Sir S. K. Ghose, J. 1. The appeal before the Board arises out of a suit to pre-empt a sale of land which originally belonged to one Satar Gadoo. The case made in the plaint is that the plaintiff is a collateral of Satar Gadoo while the defendant No. 2 Ahmad Rishi is a Pisar Parwarda or adopted son of Satar Gadoo. He executed a deed of sale in respect of the property in favour of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff's case is that he being of the same caste and a collateral has got a preferential right to pre-empt against the defendant No. 1. The defence, according to the written statement, is that the plaintiff has no right of prior purchase as claimed by him. Certain ether pleas where raised in defence. The trial Court of the Second Additional Munsiff Srinagar struck various issues and after trial dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had not proved that he was the presumptive heir of the vendor. On appeal the senior Subordinate Judge remanded the case to the trial Court under Order 41, rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court again dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had not proved that he was the presumptive heir. On appeal the senior Subordinate Judge again remanded the suit to the trial Court calling for a report on the following issues framed by him: - "(1) Was the sale price of Rs. 300 as mentioned in the sale deed dated 4th Baisakh 1993, fixed in good faith or paid? O. P. On defendant No. 1. (2) If issue No. I is not decided in favour of the defendant what is the market value of the property in dispute? O. P. on parties. (3) Is the defendant entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 240 spent by him in having the land over and above the sale price paid by him ? O. P. on defendant No. 1. (4) Has the defendant No. 1 acquired the status of a co-sharer with defendant No. 2. pendente lite and how does this matter affect the decision of the present suit ? O. P. on defendant No. 1. (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to succeed as heir to Ahmad Rishi the adopted son of Satar Gadoo? (4) Has the defendant No. 1 acquired the status of a co-sharer with defendant No. 2. pendente lite and how does this matter affect the decision of the present suit ? O. P. on defendant No. 1. (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to succeed as heir to Ahmad Rishi the adopted son of Satar Gadoo? Is there a well recognized custom prevailing among the parties by virtue of which the adopted son is considered to have the same status as that of a natural son so far as the question of inheritance to the property of the adoptive father inherited by him are concerned. O. P. on plaintiff." 2. After considering the report in due course the senior Subordinate Judge held in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. - The defendant vendee appealed to the High Court which held that the Court below had rightly decreed the plaintiff's claim. The present appeal is by the defendant vendee. 3. The point which is argued before the Board is comprised in issue No. 5 as mentioned above. The findings on the other issues are not challenged before the Board. 4. The plaintiff's case is based on clause (a) of section 14 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, 1993. On the ground of being a collateral of Satar Gadoo he claims to be entitled to inherit the land on the death of the vendor Ahmad Rishi. At the trial there was some confusion as to the points at issue. The fact that Ahmad Rishi had been adopted by Satar Gadoo appears to have been challenged, though Ahmad Rishi is described in the plaint as Pisar Parwarda of Satar Gadoo. However, it may not be taken to be admitted or proved that in fact Satar Gadoo had adopted Ahmad Rishi. The parties are Kashmiri Mohammadans and the ordinary Mohammadan Law does not recognize adoption. It is not disputed, however, that in this case the ordinary Mohammadan law has been varied by a custom of adoption. To this extent custom is admitted. The plaintiff's case, further, is that according to the custom applicable to this case the properties of the adoptive father would devolve on the death of the adopted son if he should die childless not on the latter's heirs, but on the collaterals of the former. To this extent custom is admitted. The plaintiff's case, further, is that according to the custom applicable to this case the properties of the adoptive father would devolve on the death of the adopted son if he should die childless not on the latter's heirs, but on the collaterals of the former. Therefore the plaintiff being a collateral of Satar Gadoo would be entitled, on the death of Ahmad Rishi, to inherit the property sold. The defence also pleads custom but according to the defence case the custom is that the adopted son would inherit the property of the adoptive father as his natural son and therefore succession would devolve, after the death of the adopted son, on his heirs and not on the collaterals of the adoptive father. This is the real question in dispute between the parties. It is not, however specifically stated in the pleadings which suffer from the common defect of being vague and badly drafted. In this case the result of this initial defect has been to confuse the issues and prolong the litigation. The question in dispute, as stated above, emerged in the course of the hearing. It was noticed by the senior Subordinate Judge, Pt. Ram Nath Sharma. In his judgment dated 15th Maghar 1999 he stated as follows:- "We have to determine as to whether an adopted son among Mohammadans adopts the paternity of his adoptive father for purposes of succession or not. There is no doubt that the Mohammedan Law does not recognize adoption as a mode of filiations. But we have to see as to whether an adopted son taken in adoption according to a well recognized custom by a Mohammadan leaves the maternity and paternity of his natural parents and adopts the maternity and paternity of the adoptive parents or not. For this purpose we may have to examine the custom of adoption among the Mohammadans in all its bearings." 5. To that end he formulated, for further hearing, the issues as stated above so far so good. 6. At the subsequent hearing, however, there seems to have been again some confusion as to how the parties were to prove the alleged custom one way or the other. After remand the matter was heard by another Subordinate Judge, Ft. Munna lal Sharma. 6. At the subsequent hearing, however, there seems to have been again some confusion as to how the parties were to prove the alleged custom one way or the other. After remand the matter was heard by another Subordinate Judge, Ft. Munna lal Sharma. His judgment dealing with the question of custom is rather obscure and his references to two books, one by Pt. Nil Kanth and the other by Pt. Sant Ram Dogra, have not been verified at the Bar as being correct. The Board has the impression that the point at issue has not been satisfactorily dealt with. Before the High Court the difficulty which was caused by the initial vagueness of the pleadings was again apparent. Referring to the argument that by customary law applicable to the case "the heirs of the adoptive family would not succeed to the adoptee but the heirs of the natural father of the adopted son would succeed to his property," the High Court remarked that it was "not a plea taken by the vendee in his written statement." It is true that the pleadings are not explicit on this point but the plaintiff's right of prior purchase is expressly denied in the written statement. The High Court further remarks that the plaintiff is admittedly the first cousin of Ahmad Rishi. It is conceded by the Bar before the Board that this would be begging the question. 7. As mentioned already, in this case so far is common ground that the ordinary Mohammadan Law has been varied by a custom of adoption. But the other incidents of succession as following from adoption do not necessarily follow, nor are they admitted. Even in Hindu Law the law of succession is not uniform in the case of adoption in all the schools. For instance there are material differences in the incidents of adoption in the case of Dattaka and Kritrima forms of adoption. There are differences also in the rules of succession in the schools prevailing in different provinces. In the Punjab, for instance, special law of succession in case of adoption is brought out in case 1922 Lahore 433. In Kashmir differences are said to occur as amongst different tribes, families and localities. The general principle is that the ordinary law regulates everything beyond custom. In the Punjab, for instance, special law of succession in case of adoption is brought out in case 1922 Lahore 433. In Kashmir differences are said to occur as amongst different tribes, families and localities. The general principle is that the ordinary law regulates everything beyond custom. Not only each custom but each alleged separate incident of a custom must be proved to exist as customary law. Every separate departure from the ordinary law has to be supported by evidence of a binding custom; I. L. R. 29 Calcutta 828. See also 3 I. C. 207. 8. It seems to the Board that the point which is comprised in issue No. 5 mentioned above and which is the real point in dispute now, has not been satisfactorily dealt with. It is regrettable in view of the remands already had but the Board is of the opinion that in the interests of justice another opportunity should be given to the parties to adduce additional evidence, if they so choose, to prove the custom and its incidents of succession according to the principles mentioned. For the sake of clarity the issue No. 5 may be re-stated thus:- " (a) Is the plaintiff entitled to succeed as heir to Ahmad Rishi, the adopted son of Satar Gadoo ? The onus is primarily on the plaintiff, (b) Is there a family or tribal custom applicable to the parties by virtue of which an adopted son has the same status as a natural son in the matter of inheritance to the property inherited by him from the adoptive father? The onus is primarily on the defendants." 9. These issvies will be remanded to the senior Subordinate Judge Srinagar, who will in his discretion give a resasonable opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. The senior Subordinate Judge will then proceed to try the issues and submit the evidence with his findings thereon and reasons therefore to the High Court. The High Court will then submit the record with its opinion to this Board for the further hearing of the appeal.