Ashok Bhushan, J.;- Heard Sri V.M. Zaidi, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri S.M.G. Asghar, for the petitioners, Sri Anurag Khanna appearing for respondent No.4 and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. These two writ petitions, raising common question of facts and law, have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 3. The Writ Petition No.1952 of 2011 is treated as leading writ petition and for deciding the issues raised, it is sufficient to refer to the pleadings in the leading writ petition. 4. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the recovery certificate dated 26nd March, 2002/22nd July, 2010 sent by respondent No.4 to the Collector, Ghaziabad for recovery of an amount of Rs.5,43,57,761.68. A writ of mandamus has also been sought commanding the respondents not to make recovery of the amount in dispute from the petitioners and its guarantors by adopting coercive method. 5. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and by consent of the learned counsel for the parties, both the writ petitions are being finally decided. 6. Brief facts, which emerge from pleadings of the parties, are; petitioner No.1 is a registered company, which established its factory for manufacture of goods at district Ghaziabad. The company took loan from the respondent No.4 (Pickup, the Pradeshiya Industrial Investment Corporation Limited, U.P.) and other financial institutions. The company had approached the respondent No.4 for grant of term loan of Rs.4 crores for manufacture of flexible laminated packaging and co-excluded multilayer films in two phases. The loan of Rs.2,32,00,000/- was disbursed. The petitioner No.1 submitted an application before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as the B.I.F.R) under Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the 1985 Act). The reference was received in the Board on 6th December, 2001. The recovery certificate dated 26th March, 2002 was sent by the respondent No.4 to the Collector, Ghaziabad for recovery of an amount of Rs.5,43,57,761.68 from the guarantors of the loan, namely, Manish Goel (petitioner No.2), Piyush Goel son of S.C. Goel, Ritu Goel wife of Manish Goel, S.C. Goel son of late Raman Lal Goel and Vijay Goel wife of S.C. Goel. The petitioners' company was declared as sick unit under the 1985 Act. The petitioners' company was declared as sick unit under the 1985 Act. The I.D.B.I. was appointed as operating agency by order dated 25th August, 2005. Petitioners' case is that the proceedings before the B.I.F.R. are still pending. The Collector vide his endorsement dated 22nd July, 2010 forwarded the recovery certificate to Tahsildar, Ghaziabad for recovering the same as arrears of land revenue. The writ petition has been filed challenging the recovery certificate dated 26th March, 2002/22nd July, 2010. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of the writ petition, made following submissions:- (i) The recovery certificate issued for recovery under the provisions U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Act) is without jurisdiction since after the enforcement of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Act), the recovery of dues of a financial institution can be made only in accordance with the 1993 Act as Section 18 of the 1993 Act bars any other proceeding for recovery. (ii) The petitioners' company having been declared as sick unit under the 1985 Act, recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act are barred by virtue of Section 34 of the 1985 Act. The respondents being participating in the proceedings before the B.I.F.R. where the preparation of rehabilitation scheme is under process, the respondent No.4 has no jurisdiction to resort to recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act. (iii) The proceedings before the B.I.F.R. being pending, the recovery both against petitioner No.1, i.e., the company, as well as guarantors of the loan is barred. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and others reported in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2103, Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Gupta and another vs. The Collector, Kanpur Nagar and others reported in A.I.R. 2005 (Alld) 320 and judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Iqbal Naseer Usmani vs. Central Bank of India and others reported in JT 2006(1) SC 380 and M/s. A.P.T. Ispat Pvt. Ltd. vs. U.P. Small Industrial Corporation Ltd. and another reported in A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 2095. 9. 9. Sri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that the recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act are not barred in view of the fact that recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 2002 whereas the respondent No.4 was notified under the 1993 Act on 24th January, 2004 only. It is submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Jain vs. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Limited and others reported in (2004)6 S.C.C. 758 the recovery proceedings, which have been initiated under the 1972 Act before the date of notification of respondent No.4 under the 1993 Act can continue and are not barred by the 1993 Act. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondent No.4 on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in 18435 of 2009 (M/s Rafat Paper Mills Pvt. Limited and others vs. The Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Limited and others) decided on 22nd April, 2009. Sri Khanna further submits that petitioner No.2 and other guarantors are bound by there bond of guarantee in which it was clearly undertaken by the guarantors that any amount due from them to the Corporation shall be recoverable under the 1972 Act as arrears of land revenue and further it shall not be necessary for the Corporation to sue the Company/Borrower before suing guarantors for the amount due. Sri Khanna submits that in view of the pendency of proceedings before the B.I.F.R., the recovery against the industry concerned, i.e., petitioner No.1 is barred by Section 34 of the 1993 Act but the said bar is not applicable against the guarantors and the respondent No.4 can proceed to recover the amount from the guarantors in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Nath Agarwal and others vs. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and another reported in (2003)4 S.C.C. 305 . Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has further placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.28924 of 2005 (Man Mohal Goel vs. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd.) decided on 13th April, 2005 and further on the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of S.B.I. vs. Ind. Export (regd). Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has further placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.28924 of 2005 (Man Mohal Goel vs. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd.) decided on 13th April, 2005 and further on the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of S.B.I. vs. Ind. Export (regd). reported in 1992(3) S.C.C. 159 and Industrial Investment Bank of India Limited vs. Vishwanath Jhunjhunwala reported in 2009(9) SCC 478 . Reliance has also been placed on the Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No.15796 of 2010 (J.C. Deewan and others vs. State of U.P.) decided on 26th May, 2010. 10. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents, has adopted the submissions made by Sri Anurag Khanna and submitted that the recovery under the 1972 Act is not barred and there is no illegality in the recovery proceedings against the guarantors. 11. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 12. The first issue, which needs consideration, is as to whether the recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act can be resorted to in view of the provisions of 1993 Act. The judgment of the Apex Court relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners in M/s. Unique Butyle's case (supra) had occasion to consider the provisions of the 1993 Act in context of the provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 and U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972. Section 34 of the 1993 Act was interpreted by the Apex Court and it was laid down that jurisdiction of the Tribunal in regard to adjudication of dues of financial institution is exclusive and the 1972 Act does not find place in Sub-Section (2) of Section 34 of the 1993 Act, hence proceedings under the 1972 Act cannot be resorted to in view of the provisions of the 1993 Act. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment in M/s. Unique Butyle's case (supra):- "9. Section 34 of the Act consists of two parts. Sub- section (1) deals with the over-riding effect of the Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. Section 34 of the Act consists of two parts. Sub- section (1) deals with the over-riding effect of the Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. Sub-section (1) itself makes an exception as regards matters covered by sub-section (2). The U.P. Act is not mentioned therein. The mode of recovery of debt under the U.P. Act is not saved under the said provision i.e. sub- section (2) which is of considerable importance so far as the present case is concerned. Even a bare reading therein makes it clear that it is intended to be in addition to and not in derogation of certain statutes; one of which is the Financial Act. In other words, a Bank or Financial institution has the option or choice to proceed either under the Act or under the modes of recovery permissible under the Financial Act. To that extent, the High Court's conclusions quoted above were correct. Where the High Court went wrong is by holding that proceedings under the U.P. Act were permissible. U.P. Act deals with separate modes of recovery and such proceedings are not relatable to proceedings under the Financial Act." 13. The same view was taken by the Apex Court in M/s A.P.T. Ispat's case (supra) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the said case challenge was made to the recovery proceedings initiated under the 1972 Act for payment of goods which was received by the A.P.T. Private Limited. Payment of goods having not been made, the Corporation issued recovery certificate. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The judgment of the High Court was overruled. The Apex Court took the view that there was no financial assistance given by the Corporation in the facts of the aforesaid case. The dues do not relate to any financial assistance hence could not be recovered and further in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Unique Butyle's case (supra) after the 1993 Act recourse cannot be taken to the 1972 Act. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 15 and 18 of the said judgment:- "15. The dues do not relate to any financial assistance hence could not be recovered and further in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Unique Butyle's case (supra) after the 1993 Act recourse cannot be taken to the 1972 Act. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 15 and 18 of the said judgment:- "15. In the present case it is evident that the dues of which recovery is sought by the impugned certificates do not pertain to any loan, advance or grant given to the appellant or to any credit concerning any hire purchase of goods sold to the appellant by the Corporation under any agreement, express or implied. The dues do not relate to any financial assistance. 18. There is another point and though it was not raised before the High Court, we think proper to mention it since it is crucial to the proceeding under section 3 of the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972. In a decision by this court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 455 , it was held that after the coming into force of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, recourse cannot be taken for recovery of dues to the provisions of U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 because the U.P. Act does not find mention in section 34(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993." 14. Thus there cannot be any dispute to the proposition that in view of the provisions of the 1993 Act for recovery the provisions of the 1972 Act cannot be resorted to, but the distinguishing feature in the present case is the fact that in the present case the recovery proceedings were initiated by sending the recovery certificate by respondent No.4 dated 26th March, 2002 whereas respondent No.4 was notified under the 1993 Act on 24th January, 2004. Thus when the recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act were initiated the respondent No.4 was not notified under the 1993 Act and the 1993 Act was not applicable. The similar issue came for consideration in Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) in which case also the financial assistance was extended by the respondent No.4. Thus when the recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act were initiated the respondent No.4 was not notified under the 1993 Act and the 1993 Act was not applicable. The similar issue came for consideration in Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) in which case also the financial assistance was extended by the respondent No.4. The recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act were challenged by means of the writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed by the order dated 1.9.1997. The writ petitioner filed special leave petition in the Apex Court in which relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Unique Butyle's case (supra) it was submitted that after the 1993 Act the recovery proceedings cannot be initiated by PICUP under the 1972 Act. The said submission was considered and was rejected by the Apex Court laying down following in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said judgment:- "3. Mr. Mohta submitted that the Central Government has issued a Notification specifying 1st Respondent-Corporation as a Financial Institution within the meaning of the term as defined in Section 2(h) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Debt Recovery Act"). He submitted that such an Institution can only proceed in the manner laid down in the Debt Recovery Act. He submitted that it is not open to give a go-by to the provision of the Debt Recovery Act and use the machinery under the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the "U.P. Act"). For this reason the Notice is bad and requires to be quashed. In support of his submission, he relied upon the case in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. U. P. Financial Corporation & Ors. [ (2003) 2 SCC 455 ]. In this case, it has been held that a Financial Institution within the meaning of that term in the Debt Recovery Act cannot proceed under the U. P. Act. 4. This authority would have been binding upon us. However, in reply Mr. Bhalla pointed out that in respect of the 1st Respondent- Institution the Notification by the Central Government has only been issued on 24.01.2004, whereas the Recovery Certificate is of a much earlier date. He submitted that, therefore, in this case the proceedings under the U. P. Act are not barred. However, in reply Mr. Bhalla pointed out that in respect of the 1st Respondent- Institution the Notification by the Central Government has only been issued on 24.01.2004, whereas the Recovery Certificate is of a much earlier date. He submitted that, therefore, in this case the proceedings under the U. P. Act are not barred. He pointed out that under Section 31 of the Debt Recovery Act, it is only suit or proceeding pending before any Court, which stand transferred to the Tribunal established under that Act. In our view, Mr. Bhalla is right. As the action was initiated prior to the Notification being issued by the Central Government, the action would not be barred and would not stand transferred to the Tribunal." 15. Thus when the recovery proceedings have been initiated prior to notification of PICUP, the said proceedings could be continued even after the 1993 Act and the said proceedings cannot be held to be barred under the provisions of the 1993 Act. 16. Sri Zaidi has further submitted that, in fact, the recovery certificate, which was issued on 26th March, 2002, was not proceeded with on account of the objection raised by the petitioners that the matter is pending before the B.I.F.R. and the endorsement of the Collector on the recovery certificate on 22nd July, 2010 is initiation of fresh recovery proceedings, which is not permissible. 17. Copy of the recovery certificate has been filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition which indicates that on the same recovery certificate, which was issued on 26nd March, 2002, the Collector has made endorsement. The Collector has initially made endorsement on 22nd March, 2002 to the Tahsildar, Ghaziabad for recovery as arrears of land revenue and again endorsement was made on 22nd July, 2010 to the Tahsildar, Ghaziabad for recovery as arrears of land revenue. The recovery certificate dated 26th March, 2002 was not satisfied and the certificate remained pending and it has been only again directed to be implemented on 22nd July, 2010. The endorsement of the Collector dated 22nd March, 2010 cannot be said to be initiation of fresh recovery proceedings since recovery certificate is the same (dated 26th March, 2002) which was sent for recovery of Rs.5,43,57,761.68. The endorsement of the Collector dated 22nd March, 2010 cannot be said to be initiation of fresh recovery proceedings since recovery certificate is the same (dated 26th March, 2002) which was sent for recovery of Rs.5,43,57,761.68. Thus the endorsement of the District Magistrate on 22nd July, 2010 cannot be said to be initiation of fresh recovery proceedings and the recovery proceedings have to be treated to have been initiated by recovery certificate dated 26th March, 2002 itself when the Collector made earlier endorsement on 22nd March, 2002 to the Tahsildar, Ghaziabad. Thus from the above discussion, it is clear that although for a financial institution, which is covered under the 1993 Act no fresh recovery proceedings can be initiated under the 1972 Act after applicability of the 1993 Act, but recovery proceedings initiated before applicability of the 1993 Act by a financial institution can continue and shall not be barred in view of the clear pronouncement of the Apex Court in Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra). 18. The Full Bench of this Court in Suresh Chandra Gupta's case (supra) had occasion to consider the provisions of the 1972 Act, the 1993 Act and the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Considering Section 32-G of the State Financial Corporation, 1951 and the provisions of the 1972 Act, the Full Bench opined that there is no conflict between the recovery under Section 32-G of the 1951 and the 1972 Act. The Full Bench, however, after considering the provisions of the 1993 Act came to the conclusion that recovery proceedings can neither be initiated against the principal borrower nor against the guarantors under the 1972 Act and it can be initiated only under the 1993 Act. Following was laid down by the Full Bench in paragraph 19 of the said judgment:- "19. In the Unique Butyle case, the recovery was against the principal borrower. While deciding point-IV, we have held that recovery against the guarantor can be initiated under the 1993 Act. Same reasoning as applicable to the principal borrower will apply to a recovery against the guarantor. In view of the UniqueButyle case, recovery proceedings can neither be initiated against the principal borrower nor against the guarantor under the 1972 Act if the debt is more than 10 lakhs: recovery proceedings can only be initiated under the 1993 Act." 19. Same reasoning as applicable to the principal borrower will apply to a recovery against the guarantor. In view of the UniqueButyle case, recovery proceedings can neither be initiated against the principal borrower nor against the guarantor under the 1972 Act if the debt is more than 10 lakhs: recovery proceedings can only be initiated under the 1993 Act." 19. One of the questions, which was also framed for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Suresh Chandra Gupta's case (supra) was as to whether the Corporation was bound to exhaust its remedy under the 1951 Act before initiating recovery proceedings against the sureties/guarantors. The said question was not decided. 20. In the case before the Full Bench the loan was granted on 18th October, 1996. The Corporation issued notice on 23rd November, 2000 for recovery and possession was taken by the Corporation of the premises on 2nd March, 2001. The proceedings were initiated under the 1972 Act by issuing citation on 25th January, 2002, which was challenged. The Central Government had notified the State Financial Corporation by notification dated 28th March, 1995. Thus when the loan was sanctioned and proceedings were initiated by the State Financial Corporation for recovery under the 1972 Act, the Corporation had already been notified and in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Unique Butyle's case (supra), the proceedings under the 1972 Act were barred. The distinguishing fact of the present case with the case of Suresh Chandra Gupta is the fact that in the present case the recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 2002, i.e. before the respondent No.4 was notified under the 1993 Act. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition as laid down by the Full Bench in Suresh Chandra Gupta's case (supra), however, the said case is distinguishable in view of the fact that respondent No.4 was not notified under the 1993 Act when the recovery proceedings were initiated under the 1972 Act and the ratio of the judgment in Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) is fully attracted in facts of the present case. 21. The second and third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is based on the provisions of the 1985 Act. There is no dispute that petitioner No.1 has been declared as sick unit under the 1985 Act. 21. The second and third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is based on the provisions of the 1985 Act. There is no dispute that petitioner No.1 has been declared as sick unit under the 1985 Act. Under Section 22 of the 1985 Act, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie. Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act is quoted below:- "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." 22. The provisions of Section 22 of the 1985 Act qua the provisions of the 1972 Act were considered by the Apex Court in Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra). The Apex Court in the said judgment took the view that Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act prohibits recovery against the industrial company but there is no protection afforded to the guarantors against recovery proceedings under the U.P. Act. Following was laid down in paragraph 35 of the said judgment:- "35. The Apex Court in the said judgment took the view that Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act prohibits recovery against the industrial company but there is no protection afforded to the guarantors against recovery proceedings under the U.P. Act. Following was laid down in paragraph 35 of the said judgment:- "35. Finally, the phrase introduced by the 1994 amendment relates to the pre-decretal stage because recovery proceedings by way of execution is already covered under the first half of sub-section (1) of Section 22. If the procedure under the U.P. Act is covered under the word 'proceeding' in the first limb of Section 22(1) of SICA, which it is according to Maharashtra Tubes, it is not a 'suit' for recovery under the second limb of that Section. As rightly contended by learned counsel appearing for PICUP, the proceedings under the U.P. Act are really recovery proceedings within the meaning of the word 'proceeding' as defined in Maharashtra Tubes. Since Section 22(1) only prohibits recovery against the industrial company, there is no protection afforded to guarantors against recovery proceedings under the U.P. Act." 23. The Division Bench judgment relied by learned counsel for the respondents in M/s. Rafat Paper Mills' case (supra) of which one of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan) was a member, is fully applicable in the facts of the present case. In the said case recovery citation was issued in the year 1998 which was challenged in the writ petition and due to interim order the recovery could not be proceeded with. Subsequently the said recovery proceedings were reactivated in the year 2009 which were challenged on the ground that after the 1993 Act the recovery proceedings cannot be initiated under the 1972 Act. The same submissions were pressed before the Division Bench which have been submitted in the present case. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition holding the recovery permissible under the 1972 Act since it was initiated prior to notification of PICUP under the 1993 Act. The ratio of Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) was followed. Following was laid down by the Division Bench in the said judgment:- "From the above pronouncement, it is clear that what has been laid down is that if the action was initiated prior to the notification dated 24.1.2004, the action could not be barred and could not be transferred to the Tribunal. Following was laid down by the Division Bench in the said judgment:- "From the above pronouncement, it is clear that what has been laid down is that if the action was initiated prior to the notification dated 24.1.2004, the action could not be barred and could not be transferred to the Tribunal. In the present case the action was initiated in the year 2000, which could not be proceeded with against the guarantors due to interim order of the High Court and respondent No.1 has requested the respondent to proceed with the recovery and further informs that the amount which was earlier mentioned in the certificate has increased upto amount of Rs.13 crores and odd, as such action initiated by the letter dated 5.3.2009 cannot be said to be initiation of any fresh action. The increase of the amount was consequence of passage of time which cannot change the nature of the action which remains same and by virtue of para 4 of the judgment, such action cannot be said to be barred. The judgment of P.K. Jain (supra) fully support the contention of learned counsel for the respondents and the submission of petitioners that action is barred cannot be accepted....." 24. The Division Bench judgment in J.C. Dewan's case (supra) also fully supports the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. The Division Bench followed Kailash Nath Agarwal's case and held that recovery against the guarantors is not prohibited. Following was laid down by the Division Bench in the said judgment:- "Submission is that the liability of the guarantor and the borrower being co-extensive, complaint by petitioners is totally misconceived. Lastly, it is submitted that in respect to the recovery citation, issued against similar class of petitioners of a private limited company by interpreting the personal guarantee deed about which, there is no dispute, a Bench of this Court by placing reliance on various decision given by the Apex Court dismissed the writ petition. Reference has been placed on the decision given by this Court in the case of Om Hari Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. Reported in 2006(7) ADJ 390 (DB). Reference has been placed on the decision given by this Court in the case of Om Hari Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. Reported in 2006(7) ADJ 390 (DB). On perusal of the judgment given by this Court in the case of Om Hari Agarwal (supra), it is clear that this was the specific argument from the side of respondents that in view of execution of guarantee deed between the petitioners and the Corporation, it was open for the respondents to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue against the guarantors of the loan. In fact, petitioners agreed and gave an undertaking in respect to the payment of loan amount and thus the guarantee given by the petitioners will have to be accepted to be enforceable, notwithstanding that any action has been taken by the Corporation against the Company/borrower or not. In view of guarantee deed so executed, the title deed of the immovable property of the petitioners so agreed to be proceeded may not be in a position of being objected as and when, now it is being proceeded. In respect to the aspect that guarantors do not have any protection so far as proceeding of BIFR is concerned, reference was given to the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Nath Agrawal reported in 2003(4) SCC 305 ." 25. One more aspect of the case need to be noticed. In Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra), the Apex Court observed that action against guarantors cannot be taken until the property of the principle debtor is first sold off. Following was laid down in paragraph 8 of the judgment:- "8. In our view, the above-set-out provisions of the U.P. Act are very clear. Action against the guarantor cannot be taken until the property of the principal debtor is first sold off. As the appellant has not sold the property of the principal debtor, the action against the appellant cannot be sustained. We, therefore, set aside the recovery notice." 26. It is relevant to note that in Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra), which is a judgment of coordinate Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court, this very issue as to whether in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the 1985 Act recovery proceedings under the 1972 Act can be proceeded against the guarantor was examined and decided. In paragraph 35 of the judgment in Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra), as quoted above, it was held that Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act prohibits recovery only against the industrial company and there is no protection afforded to the guarantors against the recovery proceeding. The judgment in Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra) was delivered on 14th February, 2003 whereas the judgment in Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) was subsequent in point of time delivered on 11th August, 2004, but has not noticed the judgment of Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra). It is further to be noticed that two Benches of the Apex Court consisting of two Hon'ble Judges have expressed doubt over the above proposition laid down in Pawan Kumar Jain's case and have referred it for consideration by a larger Bench. The correctness of the decision of the Pawan Kumar Jain's case has been doubted by two Judge Bench in S.L.P. (C) No.14065 of 2006 (Sobran Singh vs. State of U.P. and others) where following observations were made:- "This Court in Pawan Kumar Jain (spra) did not consider the effect of Section 3(1)(D) of the Act. Under the general law, namely, Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, the liability of a borrower and that of the guarantor is co-extensive. In our opinion if the State had intended to make any provision contrary or inconsistent with the said general provision it should have specifically been so stated in the Act. Furthermore, Section 4(2)(b) is an exception to Section 3 thereof. General power of recovery of dues as arrears of land revenues is provided for in Section 3. Section 4(2)(b), however, in our opinion speaks of a situation where the defaulter's immovable property is mortgaged, charged or otherwise encumbered and only in that event the same is required to be sold first and only in the event the entire amount is not recovered thereby any other proceeding may be initiated thereafter subject to the conditions laid down therein. We may, however, note that Section 4(2)(b) of the Act covers the case of a defaulter and not that of a guarantor. Even otherwise, ordinarily the property of a guarantor would not be subjected to any mortgage, charge, pledge or other encumbrance. We may, however, note that Section 4(2)(b) of the Act covers the case of a defaulter and not that of a guarantor. Even otherwise, ordinarily the property of a guarantor would not be subjected to any mortgage, charge, pledge or other encumbrance. Section 4(2)(b) of the Act, therefore, being an exception to the general provision, namely, Section 3 thereof, we are of the opinion that it may not be correct to hold that a guarantor is also covered by the said provision. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the ratio in Pawan Kumar Jain (supra) case may ultimately be found not to be correct. As we doubt the correctness of the said decision, we are of the opinion that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench. We direct accordingly." 27. Subsequently another two Judge Bench in S.L.P. (C) No.9692 of 2005 (R.K. Dewan (Dead) by Lrs & others vs. State of U.P. and others) by order dated 4th January, 2008 referred the judgment of Pawan Kumar Jain's case (supra) for consideration by Larger Bench. 28. In view of the above discussions, following the judgment of the Apex Court in Kailash Nath Agarwal's case (supra), it is clear that the recovery against the guarantor is not prohibited by Section 22(1) of the 1985 although recovery against the industry concerned is prohibited by virtue of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act. From a perusal of the recovery certificate (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), it is clear that recovery certificate has not been issued against petitioner No.1, rather recovery certificate has been issued against the guarantors, who have given personal guarantee, which fact is mentioned in paragraph 5 of the recovery certificate. 29. In view of the foregoing discussions, none of the submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners can be accepted. The recovery proceedings, which were initiated by recovery certificate dated 26th March, 2002 against guarantors only, are not barred and there is no error in the recovery proceedings. 30. Both the writ petitions lack merit and are dismissed.