JUDGMENT :- 1. The petitioner, at the relevant time holding the post of Inspector of Police filed O.A.No.2816 of 2001 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, seeking to challenge an order dated 06.02.2001 passed by the Additional Director General of Police cum Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai. 2. The petitioner was convicted for a criminal offence of demanding bribe of Rs.10,000/-for deleting the name of an accused Shanmugasundaram from a case registered by the Prohibition Enforcement Wing Police Station in Crime No.45/87 and accepting the first instalment of Rs.5,000/- on 02.03.1987 from the said accused. The petitioner was charge sheeted subsequently and tried before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate cum Additional 1st Additional Sessions Judge cum Special Judge, Tirunelveli in S.C.No.1/89. He was convicted and sentenced to one year R.I. together with a fine of Rs.2,000/- under each count for Section 161 IPC r/w Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The sentences were directed to be run concurrently. The petitioner paid the total fine amount of Rs.5,000/- in the Court on the same day. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before this Court in Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2001 and this Court on noticing that the fine amount had already been paid suspended the sentence of the Trial Court on furnishing sureties. 3. When the fact of the petitioner's conviction came to the knowledge of the respondents, he was given a show cause notice dated 10.01.2001 by the respondent. By the impugned order, it was informed that the petitioner had been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude and hence, he had arrived at the provisional conclusion of dismissing the petitioner as per the provisions of Police Standing Order 59 (1) of Vol.I. It was recorded by the officer that he had considered all aspects of his conviction and he was of the opinion that it was not desirable to retain him in service. The petitioner was given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed penalty. 4. The petitioner sent a reply dated 22.01.2001 requesting to grant extension of time for submitting his explanation. He had also stated that the case was registered in the year 1987 and he was facing trial from the year 1989 and since his health condition was not good, he was under medical leave. Accepting the petitioner's explanation, further time extension was given by a letter dated 25.01.2001. He had also stated that the case was registered in the year 1987 and he was facing trial from the year 1989 and since his health condition was not good, he was under medical leave. Accepting the petitioner's explanation, further time extension was given by a letter dated 25.01.2001. Thereafter, the petitioner sent a detailed representation dated 29.01.2001. Apart from contending that he had meritorious service, he also submitted that he had challenged the suspension order which was made pending criminal trial. The Tribunal in O.A.No.407 of 1994 by an order dated 16.02.1996 stayed the operation of the suspension order pursuant to which he was restored to duty on 31.12.1996. It was further stated that the trap case against him was made out of vengeance. He had also moved this Court in Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2001 and the sentence made against him was suspended as noted above. However, the respondent rejected the petitioner's case and by an order dated 06.02.2001, he was dismissed from service with effect from 29.12.2000 the day on which he was found convicted. It was also noted that this Court had granted only suspension of sentence. The petitioner, as a responsible officer in a disciplined force had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and he was caught in a trap case where he was convicted and therefore, the only punishment that has to be awarded is dismissal from service. 5. It transpires, in the meanwhile after granting time extension for replying to the show cause notice, the petitioner moved the Tribunal with O.A.No.1103 of 2001 challenging the show cause notice dated 10.01.2001. The Tribunal admitted the OA and granted interim stay by an order dated 09.02.2001. The petitioner in his reply sent to the respondent dated 29.01.2001 as against the second show cause notice did not mention about his moving the Tribunal challenging the show cause notice. Therefore, when the impugned order came to be passed on 06.02.2001, the Tribunal is yet to grant any interim order. It was thereafter, the Tribunal's interim order came into existence on 09.02.2001. 6. The second Original Application (O.A.2816 of 2001) was admitted on 23.04.2001 and once again the Tribunal granted interim stay. Even though the respondents have filed a vacate stay application in M.A.No.5779 of 2001, the Tribunal did not take up the same for reasons best known to it. It was thereafter, the Tribunal's interim order came into existence on 09.02.2001. 6. The second Original Application (O.A.2816 of 2001) was admitted on 23.04.2001 and once again the Tribunal granted interim stay. Even though the respondents have filed a vacate stay application in M.A.No.5779 of 2001, the Tribunal did not take up the same for reasons best known to it. Aggrieved by the grant of interim stay, the respondent moved this Court with the writ petition being W.P.No.5439 of 2002 and challenged the order of ex party interim stay. A Division Bench of this Court presided by R.Jayasimha Babu,J. by an order dated 25.02.2002 granted an interim stay of the operation of the interim order granted by the Tribunal. Even before moving the Division Bench, the respondent in order to give effect to the interim stay granted by the Tribunal on 23.04.2001 restored the petitioner to service on 27.06.2001. The petitioner continued to be in service notwithstanding the Division Bench had granted stay of the order of suspension by an order dated 25.02.2002. 7. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation on 29.07.2006. However, the respondent issued an order of suspension on 29.07.2006 placing the petitioner under suspension and he was not allowed to retire from service pending further orders on the Original Application. 8. In the original application, the respondent had filed a detailed reply affidavit dated 13.06.2001. In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this Court and was re-numbered as W.P.No.49373 of 2006. 9. In the reply affidavit, it was stated that the petitioner while he was working in the Prohibition Exercise Wing at Tirunelveli Unit had involved in a criminal case. The Vigilance and Anti Corruption Police caught him in a trap case and he was charge sheeted before the Special Court at Tirunelveli in S.C.No.1/89 and he was convicted on two counts. The fact that this Court had suspended the sentence will not disable the respondent from taking action against the petitioner. The conduct of the petitioner in getting convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude and not only sentenced with rigorous imprisonment but also fined, he is unfit to be kept in service. Keeping such a person in the police force will spoil the morale of the Department. The conduct of the petitioner in getting convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude and not only sentenced with rigorous imprisonment but also fined, he is unfit to be kept in service. Keeping such a person in the police force will spoil the morale of the Department. Since the conviction was on record, there is no impediment for the respondent from passing the impugned order. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera reported in (1995) 3 SCC 377 . Therefore, it was contended that the suspension of sentence is not a bar for taking further action. 10. However, when the matter came up today, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that subsequently this Court by a judgment dated 04.12.2008 disposed of the criminal appeal and interfered with the sentenced made by the learned Special Judge. A copy of the said judgment dated 04.12.2008 in Criminal Appeal (MD)No.25 of 2001 was also produced for perusal by this Court. In paragraphs 12 and 13, it was observed as follows:- "12. The above principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also the appellant/accused has undergone the ordeal of criminal proceedings nearly about 22 years and subjected to mental agony, expense and prolonged uncertainty of the result apart from losing his job and as such all these factors cannot be ignored by this Court and the same have to be taken into consideration while reducing the sentence. Therefore, in view of the above said mitigating circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that reducing the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment for each offence imposed by the trial judge, viz., learned First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli in Special Case No.1 of 1989 by judgment dated 29.12.2000 to one of till rising of Court and further imposing a fine of Rs.15,000/-(Rupees Fifty thousand only), in default to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. The appellant/accused is directed to pay the fine amount of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. With the above modification in sentence, this appeal is disposed of." (Emphasis added) 11. The appellant/accused is directed to pay the fine amount of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. With the above modification in sentence, this appeal is disposed of." (Emphasis added) 11. He submitted that thanks to the order of the interim stay granted by the Tribunal. The petitioner had completed his tenure of service. But because of the pendency of the Original Application, he was not allowed to retire and he had also sent a representation dated 17.11.2009 bringing to the notice of the respondent about the modification of the conviction made by the court. A copy of the said representation was also produced in the form of additional typed set of papers. 12. In the typed set, the petitioner has also enclosed the appreciation and rewards received from the superior officers. In pages 3 to 5 of the additional typed set, he had enclosed photographs standing next to a judge of this Court while attending a function organised by the Mylapore Academy during its 49th Anniversary. The attempt made by the petitioner in placing such photographs of the petitioner standing on the same dais with a judge of this court for perusal by this court is a clear attempt to overreach the Court by illegal means. Such attempt by the petitioner through his counsel must be condemned as unethical and unwarranted exercise arguing such a writ petition. Even when this was pointed out, the learned counsel for the petitioner was not willing to express any regret and did not retract the photographs filed in this regard. This had necessitated this Court for making comments on the conduct of the petitioner. It should be known to the counsel for the petitioner that such exhibits will no way influence the outcome of the decision of this court. 13. In fact the learned Judge's photographs with whom the petitioner was standing in the same dais in a function held at the Mylapore Academy is well known for his integrity, rectitude and strict views on rule of law. In fact it is the very same judge who had presided over the Division Bench and who had granted stay against the interim order passed by the Tribunal granting an ex parte stay in favour of the petitioner even against a show cause notice. In fact it is the very same judge who had presided over the Division Bench and who had granted stay against the interim order passed by the Tribunal granting an ex parte stay in favour of the petitioner even against a show cause notice. Many time when Judges are invited to functions as a Chief Guest or a speaker, they attend such gatherings under the bonafide belief that the organisers of the function have contributed to the well being of the society in some form and therefore, there was nothing wrong for a Judge to accept a privilege or honour conferred on him while attending those functions. But during such functions, the Judge will be totally unaware of other persons who are invited to attend or who are likely occupy the stage or who are invited to receive either awards or momentos. It was one such occasion where the petitioner being a police officer of the area was called to the dais in which the Judge also sat as a special guest. The petitioner had no qualms in using one such photograph to buttress his own nefarious desires. The counsel appearing had made himself as an instrument in the hands of the petitioner in passing on such unwarranted materials for perusal by this court. The Bill relating to Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill 2010 which is pending consideration before the Parliament is now attempting to define the standards expected of a judge. It will be a sad day that Judges are to be told about the standards to be adopted in public life by Judges. 14. Leaving this small digression, the other legal contentions of the petitioner can be considered. The Tribunal had granted an ex parte stay in O.A.No.1103 of 2001 and subsequently also granted an interim stay against the dismissal order passed against the petitioner on 23.04.2001. The Tribunal did not give reasons for the grant of stay against the dismissal order. Even though it is well known that once a Government servant is dismissed, the same cannot be stayed by an ex parte interim order and that too without giving strong reasons. The Tribunal did not give reasons for the grant of stay against the dismissal order. Even though it is well known that once a Government servant is dismissed, the same cannot be stayed by an ex parte interim order and that too without giving strong reasons. The Supreme Court time and again has held that it is only in case of a final order, appropriate relief can be granted because even in cases of dismissal, the loss or damages suffered by a Government servant can be compensated monetarily and if he has still remaining service to go he can be restored with all attendant benefits. Apart from the general Service Law relating to grant of discretionary interim order in the present case, the reasons found in the impugned order dated 06.02.2001 cannot be found fault with by the Tribunal. 15. In fact it is the very same Tribunal's order which went to the Supreme court in Nagoor Meera's Case (cited supra) was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal and Courts were forewarned not to interdict such orders. The Tribunal is fully aware of its own decision was earlier reversed by the Supreme Court, which is also available in the form of a reported decision. But yet it had continued to grant such interim orders as a matter of course. The Tribunal's action is clearly repugnant to rule of law and creates disobedience of the orders passed by the Supreme Court. Now that the Tribunal is abolished and does not exist any more, no strictures can be passed against the conduct of the Tribunal. 16. In any event, the case projected herein has a complete answer in Nagoor Meera's case (cited supra). It is necessary to refer to the following passages found in paragraphs 8 to 10: "8. We need not, however, concern ourselves any more with the power of the appellate court under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason that what is relevant for clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is the "conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge" and there can be no question of suspending the conduct. We are, therefore, of the opinion that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a government servant who has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentence or order is suspended by the appellate court or on the ground that the said government servant-accused has been released on bail pending the appeal. 9. The Tribunal seems to be of the opinion that until the appeal against the conviction is disposed of, action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is not permissible. We see no basis or justification for the said view. The more appropriate course in all such cases is to take action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) once a government servant is convicted of a criminal charge and not to wait for the appeal or revision, as the case may be. If, however, the government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceeding, the order can always be revised and if the government servant is reinstated, he will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been entitled to had he continued in service. The other course suggested, viz., to wait till the appeal, revision and other remedies are over, would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service a person who has been convicted of a serious offence by a criminal court. It should be remembered that the action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) will be taken only where the conduct which has led to his conviction is such that it deserves any of the three major punishments mentioned in Article 311(2). As held by this Court in Shankar Dass v. Union of India: (SCC p.362, para 7) "Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution confers on the Government the power to dismiss a person from service ‘on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge’. But that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. But that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) makes the provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly." 10. What is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servant which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, the respondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. Until the said conviction is set aside by the appellate or other higher court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice." 17. From the above passage, it is clear that the competent authority need not wait for the outcome of the criminal appeal and a suspension of sentence does not efface the conviction on record. But in the present case, what was contended before the Tribunal and before this Court was after the removal of provision relating to second show cause notice found under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the respondent cannot issue a notice in terms of PSO 59(1) of Volume I and inasmuch as show cause notice had already predetermined the imposition of penalty of dismissal, the show cause notice was invalid. 18. In answer to this allegation, in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the reply affidavit, it was averred as follows:- "12. Regarding the averments made in ground(a) it is submitted that Art.311(2) (a)(b)(c) provide that holding of enquiry is not necessary in case of person, on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction, on a criminal charge. 18. In answer to this allegation, in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the reply affidavit, it was averred as follows:- "12. Regarding the averments made in ground(a) it is submitted that Art.311(2) (a)(b)(c) provide that holding of enquiry is not necessary in case of person, on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction, on a criminal charge. Hence the show cause notice was issued as prescribed in Rule 3C(i)(1) of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955, just to give an opportunity to the delinquent before passing final orders. 13. Regarding the averments made in ground (B) it is submitted that according to Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (D & A) Rules 1955 rule 3c(i)(1), the delinquent Inspector / Applicant was given an opportunity to represent against the punishment proposed to be imposed on him as defined in rule 3(a) of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Hence it is not correct to say that the punishment was pre-determined and issued without application of mind." 19. The stand of the respondent is fully in consonance with the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 . It is necessary to extract the following passages from the said judgment: "114. So far as Challappan case is concerned, it is not possible to find any fault either with the view that neither clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) nor clause (i) of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules is mandatory or with the considerations which have been set out in the judgment as being the considerations to be taken into account by the disciplinary authority before imposing a penalty upon a delinquent government servant. Where a situation envisaged in one of the three clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or of an analogous service rule arises, it is not mandatory that the major penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank should be imposed upon the concerned government servant. The penalty which can be imposed may be some other major penalty or even a minor penalty depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The penalty which can be imposed may be some other major penalty or even a minor penalty depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In order to arrive at a decision as to which penalty should be imposed, the disciplinary authority will have to take into consideration the various factors set out in Challappan case1. It is, however, not possible to agree with the approach adopted in Challappan case1 in considering Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules in isolation and apart from the second proviso to Article 311(2), nor with the interpretation placed by it upon the word ‘consider’ in the last part of Rule 14. Neither Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules nor a similar rule in other service rules can be looked at apart from the second proviso to Article 311(2). The authority of a particular officer to act as a disciplinary authority and to impose a penalty upon a government servant is derived from rules made under the proviso to Article 309 or under an Act referable to that article. As pointed out earlier, these rules cannot impinge upon the pleasure of the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, because they are subject to Article 310(1). Equally, they cannot restrict the safeguards provided by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 as such a restriction would be in violation of the provisions of those clauses. In the same way, they cannot restrict the exclusionary impact of the second proviso to Article 311(2) because that would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of pleasure under Article 310(1) which has become free of the restrictions placed upon it by clause (2) of Article 311 by reason of the operation of the second proviso to that clause. The only cases in which a government servant can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by way of punishment without holding an inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311 are the three cases mentioned in the second proviso to that clause. A rule which provides for any other case in which any of these three penalties can be imposed would be unconstitutional. A rule which provides for any other case in which any of these three penalties can be imposed would be unconstitutional. Service rules may reproduce the provisions of the second proviso authorizing the disciplinary authority to dispense with the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311 in the three cases mentioned in the second proviso to that clause or any one or more of them. Such a rule, however, cannot be valid and constitutional without reference to the second proviso to Article 311 (2) and cannot be read apart from it. Thus, while the source of authority of a particular officer to act as a disciplinary authority and to dispense with the inquiry is derived from the service rules, the source of his power to dispense with the inquiry is derived from the second proviso to Article 311(2) and not from any service rules. There is a well-established distinction between the source of authority to exercise a power and the source of such power. The Court in Challappan case1 was, therefore, in error in interpreting Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules by itself and not in conjunction with the second proviso (at that time the only proviso) to Article 311(2). It appears that in Challappan case1 the Court felt that the addition of the words ‘the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit’ warranted an interpretation of Rule 14 different from that to be placed upon the second proviso. This is also not correct. It is true that the second proviso does not contain these words but from this it does not follow that when acting under the second proviso, the disciplinary authority should not consider the facts and circumstances of the case or make an order not warranted by them. It is also not possible to accept the interpretation placed upon the word ‘consider’ in Challappan case. According to the view taken in that case, a consideration of the circumstances of the case cannot be unilateral but must be after hearing the delinquent government servant. If such were the correct meaning of the word ‘consider’, it would render this part of Rule 14 unconstitutional as restricting the full exclusionary operation of the second proviso. The word ‘consider’, however, does not bear the meaning placed upon it in Challappan case. If such were the correct meaning of the word ‘consider’, it would render this part of Rule 14 unconstitutional as restricting the full exclusionary operation of the second proviso. The word ‘consider’, however, does not bear the meaning placed upon it in Challappan case. The word ‘consider’ is used in Rule 14 as a transitive verb. The meaning of the word ‘consider’ as so used is given in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘To contemplate mentally, fix the mind upon; to think over, meditate or reflect on, bestow attentive thought upon, give heed to, take note of’. The relevant definition of the word ‘consider’ given in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is ‘to reflect on: think about with a degree of care or caution’. Below this definition are given the synonyms of the word ‘consider’ these synonyms being ‘contemplate, study, weigh, revolve, excogitate’. While explaining the exact different shades of meaning in this group of words, Webster’s Dictionary proceeds to state as under with respect to the word “consider”: “‘Consider’ often indicates little more than think about. It may occasionally suggest somewhat more conscious direction of thought, somewhat greater depth and scope, and somewhat greater purposefulness.” It is thus obvious that the word ‘consider’ in its ordinary and natural sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it in Challappan case1. The consideration under Rule 14 of what penalty should be imposed upon a delinquent railway servant must, therefore, be ex parte and where the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the penalty which the facts and circumstances of the case warrant is either of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, no opportunity of showing cause against such penalty proposed to be imposed upon him can be afforded to the delinquent government servant. Undoubtedly, the disciplinary authority must have regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case as set out in Challappan case1. Undoubtedly, the disciplinary authority must have regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case as set out in Challappan case1. As pointed out earlier, considerations of fair play and justice requiring a hearing to be given to a government servant with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him do not enter into the picture when the second proviso to Article 311(2) comes into play and the same would be the position in the case of a service rule reproducing the second proviso in whole or in part and whether the language used is identical with that used in the second proviso or not. There are a number of orders which are of necessity passed without hearing the party who may be affected by them. For instance, courts of law can and often do pass ex parte ad interim orders on the application of a plaintiff, petitioner or appellant without issuing any notice to the other side or hearing him. Can it, therefore, be contended that the judge or judges, as the case may be, did not apply his or their mind while passing such an order? 115. The decision in Challappan case1 is, therefore, not correct with respect to the interpretation placed by it upon Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules and particularly upon the word ‘consider’ occurring in the last part of that rule and in interpreting Rule 14 by itself and not in conjunction with the second proviso to Article 311(2). Before parting with Challappan case1, we may, also point out that that case never held the field. The judgment in that case was delivered on September 15, 1975, and it was reported in (1976) 1 SCR at pages 783 ff*. Hardly was that case reported then in the next group of appeals in which the same question was raised, namely, the three civil appeals mentioned earlier, an order of reference to a larger Bench was made on November 18, 1976. The correctness of Challappan case1 was, therefore, doubted from the very beginning. 127. Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2). The correctness of Challappan case1 was, therefore, doubted from the very beginning. 127. Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2). To recapitulate briefly, where a disciplinary authority comes to know that a government servant has been convicted on a criminal charge, it must consider whether his conduct which has led to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. For that purpose it will have to peruse the judgment of the criminal court and consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in Challappan case1. This, however, has to be done by it ex parte and by itself. Once the disciplinary authority reaches the conclusion that the government servant’s conduct was such as to require his dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank he must decide which of these three penalties should be imposed on him. This too it has to do by itself and without hearing the concerned government servant by reason of the exclusionary effect of the second proviso. The disciplinary authority must, however, bear in mind that a conviction on a criminal charge does not automatically entail dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of the concerned government servant. Having decided which of these three penalties is required to be imposed, he has to pass the requisite order. A government servant who is aggrieved by the penalty imposed can agitate in appeal, revision or review, as the case may be, that the penalty was too severe or excessive and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. If it is his case that he is not the government servant who has been in fact convicted, he can also agitate this question in appeal, revision or review. If he fails in the departmental remedies and still wants to pursue the matter, he can invoke the court’s power of judicial review subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted, it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. If he fails in the departmental remedies and still wants to pursue the matter, he can invoke the court’s power of judicial review subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted, it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the court finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular government service the court will also strike down the impugned order. Thus, in Shankar Dass v. Union of India464 this Court set aside the impugned order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant was whimsical and ordered his reinstatement in service with full back wages. It is, however, not necessary that the court should always order reinstatement. The court can instead substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. 147. In all matters before us the challenge to the validity of the impugned orders was confined only to legal grounds, the main ground being based upon what was held in Challappan case1 and the application of principles of natural justice. The contentions with respect to these grounds have been considered by us in the preceding part of this Judgment and have been negatived. In most of the matters the writ petitions contain no detailed facts. Several of the petitioners have gone in departmental appeal but that fact is not mentioned in the writ petitions nor the order of the appellate authority challenged where the appeals have been dismissed. Many government servants have combined together to file one writ petition and in the case of such of them whose departmental appeals have been allowed and they reinstated in service, the petitions have not been amended so as to delete their names and they have continued to remain on the record as petitioners. Several petitions are in identical terms, if not, almost exact copies of other petitions. No attempt has been made in such matters to distinguish the case of one petitioner from the other. Several petitions are in identical terms, if not, almost exact copies of other petitions. No attempt has been made in such matters to distinguish the case of one petitioner from the other. Apart from contesting the legal validity of the impugned orders, hardly anyone has even stated in his petition that he was not involved in the situation which has led to clause (b) or clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 being applied in his case. There is no allegation of mala fides against the authority passing the impugned orders except at times a me re bare allegation that the order was passed mala fide. No particulars whatever of such alleged mala fides have been given. Such a bare averment cannot amount to a plea of mala fides and requires to be ignored. In this unsatisfactory state of affairs so far as facts are concerned, the only course which this Court can adopt is to consider whether the relevant clause of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or of an analogous service rule has been properly applied or not. If this Court finds that such provision has not been properly applied, the appellant or the petitioner, as the case may be, is entitled to succeed. If, however, we find that it has been properly applied, the appeal or petition would be liable to be dismissed, because there are no proper materials before the Court to investigate and ascertain whether any particular government servant was, in fact, guilty of the charges made against him or not. It is also not the function of this Court to do so because it would involve an inquiry into disputed questions of facts and this Court will not, except in a rare case, embark upon such an inquiry. For these reasons and in view of the directions we propose to give while disposing of these matters, we will while dealing with facts refrain from touching any aspect except whether the particular clause of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or an analogous service rule was properly applied or not." 20. A reading of the above passage will indicate that after removal of second show cause notice under Article 311(2) of the Constitution without any show cause, the competent authority can straightaway impose the penalty. There is no principles of natural justice being in truth therein. A reading of the above passage will indicate that after removal of second show cause notice under Article 311(2) of the Constitution without any show cause, the competent authority can straightaway impose the penalty. There is no principles of natural justice being in truth therein. As held by the supreme Court, if any affected government servant wants to contend that the punishment is excessive and not warranted based on the circumstances leading to conviction, he has to state the same before the Appellate Authority. The petitioner in his anxiety to get an interim order did not move the Appellate Authority against his dismissal order. He went before the Tribunal and got a waiver of exhausting the appellate remedy and also obtained an ex parte interim stay of his dismissal. 21. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Parma Nanda reported in (1989) 2 SCC 177 had permitted a review of penalty in case the punishment imposed was in terms of Article 311 (2)(a) of the constitution. Therefore, the contention that by issuing a second show cause notice on the penalty was a predetermined exercise has no valid legal application. 22. The last submission based upon the order passed in the Criminal Appeal dated 04.12.2008 is the other issue to be considered in the present circumstances. It is noted from the said judgment that the Court did not upset the findings of the Special Judge relating to the offence of corruption. On the contrary, it only interfered with the sentence by stating that it was severe and therefore, converted the punishment of one year R.I. to be gone into concurrently in two heads into detention of one day till the raising of court together with penalty of Rs.15,000/- as fine amount. Therefore, the effect of conviction still remains. It must be noted that as long as the conviction of a Government servant involved in a corruption case of taking bribery is found out to be true by a Special Court specifically constituted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the circumstances pleaded by the petitioner will pale into insignificance. 23. Whether the circumstances pointed out by this court in the criminal side as mitigating factor in reducing the term of sentence as directed by this Court is not an issue which can be taken note for consideration by this Court. 23. Whether the circumstances pointed out by this court in the criminal side as mitigating factor in reducing the term of sentence as directed by this Court is not an issue which can be taken note for consideration by this Court. It is suffice to state that the petitioner had the indulgence by this Court viz., instead of going behind the four walls of a prison his confinement was for a day in the Court. It is also a punishment not contemplated under Cr.P.C. Nevertheless, even payment of fine is a conviction if it is for an offence involving taking bribery for removing a name of a person in a criminal case. It is a serious charge and such misconduct from a member of police force can never be tolerated. 24. The observations made by this Court in the criminal appeal for reducing the sentence are noted in paragraph 9, which is as follows:- "9. As already pointed out, in this appeal the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant restricted his submissions only in respect of the question of sentence. The fact remains that the alleged occurrence took place as early as in the year 1987 and the trial went till the year 2000 and the accused/appellant had undergone the ordeal of trial for a period of 13 years before the trial Court. It is brought to the notice of this court that the appellant already suspended from the service soonafter the registration of the case and as on date he is out of service. Yet another aspect to be borne in mind by this Court is that the appellant is having a family consisting his wife, three daughters and a son and he is the only bread-winner and they are living as a joint family." (Emphasis added) 25. The judgment was rendered on 04.12.2008 and by the time, thanks to the interim order, the petitioner was restored to duty as early as 27.06.2001 and he had also completed 5 years in service and reached the age of his superannuation on 31.07.2006. Further an order was passed specifically not to allow him to retire from service. Therefore, the counsel appeared before the Judge did not bring this fact. He had made it appear that the petitioner was out of service all along even on the date of delivering the judgment. Further an order was passed specifically not to allow him to retire from service. Therefore, the counsel appeared before the Judge did not bring this fact. He had made it appear that the petitioner was out of service all along even on the date of delivering the judgment. On the contrary, two years before delivering the judgment, the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation and had the benefit of service of five years, thanks to the order of the Tribunal. Infact it is during this period, the petitioner got himself photographed on the same stage with a sitting judge of this Court at the relevant time. 26. A Judge dealing with a criminal appeal cannot make observations on a service matter and such a question is no longer res integra. The Supreme court in State v. G.Prem Raj reported in (2010) 1 SCC 398 in Paragraph 36, had observed as follows:- "36. ..we are extremely surprised to read the last portion of the judgment of the High Court, wherein, the High Court has honourably acquitted the accused and directed his reinstatement as seniormost Civil Engineer, Civil Department, MIDHANI with all usual retiral monetary benefits inclusive of restoration of seniority, etc. with immediate retrospective effect. We wonder as to under what powers the High Court has acted. This was certainly not the jurisdiction on the part of the High Court which had only to find whether the respondent-accused was guilty or not of the offence alleged against him. It has come in evidence that a full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted against the accused, wherein he was found guilty. We are shocked to see the step taken by the High Court in straightaway writing off the findings in departmental enquiry without any justification. This aberration on the part of the High Court speaks of its wholly incorrect approach." 27. The Supreme Court in Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 has held that even a subsequent acquittal cannot obliterate earlier dismissal. In Paragraph 37, it was held as follows:- "37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. In Paragraph 37, it was held as follows:- "37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge." 28. Further in the present case, the finding as noted in paragraph 9 of the order passed in Crl.A.(Md)No.25 of 2001 was only for the purpose of mitigating circumstances in reducing the sentence. Even there was a factual error wherein it was observed that that the petitioner was not in service. The petitioner before his retirement was in service for five years. Even as on the date of judgment in the criminal appeal, the petitioner even if he wanted he could not have been in service because even two years earlier he had reached the age of his superannuation. 29. Lastly, the question whether this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the penalty imposed on the petitioner. Considering the fact that the petitioner got involved in a corruption case which was found proved by the Special Court and confirmed by this Court in the Criminal appeal and the petitioner being a member of the uniformed service he cannot be shown any leniency in such a matter. 30. Further his continuance by an interim order does not enure any right to him. In this context, it is necessary to refer a Division bench judgment of this court in C.Kamatchi Ammal Vs. Kattabomman Transport Corporation Ltd. and others reported in AIR 1987 MADRAS 173, wherein it was held that interlocutory orders made in the course of proceedings will necessarily lapse with the decision of the suit unless the suit is one for permanent injunction and the interim injunction is made permanent as a part of the decreetal order made by the court. 31. The Bombay High Court vide its decision reported in Ramesh Akre and others Vs. Smt.Mangalabai Pralhad Akre and others reported in AIR 2002 Bombay 487 has held as follows: "21. Similarly, it is also not necessary that suit should be disposed of only on merits in order to bring an end to interim order. 31. The Bombay High Court vide its decision reported in Ramesh Akre and others Vs. Smt.Mangalabai Pralhad Akre and others reported in AIR 2002 Bombay 487 has held as follows: "21. Similarly, it is also not necessary that suit should be disposed of only on merits in order to bring an end to interim order. What is contemplated in law is that such interim order would continue to operate till suit is disposed of one way or the other and would come to an end on the day suit is disposed of. Whether suit is disposed of for want of prosecution or on merits is not the criteria to decide existence of interim orders. These orders by their very nature are temporary and remain in force only during the pendency of the suit and come to an end when the suit is disposed of one way or the other." Hence, the petitioner's continuance in service due to the interim order do not come to his rescue. 33. In the light of the above, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. But by virtue of the interim order, if the petitioner had rendered any service and earned salary, it is needless to state that no recoveries can be made from the petitioner. Restoring and continuing the petitioner despite an order of stay granted by this Court in W.P.No.5439 of 2002 against the interim order of the Tribunal even as early as 25.02.2002, the respondent will have to blame themselves. Hence, on that score also, no recoveries can be made. The writ petition is dismissed with the above directions. However, there will be no order as to costs.