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2011 DIGILAW 402 (AP)

Government of AP, rep. by its Prl. Secretary, Revenue (JA) Department, Hyderabad v. P. Gopala Reddy

2011-04-30

G.CHANDRAIAH, GHULAM MOHAMMED

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JUDGMENT ( per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed ) The subject matter of dispute in these three writ appeals and writ petition relates to the land situate in an extent of Ac.23-83 cents in Sy.No.46 of Akkarampalle Village, Chandragiri Taluk, locally called as ‘Poolavanigunta Cheruvu’, for short, ‘the subject land’. 2. WA No.1802 of 2005 is filed by the Government of AP represented by the Principal Secretary, Revenue (JA) Department, Hyderabad, and two other officers questioning the order dated 8-8-2005 passed in WP No.22656 of 2002. WA No.1817 of 2005 is filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupati (Urban) Mandal, Tirupati, questioning the order dated 8-8-2005 passed in WP No.22868 of 2002. 3. WA No.731 of 2006 is filed by the 3rd party appellant, who is not a party in the writ petition, with the leave of the Court, questioning the order dated 8-8-2005 passed in WP No.22868 of 2002. The appellant in this writ appeal claims that the subject land is an inam land and in the year 1883 there was an enquiry by the Inam Commissioner and after enquiry a title deed, being deed no.2946 has been granted in the names of the then inamdars Aparokham Nayayana Char and two others and the subject land has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the family of the said inamdars from generations to generations and at present the appellant-Aparoksham Satyanarayana Char is in physical possession and enjoyment of the subject land through his tenants. 4. In all these writ appeals the common order dated 8-8-2005 passed in WP Nos.22656 & 22868 of 2002 by the learned single Judge of this Court is assailed. 5. The petitioners in WP No.8346 of 2000, which is tagged on with the writ appeals, claims to be purchasers of the subject land from one P.Gopal Reddy and others on 10-9-1985. According to them, possession of the land was delivered and they are in possession of the land. They filed the writ petition seeking direction to the respondents i.e. the District Collector, Chittoor and MRO, Tirupathi (Urban) to treat the subject land as patta land and not to interfere with their possession over the subject land. Since the subject matter in the writ appeals and the writ petition is same and interconnected, they are heard and being disposed of by common judgment. 6. Since the subject matter in the writ appeals and the writ petition is same and interconnected, they are heard and being disposed of by common judgment. 6. Akkrampalle Village, Chandragiri Taluq was declared as Inam Estate and taken over by the Government on 7-1-1959 under the provisions of the AP (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, for short, ‘the Estates Abolition Act’. It is stated that originally one Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar was owning Ac.23-83 cents of land in RS No.46, which is the subject land, and other lands as pattedar. That one P.Munuswamy Reddy as the member of joint family consisting of himself and his brother P.Ramakrishna Reddy purchased the subject land under registered sale deed dated 14-7-1930 executed by the said Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar. 7. P. Gopala Reddy was the claimant before the Settlement Officer, and he is the son of P. Ramakrishna Reddy. The said P. Gopala Reddy is 1st respondent in WA No.1802 of 2005 and 4th respondent in WA No.1817 of 2005 and 5th respondent in WA 731 of 2006. He filed an application for grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the subject land under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer took the application on file as SR No.65/11(a)/1981, CGR and noticed the concerned officer i.e. Tahsildar, Chandragiri. The Tahsildar, having received notices contested the matter. To prove his claim, the said P. Gopala Reddy examined himself as PW-1 and the children of deceased P. Munaswamy Reddy as PWs.2 to 4. The Settlement Officer by order dated 25-10-1982 allowed the claim petition. The operative portion of the order reads:- “Under the aforesaid circumstances, I feel that the suit lands are cultivable lands from times immemorial and PW-2’s father was inducted into possession of the suit lands before 1-9-1945, under Ex.P-1 and suit lands are the patta lands of PW-1 and his family members. I feel that the suit lands are wrongly classified as kunta poramboke at the time of survey. I feel that the suit lands are wrongly classified as kunta poramboke at the time of survey. Accordingly, I allow the claim of the claimant and grant a ryotwari patta for the suit lands in survey No.46 of Akkarampalle village, Chandragiri taluk for an extent of Ac.23-83 cents in favour of PW-1, PW-3, PW-1’s vendees, namely Y.Balachandraiah, G.Sathyanarayana Rao, Karnam Chalapathi, M.Munikrishna Reddy, A.Padmavathamma, P.Chandravathi & P. Bharathi.” The extent of the lands to which each of them was entitled for grant of ryotwari patta, has been detailed in schedule annexed to the order. 8. Against this order, the Special Commissioner and Director of Settlement, took up suo-motu revision in RP No.186/83/(H1) in exercise of powers under Section 5(2) of the Estate Abolition Act. On considering the matter on record and on hearing both the counsel for parties, the Special Commissioner and Director of Settlement confirmed the order passed by the Settlement Officer and accordingly dismissed the revision petition by order dated 30-9-1999. As against this order, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi, Urban Mandal, Chittoor District, filed revision under Section 7(d) of the Estate Abolition Act assailing the order passed by the Director of Settlement in RP No.186/83/(HI), dated 30-9-1999. The Commissioner of Appeals took up the revision on file as P-3/1639/99, and on considering the material on record and on hearing both the parties declined to interfere with the order passed by the Special commissioner and Director of Settlement and accordingly dismissed the revision. Hence, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal, Chittoor District, filed writ petition being WP No.22868 of 2002. 9. P.Gopala Reddy and 17 others filed WP No.22656 of 2002 seeking a direction to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, AP, represented by its Principal Secretary, the District Collector, Chittoor and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi, to implement the orders of the Settlement Officer, dated 25-10-1982 as confirmed by the Special Commissioner and Director of Settlement in Revision Petition No.186/83(HI) dated 30-9-1999 and the Commissioner of Appeals in CCLA Ref.No. P3/1639/99, dated 18-12-2001. 10. Both the writ petitions were heard together and by the impugned common order, the learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by P.Gopala Reddy and others and dismissed the writ petition filed by the MRO, Tirupathi. 10. Both the writ petitions were heard together and by the impugned common order, the learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by P.Gopala Reddy and others and dismissed the writ petition filed by the MRO, Tirupathi. The learned single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by P. Gopala Reddy mainly relying on the statement of the Tehsildar who represented the Government before the primary authority i.e. the Settlement Officer to the effect that the Government has no interest in the kunta and the kunta (subject land) has not been repaired by the Government so far observed that it is royti land. The learned Judge also observed that concurrently all the statutory authorities held in favour of the claimant and, therefore, warrants no interference. However, the writ petition filed by the MRO, Tirupathi, was dismissed. Hence, these appeals and the writ petition. 11. The matter was heard at length. We have heard Sri Koka Raghava Rao, Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel, Sri A. Rangacharyulu, learned counsel and the learned Advocate General for the contesting parties in the matter. 12. Learned Advocate General appearing for the appellants in WA Nos.1802 of 2005 and 1817 of 2005 strenuously contended that claim made by the claimant-P. Gopala Reddy ought not to have been entertained under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act and issued ryotwari patta by the Settlement Officer in respect of the subject land, in the light of GO Ms.No.50, dated 16-1-1974, which clearly postulates that no claim for ryotwari patta under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, could be entertained after 8-3-1974, which is cut off date fixed in the said GO. It is stated that the Settlement Officer i.e. the primary authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, thus the order of the Settlement Officer is vitiated by fraudulent exercise of power. It is also stated that the then Tehsildar who represented the Government before the Settlement Officer was also a party to the fraud. It is also stated that the then Tehsildar who represented the Government before the Settlement Officer was also a party to the fraud. It is stated that in view of fact that the initial order granting the ryotwari patta under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act itself is vitiated by fraud and without jurisdiction, affirmation of the said order by the revisional and appellate authorities and also by the learned single Judge of this Court is a nullity and liable to be set aside. It is further stated that the order granting patta is also bad as the appellant in Writ Appeal no.731 of 2006 was not made a party to the proceedings before the Settlement Officer. 13. Learned Advocate General also stated that the Government has issued Memo No.486/J2/84-6, dated 25-4-1984 declaring ADV Reddy, the then Settlement Officer, to the effect that he has issued bogus settlement pattas both before and after his retirement and the Government further directed the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records to sensitize the District Collectors particularly the Collectors of Chitoor and Prakasam Districts and issue necessary instructions not to implement the settlement pattas granted by him in the village accounts. There was also a direction to cancel the pattas granted by Sri ADV Reddy, the then Settlement Officer. It is stated that the issue of bogus pattas by the then Settlement Officer Sri ADV Reddy, was not brought to the notice of Director of Settlement and the Commissioner of Appeals or to the notice of the learned single Judge in the writ petition. It is stated that the Director of Settlement has taken up proceedings suo-motu against the order dated 25-10-1982 passed by the Settlement Officer in the year 1982, but the suo-motu revision could not be disposed of till 1999 and it was pending for 16 years on his file and as on the date of consideration of the matter by the revisional authority and the appellate authority, Government Memo No.486/J2/84-6, dated 25-4-1984 and GO Ms.No.50, dated 16-1-1974 were very much available. It is contended that claim for grant of patta under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, long after cut off date without there being a petition to condone the delay was illegal and ought to have rejected as not maintainable. It is contended that claim for grant of patta under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, long after cut off date without there being a petition to condone the delay was illegal and ought to have rejected as not maintainable. It is lastly contended that there was no evidence to prove that the claimant was ryot and he was cultivating himself or through his labour. 14. Sri Koka Raghava Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in WA No.731 of 2006 contended that the inamdars Aparoksham Narayana Char and two others were the inamdars and the subject land has been in continuous possession and enjoyment and therefore, the claim made by the claimant-P.Gopala Reddy under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act is unsustainable in view of the entries in the Inam Fair Register recognized at the enquiry by the Inam Commissioner in the year 1883 and title deed being deed no.2946 has been granted in respect of the subject land in favour of the ancestors of the appellant in this appeal. It is stated that the appellant has submitted a petition to the Inams Deputy Tahasildar on 26-10-1999 for grant of ryotwari patta to him under the provisions of AP (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, and it could not be processed during the last six years for the reason of pendency of proceedings before the authorities based on the bogus patta brought into existence by the claimant-P.Gopal Reddy under the provisions of the Estate Abolition Act. It is further stated that since the subject land in Sy.No.46 is an inam land and entries were made to that effect in the records, any claim by any party for the issue of ryotwari pattas in respect of the subject land has to be dealt with under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 and not under the provisions of Estate Abolition Act. Learned senior counsel further states that the appellant has not been impleaded as party to the proceedings taken by the claimant-P.Gopala Reddy and the appellant is the rightful owner and has been in possession of the subject land and getting cultivated by the tenants by raising tulasi plants and flower gardens as per the original grant of the year 1970 AD being Salivahana year 1652. Learned counsel therefore stated that the impugned order passed in WP No.22656 of 2002 confirming the grant of patta is liable to be set aside. From here :15. Sri E.Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP No.8346 of 2000 and the party respondents in the writ appeals made submissions in support of the order passed by the learned single Judge. It is the contention of learned senior counsel that the subject land a hamlet of Akkarampalle was taken over by the Government on 7-1-1959 under the provisions of Estate Abolition Act, 1948 and that the land originally belongs to Sri Tirupati Doraiswamy Ayyangar and from him, the father of the claimant-4th respondent and one Munuswamy Reddy have acquired the subject land by way of a registered sale deed dated 14-7-1930. It is stated that father of the claimant, i.e. P.Ramakrishna Reddy and his brother Munuswami Reddy portioned their properties through registered partition deed dated 2-6-1940 and the subject land covered by Sy.No.46 fell to the said P.Ramakrishna Reddy and Munuswami Reddy equally and afterwards, the subject land has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the successors of the said P. Ramakrishna Reddy and Munuswami Reddy who are party respondents in the writ appeals. Learned counsel further submitted that in fact the ancestors of the party respondents have been maintaining the subject land (tank) and utilized water for the lands in Sy.Nos.47, 48 and 49 and therefore the subject land is ryoti in nature as there was an “improvement” of the land as defined in Section 2 (4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908, and it is not a communal land or ‘tank’ as contended by the appellants. Learned counsel also stated that the writ petitioners in WP No.8346 of 2000 are purchasers of parts of the land from the subject land from hirers of P. Ramakrishna Reddy and Munuswamy Reddy on 10-9-1985 and taken possession of the respective lands and, therefore, they are entitled for pattas recognizing their possession. Sri A. Rangacharyulu, learned counsel for the respondents in WA No.1802 of 2005 made submission in support of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petitions. 16. Sri A. Rangacharyulu, learned counsel for the respondents in WA No.1802 of 2005 made submission in support of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petitions. 16. In these writ appeals, we have to see whether the patta granted by the Settlement Officer, as confirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities and the learned single Judge of this Court is proper; and whether the claimant and other persons claiming through the heirs of Munuswami Reddy are entitled to the ryotiwari patta. 17. We are examining this matter in exercise of our jurisdiction under Clause 15 of Letters Patent and this Court can go into all questions of fact and law as of a first appellate Court as is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ASHA DEVI vs. DUKHI SAO.1 In this decision a reference was made to a five-judges Bench (unreported) decision of Supreme Court in ALAPATI KASI VISWANATHAM vs. A. SIVRAMA KRISHNAYYA, speaking for the Bench, Wanchoo,J observed thus:- "…The first contention urged before us on behalf of the appellant is that the Letters Patent Bench was not authorized in law to reverse the concurrent findings of fact of the Subordinate Judge and the learned Single Judge of the High Court. It is submitted that a Letters Patent Appeal stand on the same footing as a second appeal and it was therefore not open to the Letters Patent Bench to reverse the concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below. We are of opinion that this contention is not correct. A Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a first appeal to the High Court is not exactly equivalent to a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore it cannot be held that a Letters Patent appeal of this kind can only lie on a question of law and not otherwise. The matter would have been different if the Letters Patent appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court. The matter would have been different if the Letters Patent appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court. In these circumstances it will be open to the High Court to review even findings of fact in a Letters Patent Appeal from a first appeal heard by a learned Single Judge, though generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below. But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned Single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. The contention of the appellant therefore that the Letters Patent Bench was not in law entitled to reverse the concurrent findings of fact must be negatived". 18. In BADDULA LAKSHMAIAH vs. ANJANEYA SWAMI TEMPLE2 the Supreme Court considering the scope of Letter Patent Appeal at para 2 held thus:- “2……Against the orders of the trial court, first appeal lay before the High Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the internal working of the High Court which splits it into different 'Benches' and yet the court remains one. A letters patent appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent bench, sitting as a court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language. That apart the construction of the two documents involved, in the very nature of their import, a mixed question of law and fact, well within the powers of the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The bench was not powerless in that regard. We are therefore of the view that the Letters Patent bench committed no error in redoing the exercise to reconcile those two questioned documents so as to get to the result in favour of the temple-respondent”. 19. The bench was not powerless in that regard. We are therefore of the view that the Letters Patent bench committed no error in redoing the exercise to reconcile those two questioned documents so as to get to the result in favour of the temple-respondent”. 19. Coming to the factual matrix of the case, Section 3(b) of the Estates Abolition Act provides, save as otherwise provided, for the vesting of the entire estate in the Government, free of all encumbrances, with effect on and from the notified date. An express provision otherwise is found in Section 3 (d) itself. The proviso to Section 3 (d) of the Act prohibits the Government from dispossessing any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta and any person having rights recognized by the Estate Abolition Act had to work them out under the provisions of the said Act. 20. Section 11(a) of the Estate Abolition Act, under which the claimant made the claim petition reads thus:- “11. Lands in which ryot is entitled to ryotwari patta:--Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of— (a) All ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act; and (b) All lanka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified date, such lands having been in his occupation or in that of his predecessors-in-title continuously from the 1st day of July, 1939; Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the first day of July, 1945 shall except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land. Explanation:- No lessee of any lanka and no person to whom a right to collect the rent of any land has been leased before the notified date, including an jaradar or a farmer of rent, shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this section.” 21. Explanation:- No lessee of any lanka and no person to whom a right to collect the rent of any land has been leased before the notified date, including an jaradar or a farmer of rent, shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this section.” 21. A reading of the above provision it is clear that every ryot who claims for grant of ryotwari patta under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act has to fulfil the following requirements:- (i) the land claimed as patta land has been in his or her predecessors continuous occupation and possession prior to 1-7-1945 till the notified date of the estate; (ii) the land is ryoti; (iii) the claimant is a ryoti; (iv) details regarding pre-abolition records. 22. It is noted by the forums below that the subject land covered by Sy.No.46 is a notified Inam Estate, and taken over by the Government on 7-7-1959 under the provisions of the Estate Abolition Act. Records of Enquiry was conducted by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor under Section 15 (1) of the Estates Abolition Act, suo-muto at the time of field operations. Notices were issued to P. Ramakrishna Reddy and P. Munuswamy Reddy who made a claim on the basis of registered sale deed dated 13-8-1930. The claimant and other respondents are claiming the subject land through these two persons. It is pertinent to note that on earlier occasion, P. Ramakrishna Reddy and P. Munuswamy Reddy did not make any claim respect of the subject land situate in Sy.No.46 which is classified as ‘Pollavanigunta cheruvu’ in the revenue records. Thus it is evident that the claimant’s father P. Ramakrishna Reddy and his brother P. Munuswamy Reddy made claims only in respect of lands in Sy.Nos.45, 47, 48 and 49 on the basis of Ex.P-1, sale deed dated 14-7-1930 as landholders under Section 15(1) of the Estates Abolition Act in the year 1961. The statement of P.Munuswamy Reddy, under enquiry under Section 15 (1) of the Estates Abolition Act himself described the subject land in Sy.No.46 as ‘Pollavanigunta’ (tank). The statement of P.Munuswamy Reddy, under enquiry under Section 15 (1) of the Estates Abolition Act himself described the subject land in Sy.No.46 as ‘Pollavanigunta’ (tank). The basis for claim of patta in the year 1961 by the father of the claimant P. Ramakrishna Reddy and his brother P.Munuswamy Reddy in respect of lands in other survey numbers and the basis of claim now made by the claimant before the Settlement Officer, for grant of patta, is one and the same i.e. Ex.P-1 sale deed dated 14-7-1930. The claimant and the persons claiming through the heirs of P.Munuswamy Reddy failed to explain as to why no claim was made by their respective fathers in respect of the subject land situate in Sy. No.46, when admittedly claim was made by them in respect of lands in other survey numbers in the year 1961 itself. Hence, the claim now made by the claimant is inconsistent with the earlier claim, inasmuch as the source of the title in respect of both the claims is the same document i.e. Ex.P-1, the sale deed dated 14-7-1930. 23. If the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer by the claimant is examined, we may have to observe that the Settlement Officer, Nellore, was prima facie not empowered to admit any claim after the cut of off date i.e. 8-3-1974, as contemplated in GO Ms.No.50, dated 16-1-1974. There was no petition filed, except stating that the case has been taken up after condoning the delay. Condoning delay of eight years is an axiomatic error, in the absence of a petition filed for that purpose. No doubt, the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation. It is intended to acquire the rights of landholders in estates and other settlements, to divest them with all rights and vest all rights in cultivable lands in ryots in accordance with the principles laid down therein. It is true that in the absence of any provision being enacted or any, rule being made under the rule making power, prescribing the period of limitation, it would not be open to the Settlement Officer to reject the applications filed under Section 11 (a) of the Act, on the ground of limitation. But it is well settled that in the absence of any provision prescribing limitation, the authorities have to exercise power within a reasonable time. But it is well settled that in the absence of any provision prescribing limitation, the authorities have to exercise power within a reasonable time. Any violation of the provisions of the Act in granting of patta would amount to fraud on the statute. 24. The claimant made a claim for patta in the year 1982. A statement was made before the Settlement Officer that the claimant’s father P. Ramakrishna Reddy and his father’s brother Munuswami Reddy were in joint possession and enjoyment of the lands including the subject land since the day of Ex.P-1 sale deed dated 14-7-1930 and after their life time, they are in possession of the land and the subject land is ryoti in nature and no communal interest was involved and it was wrongly classified as kunta poramboke. 25. It is to be noticed that in the year 1979, the claimant’s father P. Ramakrishna Reddy and others filed writ petition being WP No.5121 of 1979 on the file of this Court seeking to issue a writ of mandamus to the official respondents therein not to assign the subject land in Sy.No.46 to one MS Reddy on the ground that it is an irrigation tank. The operative portion of the order passed in the said WP reads thus:- “….This writ petition was filed on an apprehension that a tank used for irrigation source situate in Sy.No.46 is going to be assigned in favour of one MS Reddy. The petitioner, therefore, contended that so long as the Government did not abandon the tank for purpose of irrigation of the lands belonging to the petitioner as well as the other lands in the neighbouring locality the tank cannot be assigned in favour of somebody else. In the counter filed by the respondents it is stated that the entire ayacut under this tank is proposed to be acquired for the establishment of Autonagar by the APIIC Limited, Hyderabad. It is further stated that the proposal for assignment will have to be taken only after the entire ayacut under this tank is acquired and the source is abandoned. It is also mentioned in the counter that no proposals are finalized or orders are passed for abandoning the tank as yet and therefore the apprehension of the petitioner is unfounded…..” 26. It is also mentioned in the counter that no proposals are finalized or orders are passed for abandoning the tank as yet and therefore the apprehension of the petitioner is unfounded…..” 26. From this it is evident that the claimant’s father and others themselves treated the subject land as ‘tank’ and even according to them, the tank was being used for irrigating the neighbouring lands. Therefore, the plea of the claimant, that he and other persons are in possession of the land and the subject land is ryoti in nature and no communal interest was involved and it was wrongly classified as kunta poramboke cannot be accepted. It is pointed by the learned Advocate General that except producing the cist receipts no evidence was produced by the claimant to claim himself as ryot. According to him the cist receipts produced by the claimant are only note book entries and the receipts are not produced in the form prescribed. The cist receipts under Exs.P-2 to P-29 cannot be construed as receipts for payment of cist, without proof of authenticity issued by revenue authority. No material was placed by the claimant except the cist receipts that they are in possession and no declaration showing the subject land is in their holding was filed as required under the provisions of AP Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1973. The statement of the Village Karanam that the subject land was being cultivated by the claimant is contrary to the revenue records, inasmuch as without there being a declaration by the District Collector under Section 20 (d) of the Estate Abolition Act, any statement contrary the documentary record cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, cist receipts alone are not sufficient to hold that the grantee is eligible for ryotwari patta. Under Section 11 of the Act, every ryot in the estate shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti land. Likewise, under Section 12 of the Act a landlord shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of private land and if the same is under cultivation. Under Section 11 of the Act, every ryot in the estate shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti land. Likewise, under Section 12 of the Act a landlord shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of private land and if the same is under cultivation. The grant of patta either under Sections 11, 12 or 13 of the Act is however subject to provisions of Section 13 (b) of the Act, which reads thus:- “13 (b ) (i) All lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included, in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder, by inheritance or succession under a will, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, from the date of such acquisition or the 1st day of July, 1945, whichever is later and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from such later date; (ii) all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder by purchase, exchange or gift, including purchase at a sale for arrears of rent, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date; (iii) all lands (not being (i) lanka lands, (ii) lands of the description specified in section 3, clause (16), sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Estate land Act, or (iii) forest lands which have been abandoned or relinquished by a ryot, or which have never been in the occupation of a ryot, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date.” 27. From a reading of the above clauses to Section 13 of the Act, grant of patta under Section 11 is prohibited in respect of land which is classified as tank poramboke and the land is not under cultivation. The version of the father of the claimant P. Ramakrishan Reddy and others in writ petition being WP No.5121 of 1979 was that the subject land is an irrigation tank and they themselves treated the subject land as ‘tank’ being used for irrigating the neighbouring lands. If a person is seeking a piece of land as ryoti land, and according to him it was wrongly classified as ‘tank poramboke’, the only course open for him is to seek for a declaration that the said classification by the revenue authorities was illegal. The Supreme Court in STATE OF TAMIL NADU vs. RAMALINGA SAMIGAL MADAM ( AIR 1986 SC 794 ) in a similar case held that on an application by ryot for grant of ryotwari patta under Section 11 of the Act, before the Settlement Officer, adjudication on the real nature of the land by a civil Court is not barred. The relevant portion reads thus:- “There are provisions in the Act dealing with grant of ryotwari patta to a ryot and grant thereof to a landholder. In between Sections 12 to 15 there is a difference of vital significance; whereas in the case of an application for a Ryotwari Patta by a landholder under Sections 12, 13 or 14, Section 15 of the Act enjoins a duty upon the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and character of the land and history thereof and then decide whether the claim of the landholder should be allowed or not, in the case of an application for a Ryotwari Patta by a ryot under Section 11, there is no similar express provision for any inquiry into the nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to grant such patta to the applicant. Even if Section 11 is read with the proviso to clause (d) of Section 3, whereunder some inquiry is contemplated before granting a Ryotwari Patta to a ryot there is no provision directing an inquiry for the ascertainment of the character of the land, namely, whether it is ryoti land or communal land and the Settlement Officer's decision on this aspect will be incidental to and impliedly rendered only for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the Ryotwari Patta….” 29. No material pertaining to pre-abolition period was placed by the claimant and others to the effect and that they are in possession of the land subject land and no declaration showing the subject land in their holding was filed as required under the AP Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1973. The Settlement Officer i.e. the primary authority has no power or authority to declare the subject land classified as ‘tank poramboke’ in the revenue records as ryoti land and except the cist receipts under Exs.P-2 to P-29 which are note book entries are not properly authenticated by the revenue authorities, cannot prove the possession of the subject land by the claimant and other persons. Hence, it is held that the subject and is a ‘tank poramboke’ and it is a source of irrigation to the neighbouring lands. The contention of the claimant’s counsel that the subject land was never ever repaired by the governmental agencies and it was the claimant and his ancestors who have maintained the tank and, therefore, it is a private tank is not tenable for the reason, restoration of government tanks and wells which are in disuse by private individuals cannot be construed that such private individuals have rights over the tank to the exclusion of all others. To put it more lucidly, when a tank classified as tank promaboke in the revenue records, and even if by usage, the word ‘private’ is added to the tank, it cannot be inferred that the tank belonged to private individuals by mere usage and calling. In the instance case, even if it is accepted that the tank is maintained and repaired by the claimant, by his father and his brother, that by itself does not make the subject land into a private tank. In the instance case, even if it is accepted that the tank is maintained and repaired by the claimant, by his father and his brother, that by itself does not make the subject land into a private tank. Even according to the claimant’s farther P. Ramakrishna Reddy and his brother Munuswamy Reddy, the subject land was the source of irrigation to the neighbouring lands and, therefore, communal interest exists and the claimant and others cannot claim it to the exclusion of others and they themselves excluded the subject land in Sy.46 and described it as Pollavanigunta (tank) in an enquiry under Section 15 (1) of the Act at the time of field operations by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor. Therefore, the question of “improvement” of the land within the meaning of Section 2 (4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908, does not apply as it is not a royti land. 30. Apart from the merits of the case, serious objection as to the validity of the order passed by the Settlement Officer dated 25-10-1982 in granting patta to the claimant and others is taken by the appellants in the writ appeals. Based on the complaints against the said officer, the Government issued Memo No.486/J2/84, dated 25-4-1984, the relevant part of the memo reads thus:- “It has been brought to the notice of the Government by some of the Collectors and also by a member of Legislature that Sri ADV Reddy, retired Settlement Officer, Nellore, has issued bogus settlement pattas both before and after his retirement. This has also been specifically brought to the notice of the Government by the Collectors, Chittoor and Prakasham. There is thus the management of valuable land going into the hands of unauthorized persons. The Director of Settlement has also cancelled such bogus pattas which were brought to his notice in Prakasham District. The Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land records is requested to bring this notification to the Collectors about the bogus pattas issued by Sri ADV Reddy, retired Settlement Officer, Nellore, and issue necessary instructions to them not to implement the settlement pattas in the village accounts. He may also issue necessary instructions to the Director of Settlements in this regard to get all bogus pattas cancelled at once and in turn that holders of such bogus pattas do not derive illegal benefit out of it.” 31. He may also issue necessary instructions to the Director of Settlements in this regard to get all bogus pattas cancelled at once and in turn that holders of such bogus pattas do not derive illegal benefit out of it.” 31. In the instant case, the order granting patta in favour of the claimant and others is passed by the above noted person who was Settlement Officer at that time. But since it is not the case that the patta granted in the instant case is a bogus patta, there is no need to probe into that allegation. Suffice it observe that the order passed by him is tested on its own merits and concluded by us that there was no material before him to grant patta in respect of the subject land which is a non-ryoti and classified as ‘tank poramboke’ in the revenue records. It is no doubt true that an order obtained by a party playing fraud is a nullity and doctrine of res judicate will have no application to a non est decision. The decisions of the Supreme Court in INDIAN BANK vs. SATYAM FIBRES (INDIA) PVT. LTD. ( AIR 1996 SC 2592 ), RAMCHANDRA G. SHINDE vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1993) 4 SCC 216 , & SP CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU vs. JAGANNATH (1994) 1 SCC 1 ) are to the effect that any order obtained by fraud cannot be allowed to stand. Reference can be made to the observation made by the Supreme Court in Satyam Fibres case, the relevant portion reads thus:- “The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under section 151 CPC to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent power are powers, which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constructions of the tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constructions of the tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business…..Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularly and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court.” 32. It is stated by learned counsel appearing for the appellant in WA No.731 of 2006 that the subject land was an inam land and it was so recorded in the Inam Fair Register by the Inam Commissioner in the year 1883 and a title deed being deed no.2946 has been granted in favour of the ancestors of the appellant and, therefore, he is entitled for issue of ryotwari patta in respect of the subject land. Since it is not the subject matter before us, we are not expressing any opinion on the rights or otherwise of the appellant based on such entries in the Inam Fair Register. 33. Before parting with case, we are advert to the contention of the learned counsel for the claimant that this Court cannot go into concurrent findings given by all the statutory forums and as confirmed by the learned single Judge of this Court. As observed above, we are exercise our jurisdiction under Clause 15 of Letters Patent and this Court can go into all questions of fact and law. The Supreme Court in RAMLAL vs. PHAGUA (2006) (1) SCC 168 at para 22 held thus:- “This Court also held that it is not the number of times that a finding has been reiterated that matters. What really matters is whether the findings is manifestly unreasonable and unjust one in the context of evidence on record. This judgment squarely applies to the case on hand. In the instant case, the High Court has rightly exercised its right and discharged its duty to reverse the error and removed the injustice done by the courts below. The High Court is right in exercising its duty, rightly so in interfering with an unreasonable and unjust findings by both the Courts below.” 34. In the instant case, the High Court has rightly exercised its right and discharged its duty to reverse the error and removed the injustice done by the courts below. The High Court is right in exercising its duty, rightly so in interfering with an unreasonable and unjust findings by both the Courts below.” 34. In the result, we allow all three writ appeals and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge in WP No.22656 of 2002 and allow WP No.22868 of 2002 and as a consequence thereof, the orders passed including the order passed by the Settlement Officer dated 25-10-1982 are also set aside. For the reasons stated above, WP No.8346 of 2000 is dismissed. There shall no order as to costs.