JUDGMENT V. GOPALA GOWDA, C.J. — This appeal is directed against he order dated 20.6.2005 passed in OJC No.5059 of 1996 affirming the award dated 31.10.1995 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.46 of 1987 urging various grounds for setting aside the impugned order and quash the award and to pass such other order/orders as may be deemed fit in the facts of this case. 2.The required brief facts are stated for the purpose of appreciating rival legal contentions urged in this appeal with a view to find out as to (i) whether the impugned order in affirming the award is vitiated on account of erroneous finding or error in law which constitute substantial question of law? (ii) Whether non consideration of the relevant legal aspect namely, the order of retrenchment passed against the appellant is an admitted fact, but the post being abolished is not a fact, and for that reason the order of termination is not in conformity with the provisions of Section 25F read with 25G of Industrial Disputes Act and thereby the order is vitiated in law ? 3.The appellant had worked in the Respondent-2 Management for a period of nineteen years in the post of Advertisement Manager. Accordingly to him, his nature of work was mostly clerical and supervisory and his monthly salary was Rs.1472.80 paise at the time of termination on 6.11.1986. Therefore, he has pleaded that he is covered under the definition of Section 2(s) ‘workman’ of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called ‘I.D. Act’). 4.Further case of the appellant is that when he was continuing as an Advertisement Manager in the Respondent-Management, Sri Basanta Kumar Biswal joined the management as Working Chairman. At his instance, many new employees were appointed by the management. One Amitabh Swain joined in the Advertisement Section as an Advertisement Executive. Subsequently, the management took away from the appellant important jobs slowly and steadily, so that he would be forced to leave the service as he did not toe the line of Sri Biswal. It is further pleaded that by order dated 3.3.1986, some of the material jobs of the appellant were handed over to the said Amitabh Swain. The said document is marked as Ext.F before the Labour Court. It is further pleaded that by order dated 3.3.1986, some of the material jobs of the appellant were handed over to the said Amitabh Swain. The said document is marked as Ext.F before the Labour Court. Being deprived of such powers of him, as per the aforesaid order, he left with only supervisory function and no managerial powers or duties was with him. The appellant applied for one week’s ESI Leave from 4.11.1986 on the advice of E.S.I. doctor. While he was on sick leave on 7.11.1986, to his utter surprise, he received an order of termination on 6.11.1986 on the ground of abolition of the post of Advertisement Manager. He was paid one month’s notice pay and retrenchment compensation as per the provisions of the I.D. Act, 1947. It is the further case that after his retrenchment, Sri Amitabh Swain continued to perform the duties of the appellant. 5.The appellant being aggrieved by the illegal and unjustified termination of the appellant from the service, raised the Industrial Dispute. On account of the failure of the conciliation proceeding, the State Government being the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar for adjudication. The order of reference reads thus:- “Whether the termination of the services of Sri Kedareswar Mohapatra by the management of M/s. Prajatantra Prachar Samity with effect from 6.11.1986 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief Sri Mohapatra is entitled?” 6.A case was registered as I.D. Case No.46 of 1987 before the Labour Court. Parties have filed their claim statement and written statement respectively. 7.The appellant has examined himself as witness no.1. On behalf of the management, two witnesses were examined and several documents were produced by the parties as Exhibits. On 29.10.1992, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court passed the award holding that status of the appellant was that of a ‘workman’ and his termination amounts to retrenchment, but without appreciating the facts on record held that the termination of the services of the appellant was legal and justified. However, the Labour Court directed the management to pay the balance retrenchment compensation and full back wages from the date of termination till the date of reference only at the admissible rate. 8.Aggrieved by the said award, both the appellant and the Respondent No.2 Management filed OJC No.2368 of 993 and 1161 of 1993 respectively challenging the very same award urging various grounds. 8.Aggrieved by the said award, both the appellant and the Respondent No.2 Management filed OJC No.2368 of 993 and 1161 of 1993 respectively challenging the very same award urging various grounds. Both the matters were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 28.3.1995 passed by this Court by setting aside the award impugned in the said writ petition and remanding the matter to the Labour Court for re-disposal of the same after hearing the matter afresh on existing materials on record. 9.In pursuance of the remand order and direction of this Court, both the parties appeared before the Labour Court and made their factual and legal submissions. The Labour Court has passed the award dated 21.10.1995 by holding that the appellant is not a ‘workman’ and accordingly refused to extend the benefits to him under the I.D. Act. It is the case of the appellant that a bare perusal of the award reveals that the Labour Court was swayed away by the designation of the appellant alone, ignored and failed to appreciate the legal evidence on record and acted contrary to the intendment of the judgment of this Court dated 28.3.1995 in remanding the case to it. 10.It is the further case of the appellant that the findings on the terms of reference in the impugned award passed by the Labour Court was not only perverse, but also contrary to the intent of the judgment of this Court. Therefore, he approached this Court by filing OJC No.5059 of 1996 urging various tenable and legal contentions. In support of his contention it is stated that the findings of the Labour Court on the terms of reference are not only erroneous but suffers from error in law. Further the appellant has pointed out about the erroneous approach of the learned Labour Court in considering the irrelevant and non-existing materials and also non-consideration of specific and important materials available on record in favour of the appellant and helpful for deciding the lis. The second respondent appeared in the case and filed its counter affidavit to which rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the appellant. 11.The following grounds are urged by the learned counsel Mr. Mishra appearing on behalf of the appellant. The second respondent appeared in the case and filed its counter affidavit to which rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the appellant. 11.The following grounds are urged by the learned counsel Mr. Mishra appearing on behalf of the appellant. Both the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge have not accepted the well settled legal position that the nature of duties performed by an employee are relevant to determine his/her status as workman, but not his designation as workman under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. In the earlier writ petition, this Court while disposing of the writ petition remanded the matter to the Labour Court for re-appraisal of the facts after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Maini Vrs. M/s. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 1994-II LLJ 1153, wherein the Supreme Court has held that designation of the employee is not of much importance and what is important is the nature of duties. The determinative factor is the main duties and not some work incidentally done by an employee. It is the contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel that the learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration the erroneous findings on the basis of non-existing material evidence against the appellant regarding the duties mainly performed by the appellant. Learned Presiding Officer has dealt upon some parts of the duties of the appellant related to a period beyond twelve years prior to his retrenchment and also failed to exercise judicial mind to render justice to the appellant. Another legal submission is that while questioning the correctness of the finding of the award before this Court, the appellant has pointed out specific irregularities committed by the Labour Court invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court pointing out such apparent incongruities and perversities in the award. Learned Single Judge has not considered such vital aspects and appears to have been swayed away by the designation held by the appellant as Advertisement Manager and has completely failed to look into the nature and performance of duties mainly discharged by the appellant at the time of impugned termination. Learned Single Judge has manifestly erred in law in negativing the contention of the appellant that he is a ‘workman’ which is contrary to the decision of the Apex Court and also the specific directive of this Court. Learned Single Judge has manifestly erred in law in negativing the contention of the appellant that he is a ‘workman’ which is contrary to the decision of the Apex Court and also the specific directive of this Court. Therefore, he has prayed for to set aside the impugned order. 12.Learned counsel for the appellant has also pointed out with reference to paras 11 to 14 of the order of the learned Single Judge in which he had discussed as to how the appellant is not a workman in holding that there is no error in the finding of the Labour Court on the term of reference. Learned Single Judge while holding that appellant is not a workman as per Section 2(s) has extracted the definition of the said provision and taken into consideration only a fraction of the statement in chief of the appellant and Annexure-1, besides considering an extraneous material, i.e. the Wage Board Award and approved the finding as held by the Labour Court that the employee was not a workman and further erred in holding that the Labour Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction nor there is any error of law apparent on the face of the award, so as to interfere with the award. The said finding and reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the impugned order has been on the fact that the appellant being designated as Advertisement Manager all through his tenure, he cannot be anything else than a Departmental Manager and as such, it is concluded that he discharged the managerial functions. Further he has not made reference to Annexure-1, which has not at all been considered and the effect of the earlier judgment of this Court has not been considered at all. Therefore, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in law. The impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Single Judge on the basis that the appellant is not a workman on the erroneous comprehension that the appellant was appointed and terminated while holding the post of Advertisement Manager notwithstanding the innumerable evidence both oral and documentary in the case to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant has not discharged the managerial function. The said observation has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge on the basis that the appellant had failed to produce any material to come under the four exceptions as per Section 2(s) of I.D. Act. However, repeated reference has been made by the appellant to the oral and documentary evidence on record to show that the functions discharged by him were supervisory in nature and he was drawing admittedly less than Rs.1600/- per month. In view of this undisputed fact, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the appellant is not a workman is a blatant error and deserves to be set aside. 13.The other ground urged is that the learned Single Judge has erroneously taken into consideration the Wage Board Award wherein the appellant was included in Group-II of the administrative staff being a Departmental Manager for which it has been concluded that he discharged the managerial functions. Such finding is patently based on perverse consideration of the Wage Board Award and is totally extraneous to the oral and documentary evidence on record and as such, the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction under certiorari powers to traverse the same while deciding the matter. Even if such Wage Board Award not being a matter of lower Court records was taken into account, the co-employee of the appellant namely, Sri Artatran Buxi, Recovery Manager being also a Departmental Manager was construed to be a ‘workman’ by the management as also by the Labour Court. Therefore, the finding and observation in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is wholly irrational and discriminatory. 14.Learned Single Judge has not discussed that the admitted act of termination of the appellant as per the management amounted to retrenchment and notice pay and retrenchment compensation as per their calculation under the I.D. Act had been remitted to the appellant. Learned Single Judge has not noticed that the respondent-employer has been adopting the principle of blowing hot and cold or approbation or reprobation. Therefore, the impugned judgment rendered is bad in law. 15.Another ground of challenge to the correctness of the finding that the appellant is not a workman is on the basis that the Labour Court has considered the following materials and arrived at a finding that he is not a workman. Therefore, the impugned judgment rendered is bad in law. 15.Another ground of challenge to the correctness of the finding that the appellant is not a workman is on the basis that the Labour Court has considered the following materials and arrived at a finding that he is not a workman. Reliance placed upon the said materials is fraught with incurable illegalities and jurisdictional improprieties as briefly indicated below:- (i)Most of the above materials taken into consideration are stale and old material having no life nor nexus with the time, when the services of the appellant were terminated. (ii)Out of the said materials, the following are manifestly error of record. (a)There is no document as Ext.C dated 18.6.68 indicating that the appellant was in charge of Recovery Section and that the employees therein were under this contract. (b)Ext.7 dated 18.4.73 nowhere reveals that the appellant was an independent officer in-charge of the administration of Advertisement Department. (c)Exts. 8 to 10 relate to communication by the appellant as Recovery Manager with regard to disciplinary matters and not as Advertisement Manager. However, the relevant oral evidence of M.W.2 discloses that the appellant had no such independent powers, except to comply with the orders of his higher authorities, such as Chairman, Managing Trusty etc. (d)Exts. 12 and 13 relate to long past and have the same consequences as at Ext.1 to 11 in respect of powers of the appellant. (e)Exts. 14 and 15 never disclosed that the appellant issued warning to Jadu Sahu for remaining on leave. On the contrary, the said Exhibits are leave application forms, which have been finally considered by the Working Chairman. (f)Exts. 20 and 20/a relate to 11.3.90 and 30.12.89 respectively and are release orders of one advertising agency. The same are no way connected with the duties of the appellant, since he had been illegally and unjustly retrenched w.e.f. 6.11.86. (g)Exts.16 is an explanation of the Peon but it no where suggests that the appellant sanctioned his leave application. (h)Exts.17 and 17/b no where reveal that the appellant sanctioned leave application of subordinate employees. On the contrary, such leave was granted either by the Working Chairman or General Manager. (i)Under Ext.18, the allotment of duties to an employee on leave vacancy was only recommended by the appellant for being allowed by his higher authorities. (h)Exts.17 and 17/b no where reveal that the appellant sanctioned leave application of subordinate employees. On the contrary, such leave was granted either by the Working Chairman or General Manager. (i)Under Ext.18, the allotment of duties to an employee on leave vacancy was only recommended by the appellant for being allowed by his higher authorities. (j)Ext.19 to 19/p and 22, 22/f, 22/g, 22/h series relate to signing of contract by the appellant prior to 3.3.86. The said duties were performed by Sri Amitav Swain thereafter till the retrenchment of the appellant Ext.22/a to 22/c are Xerox copies of Exts.19 to 19/b. Ext.22/j is not a rate contract document signed by the appellant but a Xerox copy of Ext.18/a. (k)M.W.1 and M.W.2 in cross examination have stated that the appellant had never attended to the duties of publishing text of advertisement, signing of contract and fixing rate of advertisement after issuance of the order dated 3.3.86 (Annexure-1). The said duties thereafter used to be performed by Sri Amitav Swain and his duties admittedly were clerical and supervisory. (l)There is no term as non-working journalist in the Working Journalist and Other News Paper Employees (Conditions of Services and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. On the contrary, the appellant and other employees designated as Department Manager were covered under different Wage Board awards as other Non-Journalist Newspaper employees. 16.It is further contended that non-consideration of the aforesaid materials both oral and documentary which is a serious error of law committed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court which has been concurred by the learned Single Judge has prejudiced the case of the appellant as documentary evidence Exts. A to E discloses the arrangement and policy decision taken by the Managing Trustee and the appellant had no such power in respect of the Advertisement Section. Ext.F is the most important office order dated 3.3.1986 issued by the Managing Trustee which is very relevant in support of the case of the appellant relating to allocation of duties between the appellant and Sri Amitav Swain. Ext.G is the advertisement published in the ‘Prajatantra’ dated 24.12.1988 showing the management’s intention to continue the post of Advertising Manager which clearly shows that the reason for termination on the ground that such post is abolished is non-existing fact. Ext.4 is the order of termination of the appellant showing payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay at the time of such termination. Ext.4 is the order of termination of the appellant showing payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay at the time of such termination. Exts. Y and Y/1 are respectively the memorandum of settlement and the award in I.D. Case No.50 of 1987 relating to Sri Artatrana Buxi, wherein the Recovery Manager was accepted as a workman. Further the uncontroverted oral evidence of W.W.1 and the relevant cross-examination of M.W.1 and M.W.2 have also been lost sight of by the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge. 17.It is further contended that had the aforesaid material piece of evidence placed before the Labour Court been considered by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, its finding would have been changed for the reason that Annexures 4 and 4/1 reveal that the post of Recovery Manager has been accepted by the Management as workman’s post. 18.This Court in its earlier writ petition referred to supra while remanding the case to the Labour Court directed it to re-examine the matter by taking into consideration the evidence of M.W.1 and Exts.6 to 10 specifically from the side of the management and several provisions of Industrial Disputes Act as contended by the appellant. Learned Presiding Officer completely misdirected himself in overlooking the said direction of this Court and passed an award on surmises and conjectures. Besides on a thorough misreading of the deposition and documents on record, learned Single Judge has erred materially by making a solitary but incorrect observation that there is no case for interference in the award as it is not irrational or perverse. Therefore, the impugned judgment required interference. 19.Learned counsel for the respondent-employer sought to justify the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge placing strong reliance upon the finding and reasons recorded at paras 11 to 14 of the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge in exercise of judicial review power has concurred with the findings of learned Presiding Officer in answering to term of reference against the appellant and further declining to quash the award impugned in the writ petition as the nature of duties performed by the appellant does not come under the exception of Clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as he was designated as the Advertising Manager. The Labour Court on appreciation of evidence on record in exercise of its original jurisdiction has arrived at and recorded a finding that appellant is not a workman. Further, he has contended that on the basis of the pleadings learned Single Judge has rightly made observation at para-14. That apart, from the pleadings, the status, position, pay-scale, etc. of the appellant had been determined as that of a Departmental manager coming under Group-II of the administrative staff. Since the Advertisement Managers as per the Wage Board Award are held to be Departmental Managers, it can be safely concluded that they discharge managerial functions. The power of the learned single Judge in the matter of interference with the award of the Tribunal has been well settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court. It is no more res integra that this Court merely exercises supervisory jurisdiction over an inferior tribunal and can interfere with the award of an Industrial Tribunal when it comes to the conclusion that the said Tribunal has committed any error of jurisdiction or error of law apparent on the face of the award which vitiates the ultimate conclusion by taking inadmissible evidence into consideration or by ignoring the material evidence. Learned Single Judge cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record and come to the conclusion to interfere with the finding arrived at by the Labour Court. Therefore, he submitted that it is not a fit case for interference. He has placed reliance in support of its submission at paragraph 13 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya & Ors. Vrs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Ors., reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 . Further on the principle of estoppel, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank Vrs. Neelam, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 91 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mahammed Saud & Ors. Vs. Dr. (Maj) Shaikh Mahfooz & Anr., reported in 2008 (II) OLR (FB) 725 to contend that the appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge is not maintainable. Therefore, he contends that the appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Vs. Dr. (Maj) Shaikh Mahfooz & Anr., reported in 2008 (II) OLR (FB) 725 to contend that the appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge is not maintainable. Therefore, he contends that the appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 20.Considering the rival legal contentions, the following substantial questions of law would arise for consideration : (i) whether the appeal against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 2008 (II) OLR 725 is maintainable? (ii) Whether the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge in holding that appellant being a Advertising Manager, does not come within the exception clause nos. I to IV of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act is an erroneous finding or error in law which would constitute substantial question of law in this appeal required to be answered in favour of the appellant? What order? 21.The first point is required to be answered in favour of the appellant in view of the decision of the Full Bench wherein it has considered the provisions of the Rules of the Orissa High Court and also the decision of the Supreme Court and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to supra, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is appealable before this Court. Hence this position has been stated at paragraph 47 of the judgment which reads thus:- “47. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties patiently, noted the citations carefully, perused the materials meticulously and considered the submissions pragmatically and for the discussions made above, we have arrived at the following conclusions: (1)After Introduction of Section 100-A in the Code of Civil Procedure by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against a judgment/order/decree passed by a learned Single Judge of a High Court. (2)The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Birat Ch. Dagra case (supra) has not laid down the correct position of law. On the other hand, the conclusions arrived at by Division Benches of this Court in V.N.N. Panicker and Ramesh Ch. Das cases (supra) are held to be good law and are confirmed. (2)The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Birat Ch. Dagra case (supra) has not laid down the correct position of law. On the other hand, the conclusions arrived at by Division Benches of this Court in V.N.N. Panicker and Ramesh Ch. Das cases (supra) are held to be good law and are confirmed. (3)A writ appeal shall lie against the judgment/orders passed by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a Writ Appeal will lie, whereas no Writ Appeal will lie against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge exercising powers of Superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. (4)No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against judgment/order passed by a learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of Special Acts. Accordingly, the first point is answered in favour of the appellant holding that the appeal is maintainable against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 22.The second point is also required to be answered in favour of the appellant for the following reasons:- It is an undisputed fact that the order of termination is passed by the employer on the ground that Advertising Manager post is abolished and treating the same as retrenchment, paid the retrenchment compensation and notice pay in lieu of issuance of one month’s notice, as per the calculation under the provisions of the I.D. Act. This material evidence on record in favour of the appellant has been conveniently ignored by the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge could have noticed that having regard to the undisputed fact of termination of the services of the appellant treating it as retrenchment and paid the retrenchment benefit and one month’s notice pay under the provisions of I.D. Act. The contention urged by the respondent employer that appellant is not a workman in terms of definition of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act and therefore the reference is not maintainable in law is wholly untenable in law. According to him adopting the principle of blowing hot and cold or approbation or reprobation by the respondent-employer is not permissible in law. This important aspect has not been considered at all by the learned Single Judge. According to him adopting the principle of blowing hot and cold or approbation or reprobation by the respondent-employer is not permissible in law. This important aspect has not been considered at all by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the finding on the question that the appellant is not a workman in terms of Section 2(s) of I.D. Act is erroneous in law. Further, the appellant’s counsel has rightly invited our attention to the finding recorded by the Labour Court in holding that the appellant is not a workman placing reliance upon the various materials which are extracted above as ground nos. (a) to (l) which are prior to the date of office order dated 3.3.86 as the status, position of the appellant were lower. No doubt the learned Single Judge has extracted the same at paragraph-13, but he has not noticed the material evidence in support of the case of the appellant that his status, position and nature of duties were lowered which certainly comes within the exception of Clauses I to IV of Section 2(s) of I.D. Act and further even assuming that he is being employed in supervising capacity discharging the nature of duties as such, the wages does not exceed Rs.1600/- per month. The undisputed fact is that the salary paid to the appellant is a sum of Rs.1472.80 paise as retrenchment compensation and one month pay is remitted to the appellant. Therefore, non-consideration of the said relevant material evidence and provisions of Section 2(s) and not considering the office order dated 3.3.86 has certainly rendered the finding on the contentious issue perverse, which is an error apparent on the face of the record. Further non-consideration of abundant material evidence in support of the case of the appellant namely, the various aspects mentioned in the ground no.15 at sub-paras (a) to (l), the documentary as well as oral evidence elicited in the cross-examination of M.W.1 and M.W.2 wherein they have stated that the appellant had never attended to the duties of publishing the text of the advertisement, signing of contracts and fixing rate of advertisement after issuance of the order dated 3.3.86 and the said duties thereafter used to be performed by Sri Amitav Swain and his duties admittedly were clerical and supervisory has rendered the decision perverse. However, in the case of Artatrana Buxi, by consent the award was passed by the Labour Court in I.D. Case No.50 of 1987 wherein who was designated as Recovery Manager was accepted as workman by entering into a memorandum of settlement. In the case of appellant all legal evidence adduced to show the nature of duties which are performed by him for the purpose of determination as to whether the appellant is a workman or not in terms of Section 2(s) of I.D. Act, has not been taken into consideration and the Labour Court has recorded a finding against the appellant which is erroneously confirmed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge on the status of the appellant holding that the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court that the appellant is not a workman in terms of the definition of Section 2(s), is not legal and valid. Further, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance upon the award of Wage Board which was not the material evidence produced before the Labour Court. Further there is no term as ‘non-working Journalist’ in the Working Journalist and other News Paper Employees (Conditions of Services and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. On the contrary, the appellant and other employees designated as Departmental Manager were covered under different Wage Board Awards as other non-Journalist Newspaper employees. Therefore, the wage board award relied upon by the learned Single Judge has no application to the fact situation. Exts. A to L disclose about the arrangement and policy decision taken by the Managing Trustee. The appellant had no such power in respect of the advertisement section is also an important material evidence on record which has been omitted to be considered by the Labour Court at the time of appreciation of evidence on record. Further placing reliance upon Exts. A to L and recording a finding against the appellant is an erroneous approach of the Labour Court, which has been mechanically accepted by the learned single Judge without scrutinizing the said finding in the backdrop of the evidence which has no relevance for the purpose of recording a finding against the appellant that he is not a workman in terms of Section 2(s). The workman has produced voluminous documentary evidence on record apart from the admission that Advertising Manager is not a workman. The workman has produced voluminous documentary evidence on record apart from the admission that Advertising Manager is not a workman. Non-consideration of the material evidence produced by the appellant and recording a finding on the contentious issue that appellant is not a workman is not only erroneous in law but an error apparent on the face of the record which has rendered the award of the Labour Court and the order of learned Single Judge irrational and perverse in not complying with the principle in exercise of judicial review power of the learned Single Judge has certainly construed the second point as substantial question of law for consideration of this Court and the same is answered in favour of the appellant for the reasons stated supra. Further the reason assigned for determination that the Advertisement Manager post is abolished in contrary to the documentary evidence Ext. G advertisement published in the ‘Prajatantra’ dated 24.12.1988 showing the management’s intention to continue the post of Advertisement Manager. Therefore, termination order passed against the appellant on a non-existing fact is void in law. Therefore, the order of termination is liable to be set aside by answering the terms of reference made in the order of reference to the Labour Court for adjudication holding that the order of termination is not justified as the alleged abolition of the Advertisement Manager’s post is only a ground made out to terminate the services of the appellant which is a clear case of mala fide exercise of power by the employer and totally unsustainable in law. Point No.3 23.Since we have held that the findings recorded in the impugned award on the contentious issue concurred by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are erroneous and error in law the same are liable to be set aside and accordingly we direct. Point No.3 23.Since we have held that the findings recorded in the impugned award on the contentious issue concurred by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are erroneous and error in law the same are liable to be set aside and accordingly we direct. While answering to point no.3, we grant the following relief to the appellant as indicated in the operative portion of this judgment for the following reasons:- Since we have already held that the termination of service of the appellant on non-existing ground is a mala fide exercise of power on the part of the employer and it also colourable exercise of power by the employer to terminate the services on the ground of abolition of the post of Advertisement Manager which is factually incorrect as evidenced from Ext.G for which we have answered the term of reference in favour of the appellant by holding that termination of the appellant is not justified, in the normal course, the workman is entitled for all service benefits. Since the workman has attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the appeal, therefore, he is entitled for full salary and the consequential benefits. Accordingly, we direct the respondent-employer to pay the full salary and other consequential benefits from the date of termination till the date of attaining the age of superannuation, i.e. 58 years, by granting all consequential benefits, such as, Provident Fund, Bonus and all other service benefits applicable to the workman by computing the same taking into consideration the Wage revision and other monetary benefits for which the workman is entitled to and pay the same to him within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 24.Accordingly, we allow this appeal in the above said terms by setting aside the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge and quash the award passed by the Labour Court in the I.D. Case No.46 of 1987 and pass the award in the above terms by answering the terms of reference in favour of the appellant. B.N. MAHAPATRA, J.I agree. Appeal allowed.