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2011 DIGILAW 397 (PNJ)

Narinder Singh v. Kamla

2011-02-01

MAHESH GROVER

body2011
JUDGMENT Mr. Mahesh Grover, J.: - By this common judgment, I will be disposing C.R. Nos.3481 of 2010, 3482 of 2010 and 3919 of 2010, as a common question of law is involved in these three petitions. For the sake of convenience, facts have been taken from C.R. No.3481 of 2010. 2. This petition has been preferred by one of the legal heirs of the tenant who has been ordered to be evicted from the demised premises by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. 3. The respondents/landladies who preferred the ejectment petition, pleaded that one Madan Mohan Khullar and Janak Raj Khullar sold the shop in question to them on 19.2.1993 for a sum of Rs.40,000/- and that the father of the present petitioner and one Gurcharan Singh were inducted as tenants therein at the rate of Rs.40/- per month by the previous holder whose eviction was sought on the ground of non-payment of rent at the rate of Rs.40/- per month from 18.2.1993. 4. It was further pleaded that the shop is 75 years old and is in a dilapidated condition. Tenants have replaced 10 to 11 Ballas (beams) without the consent of the landladies and that the premises have been sub-let by the tenants to one Gurmit Singh. 5. The petition was resisted by the tenants who pleaded that the shop was in the shape of a Khola and was not a complete building. The rent note dated 6.10.1966 was executed by the previous owner at the rate of Rs.6/- per month. The shop was in two portions and the second portion was taken on rent on 24.1.1970 at the rate of Rs.15/- per month. The tenants had raised construction on these premises and according to the rent note, they were permitted to raise construction and sell the Malba and in this eventuality, the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition, is not maintainable, because if the construction has been raised by the tenants, in such an eventuality, it is they who can re-construct the same. 6. The following issues ware framed :- (1) Whether the respondents are liable to be ejected on the basis of grounds of ejectment detailed in Para No.4 of the application? OPA. (1A) Whether the petitioner has purchased the property vide sale deed dated 18.2.1993, as alleged in the petition, if so, its effect? OPA. 6. The following issues ware framed :- (1) Whether the respondents are liable to be ejected on the basis of grounds of ejectment detailed in Para No.4 of the application? OPA. (1A) Whether the petitioner has purchased the property vide sale deed dated 18.2.1993, as alleged in the petition, if so, its effect? OPA. (2) Whether the applicants are estopped to file the application by their act and conduct? OPR. (3) Whether the site plan produced by applicant is incorrect? OPR (4) Whether the applications have no locus standi to file the present application? OPR (5) What is the rate of rent of the shops in question? OP Parties. (6) Relief. 7. The Rent Controller ordered eviction of the tenants on the ground that the building had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. The ground of non-payment of rent was not pressed in view of the fact that the same had been deposited before the Rent Controller. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner who is one of the legal heirs of Kartar Singh tenant while assailing the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, contended that the respondents/landladies could not lay any claim to the property as the sale deed was not a valid sale deed as it was registered in Delhi even though the property was situated in Banga, Tehsil and District Nawanshehr. He next contended that in view of the challenge to the sale deed, the Rent Controller was competent to look into the validity of the sale deed. To bring home this argument, reliance was placed by him on a judgment of this Court in Mrs.Rekha Sharma v. Smt.Shankar Devi and another 1988(1) P.L.R. 315. 9. Reliance was also placed on on a judgment of this Court in Vijay Kumar and others v. Durga Ashram Charitable Trust etc. 2002(2).R.C.R. (Rent) 87, para-12 of the judgment is extracted below :- “12. The aforesaid enunciation of the law is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Rent Controller having come to the conclusion that the Trust was landlord of Karori Mal passed a wholly erroneous order with regard to issue No.3. Thus, it was absolutely necessary for the appellate authority to correct the error. The Appellate Authority has merely held that the Rent Controller need not have touched upon the question of title of the property. Thus, it was absolutely necessary for the appellate authority to correct the error. The Appellate Authority has merely held that the Rent Controller need not have touched upon the question of title of the property. Therefore, the Appellate Authority has directed that the observations of the Rent Controller regarding sale deeds Ex.R2 and Ex.R3 would not be binding on the civil rights of the parties. Thus it becomes patent that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners, in the civil litigation, which is said to be pending between the parties, with regard to the validity of the sale deeds Ex.R2 and Ex.R3. The Appellate Authority has also made it clear that the observations with regard to the saledeed have only been made for the collateral purpose for deciding the eviction application. Necessarily, a certain amount of discussion was required to decide as to whether the Trust was the landlord or Karori Mal. It is now well settled that validity of the sale-deed could be gone into by the Rent Controller. I find support for this view of mine from the Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rekha Sharma v. Shankar Devi and others (1988) 2 I.L.R. Punjab and Haryana 83 : 1988(1) RCR(Rent) 618 (P&H). In paragraph 7 of this judgment, it has been observed as follows:- “(7) The contention of Mr.Sibal that this Court cannot go into the validity of the Gift Deed in view of the observations in Sardarni Kirpal Kaur’s case (supra) has also no substance. It is true that in that case, it was observed by Grover,J. (as he then was) that the question of validity of gift cannot be raised in proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as such question is outside the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. However, the Supreme Court in Devi Dass v. Mohan Lal (2), observed to the contrary. In that case, the validity of the sale in favour of the landlord who filed an application for ejectment against his tenant was challenged, before the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority rejected the tenant’s contention observing that he could not challenge the validity of the Sale Deed executed in favour of the landlord, as the tenant was not a party to that. The High Court did not advert to that point. The Appellate Authority rejected the tenant’s contention observing that he could not challenge the validity of the Sale Deed executed in favour of the landlord, as the tenant was not a party to that. The High Court did not advert to that point. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the trial Court to record a finding on the question whether the sale of the building was a bona fide transaction, or not. From the above case, it is obvious that Court was of the view that in the Rent Cases the question of validity of the sale of the property in favour of the landlord could be gone into by the Rent Controller. The above judgment is binding on this Court. Therefore, I am of the view that the Authorities under the Act can determine the question whether the Gift, dated March 30, 1979 is a valid or a sham transaction.” 10. It was then contended with reference to the rent note that the shop in question was initially taken in the year 1966 and that at that point of time, it was an empty Khola and was not a complete building and the subsequent rent note permitted the tenants to enter other premises as a tenant in adjoining portion which was constructed by him and, therefore, the question of the building being in a dilapidated condition, did not arise and that in view of the fact that the rent note specifically granted the right to the petitioner to remove the Malba, the ground of the building being in a dilapidated condition, could not be pressed by the respondents/landladies under any circumstances and that further, even if this ground is available to the respondents, there is no evidence to show that the building was in a dilapidated condition. 11. Reliance was placed on a judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Surinder Nath v. Shri P.N.Dhawan 1981(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 704 ; a judgment of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Dr.Harbans Singh and others 2008(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 324 and a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shadi Singh v. Rakha 1992(2) P.L.R.163. The crux of the law laid down in the said judgments is that merely because a building is old, does not imply that the same is unfit for human habitation unless there is cogent evidence on record. 12. The crux of the law laid down in the said judgments is that merely because a building is old, does not imply that the same is unfit for human habitation unless there is cogent evidence on record. 12. Lastly, it was contended that the petitioner did not testify before the Rent Controller and therefore, the matters which are in his personal knowledge, such as the condition of the building, could not be accepted to be correct on the testimony of any other person than the petitioner. Reliance was placed on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. 2004(10) J.T. 264. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents controverted the contentions of the petitioner 14. A reference has been made to the provisions of Registration Act. Prior to the amendment, Section 30 of the said Act empowered the Registrar of Delhi to receive and register any document referred to in Section 28 without regard to the situation in any part of India of the property to which the document relates. 15. The unamended Section 30 is extracted below :- “30. (1) Any Registrar may in his discretion receive and register any document which might be registered by any Sub- Registrar subordinate to him. (2) The Registrar of a district in which a Presidency towns is included and the Registrar of Delhi District may receive and register any document referred to in sec.28 without regard to the situation in any part of India of the property to which the document relates.” 16. The amendment restricting the power of the Registrar, Delhi was made in the year 2001, whereas the sale deed in question was registered prior thereto. Consequently, the plea of the petitioner that the sale deed registered on 19.2.1993 at Delhi pertaining to a property at Banga in District Nawanshehr was invalid, cannot be accepted. 17. Having observed so, it is thus necessary to traverse to the other aspects of the matter. Not much discussion is required as the law is well settled that after purchase of the property the subsequent owner steps into the shoes of the landlord and therefore, the petitioner cannot question the status of the respondents when they seek his ejectment on the ground of their being the landladies of the premises in question. 18. Not much discussion is required as the law is well settled that after purchase of the property the subsequent owner steps into the shoes of the landlord and therefore, the petitioner cannot question the status of the respondents when they seek his ejectment on the ground of their being the landladies of the premises in question. 18. The next question that is to be seen is as to whether the rent note is valid and relevant piece of document to be relied upon and whether in the wake of such a reliance, it can be said that the demised property was a vacant plot and that the petitioner raised construction thereon and that he was entitled to the Malba (debris) or not, to deny the respondents/landladies the ground of seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground of building being in a dilapidated condition. For the perusal of this Court the rent notes have been placed on record as Annexures P-1 and P-2. If the rent note which pertains to the year 1966 is perused then therein it has been mentioned - “roof of the house shall be constructed by wooden planks for adjusting the machinery which shall be taken out at the time of vacation of the shop. This Rent Deed has therefore been reduced into writing so that it may be used at the time of need.” 19. It is evident from a bare perusal of the rent note that even if such a rent note is admitted, it belies the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the building was constructed by him as the aforesaid extracted portion of the rent note shows the existence of a house wherein only the roof was constructed by the petitioner placing wooden planks. 20. Similarly, on the same parity of reasoning, Annexure P-2 contains the following stipulation :- “The roof, Balla etc. have been put by me - Tenant and even the half payment for the construction of the wall towards the eastern side have been made by me. The southern wall belongs to the landlord. The wall towards the northern side has been constructed by me. I shall take the Malba at the time of vacating the shop.” 21. have been put by me - Tenant and even the half payment for the construction of the wall towards the eastern side have been made by me. The southern wall belongs to the landlord. The wall towards the northern side has been constructed by me. I shall take the Malba at the time of vacating the shop.” 21. It is, therefore, evident that the building was already in existence and the roof had been put by the petitioner and some wall had also been constructed by him. But interestingly, these rent notes have not been proved on record. The courts below rightly rejected these documents as the respondents raised an objection that this document Ex.RW3/1 was not the original document and the writing dated 24.1.1970 did not reveal the signatures of any of the erstwhile landlords. Once the rent notes thus are disbelieved as not having been proved, then the remaining controversy regarding the building having been constructed by the petitioner, fades into insignificance. But as observed earlier, even if the same are admitted to be correct, they will still belie the contention of then petitioner. 22. The next question to be determined is as to whether the building is in a dilapidated condition or not. The respondent examined PW-4 Parmod Chander Bhardwaj who stated as under :- “The walls have been made with mud mortar, roof is laid with wooden battons, roof is katcha one, flooring is of bricks and is in damaged condition, the joints are naked and wide open. Wooden battons are fallen or in the process of falling.” 23. Even the witness produced by the petitioner to show that the building was fit for human habitation, deposed in cross-examination that in the site plan produced and prepared by him, the hind portion of the shop had fallen. He also deposed that 9 to 10 Ballas are missing in that portion of the shop and that the roof is a Katcha one and bricks used in the construction are the old ones and the construction cannot be said to be of first class category and that the walls are plastered with mud. 24. At the time of making these submissions, learned counsel for the respondents candidly admitted that the building had completely fallen down and that the Municipal Committee had issued a notice to them to remove the Malba in July, 2010. 24. At the time of making these submissions, learned counsel for the respondents candidly admitted that the building had completely fallen down and that the Municipal Committee had issued a notice to them to remove the Malba in July, 2010. This factual position could not be controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is thus, no hesitation to hold that the building is not fit for human habitation. The findings of facts recorded by the courts below do not warrant any interference in reversional jurisdiction, more so, when the evidence conclusively points to the condition of the building. 25. Lastly, it has been contended that since the landladies did not appear herself in the witness-box and did not examine herself, therefore, no credence can be given to her testimony, as also her pleadings. 26. I am not in agreement with the contention so raised for the reasons that the Attorney who has appeared on behalf of the landladies, is the husband of the respondent and in such an eventuality, a person who is so closely and intricately related to the landladies, cannot be expected to be not having the personal knowledge of the need of the landladies or not knowing the facts of the case. 27. Therefore, this contention is also rejected. 28. For the detailed reasons given above, Civil Revision No.3481 of 2010 is without any merit and the same is dismissed. The petitioner is ordered to be evicted from the premises in question. Civil Revisions No.3482 of 2010 and 3919 of 2010 are also thus dismissed. ------------------