by others lawful authority and which the offender holds subject to some duty or obligation to apply it accordingly to the trust, Sections 407 to 409 made special provisions for various cases in which property is entrusted to the enumerated categories of persons who commit the offence. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one‘s own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. The term entrustment is not necessarily a term of law. It may have different implications in different context. In its most general signification all it imports is the handing over possession for some purpose which may not imply the, conferring of any proprietary right at all. When a person misappropriates to his own use the property that does not belong to him, the misappropriation is dishonest even though there was an intention to restore it at some future point of time. Some times, it so happens that with a view to create confidence the repayments are made so that for the future transactions the money can be dishonestly misappropriated. This is a part of the scheme and the factum of repayment and not be considered in isolation. The repayment can be a factor to be considered while awarding sentence, but cannot be a ground for proving innocence of the accused.” 182. In this connection, Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to Police would submit that in sofar as the first accused as per the first information report Rev. Aruldas James, Archbishop, was concerned he was the trustee in the year 2001 and he had re-constituted the property committee in the year 2001 in order to facilitate the illegal activities pertaining to Bens Garden property measuring 212 Grounds. He had entered into a memorandum of understanding with Mr. Jeppiar (A10) in respect of 150 Grounds for Rs. 37.50 Crores and with Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) for 50 grounds for Rs. 50 Crores and both the agreements were for about 50 years, which was prohibited by the Trust Act. He has also argued that unauthorised possession was handed over to Jeppiar (A10) for illegal gratification or unaccounted rent for nine years. or obligation to apply it accordingly to the trust, Sections 407 to 409 made special provisions for various cases in which property is entrusted to the enumerated categories of persons who commit the offence. He has also argued that unauthorised possession was handed over to Jeppiar (A10) for illegal gratification or unaccounted rent for nine years. or obligation to apply it accordingly to the trust, Sections 407 to 409 made special provisions for various cases in which property is entrusted to the enumerated categories of persons who commit the offence. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one‘s own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. The term entrustment is not necessarily a term of law. It may have different implications in different context. In its most general signification all it imports is the handing over possession for some purpose which may not imply the, conferring of any proprietary right at all. When a person misappropriates to his own use the property that does not belong to him, the misappropriation is dishonest even though there was an intention to restore it at some future point of time. Some times, it so happens that with a view to create confidence the repayments are made so that for the future transactions, the money can be dishonestly misappropriated. This is a part of the scheme and the factum of repayment and not be considered in isolation. The repayment can be a factor to be considered while awarding sentence, but cannot be a ground for proving innocence of the accused. 182. In this connection, Mr. P.T. Perumal, learned counsel for the second respondent/complainant to Police would submit that in sofar as the first accused as per the first information report Rev. Aruldas James, Archbishop, was concerned he was the trustee in the year 2001 and he had re-constituted the property committee in the year 2001 in order to facilitate the illegal activities pertaining to Bens Garden property measuring 212 Grounds. He had entered into a memorandum of understanding with Mr. Jeppiar (A10) in respect of 150 Grounds for Rs. 37.50 Crores and with Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) for 50 grounds for Rs. 50 Crores and both the agreements were for about 50 years, which was prohibited by the Trust Act. He has also argued that unauthorised possession was handed over to Jeppiar (A10) for illegal gratification or unaccounted rent for nine years. 183. 37.50 Crores and with Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) for 50 grounds for Rs. 50 Crores and both the agreements were for about 50 years, which was prohibited by the Trust Act. He has also argued that unauthorised possession was handed over to Jeppiar (A10) for illegal gratification or unaccounted rent for nine years. 183. Further, the learned counsel would submit that unauthorised possession was also given to Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) for more than ten years taking unaccounted rent. Hence, the act of the first accused Rev. Aruldas James (since deceased) would come under the ambit of Section 420 I.P.C. 184. Further, he would argue that in sofar as A2 to A8 were concerned they were the members of the property committee constituted in the year 2001 in order to facilitate the said illegal acts. He has argued further that they conspired, abetted and jointly endorsed in a mala fide manner to give the property on lease for fifty years for Rs. 37.50 Crores to the co-committee member Mr. Jeppiar (A10) and allowed him to be in illegal possession for more than nine years. 185. Further, the learned counsel has also added that A2 to A8 conspired, abetted and jointly endorsed in a mala fide manner to give the property on lease for fifty years for Rs. 12.50 Crores to the Mr. M.G.M. Maran (A11) and allowed him to be in illegal possession. Hence, the act of A2 to A8 would come under the purview of 420 186. The learned counsel has also added that A9 Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa, Arch Bishop became the Archbishop and the trustee of De Monte Trust in the year 2005 and he had allowed the illegal possession of 150 grounds with Mr. Jeppiar (A10) by taking illegal gratification or unaccounted rent. 187. The learned counsel has also submitted that without Court sanction, he had entered into a memorandum of understanding with A12 Nithesh Shetty for 66 years for Rs. 630 Crores taking a subtle amount of Rs. 5,00,00,000/-as advance without verifying the financial status of A12. He has also submitted that A9 Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had issued a comfort letter dated 19.10.2009 to A12 Nithesh Shetty for raising funds by Initial Public Offer (IPO) in stock market. 188. The learned counsel would argue further that A9 had facilitated and abetted A12 to raise money from public by giving false information. He has also submitted that A9 Rev. Dr. A.M. Chinnappa had issued a comfort letter dated 19.10.2009 to A12 Nithesh Shetty for raising funds by Initial Public Offer (IPO) in stock market. 188. The learned counsel would argue further that A9 had facilitated and abetted A12 to raise money from public by giving false information. Hence, the act of A9 would also come under the purview of Section 420 I.P.C. 189. Further, the learned counsel has also canvassed that the complaint lodged by the second respondent with the first respondent would be maintainable and that the criminal proceedings pertaining to the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 on the file of the first respondent could not be curtailed or quashed. 190. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the following decisions: 1. R.K. Dalmia etc. v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 805: LNIND 1962 SC 146, 2. Wahid Ali v. Eshwariah (1957) 1 MLJ (Crl) 235. 191. In the first case viz. R.K. Dalmia etc. v. Delhi Administration (supra), in paragraph No. 44, the Apex Court has placed reliance upon the following cases for the suggested restriction meaning of property in Section 405 I.P.C: 1. Reg v. Girdhar Dharmdas, (1869) 6 Bom High Ct Rep (Crown Cases) 33, 2. Jugdown Sinha v. Queen Empress, ILR 23 Cal 372, 3. 3 Ram Chand Gurvala v. King Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 385, In Paragraph No. 4 6 it is held that: “We are of opinion that there is no -good reason to restrict the meaning of the word “property” to movable property only when it is used without any qualification in Section 405 or in other Sections of the Indian Penal Code. Whether the offence defined in a particular Section of the can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property will depend not on the interpretation of the word “property” but on the fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject to acts covered by that Section. It is in this sense that it may be said that the word “property” in a particular Section covers only that type of property with respect to which the offence contemplated in that Section can be committed. “ 192. In the next case viz. It is in this sense that it may be said that the word “property” in a particular Section covers only that type of property with respect to which the offence contemplated in that Section can be committed. “ 192. In the next case viz. Wahid Ali v. Eshwariah (supra) it is held that: “Merely because the complainant has a remedy to recover the amount through the Civil Court the Criminal complaint of Criminal misappropriation punishable under Section 406 I.P.C. cannot be thrown out.” 193. This Court has carefully perused the averments of the complaint dated 26.4.2010 lodged by the second respondent and the averments of the petitions filed by the petitioners and this Court has also carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners and Mr. A.N. Thambidurai, learned Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the first respondent as well as Mr. P.T. Perumal on behalf of the second respondent/complainant. 194. Having given careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsels on both sides and on perusal of the materials available on record, this Court is of view that the complainant does not reveal the ingredients of any offences under Sections 403 , 406 Sections 403 , 406 , 418 and 420 I.P.C. Further, the complaint itself is not maintainable as it is bereft of any particulars of offence committed by the petitioners. 195. As adumbrated in the opening paragraphs, the Assistant Commissioner of Police had closed the very same complaint dated 26.4.2010 on 31.5.2010 on the ground that no cognizable offence is made out and. that the second respondent/complainant was advised to take recourse from the Civil Court. 196. Secondly, the petition in Crl. O.P. No. 15002 of 2010 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking a direction to the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police to forward the second respondent‘s complaint dated 26.4.2010 to their appropriate subordinate to register a case was disposed of based on the closure report of the Assistant Commissioner of Police dated 31.5.2010. But, the present case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 was registered only after one year one month and eighteen days from the date of 31.5.2010 on which date the same complaint was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police. 197. But, the present case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 was registered only after one year one month and eighteen days from the date of 31.5.2010 on which date the same complaint was closed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police. 197. On perusal of the complaint, this Court is of view that prima facie it is not disclosed any cognizable offence against the petitioners. As observed by the Apex Court in State of West Bengal and Others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others and State of West Bengal and Others v. Sanchaita Investments and Others (supra), where an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and in considering the question the Court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or F.I.R. On a consideration of all the relevant materials, the Court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that the offence is disclosed the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual. 198. On coming to the present case on hand, this Court is of view that as on facts and circumstances no offence under Sections 403, 406 Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 I.P.C. are disclosed and it will be manifestly unjust to allow the process of criminal proceedings against the petitioners. Hence, this Court has to come the conclusion that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners in the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 must be quashed as the first information report and the other materials do not disclose any offence under Sections 403, 406 Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 I.P.C. and as such no investigation into the affairs of the petitioners under the said penal provisions could be permitted or allowed to be continued. 199. In the result, these criminal original petitions viz.Crl. O.P. Nos. 199. In the result, these criminal original petitions viz.Crl. O.P. Nos. 18183, 18331, 18475, 18683 and 19057 of 2011 are allowed and the criminal proceedings in the case in Crime No. 301 of 2011 against the petitioners are quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.