JUDGMENT: GODA RAGHURAM, J :-The Secretary, Irrigation and Command Area Development Department, Hyderabad - the 1st respondent in WP No.9944 of 1999 is the appellant herein. The appeal is directed against the judgment dated 16.4.2003 in the Writ Petition No.9944 of 1999. 2. The undisputed facts are that the sixteen petitioners, who are tribals, belonging to 'Lambada' community, own small extents of lands in Thungapahad Village of Miryalaguda MandaI, Nalgonda District; the extent of lands owned by each petitioner range from 0.7 guntas to Ac.l.10 guntas. The appellants excavated a water channel from Amedipalli to Thungapahad to supply water to the tail and ayacut lands under the Nagarjuna Sagar Canal during 1986-87, through the lands of the petitioners. 3. The petitioners claim that the possession of their lands was taken by the officials of the Irrigation Department assuring payment of compensation, but since the officials did not pay compensation despite a series of representations they pursued with the authorities and in response to their representation dated 14.11.1998, the Executive Engineer, Nagarjuna Sagar Canal (3rd respondent in the writ petition) by letter dated 29.12.1998, declined payment of compensation contending that there was oral consent by the petitioners to part with their lands without claiming compensation and that there was no objection on their behalf to the excavation of the canal either. In the letter dated 29.12.1998, the Executive Engineer also asserted that the representation dated 14.11.1998 was made after lapse of 13 years (from the date of dispossession) as an afterthought to derive "undue advantage by hiding the facts", claiming compensation for the lands utilized for the supplementation channel and so cannot be entertained. 4. In view of the rejection of their claim for compensation, the petitioners filed the writ petition. By the judgment under appeal, the writ petition was allowed and the respondents directed to take steps for payment of compensation to the petitioners by initiating appropriate steps under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. A time limit was also fixed. 5. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition reiterates. before this Court the selfsame grounds as have found disfavour before the learned Single Judge. A time limit was also fixed. 5. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition reiterates. before this Court the selfsame grounds as have found disfavour before the learned Single Judge. The learned Assistant Government Pleader would contend that since the writ petition has been filed in the year 1999 in respect of dispossession during 1986-87 more than twelve years from the date of dispossession, the writ petition is barred by latches and delay and no relief could be granted. She would also faintly contend that in view of the provisions of Section 23 of the A.P. (Telangana .Area) Irrigation Act 1357 Fasli (for short "1357 Fasli Act"), for laying a field channel within a field, no compensation need be paid. 6. The learned Single Judge has rejected the appellants resistance to grant of relief in the writ petition (on the ground of latches) by holding that as the representation of the petitioners dated 14.11.1998 was rejected on 29.12.1988 and the writ petition was filed in March 1999, no question of latches and delay arises. The learned Assistant Government Pleader contends that merely because the writ petitioners have made repeated representations that does not condone the enormous delay in seeking relief and there are no merits in the writ petition. 7. With regard to the contention as to delay and latches on the part of the petitioners, it must be noticed that as pointed authoritatively by the Supreme Court in Trilockchand Motichand v. H.E. Munshi. 1969 (2) SCR 824 , the rule of latches and delay, is not a rule of law, but is a rule of discretion. There are no upper and lower limits. The facts and circumstances of each case must be ascertained and analyzed to apply this rule of discretion. In the case on hand, the writ petitioners are poor Scheduled Tribe agriculturists, eking out their livelihood by exclusive and wholesome dependence on the lands; they are socially and economically disadvantaged and do not have adequate access to legal remedies either. The grievance of such socially un-empowered petitioners is a out the arbitrary conduct of the State in depriving them of their right to property without due process of law and without payment of compensation. The grievance of such socially un-empowered petitioners is a out the arbitrary conduct of the State in depriving them of their right to property without due process of law and without payment of compensation. The arbitrariness in the State conduct is emphatically verified by the rejection letter dated 29.12.1998, wherein the Executive Engineer asserts that the petitioners were dispossessed of their lands on the basis of "oral" consent to such dispossession given by them. It is rather strange and even the Assistant Government Pleader is not able to present before this Court any statutory or other authority or even a hallowed practice under which oral consent is obtained by a formally constituted Government or by the State actors. If such be the coercive influence of State actors on the socially disadvantaged sector of our citizens - Scheduled Tribes, it is ample justification for the delay in approaching for relief. Even otherwise as pointed out by the learned Single Judge, since the petitioners' representations were rejected only on 29.12.1998 and the writ petition is filed within a short while thereafter, no question of delay and latches arises. 8. Regarding the other contention as to the immunity to pay compensation qua Section 23 of 1356 Fasli Act the learned Single Judge has dealt with this contention by holding that the provisions of Section 23 are applicable only for construction of a 'water course' as the expression is defined under Section 3(c) of that Act, which is conformed to a field channel in pipes not having a water carrying capacity in excess of 3 c.ft. per second; whereas the channel dug through the petitioners' lands, in the present case, is admittedly a supplementary channel from a main canal and not a field channel within the meaning of the expression as defined under Section 3(c) of 1357 Fasli Act. The interpretation and conclusion recorded by the learned Single Judge on this aspect commends our acceptance and we find no reasons for appellate reversal of this view. 9. On the aforesaid analysis, there are no merits and accordingly the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.