Judgment : Aggrieved by the award dated 02.02.2007 passed in OP No.2656 of 2003 on the file of the XXII Additional Chief Judge-cum-before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, City Criminal Court, at Hyderabad, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) to the extent of holding that the second respondent–Insurance Company is entitled to avoid its liability to pay the compensation to the claimants, the claimants have preferred this appeal. 2. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed before the Tribunal for the sake of convenience. 3. The first claimant is the father, second claimant is the mother and the third claimant is the sister of the deceased. Their case is that on 15.08.2003 at about 12.30 hours the deceased Alok Kumar Agarwal was proceeding on his Scooter bearing No. AP 12A 851 from Katedan to his house at Siddiambar Bazar and when he reached Miralam tank road, the offending lorry bearing No.ATT 3035 being driven by its driver-cum-owner Mohd. Kaleemulla came from opposite direction and dashed against the scooter and ran over the deceased. The deceased sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to injuries on the spot. The police, Bahadurpura, registered a case in Crime No. 154 of 2003, under Section 304-A IPC. It is also their case that the deceased was aged about 19 years, unmarried and working as a Purchase Manager in Pooja Priya Plasto Pack (P) Limited, Gaganpahad, Rajendranagar and earning Rs.8500/- per month as on the date of his death. Contending that they have lost their bread winner and love and affection of the deceased for untimely death of the deceased the claimants have filed the claim petition claiming total compensation of Rs.11,00,000/- against the first respondent-owner of the vehicle and the second respondent-the insurance company with which the vehicle was insured contending that both the respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to them. 4. The first respondent filed a counter and denied the material averments made by the claimants with regard to age, occupation and income of the deceased. It is also denied that he had driven the lorry in a rash and negligent manner and caused the accident. 4. The first respondent filed a counter and denied the material averments made by the claimants with regard to age, occupation and income of the deceased. It is also denied that he had driven the lorry in a rash and negligent manner and caused the accident. It is his case that he was having valid driving licence on the date of accident issued by the RTA and that the vehicle was insured with the second respondent-Insurance Company and therefore the insurance company is liable to indemnify him. He has also mentioned that he filed Xerox copy of the driving license along with counter. 5. The second respondent filed a counter and denied the material averments made by the claimants. In their additional counter the second respondent has taken a specific plea that the driver of the vehicle was issued a driving license to drive non-transport vehicle valid for the period from 21.06.1992 to 11.02.1993 and whereas the accident occurred on 15.08.2003 and therefore on the date of accident the driver was not having valid driving license and consequently the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. 6. On behalf of the claimants, the first claimant was examined as PW.1 and PWs.2 and 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A8 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, RWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 and B2 were marked. 7. The Tribunal, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, particularly the evidence of PW.2, came to the conclusion that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry. This issue is not in dispute in this appeal. On issue No.2, the Tribunal, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co.Ltd., v. Swaran Singh 2004 ACJ 1, came to the conclusion that though the driver of the lorry was not having valid driving license on the date of accident, but, however, the first respondent is liable to pay compensation to the claimants and accordingly directed the first respondent to pay compensation to the claimants. On the quantum of compensation the Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.15,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased, the loss of contribution was estimated at Rs.10,000/- per annum and on applying the multiplier ‘16’ determined the total compensation at Rs.1,72,000/-, which includes Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.10,000/- towards loss of estate. As indicated supra, the claimants being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal exonerating the second respondent-insurance company preferred this appeal. 8. Smt. A. Chayadevi, learned counsel for the claimants, submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the evidence on record in proper perspective and erred in holding that the insurance company proved that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy. It is her main submission that the evidence of RWs.1 and 2 reveals that the driving licence can be renewed from any one of the offices of RTA and that originally the driver had obtained licence from RTA Office, Nandhed, Maharashtra and subsequently he got renewed his licence from RTA Office, East Zone, Hyderabad, but, since there are several similar offices in Hyderabad city itself as admitted by RW.2, the evidence of RWs.1 and 2 is not helpful to the insurance company and basing on such evidence it cannot be conclusively held that the driver was not having valid driving licence on the date of accident. It is also her submission that the insurance company had not furnished the copy of application which they filed before the RTA for obtaining Ex.B2 the particulars of the driving licence of one Kaleemulla. Her main submission is that even if it is held that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy by not holding valid driving licence on the date of accident, the deceased being third party the insurance company cannot avoid its liability in respect of third parties. It is also her submission that merely because the driver was not having valid driving license it is not a valid reason to avoid its liability by the insurance company, but the insurance company has to prove that it was the main cause for occurrence of the accident and in this case there is no such evidence on record. It is also her submission that merely because the driver was not having valid driving license it is not a valid reason to avoid its liability by the insurance company, but the insurance company has to prove that it was the main cause for occurrence of the accident and in this case there is no such evidence on record. She had relied on the decisions reported in Skandia Insurance Co.Ltd v. Kokilaben Chandravadan AIR 1987 SC 1184 (1), New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and others AIR 2001 SC 1419 (1), National Insurance Co.Ltd v. Swaran Singh (1 supra) and Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd., v. Paulose 2004 ACJ 457. Her submission is that the decisions of the Apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case and Paulose’s cases hold the field as on today and even if any other High Court or a Bench of lesser than three judges of the Apex Court had taken a different view, the same is not binding on this Court and this Court is bound to follow the decision of the Apex Court as long as the same is not reviewed by the larger bench of the Apex Court. 9. Per contra, Smt. A. Jayanthi, learned counsel for the insurance company, submitted that in the case on hand the owner is the driver and in spite of receiving summons he did not appear before the Tribunal or before this Court. It is vehemently argued that it was obligatory on his part to inform the insurance company about the occurrence of the accident and he ought to have furnished all the particulars to the insurance company. Besides not furnishing the particulars to the insurance company, the first respondent did not appear before the Tribunal. It is her submission that mere taking a plea in the counter that he was holding a valid driving licence is not sufficient and it was obligatory on the part of the first respondent to establish that he was having valid driving licence on the date of accident. It is her submission that mere taking a plea in the counter that he was holding a valid driving licence is not sufficient and it was obligatory on the part of the first respondent to establish that he was having valid driving licence on the date of accident. It is her main submission that the Apex Court had considered the violations under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act and categorically held that wherein the insured had entrusted the vehicle to a driver who was not holding valid driving licence on the date of accident the insurance company can avoid its liability and it is a statutory right given to the insurance company to avoid its liability. When the statute itself gives a right to the insurance company to avoid its liability and when it is established that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy the Tribunal cannot direct the insurance company to pay the amount. It is her submission that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the claimants are not applicable to the facts of this case and the latest decisions of this Court and the Apex Court clarify the position that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured when he had violated the terms and conditions of the policy. 10. The point that arises for consideration is whether the insurance company has proved that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy and if so whether it can avoid its statutory liability as per the guidelines of the Apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case? 11. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act are as follows:- 3. Necessity for driving licence:- (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him authorizing him to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a transport vehicle other than (a motor cab or motor cycle) hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made under subsection (2) of Section 75 unless his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do. (2) The conditions subject to which sub-section (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government. 4. (2) The conditions subject to which sub-section (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government. 4. Age limit in connection with driving of motor vehicles:- (1) No person under the age of eighteen years shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place:- Provided that a motor cycle with engine capacity not exceeding 50 Christian Colony) may be driven in a public place by a person after attaining the age of sixteen years (2) Subject to the provisions of Section 18, no person under the age of twenty years shall drive a transport vehicle in any public place. (3) No learner licence or driving licence shall be issued to any person to drive a vehicle of the class to which he has made an application unless he is eligible to drive that class of vehicle under this Section. 5. Responsibility of owners of motor vehicles for contravention of Sections 3 and 4:-No owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 to drive the vehicle. Section 146(1) of the Act reads as follows:- 146. Necessity for insurance against third party risk:-(1) No person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter. Section 149 of the Act reads as under:- 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks. Section 149 of the Act reads as under:- 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks. (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub- section (3) of section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:-- (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:-- (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle-- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side- car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non- disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. (3) Where any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) is obtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreign judgment is, by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 .) conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, the insurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938 .) and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in sub- section (1), as if the judgment were given by a Court in India: Provided that no sum shall be payable by the insurer in respect of any such judgment unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in sub- section (2). (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 147, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub- section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. (6) In this section the expressions" material fact" and" material particular" means, respectively a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the risk and, if so at what premium and on what conditions and the expression" liability covered by the terms of the policy" means a liability which is covered by the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or cancel or has avoided or cancelled the policy. (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub- section (2) or sub- section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub- section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in subsection (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be. 12. It has to be seen that the legislature, in their wisdom, have specifically used the following words “Notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this Section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor”. 13. Thus, it becomes necessary that the insurer shall be issued notice about the proceedings before the Tribunal as required under Section 149(2) of the Act. 14. The Apex Court had elaborately dealt with all these issues in case between Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd., Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and others (2 supra). The facts of that case are that the driver had gone for bringing snacks from the opposite shop leaving the engine running. The ignition key was in the ignition lock and not in the cabin in the truck as alleged by the driver. The driver had handed over the control of the truck to the cleaner and the accident occurred when the cleaner moved the vehicle. Admittedly, the accident occurred when an un-licensed person was at the steering. The ignition key was in the ignition lock and not in the cabin in the truck as alleged by the driver. The driver had handed over the control of the truck to the cleaner and the accident occurred when the cleaner moved the vehicle. Admittedly, the accident occurred when an un-licensed person was at the steering. In the circumstances, the Apex Court observed as follows:- “…The defence built on the exclusion clause cannot succeed for three reasons, viz :- (1) On a true interpretation of the relevant clause which interpretation is at peace with the conscience of Section 96, the condition excluding driving by a person not duly licensed is not absolute and the promisor is absolved once it is shown that he has done everything in his power to keep, honour, and fulfil the promise and he himself is not guilty of a deliberate breach. (2) Even if it is treated as an absolute promise, there is substantial compliance therewith upon an express or implied mandate being given to the licensed driver not to allow the vehicle to be left unattended so that it happens to be driven by an unlicensed driver. (3) The exclusion clause has to be 'read down' in order that it is not at war with the 'main purpose' of the provisions enacted for the protection of victims of accidents so that the promisor is exculpated when he does everything in his power to keep the promise.” “…In order to derive the intention of the legislature in the course of interpretation of the relevant provisions there can scarcely be a better test than that of probing into the motive and philosophy of the relevant provisions keeping in mind the goals to be achieved by enacting the same. Ordinarily it is not the concern of the legislature whether the owner of the vehicle insures his vehicle or not. If the vehicle is not insured any legal liability arising on account of third party risk will have to be borne by the owner of the vehicle. Why then has the legislature insisted on a person using a motor vehicle in a public place to insure against third party risk by enacting S. 94. Surely the obligation has not been imposed in order to promote the business of the insurers engaged in the business of automobile insurance. Why then has the legislature insisted on a person using a motor vehicle in a public place to insure against third party risk by enacting S. 94. Surely the obligation has not been imposed in order to promote the business of the insurers engaged in the business of automobile insurance. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the members of the Community travelling in vehicles or using the roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. The law may provide for compensation to victims of the accidents who sustain injuries in the course of an automobile accident or compensation to the dependants of the victims in the case of a fatal accident. However, such protection would remain a protection on paper unless there is a guarantee that the compensation awarded by the Courts would be recoverable from the persons held liable for the consequences of the accident. A Court can only pass an award or a decree. It cannot ensure that such an award or decree results in the amount awarded being actually recovered, from the person held liable who may not have the resources. The exercise undertaken by the law Courts would then be an exercise in futility. And the outcome of the legal proceedings which by the very nature of things involve the time cost and money cost invested from the scarce resources of the Community would make a mockery of the injured victims, or the dependents of the deceased victim of the accident, who themselves are obliged to incur not inconsiderable expenditure of time, money and energy in litigation. To overcome this ugly situation the legislature has made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless a third party insurance is in force. To use the vehicle without the requisite third party insurance being in force is a penal offence. The legislature was also faced with another problem. The insurance policy might provide for liability walled in by conditions which may be specified in the contract of policy. To use the vehicle without the requisite third party insurance being in force is a penal offence. The legislature was also faced with another problem. The insurance policy might provide for liability walled in by conditions which may be specified in the contract of policy. In order to make the protection real, the legislature has also provided that the judgment obtained shall not be defeated by the incorporation of exclusion clauses other than those authorised by S. 96 and by providing that except and save to the extent permitted by S. 96 it will be the obligation of the Insurance Company to satisfy the judgment obtained against the persons insured against third party risks. (Vide Section 96). In other words, the legislature has insisted and made it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risks which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that the injured victims of automobile accidents or the dependents of the victims of fatal accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the use of motor vehicles notwithstanding the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision has therefore, to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective. 15. The Apex court further observed as follows:- “The expression 'breach' is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of 'breach' is 'infringement or violation of a promise or obligation' (see Collins English Dictionary). It is therefore abundantly clear that the insurer will have to establish that the insured is guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise that a person who is not (sic) duly licensed will have to be in charge of the vehicle.” 16. The Apex Court further observed as follows:- “The circumstances in which such a contingency occurs (that when the vehicle is being driven by an unlicensed person) has to be taken into consideration.” 17. It was further observed as follows:- “It needs to be emphasized that it is not the contract of insurance which is being interpreted. The Apex Court further observed as follows:- “The circumstances in which such a contingency occurs (that when the vehicle is being driven by an unlicensed person) has to be taken into consideration.” 17. It was further observed as follows:- “It needs to be emphasized that it is not the contract of insurance which is being interpreted. It is the statutory provision defining the conditions of exemption which is being interpreted. These must therefore be interpreted in the spirit in which the same have been enacted accompanied by an anxiety to ensure that the protection is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation which serves to defeat the provision rather than to fulfill its life-aim. To do otherwise would amount to nullifying the benevolent provision by reading it with a non-benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. What the legislature has given, the Court cannot deprive of by way of an exercise in interpretation when the view which renders the provision potent is equally plausible as the one which renders the provision impotent. In fact it appears that the former view is more plausible apart from the fact that it is more desirable. When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of Accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach. The very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.” 18. Thus, it was held that the main purpose of the Act and the relevant provisions should be kept in mind while interpreting the provisions. 19. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.” 18. Thus, it was held that the main purpose of the Act and the relevant provisions should be kept in mind while interpreting the provisions. 19. It has to be seen that the above referred judgment had been followed in case between Sohan Lal Passi Vs.P.Sesh Reddy and others AIR 1996 SC 2627 , which is a Judgment of three Judges of the Apex Court. In that case, one Gurbachan Singh was a regular driver but at the time of accident, one Rajenderpal Singh, who was a cleaner and who was not having valid driving licence was found to be driving the vehicle. In the circumstances, the Apex Court observed as follows:- “The road accidents in India have touched a new height. In majority of cases because of the rash and negligent driving, innocent persons become victims of such accidents because of which their dependents in many cases are virtually on the streets.” 20. In fact, to examine the correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd’s case (2 supra), the matter was referred to the three Judge Bench in Sohan Lal Passi’s case (5 supra), wherein, it was held as follows:- “The insurer has also to satisfy the Tribunal or the Court that such violation or infringement on the part of the insured was wilful. If the insured has taken all precautions by appointing a duly licensed driver to drive the vehicle in question and it has not been established that it was the insured who allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person not duly licensed, then the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability under sub-section (1) of Section 96.” 21. Thus, the view taken by the Division Bench in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd’’s case (2 supra) had been confirmed by the Apex Court by the three Judge Bench in Sohan Lal Passi’s case (5 supra). 22. Thus, the view taken by the Division Bench in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd’’s case (2 supra) had been confirmed by the Apex Court by the three Judge Bench in Sohan Lal Passi’s case (5 supra). 22. In New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and others(3 supra), the Apex Court had explained the proviso to Sub-sections 4 and 5 and Section 149 of the Act, as follows:- “A reading of the proviso to sub-section (4) as well as the language employed in subsection (5) would indicate that they are intended to safeguard the interest of an insurer who otherwise has no liability to pay any amount to the insured but for the provisions contained in Chapter XI of the Act. This means, the insurer has to pay to the third parties only on account of the fact that a policy of insurance has been issued in respect of the vehicle, but the insurer is entitled to recover any such sum from the insured if the insurer were not otherwise liable to pay such sum to the insured by virtue of the conditions of the contract of insurance indicated by the policy.” 23. It has to be seen that it was further specifically observed by the Apex Court that “even if the insurer is not otherwise liable to pay”. The Apex Court further observed as follows:- “To repeat, the effect of the above provisions is this : When a valid insurance policy has been issued in respect of a vehicle as evidenced by a certificate of insurance the burden is on the insurer to pay to third parties, whether or not there has been any breach or violation of the policy conditions. But the amount so paid by the insurer to third parties can be allowed to be recovered from the insured if as per the policy conditions the insurer had no liability to pay such sum to the insured.” “It is advantageous to refer to a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (1987) 2 SCC 654 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1184 ). Though the said decision related to the corresponding provisions of the predecessor Act (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) the observations made in the judgment are quite germane now as the corresponding provisions are materially the same as in the Act.” 24. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (1987) 2 SCC 654 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1184 ). Though the said decision related to the corresponding provisions of the predecessor Act (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) the observations made in the judgment are quite germane now as the corresponding provisions are materially the same as in the Act.” 24. After referring to the certain observations of Skandia’s Case the Apex Court observed as follows. “The position can be summed up thus : The insurer and insured are bound by the conditions enumerated in the policy and the insurer is not liable to the insured if there is violation of any policy condition. But the insurer who is made statutorily liable to pay compensation to third parties on account of the certificate of insurance issued shall be entitled to recover from the insured the amount paid to the third parties, if there was any breach of policy conditions on account of the vehicle being driven without a valid licence. Learned counsel for the insured contended that it is enough if he establishes that he made all due enquiries and believed bona fide that the driver employed by him had a valid driving licence, in which case there was no breach of the policy condition. As we have not decided on that contention it is open to the insured to raise it before the Claims Tribunal. In the present case, if the Insurance Company succeeds in establishing that there was breach of the policy condition, the Claims Tribunal shall direct the insured to pay that amount to the insurer. In default the insurer shall be allowed to recover that amount (which the insurer is directed to pay to the claimants third parties) from the insured person.” 25. In the same judgment, the Apex Court further observed as follows:- “Now the Claims Tribunal has to decide the next question whether the insurance company is entitled to recover that amount from the owner of the vehicle on account of the vehicle being driven by a person who had no valid licence to drive the vehicle.” 26. The view taken by the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co.’s case (3 supra), had been followed in United India Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Lehru and others AIR 2007 SC 1563 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut AIR 2003 SC 1292 . 27. The view taken by the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co.’s case (3 supra), had been followed in United India Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Lehru and others AIR 2007 SC 1563 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut AIR 2003 SC 1292 . 27. Insurance policy is an outcome of the agreement between insured and insurer. The terms and conditions enumerated in the policy are outcome of such an agreement. The rights and obligations of insurer and insured emerge out of such an agreement since the insured and insurer are parties to such an agreement. They are bound by the terms of such agreement. If any one of them violate any one of those conditions or some of those conditions, the burden lie on the party to prove such violations. It is obligatory on such party to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the other party has violated the terms and conditions of the policy. Certain things will be within the exclusive knowledge of those parties or both the parties. Admittedly, the claimants are not the parties to the agreement, i.e., policy. A person who is not a party to an agreement is not bound by the terms and conditions of the policy. How can a person who is a third party will prove that one of the party to the agreement has not violated the terms and conditions of the policy? In fact, burden lies on the party who alleges such violation of terms and conditions. By shifting the burden to the claimants, the insurance company is trying to escape from its responsibility of proving the fact that insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy. 28. For example, in a given case, when a driver had renewed his licence from one of the RTA offices and it will be difficult for claimants to secure such information from the RTA office. It means that even if the driver had renewed his driving licence from one of the RTA offices it may not be noted in the office from which he obtained the driving licence. The RTA office which renewed the driving licence has the onus to inform the office which originally issued the driving licence that the licence had been renewed and necessary entries have to be made. The RTA office which renewed the driving licence has the onus to inform the office which originally issued the driving licence that the licence had been renewed and necessary entries have to be made. Now-a-days, i.e., in the computer age, it may not be difficult for the mighty organizations such as Insurance companies to get such information, but it may not be possible to a poor widow coming from a remote tribal area. 29. The Apex Court again interpreted Section 149(2)(a)(ii) vis-à-vis the proviso appended to Sub-sections (4) and (5 ) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In the famous case i.e., in Swaran Singh’s case, all the violations concerning driving licence have been examined by the Apex Court. In this case the Apex Court considered the definition of driving licence, Section 3 which deals with necessity for driving licence, section 4 age limit in connection with driving of motor vehicles, Sections 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 14 (currency of licences to drive motor vehicles) Section 15 renewal of driving licences, Section 16 revocation of driving licence on certain grounds and then Sections 19, 20, 21, 147, 149, 165 and 168 and elaborately discussed all the relevant aspects. It was observed as follows. “14.…………….The provision for compulsory insurance indisputably has been made, inter alia, with a view to protect the right of a third party. 16. The intention of the Parliament became further evident when in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a new chapter being Chapter VIIA dealing with insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks was introduced and the beneficent provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were further made liberal by reason of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the amendments carried out therein from time to time in aid of the third party claims by way of grant of additional or new rights conferred on the road accident victims. 19. Concededly different types of insurance covers are issued containing different nature of contract of insurance. We are, however, in this batch of cases mainly concerned with third party right under the policy. Any condition in the insurance policy, whereby the right of the third party is taken away, would be void. 20. 19. Concededly different types of insurance covers are issued containing different nature of contract of insurance. We are, however, in this batch of cases mainly concerned with third party right under the policy. Any condition in the insurance policy, whereby the right of the third party is taken away, would be void. 20. Indisputably such a benefit to a third party was provided under the Statute keeping in view the fact that the conditions in the assured's policy may not be of no or little effect in relation to a claim by a person to whom an assured was under a compulsorily insurable liability. 26. A right of the victim of a road accident to claim compensation is a statutory one. He is a victim of an unforeseen situation. He would not ordinarily have a hand in it. The negligence on the part of the victim may, however, be contributory. He has suffered owing to wrongdoing of others. An accident may ruin an entire family. It may take away the only earning member. An accident may result in the loss of her only son to a mother. An accident may take place for variety of reasons. The driver of a vehicle may not have a hand in it. He may not be found to be negligent in a given case. Other factors such as unforeseen situation, negligence of the victim, bad road or the action or inaction of any other person may lead to an accident. 27. A person suffering grievous bodily injury may require money for his survival/medical treatment. Statutory compensation paid to the next of kin of the victim of an accident may, thus, bring to a large number of families the only ray of light at the end of the tunnel. 30. Sub-section (1) of Section 149, casts a liability upon the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree as if he were the judgment debtor. Although the said liability is subject to the provision of this section, it prefaces with a non-obstante clause that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy. Furthermore, the statute raises a legal fiction to the effect that for the said purpose the insurer would be deemed to be judgment debtor in respect of the liability of the insurer. 38. Furthermore, the statute raises a legal fiction to the effect that for the said purpose the insurer would be deemed to be judgment debtor in respect of the liability of the insurer. 38. The words 'effective licence' used in Section 3, therefore, in our opinion cannot be imported for sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We must also notice that the words 'duly licensed' used in sub-section (2) of Section 149 are used in past tense. 41. ………………As for example when a person is granted a licence for driving a light motor vehicle he can drive either a car or a jeep and it is not necessary that he must have driving licence both for car and jeep separately. 42. Furthermore, the insurance company with a view to avoid its liabilities is not only required to show that the conditions laid down under Section 149(2)(a) or (b) are satisfied but is further required to establish that there has been a breach on the part of the insured. By reason of the provisions contained in the 1988 Act, a more extensive remedy has been conferred upon those who have obtained judgment against the user of a vehicle and after a certificate of insurance is delivered in terms of Section 147(3) a third party has obtained a judgment against any person insured by the policy in respect of a liability required to be covered by Section 145, the same must be satisfied by the insurer, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or to cancel the policy or may in fact have done so…………….. 45. It is trite that where the insurers relying upon the provisions of violation of law by the assured takes an exception to pay the assured or a third party, they must prove a wilful violation of the law by the assured. In some cases violation of criminal law, particularly, violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act may result in absolving the insurers but, the same may not necessarily hold good in the case of a third party. In any event, the exception applies only to acts done intentionally or "so recklessly as to denote that the assured did not care what the consequences of his act might be". 62. The proposition of law is no longer res integra that the person who alleges breach must prove the same. In any event, the exception applies only to acts done intentionally or "so recklessly as to denote that the assured did not care what the consequences of his act might be". 62. The proposition of law is no longer res integra that the person who alleges breach must prove the same. The insurance company is, thus, required to establish the said breach by cogent evidence. In the event, the insurance company fails to prove that there has been breach of conditions of policy on the part of the insured, the insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. 64. In the aforementioned backdrop, the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may be considered as the liability of the Insurer to satisfy the decree at the first instance. 65. A beneficent statute, as is well known, must receive a liberal interpretation…….. 66. The liability of the insurer is a statutory one. The liability of the insurer to satisfy the decree passed in favour of a third party is also statutory. 68. As has been held in Sohan Lal Passi, 1996 ACJ 1044 (SC), the insurance company cannot shake off its liability to pay the compensation only by saying that at the relevant point of time the vehicle was driven by a person having no licence. 76. Sub-section (5) of Section 149 which imposes a liability on the insurer must also be given its full effect. The insurance company may not be liable to satisfy the decree and, therefore, its liability may be zero but it does mean that it did not have initial liability at all. Thus, if the insurance company is made liable to pay any amount, it can recover the entire amount paid to the third party on behalf of the assured. If this interpretation is not given to the beneficent provisions of the Act having regard to its purport and object, we fail to see a situation where beneficent provisions can be given effect to. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the Act, to which pointed attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is in negative language may now be noticed. The said provision must be read with sub-section (1) thereof. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the Act, to which pointed attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is in negative language may now be noticed. The said provision must be read with sub-section (1) thereof. The right to avoid liability in terms of sub- section (2) of Section 149 is restricted as has been discussed hereinbefore. It is one thing to say that the insurance companies are entitled to raise a defence but it is another thing to say that despite the fact that its defence has been accepted having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has power to direct them to satisfy the decree at the first instance and then direct recovery of the same from the owner. These two matters stand apart and require contextual reading. 77. We have analysed the relevant provisions of the said Act in terms whereof a motor vehicle must be driven by a person having a driving licence. The owner of a motor vehicle in terms of Section 5 of the Act has a responsibility to see that no vehicle is driven except by a person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act. In a case, therefore, where the driver of the vehicle admittedly did not hold any licence and the same was allowed consciously to be driven by the owner of the vehicle by such person, the insurer is entitled to succeed in its defence and avoid liability. The matter, however, may be different where a disputed question of fact arises as to whether the driver had a valid licence or where the owner of the vehicle committed a breach of the terms of the contract of insurance as also the provisions of the Act by consciously allowing any person to drive a vehicle who did not have a valid driving licence. In a given case, the driver of the vehicle may not have any hand at all, e.g. a case where an accident takes place owing to a mechanical fault or vis-major. 82. ……………..In each case on evidence led before the tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. 82. ……………..In each case on evidence led before the tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If on facts, it is found that accident was caused solely because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus with driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning driving licence. 83. We have construed and determined the scope of sub-clause (ii) of sub- section(2) of section 149 of the Act. Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties. 96. It is, therefore, evident from the discussions made hereinbefore that the liability of the insurance company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the owner or driver thereof has been holding the field for a long time. 99. We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under subclause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realise the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act . However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be……………. 102. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163 A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g., disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/ are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The claims tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims. 30. Now it has to be seen that the judgments in the case of Sohalal Passi referred above and Swaran Singh’s case are the judgments of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court and they are still holding the field. 31. 30. Now it has to be seen that the judgments in the case of Sohalal Passi referred above and Swaran Singh’s case are the judgments of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court and they are still holding the field. 31. The very purpose of imposing a condition that no person shall drive the vehicle without a valid driving license is to prevent the accidents and to save the lives and limbs of the citizens. If the benevolent provisions are interpreted without considering the main purpose for which they have been enacted, such interpretation would in fact act against the same victims for whose benefit the provisions have been made. 32. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company had relied on several decisions mainly pertaining to three categories i.e., (1) where admittedly the driver had no valid driving licence, (2) where the driver was holding driving licence for one kind of vehicle, but was driving another kind of vehicle and (3) where the driver had failed to renew his driving licence. She has relied on a decision reported in Sardari v. Sushil Kumar (2008) 17 Supreme Court Cases 208, wherein the driver had admitted that he did not know how to drive a tractor and he had not possessed any valid driving licence. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that the award of the Tribunal exonerating the insurance company was correct. She had also relied on a case in between Malla Prakasarao v. Malla Janaki (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 343. In that case also, admittedly, the driver was not having valid driving licence to drive the vehicle at the time of accident. She has also relied on a case in between Bhuwan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2009) 5 SCC 136 , In that case the owner himself was driving the tractor. His learner’s licence expired prior to the date of accident. He applied for regular licence after the date of accident. He had also taken a plea that someone else was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred. In the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that the burden lies on the owner of the vehicle to prove his contention and that he failed to discharge the burden. It was also held that since he was not having valid driving licence on the date of accident, the insurance company was not liable to indemnify the same. In the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that the burden lies on the owner of the vehicle to prove his contention and that he failed to discharge the burden. It was also held that since he was not having valid driving licence on the date of accident, the insurance company was not liable to indemnify the same. So, on facts, the owner failed to discharge his burden in that case. Reliance is also placed in cases between Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Angad Kol (2009) 11 SCC 356 , Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Zaharulnisha (2008) 12 SCC 385 , National Insurance Co.Ltd., v. Kusum Rai (2006) 4 SCC 250 , New India Assurance Co.,Ltd., Tirupati, Chittoor District v. G. Sampoorna 2010 (4) ALD 586 . In all the above referred cases, on facts, it was held that the driver was not possessing valid driving licence. She had also relied on a decision reported in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Dupati Singaiah AIR 2009 AP 142 , wherein it was held that if the insurance company leads evidence to show that driving licence of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was fake one, it would be sufficient proof of breach of conditions as per Section 149(2)(a) of the Act. She has also relied on a judgment in case between United India Insurance Co.Ltd., v. Rakesh Kumar Arora AIR 2009 SC 24 . In that case, the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the vehicle was driven by a minor, who was admittedly not holding valid driving licence. In the above circumstances, it was held that the breach was deliberate and therefore the insurance company was exonerated. Certain of the decisions relied on by her are the cases where the driver was not holding proper licence i.e., licence to drive the kind of vehicle which he was driving. Reliance was placed on the decisions reported in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir (2008) 8 SCC 253 and New India Assurance Company Limited v. Prabhu Lal (2008) 1 SCC 696 . 33. The facts in Malla Prakasa Rao’s case (9 supra) reveal that the driving licence of the driver has expired before the date of accident and the driver did not apply for renewal within 30 days of the expiry of the said licence as required under Section 11 of the Act. 33. The facts in Malla Prakasa Rao’s case (9 supra) reveal that the driving licence of the driver has expired before the date of accident and the driver did not apply for renewal within 30 days of the expiry of the said licence as required under Section 11 of the Act. She had also relied on the judgment in United India Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Anubai Gopichand Thakare 2008 ACJ 213, wherein it was held that when in a case it is proved that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy, the insurance company is exonerated from its liability in view of fundamental breach of policy, then the Tribunal has no statutory power to direct the insurance company to pay the amount of compensation and then recover the same from the insured. 34. In the above circumstances, the Apex Court in Jai Prakash v. National Insurance Co.Ltd. 2010-AndhWR-1-216, observed as follows. “In regard to vehicles which do not have any insurance or do not have an insurance covering the risks relating to gratuitous passengers/riders, even if the driver/owner may be made liable under an award of the Tribunal, there is little or no chance of recovery of compensation that may be awarded. This is because normally drivers and owners of uninsured vehicles will not have the capacity to pay the compensation or would have transferred their assets to escape paying compensation. It is estimated that around 20 per cent of the victims of motor accidents fall under the unfortunate categories who do not get any compensation (except some who may get a token amount under Section 161 or 140 of the Act). A person hit by an uninsured vehicle, feels frustrated, cheated and discriminated, when he does not get any compensation, but sees another person hit by an insured vehicle getting compensation. The victim does not choose the vehicle which hits him, nor any role in causing the accident. But a victim is denied compensation, if the vehicle which hits disappears without trace, or if the vehicle is without insurance, while a similar victim hit by an insured vehicle gets compensation. Should the State, which by law provided for compulsory third party insurance to protect motor accident victims ignore these 20 per cent victims who do not get compensation or provide them with some effective remedy? Should the State do something to reduce the incidence of non-insurance? Should the State, which by law provided for compulsory third party insurance to protect motor accident victims ignore these 20 per cent victims who do not get compensation or provide them with some effective remedy? Should the State do something to reduce the incidence of non-insurance? Problem (ii):” “……………………Should we ignore the harsh reality that as long as the causes necessitating or forcing people to resort to such illegal travel in goods vehicles continue to exist, people will continue to travel in goods vehicles, unmindful of the risk, whether legal or illegal? Problem (iii):” 34. The Apex Court has given several directions and one of which is as follows. “A more realistic and easier alternative is to continue with the present system of third party insurance with two changes: (i) Define ‘third party’ – to cover any accident victim (that is any third party, other than the owner) and increasing the premia, if necessary (ii) increase the quantum of compensation payable under Section 161 of the Act in case of hit and run motor accidents.” 35. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that in the absence of the owner of the vehicle, no liability can be fastened on the insurance company. 36. Smt. A Chayadevi, learned counsel for the claimants, relied on a judgment reported in Meka Chakra Rao v. Yelubandi Babu Rao @ Reddemma 2001(1) ALT 495 (DB), wherein it was observed that even in the absence of owner of the vehicle, the question of statutory liability of the insurance company survives for consideration at the appellate stage. 37. Both the learned counsel have relied on the judgment in case between Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673 , wherein the Apex Court held that a smaller Bench cannot disagree or dissent from the view of law taken by a larger Bench. 38. However, the facts of that case reveal that there was no valid insurance coverage on the date of accident as the cheque towards premium for renewal of the policy was issued though one day prior to the date of accident, but the same was dishonoured. Smt. A. Chayadevi had relied on the decisions in Skandia Insurance Co.Ltd v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (2 supra) and also in Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy (5 supra). Smt. A. Chayadevi had relied on the decisions in Skandia Insurance Co.Ltd v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (2 supra) and also in Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy (5 supra). However, the facts of those cases reveal that though the driver engaged by the owner of the vehicle was having valid driving licence, but the vehicle was driven by some other person who was not having valid driving licence at the time of accident. Thus, admittedly, in those cases, the insured had placed the vehicle in the charge of driver who was having valid driving licence. She had also relied on the judgment in New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and others (3 supra). In that case, the driver produced a fake driving licence. It was observed that no licensing authority has the power to renew a fake licence and, therefore, a renewal if at all made cannot transform a fake licence as genuine. It was held that the insurer made statutorily liable to pay compensation to third parties can recover from insured vehicle owner the amount paid to third parties if there was any breach of policy conditions on account of vehicle being driven without valid licence. 39. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Admittedly, the burden lies on the insurance company to establish whether the inured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy. Even in the absence of insured the burden cannot be shifted to the claimants. As discussed in the following paras, since the evidence on record clinchingly establishes that a driving licence could be renewed from any one of the licensing offices, the evidence adduced by the insurance company is not sufficient on facts to conclusively hold that the driver had no valid driving licence on the date of accident basically for two reasons that admittedly the police did not file charge sheet against the driver in this case that he was not having valid driving licence on the date of accident. Secondly it appears that it is most improbable to say that the driver was allowed to drive the vehicle for a decade and none of the authorities had filed any case against him or prevented him from driving the vehicles. 40. Suffice to say that by literary construction or interpretation the very object of the Act may be defeated. Secondly it appears that it is most improbable to say that the driver was allowed to drive the vehicle for a decade and none of the authorities had filed any case against him or prevented him from driving the vehicles. 40. Suffice to say that by literary construction or interpretation the very object of the Act may be defeated. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that it is the duty of the owner to verify whether the driver is having valid driving licence or not. It may not be practicable for each and every owner of the vehicle to verify whether a driving licence produced by the driver is genuine or fake, particularly when the same is renewed by the RTA officials subsequently. An ordinary person may not be able to detect whether a driving licence is genuine one or fake one. In fact, it is the duty of the officials concerned to check the vehicles from time to time and to prevent the road traffic offences particularly the offences of not holding valid driving licence or driving the vehicles while they are drunk or in intoxication etc. 41. The Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Parvathneni (2009) 8 SCC 785 , arising out of a case where there was no policy at all in the circumstances the cheque issued by the owner itself was dishonoured, observed as follows. “Prima facie, we are of the opinion if the insurance company proves that it has no liability to pay compensation to the claimants, the insurance company cannot be compelled to make payment and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle. 42. No doubt, there are some decisions which have taken the view that even if the insurance company has no liability, yet it must pay and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle……….” 43. Thus, the said case was referred to a larger bench to decide the following questions. 42. No doubt, there are some decisions which have taken the view that even if the insurance company has no liability, yet it must pay and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle……….” 43. Thus, the said case was referred to a larger bench to decide the following questions. “Hence, we direct that the papers of this case be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench to decide the following questions: “(1) If an insurance company can prove that it does not have any liability to pay any amount in law to the claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act or any other enactment, can the court yet compel it to pay the amount in question giving it liberty to later on recover the same from the owner of the vehicle? (2) Can such a direction be given under Article 142 of the Constitution, and what is the scope of Article 142? Does Article 142 permit the Court to create a liability where there is none? 44. It has to be seen that in that case there was no policy i.e., agreement subsisting between the Insurance Company and the insured. Thus, the facts and circumstances of the case under which the above case was referred to a larger Bench is different from the facts and circumstances and the issues involved in the case of Swaran Singh and Skandia Insurance Company. 45. Even otherwise, it is settled law that the burden lies on the insurance company to prove that the insured had violated the terms and conditions of the policy. Mere making an averment that the owner of the vehicle violated the terms and conditions of the policy is not sufficient. In this case, admittedly, the first respondent is the owner-cum-driver of the vehicle. He was driving the vehicle on the date of accident. The contention of the insurance company is that the first respondent was not holding valid driving license on the date of accident and that the driving license issued by the Additional Licensing Authority, East Zone, Hyderabad, reveals that the license was issued to the said driver to drive non-transport vehicle and it was valid for the period from 21.06.1992 to 11.02.1993 and whereas the accident occurred on 15.08.2003. Thus, it is the case of insurance company that on the date of accident the driver was not holding a valid driving licence. Prima facie, it appears to be unnatural to say that the driver did not renew his driving licence for ten years. It also appears to be most improbable to say that none of the officials who might have checked the vehicle driven by the said driver did not raise any objection or booked any case against the driver. In this case also the police have not included the offence of not holding valid driving licence against the driver of the vehicle. Moreover, it is for the Insurance Company to prove the said violations. 46. Now it has to be seen whether the insurance company had discharged its burden. It has to be seen that the first respondent who is the owner-cum-driver of the vehicle has filed a counter and specifically averred that he was holding valid driving license on the date of accident. He has also mentioned in his counter that he filed a Xerox copy of the said driving license issued by the RTA authorities. However, the said Xerox copy of the driving license is not available in the file and there was no endorsement as to whether the Xerox copy of the said driving license was in fact filed along with the counter filed by the first respondent or not. The checking officers of the Court while checking plaint, written statement etc., should verify whether the documents said to have been filed are in fact filed or not. However, the fact remains that the first respondent claimed that he was holding valid driving license on the date of accident. In support of its case, the insurance company has examined its Assistant Manager Sri Ch.V.B. Sastry as RW.1. According to RW.1 they have obtained certificate No.125453/B2/05 from the office of the Additional Licensing Authority, East Zone, Hyderabad, in respect of driving license of the driver (Kalimulla) of the insured vehicle and as per the said certificate issued by the Additional Licensing Authority the driver (Kalimulla) was not holding driving license to drive the transport vehicle and even he did not possess any driving license as on the date of accident. Ex.B2 is the driving license extract issued by the Additional Licensing Authority. During cross-examination, RW.1 admitted that they have filed an application for issue of Ex.B2. Ex.B2 is the driving license extract issued by the Additional Licensing Authority. During cross-examination, RW.1 admitted that they have filed an application for issue of Ex.B2. But they have not filed copy of the said application, which was filed before the RTA, before the Tribunal. RW.1 also admitted that the date of birth of said Kalimulla as mentioned in Ex.B2 is 01.01.1900. It was suggested to him that in their application RTA authorities were requested to issue driving license up to 1993 only. RW.1 also admitted that the insurance company has appointed an investigator to collect the documents from RTA and examine the owner, but they have not filed the report of the said Investigator. He says that it is their internal matter. 47. The insurance company had also examined one Smt. M. Kameshwari, who is working as Junior Assistant in the office of RTA, Hyderabad East Zone, as RW.2. According to her, Ex.B2 certificate was issued by their office and it was issued in the name of Kalimullah to drive light motor vehicle, medium motor vehicle and transport vehicle and the last renewal of the license took place on 21.06.1990 valid up to 11.02.1993. During cross-examination, RW.2 admitted that there are five more regional transport authority offices in Hyderabad city for issue of driving licence and driving licences can be renewed from any one of such offices. She had also admitted that Kalimulla obtained original licence from Nandhed office of Maharashtra and not from their office. She has also admitted that as per their record there is no disqualification incurred by Kalimulla for renewal of driving license. Though she claims that she brought the file relating to Ex.B2, but she has admitted that she has not brought the application of insurance company for issue of Ex.B2. She further deposed that she cannot say whether Kalimulla obtained new driving license after 11.02.1993 from other office. Thus, her evidence also does not show whether insurance company sought the driving licence particulars of Kalimulla till the year 1993 or whether the driver had renewed his licence from any other RTA office. 48. Thus, it is clear that there are other transport offices in Hyderabad city itself wherein licence can be renewed. When license can be renewed from any other office as admitted by RW.2, the evidence adduced by RWs.1 and 2 will not help the insurance company. 48. Thus, it is clear that there are other transport offices in Hyderabad city itself wherein licence can be renewed. When license can be renewed from any other office as admitted by RW.2, the evidence adduced by RWs.1 and 2 will not help the insurance company. There is nothing on record to show that the insurance company got issued a registered notice to the first respondent owner-cum-driver of the vehicle to produce the copy of the driving licence. Unfortunately, the Motor Vehicle Inspector, who inspected the vehicle also did not make any endorsement with regard to driving license in his report. Ex.A4 reveals that the Motor Vehicle Inspector had inspected the vehicle on 16.08.2003 i.e., on the very next day of occurring the accident. He has noted the name of the owner-cum-driver of the vehicle as Mohd. Kaleemuddin, S/o Abdul Hussain, House No.19-2-11/151, Kalaputtar, Hyderabad. However, against the column particulars of driving licence the Motor Vehicle Inspector has not noted any particulars. There is another circumstance, the police after completing the investigation laid charge sheet against the first respondent Mohd. Khaleemullah, S/o Abdul Hassan, aged 34 years, Occupation: Driver, R/o House No.19-2-11/151, Bilal Nagar, Kalapather, Hyderabad and admittedly, the driver was not charge sheeted for not holding valid driving licence on the date of accident. Yet there is another circumstance, the charge sheet reveals the name of the owner-cum-driver as Mohd. Khaleemullah, S/o Abdul Hassan, but Ex.B2 shows his name as Kalimullah, S/o Abdul Hasuam. Moreover, his date of birth is shown as 01.01.1900 and his address is given as 16-2-242, Hyderabad. Thus, the house address given in the charge sheet is differing from the house address of the driver-cum-owner given in Ex.B2. Similarly, the full name and father’s name is also not tallying. In the above circumstances, I am of the view that the Insurance Company has not fully discharged its burden and therefore cannot be exonerated. Moreover it is a dispute between the insurance company and the owner of the vehicle. In the circumstances, I am of the view that it is for the insurance company to initiate separate proceedings and establish its case that the owner of the vehicle has violated the terms and conditions of the policy and recover the amount from him, if so advised. In the circumstances, I am of the view that it is for the insurance company to initiate separate proceedings and establish its case that the owner of the vehicle has violated the terms and conditions of the policy and recover the amount from him, if so advised. Even for the sake of argument, if it is accepted that the insurance company has proved that the owner of the vehicle has violated the terms and conditions of the policy, the guidelines of the Supreme Court in Swaran Singh’s case (1 supra) comes to the rescue of the claimants. 49. We should not forget that the contract of indemnity is a bilateral contract between insurer and insured whereunder promiser (insurer) undertakes to make good the loss caused to the promise by a third party. 50. In the above circumstances, I am of the view that though several other decisions cited had taken different views, this Court is bound by the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Swaran Singh’s case, which is of three judge bench of the Apex Court. Hence, the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case to be followed and accordingly the Insurance Company is directed to pay the amount to the claimants and may initiate separate proceedings against the owner of the vehicle for recovery of the said amount. Section 149(2) in fact gave rise to numerous litigations whereby the achievements of object behind Sections 147 and 149(1) and other provisions became uncertain on account of variety of interpretations on the said sections by different courts. Therefore, it is for the Legislature to examine the same and remove the uncertainties and see that all the victims of Motor Accidents receive just and reasonable compensation. 51. With regard to quantum of compensation, learned counsel for the claimants submitted that the Tribunal erred in not considering Ex.A6, salary certificate of the deceased issued by Pooja Priya Plasto Pack Private Limited and erred in fixing the income of the deceased at Rs.15000/- per annum as notional income. As seen from the evidence let in, PW.1 is the father of the deceased and he had categorically deposed that the deceased was aged about 19 years and was working as purchase manager in Pooja Priya Plasto Pack Private Limited and earning Rs.8500/- per month and that they were depending upon the income of the deceased. As seen from the evidence let in, PW.1 is the father of the deceased and he had categorically deposed that the deceased was aged about 19 years and was working as purchase manager in Pooja Priya Plasto Pack Private Limited and earning Rs.8500/- per month and that they were depending upon the income of the deceased. His evidence further reveals that the deceased had qualified intermediate in the year 2002. He denied the suggestion that Ex.A6 is a fabricated document created for the purpose of this case. PW.3 is the proprietor of Pooja Priya Plasto Pack Private Limited. According to him, the deceased worked as purchase manager in their company on a monthly salary of Rs.8500/- and that he issued Ex.A6. It is elicited in the cross-examination that he had mentioned in the complaint to the police that the deceased was his cousin. The Tribunal for valid reasons has not accepted the evidence of PW.3. Admittedly, no educational certificates of the deceased have been filed. Even in case of daily wage workers their daily wage is in between Rs.100/- and Rs.150/- per day. In the circumstances, I consider it just and reasonable to take the income of the deceased at Rs.120/- per day i.e., Rs.3,600/- per month and since the deceased is bachelor, if 1/2 is deducted towards his personal expenses, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.1800/- per month and annual loss of dependency comes to Rs.21,600/- (1800 x 12). Since the deceased is bachelor the age of his mother would be taken for applying the appropriate multiplier. The age of the mother of the deceased is shown as 40 years. As per Sarla Verma’s Case (See AIR 2009 SC 3104 ) for the age group of 36 to 40, the appropriate multiplier is ‘15’. If the same is applied, the total loss of dependency comes to Rs.3,24,000/-. The tribunal awarded Rs.2000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.10,000/- towards loss of estate. In addition to that, the claimants are also entitled to an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards love and affection. Thus, the total compensation amount comes to Rs.3,46,000/-. The interest awarded by the Tribunal at 7.5% p.a., appears to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 52. Before parting with this judgment, I intend to make the following observations. 53. In addition to that, the claimants are also entitled to an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards love and affection. Thus, the total compensation amount comes to Rs.3,46,000/-. The interest awarded by the Tribunal at 7.5% p.a., appears to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 52. Before parting with this judgment, I intend to make the following observations. 53. A lower class family which is statified with minimum necessities bare comforts leading a simple, peaceful and happy life or a wealthy and influential family with all comforts leading happy life or a family which is solely dependant upon the income of the sole earning member suddenly, unexpectedly may loose their loving family member in a ghastly motor accident. A wife may be deprived of her husband, children their loving father, the parents a sole support in their old age and thus a family may loose their most dearest one in a motor accident, and in some cases, the entire family and their future may be shattered. Is it humanly possible to compensate their loss? Whether any amount of money will bring back their happiness? 54. Why accidents have been occurring? Who is responsible? There are several reasons. Some of the reasons are as follows. (a) The vehicles are not properly maintained, therefore their condition is not good. (b) Road conditions are not good and in some areas they are the worst (Though some efforts are being made to improve national Highways, but still the road conditions are not good in most of the areas, particularly in rural areas). (c) Vehicles are being driven by the drivers who are not properly trained and in some cases vehicles are being driven by minors. (d) Driving the vehicles in drunken state, (e) overtime working of the drivers without rest and work pressure on them, (f) over crowding or over loading of the vehicles, (g) violation of traffic rules (h) rash and negligent driving (since many persons are just in hurry to reach their destinations (ultimate destination?) and (i) non-maintenance of required road signals or parking signals. 55. Several steps had been taken by the Government to ensure the safety of the road users from time to time. As long as in 1994 itself, suggestions were called for from the Transport Development Council for the purpose of amending the Motor Vehicles Act. 55. Several steps had been taken by the Government to ensure the safety of the road users from time to time. As long as in 1994 itself, suggestions were called for from the Transport Development Council for the purpose of amending the Motor Vehicles Act. The said Council made some important suggestions which include (1) providing adequate compensation to the victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. (2) Concern for the road safety standards in transport of hazardous chemicals and pollution control; (3) The simplification of procedure of pollution liberalization in the field of road transport; (4) Enhancing penalty to the traffic offenders; (5) increase in the amount of compensation to the victims of hit and run cases; (6) removal of time limit for filing applications for road accident victims for compensation. Again the Act was amended in the year 2000. The statement of objects and reasons for the amendment of the Act in 2000 show that further amendments became necessary so as to reduce vehicular pollution and to ensure the safety of the road users. 56. It appears that every provision and enactment have certain objects to be achieved. Section 3 of the Act envisages that no person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence. Section 4 of the Act imposes a condition that no person under the age of 18 years shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place. Certain violations have been made as offences. Whoever drives a motor vehicle in contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine of Rs.500/- or with both under Section 181 of the Act. Similarly, driving the vehicle at excessive speed or by a person with alcohol in blood excessive of permissible limits or under the influence of drug to an extent of making him incapable to drive or to exercise proper control over the vehicle etc., have been made offences under the Act. Passengers should not be carried in a goods vehicle. A person holding driving licence for one type of vehicle should not drive another type of vehicle. A passenger bus should not carry more passengers than the permitted capacity. Speed should not exceed the prescribed limits of the area through which the vehicle has to pass through. Passengers should not be carried in a goods vehicle. A person holding driving licence for one type of vehicle should not drive another type of vehicle. A passenger bus should not carry more passengers than the permitted capacity. Speed should not exceed the prescribed limits of the area through which the vehicle has to pass through. In spite of all this, violations continue not only in remote areas but also in the cities, even in the capital of the State or the Country. 57. The sole object of the above referred provisions is to prevent the accidents. Thus, the ultimate goal is to avoid pain and suffering and troubles to the road users. However, in spite of the above said categorical provisions for regulating road transport, still violations continue to occur and accidents have been occurring regularly and the number is on increase. A news item was published in Saakshi Daily newspaper, wherein, it was reported that traffic challans of an amount of Rs.11,00,000/-(Rupees Eleven Lakhs) are pending for collecting fine amounts for traffic violations in Hyderabad city alone and the list of defaulters include many VIPs. 58. We often observe and it is common experience that the city buses are being packed with full of passengers and there will be no space to enter into the bus. Some persons travel on footboard and some by hanging at the door. In rural areas people sit on the top of the bus as there will be no space inside the bus. A passenger auto which should carry only three passengers, carries six to seven people or sometimes even ten passengers. Transport facilities are admittedly not sufficient. People have to wait for hours together at a bus stop to board the RTC bus and there are many villages which have no bus facility an even if there are one or two buses, it is hardly sufficient. When there are no authorized passenger vehicles, people may be compelled to travel by goods vehicles or by unauthorized vehicles. A student may have to attend his examination, a patient may be urgently required to be shifted to any nearby town to provide urgent medical facility and there may be any other compelling circumstances which may force the people to travel by unauthorized vehicles. When sufficient transport facilities are not available how can we blame the persons who travel by unauthorized vehicles? When sufficient transport facilities are not available how can we blame the persons who travel by unauthorized vehicles? It is also common experience that the farmers carry the coolies in the trailer attached to their Tractor to their fields and they transport paddy etc., to the towns by their tractors. In some cases, tractors are being used for transportation of sand, bricks 59. When sufficient transport facilities are available, for example where metro railway system is in existence or sufficient number of buses or city buses are available nobody would travel in goods vehicles. Thus, it appears that only under compelling circumstances, people are forced to travel in the vehicles, which are not permitted to carry the passengers. 60. It is also the common experience of the people that for organizing public meetings ofpolitical parties people are being carried in goods vehicles i.e., in lorries and tractors and some of these meetings are being addressed by the Hon’ble Ministers. Thus, it is 61. It is also surprising to note that a vehicle which starts from Delhi reaches Cochin and another vehicle which starts from Assam reaches Mumbai by passing through several States and check posts with all violations and without any objection. Thus, the vehicles though come under the check of several check posts, traffic police and road transport officials but they ply with all violations without any objection and only when the vehicle is involved in an accident, then the violations do surface. Thus, a vehicle, which is being driven by a driver who is in a drunken state or who is not duly licensed or with fake licence or a vehicle without a valid permit or insurance policy or with any other violations conveniently passes through several states without any objection or obstruction. It is common feeling that once the checking officials are satisfied, then everything is all correct (OK). 62. It has to be seen that a driver of the vehicle, who does not pay tollgate fee, cannot pass through a private tollgate. When a private agency which is only interested in collection of tollgate fee is able to prevent a vehicle from passing through a tollgate? Whether the Government cannot prevent the vehicles being driven with violations or being driven by a driver who is in drunken state? When a private agency which is only interested in collection of tollgate fee is able to prevent a vehicle from passing through a tollgate? Whether the Government cannot prevent the vehicles being driven with violations or being driven by a driver who is in drunken state? Even if regular cases are booked and fine amounts are collected from all those who violate the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act the Government may get sufficient income even more than the expenses involved in maintaining the check posts. Can we say that the officials concerned are not aware about the continuous violations which are offences under the Act? Thus, it appears that there is lack of will and the entire system has been directly or indirectly allowing the violations continue to occur. Is it not the responsibility of the State machinery to see that no vehicle is brought on public road or cross a check post with violations? It is for the Government (State or Central as the case may be) to see that necessary check posts are arranged to check the violations and prevent the violations under the Motor Vehicles Act. If the Government take appropriate steps and become successful in maintenance provisions of MV Act but also under the provisions of NDPS Act, Excise Act and IPC can be prevented. In other words, failure of state machinery in not checking the vehicles appears to be one of the main cause for occurring road traffic accidents. 63. At the cost of repetition, I may say that we have to bear in mind the constitutional commands enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution of India. As a welfare measure and public assistance each and every victim of motor accidents or any other accident i.e., fire accident, floods or natural calamities should be awarded reasonable compensation and see that the affected family is saved from starvation and unemployment. Every effort has to be made to see that their previous status is returned to them as a social security measure. 64. Every effort has to be made to see that their previous status is returned to them as a social security measure. 64. It appears that keeping in view the above factors and the fact that it may be very difficult for the victims of the motor accidents to realize compensation from the owners of the vehicles, the legislature, in their wisdom, have made it compulsory that no vehicle shall be used in public place unless there is in force a policy of insurance complying with all the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act. Different kinds of policies are being issued. There is no common policy in issuance of policies. Be that as it may, sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act provides an opportunity to the insurance company to avoid its liability in certain circumstances for example where the insured had allowed the vehicle to be driven by a driver who is not duly licensed. Since the claimants cannot recover the compensation awarded from the insured, they are becoming the ultimate victims. Keeping in view the ground realities, the Apex Court has given certain directions in Jai Prakash’s case (20 supra) and it is for the legislature to consider the same and amend the required provisions. 65. Having regard to the ground realities, I strongly feel that the need of the hour is attitudinal change. Unless the attitude of all those i.e., police, doctors, advocates, insurance officers, judges public in general change, the victims of accidents would not get the real justice to which they are entitled to under the provisions of relevant acts and in the light of our constitutional philosophy. 66. There are several instances wherein after the accident, the victims will be lying on the road or by the side of the road. They will be crying due to unbearable pain of injuries. Several persons observe these injured victims, but rarely few persons come forward to inform the police or make efforts to shift the victims to a nearby hospital. 67. Even if somebody comes forward to help the victims and others would caution them and may say “are you prepared to move round the police station or Court?” This shows how the people have become scared about the functioning of the police and the Courts. 68. 67. Even if somebody comes forward to help the victims and others would caution them and may say “are you prepared to move round the police station or Court?” This shows how the people have become scared about the functioning of the police and the Courts. 68. Thus, in several cases, the victims do not get timely help, which would have saved the lives of several victims of motor accidents. In many cases, senior police officers, in spite of receiving information, do not move. A constable will be deputed who may not have any vehicle. He may have to wait for hours to get a passenger bus in a remote area. Therefore, he may force his entry into a lorry cabin (against rules?) and reach the place of accident. Thus, we must understand under what compelling circumstances people are forced to travel in a vehicle may be plying with violations. 69. We forget that basically we are human beings and we must have some concern for the suffering of a fellow human being. What is the using of preaching Advaita when we have no concern for the suffering of fellow human beings? 70. Vivekananda said that“He who sees Shiva in the poor, in the weak and in the diseased, really worships Shiva; and if he sees Shiva only in the image, his worship is but preliminary. He who has served and helped one poor man seeing Shiva in him, without thinking of his caste, creed or race or anything with him Shiva is more pleased than with the man who sees Him only in temples. He who wants to serve the father must serve the children first. He who wants to serve Shiva must serve his children.” It is said God will not be found in Temples, Mosque, Church or Gurudwar but He may be found in the form a former who is tilling the land or a worker who is working under the Sun. Service to humanity is service to God. 71. All great Saints, Preachers and Philosophers irrespective of their religious faiths, caste and region had shown concern for the human suffering and preached us compassionate attitude, honesty and truthfulness. 72. Peace, harmony, all round development in the society and thereby happiness to all its citizens should be the main object of every State. 71. All great Saints, Preachers and Philosophers irrespective of their religious faiths, caste and region had shown concern for the human suffering and preached us compassionate attitude, honesty and truthfulness. 72. Peace, harmony, all round development in the society and thereby happiness to all its citizens should be the main object of every State. State and all it’s instrumentalities should ensure fair and equitable justice to all the citizens. 73. In the case reported in M. Kesavana Bharati v. State of Kerala 1973(4) SCC 225 , Mathew J The learned Judges quotes from Pope Paul VI as follows. “To quote St. Ambrose….. the world is given to all, not only to the rich………That is private property does not constitute for any one an absolute and unconditional right. No one is Justified in keeping for his exclusive use what he does not need, when others lack necessities. In a word, according to the traditional doctrine, as found in the fathers of the Church and the great theologians, the right to property must never he exercised to the detriment of the common good. “God has intended the earth and all that it contains for the use of all men and all peoples. Hence, Justice accompanied by Charity, must so regulate the distribution of created goods that they are actually available to all in an equitable measure” Moreover all have the right to possess a share of earthly goods sufficient for themselves and their families”. 74. Pope Paul peaks of “Justice accompanied by charity”. It is not charity today but it is a constitutional mandate “Welfare by meeting the basic demands of subsistence can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that re available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare, guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance then is not a mere charity but a means to” promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity”. “…………………….it is clear, the Justices alter the puzzle itself and create law. Thus while judicial legitimacy requires faithful adherence to precedent legal development turns on creative acts. As a result we call Judges who follow precedent legitimate but those who successfully break from it great”. 75. “…………………….it is clear, the Justices alter the puzzle itself and create law. Thus while judicial legitimacy requires faithful adherence to precedent legal development turns on creative acts. As a result we call Judges who follow precedent legitimate but those who successfully break from it great”. 75. Therefore, it is apt to quote Pluto who said “Only philosophers should rule the country”. Philosophers said “To wipe out every tear from every eye is the greatest philosophy”. So the object of rulers (State now a days) should be to relieve its citizens from all kindly misery, pain and agony and to protect their lives. 76. We have assured our citizens the socio economic and political justice to all the citizens of India, therefore, ultimately, justice has to be done. For rendering justice, if necessary, the legislature has to make the laws or amend the same. The executive have to implement the same with all sincerity and honesty keeping in view the constitutional philosophy and the goals of the directive principles of state policy. The judiciary has to interpret the laws keeping in view the goals which the enactment intended to achieve. The constitutional philosophy should be the ultimate guiding principle. 77. Any provision in any Act or Rule which cause misery to the people should be deleted or suitably amended to serve the purpose of relieving distress of suffering people. Any provision which does not serve the main purpose of the Act or violate the fundamental rights of the citizens or against directive principles of state policies and thereby defeats the very constitutional philosophy has to be ignored, set aside or interpreted properly. 78. Therefore, the need of the hour is the change of the attitude of the police officials, doctors and the presiding officers of the Tribunals. It is the responsibility of the entire society to see that necessary help is being rendered to the victims. It is also the responsibility of the police officials concerned to act promptly and to render all the necessary and required help to the victims i.e., shifting of the victims to the hospital and collecting all necessary documents from the driver, vehicle and owner of the vehicle and sending the copies of the same to the insurer, Tribunal and to the victims. It is also most unfortunate that in spite of several directions many private hospitals do not come forward to treat the victims of the road accidents and they insist for deposit of the amount before providing any treatment. It is their duty to take all necessary steps to save the life by giving life saving medicines and necessary treatment. 79. If the richest and affluent persons and those who can render some help to the people realize the importance of helping the poor and needy 80% of the problem in the society can be solved. One should not forget that whatever huge wealth he may accumulate; he had to leave each and every pie of his wealth on this earth itself and nothing will accompany him. Therefore, the Doctors should begin the treatment whenever they get an opportunity to save a life. Similarly, all those who get an opportunity to help the victims should think positively and do all the needful that they can do. The satisfaction which one will get by doing real service and sacrifice cannot be got by any other act. 80. In most of the cases, the entire burden is shifted to the claimants. They have to collect the documents. When they approach police, hospital or RTA authorities they may feel it difficulty to secure the relevant documents. Instead of placing burden on the claimants, the Tribunal can insist the concerned police to send a report and all relevant documents under Section 158(b) of the Act. All the relevant records can be summoned from police, hospital or RTA authorities. Thus, the Tribunal, claimants, insured, insurance company should see that truth is established. However, if fraud is alleged or detected the same has to be dealt with iron hand. Since the insurance companies could avoid their liabilities in view of Section 149(2) of the Act, what is happening can be narrated as follows. When the matter ultimately reached High Court or Apex Court may be after ten which was renewed by RTA authorities was ultimately found to be fake? When RTA authorities could not detect whether it is a fake driving licence or not, and renewed the same how can a poor Tribal of a rural background would verify the driving licence before he boarded a vehicle or before he was knocked down by the said vehicle? When RTA authorities could not detect whether it is a fake driving licence or not, and renewed the same how can a poor Tribal of a rural background would verify the driving licence before he boarded a vehicle or before he was knocked down by the said vehicle? Are we justified in denying the compensation to those victims at this stage? 81. Everybody violates the rules. Nobody takes care to see that violations do not occur. Is it not the failure of the State machinery or is not the failure of the whole system, which is causing this untold misery to the motor accident victims. Is it not the responsibility of entire society, the State to see that justice is done to those victims? Is it not necessary to interpret the relevant provisions keeping in view the very object of those provisions? Is it not the responsibility of the legislature to amend the relevant provisions and see that all the victims of road accidents, irrespective of the fact whether they are third parties or not, get just and reasonable compensation? In spite of clear and categorical findings of the Apex Court since confusion is there, the legislature must consider all the aspects and see that the victims of road accidents ultimately get compensation and if necessary by amending Section 149(2) of the Act and see that the compensation amount reaches the victim and if any violations are proved to recover the same from the insured. 82. Section 160 of the Act provides that the officer-in-charge of a police station shall, if so required by a person who claims that he is entitled to claim compensation or by the insurer, furnish to them on payment of the prescribed fee required information at the disposal of such officer relating to the identification marks and other particulars of the vehicle and the name and address of the person who was using the vehicle at the time of accident etc. 83. Rule 455 envisages that every application for payment of compensation made under Section 166 shall be made in Form C.I.D. and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed therefor in Rule 475. However, sub-rule (2) of Rule 475 envisages that the Claims Tribunal may in its discretion exempt a party from the payment of fee prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 475. However, sub-rule (2) of Rule 475 envisages that the Claims Tribunal may in its discretion exempt a party from the payment of fee prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 475. As per Rule 456 on receipt of an application under Rule 455 the Claims Tribunal may, examine, the application (applicant) on oath and the substance of such examination, if any, shall be reduced into writing. Rule 457 empowers the Tribunal to dismiss the application summarily, if there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding therewith. According to Rule 458 if the application is not dismissed as referred to above, the Claims Tribunal shall send to the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident and its insurer, a copy of the application, together with a notice of the date on which it will hear the application and may call upon the parties to produce on that date any evidence which they may wish to tender. Thus, it has to be seen that on the very first day when the application is posted, the respondents may adduce their evidence. The Claims Tribunal may also require the dependent to furnish certain information to satisfy itself that spurious or a collusive claim has not been preferred as mentioned under Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 458. Rule 459 gives an opportunity to the owner of the motor vehicle and the insurer to file a written statement on or before the first hearing or within such further time as the Claims Tribunal may allow. Rule 462 also empowers the Claims Tribunal to make a local inspection or examine any person likely to be able to give information relevant to the proceedings. The method of recording evidence is provided under Rule 465. Rule 466 envisages that if the Claims Tribunal finds that an application cannot be disposed of at one hearing, it shall record the reason which necessitated the adjournment and also inform the parties present of the date of adjourned hearing. Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that no unnecessary adjournment shall be granted and without recording reasons no adjournment shall be granted and all efforts have to be made to dispose of the application at one hearing. 84. Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that no unnecessary adjournment shall be granted and without recording reasons no adjournment shall be granted and all efforts have to be made to dispose of the application at one hearing. 84. It has to be seen that as per Section 169 of the Act in holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. In spite of this clear provision, the Tribunals have been dealing with the claim petitions as if regular suits. Rule 471 deals with the judgment and award of compensation. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 471 makes it clear that the Tribunal shall read the operative part of the award in the regional language understood by the petitioner or petitioners and it shall explain the mount of compensation awarded and it shall be made clear that there is no liability to pay any percentage amount of the compensation to the lawyer who appeared in the case and that the lawyer who appeared in thecase shall be entitled to the fees determined by the Claims Tribunal (the amount determined by the Tribunal to be paid as advocate fees should be specifically informed to the Claimants). Sub-rule (4) of Rule 471 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall forward a copy of its Award to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority having jurisdiction over the place of the accident for appropriate action against the driver and owner of the vehicle concerned in case either criminal proceedings have not already been initiated against them or they have proved unsuccessful for lack of evidence. Thus, it is clear that even if the driver or the owner of the vehicle have been acquitted by the Criminal Court, the Claims Tribunal should forward a copy of the award to the above referred authority for taking necessary action against the driver and owner of the vehicle (basing on the findings of the Tribunal). Sub-rule (5) of Rule 471 envisages that the petitioner/petitioners (claimants) shall open bank accounts at the banks situated to the nearest place of their native place or place of residence and Sub-rule (6) of Rule 471 makes it clear that the Tribunal shall send the cheques or Bank Pass Books of the petitioner or petitioners direct to the respective Banks. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 471 envisages that the petitioner/petitioners (claimants) shall open bank accounts at the banks situated to the nearest place of their native place or place of residence and Sub-rule (6) of Rule 471 makes it clear that the Tribunal shall send the cheques or Bank Pass Books of the petitioner or petitioners direct to the respective Banks. Rule 473 makes it clear that Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX, Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXVIII, Rules 1 to 3 apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. As far as the applications arising under Chapter X of the M.V. Act (no fault liability) the procedure has been prescribed under Rule 476. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 476 makes it obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to obtain whatever information necessary from the Police, Medical and other authorities and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice to appear or not on the appointed date. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot say that it is for the claimants to secure the documents and to produce the same before the Tribunal. A duty is caste upon the Tribunal to obtain necessary information which includes the right of summoning the records from the authorities and proceed to decide the matter. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 envisages that basis to award the claim shall be (i) registration certificate of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, (ii) insurance certificate or policy relating to the insurance of the motor vehicle against the third party risk, (iii) copy of first information report, (iv) post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and (v) nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim. These are the basic requirements for making an award. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 476 envisages that all such applications arising under Chapter X of the M.V. Act have to be disposed of within 45 days from the date of receipt of such applications. These are the basic requirements for making an award. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 476 envisages that all such applications arising under Chapter X of the M.V. Act have to be disposed of within 45 days from the date of receipt of such applications. Rule 476-A envisages that the petitioner or petitioners shall either affix their recent photographs on the original Claim Application or affix on a separate sheet of paper and fasten the same to the original Claim Petition with their signatures or thumb impressions as the case may be duly attested by the Advocate on record. 85. It has to be seen that the Tribunal under Section 166 (4) shall treat the report filed under Section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation under the Act. Therefore, it is not necessary that in all the cases, the claimants themselves should approach the Tribunal. It has to be seen that the police report referred to in sub-section (6) of Section 158 shall be in Form 54 as per Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Form 54 is as follows. “Form 54 [See Rule 150(a) and (2)] Accident Information Report 1. Name of the police station 2. CR.No./Traffic accident report 3. Date, time and place of accident 4. Name and full address of the injured/deceased 5. name of the hospital to which he/she was removed 6. Registration number of vehicle and the type of the vehicle 7. Driving licence particulars (a) Name and address of the driver (b) Driving licence number and date of expiry (c) Address of the issuing authority (d) Badge No.in case of public service vehicle 8. Name and address of the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident 9. Name and address of the Insurance Company with Whom the vehicle was insured and the particulars of the Divisional Officer of the said insurance company 10. Number of Insurance Policy/Insurance Certificate And the date of validity of the Insurance Policy/Insurance Certificate 11. Registration particulars of the vehicle (class of vehicles) (a) Registration No. (b) Engine No. (c) Chassis No. 12. Route permit particulars 13. Action taken, if any, and the result thereof” 86. Thus, all the necessary information required for treating a report filed under sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act have to be furnished to the Tribunal in Form 54. Route permit particulars 13. Action taken, if any, and the result thereof” 86. Thus, all the necessary information required for treating a report filed under sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act have to be furnished to the Tribunal in Form 54. No middle man is required to pose himself as savior of claimants. 87. The apex Court time and again has been reminding the Tribunals and officers to follow the said rules. Referring to sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the Delhi High Court in case between All India Lawyers Union (Delhi Unit) v. Union of India and others 2002 ACJ 2019 , observed as follows. “……………………….Expression ‘as soon as’ may be stretched to mean as soon as practicable. The term has a relative meaning according to the thing which is to be done. It may denote a reasonable time; or may be equivalent to ‘whenever’ or may mean ‘immediately’. It means promptly and with due diligence; as soon as was reasonably possible; forthwith, as soon as it can be conveniently done……………” 88. Therefore, the police officers have to forward the report with due diligence as soon as was reasonably possible. 89. The Apex Court in General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2007 ACJ 2006 gave specific directions to all the police officers about the need to comply with Section 158 (6) and if the reports filed under Section 158(6) are treated as claim petitions it will reduce considerably the filing of false claims. 90. The Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Muralidhar 2009 ACJ 1526 , observed as follows. “In addition to the devastating human toll, the economic impact of road crashes is also enormous. Many of those injured or killed are wage earners, leaving families destitute and without means to support………….. 91. We have the tools needed to combat this epidemic. In the developed nations, proven methods such as enforcement of laws regarding driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, reducing speed limits and requiring seat belts and restraints have shown significant reduction in traffic fatalities. Road design and road environment, vehicle design and road safety standards are also strategies that successfully address the traffic safety. For maximum impact of RTI’s, a systems approach with multiple scientifically proven prevention techniques must be employed. Education alone has been shown to be less effective and often ineffective. 92. Road design and road environment, vehicle design and road safety standards are also strategies that successfully address the traffic safety. For maximum impact of RTI’s, a systems approach with multiple scientifically proven prevention techniques must be employed. Education alone has been shown to be less effective and often ineffective. 92. Proven interventions for developed countries require research, modification and testing for developing countries. For example, developing countries face poorly designed and maintained roadways, unsafe vehicles, drivers under the influence of drugs or alcohol, lack of national policies and inadequate enforcement. Success will require significant new resources supported by sustained political commitment.” 93. This Court in M. Jayanna v. K. Radha Krishna Reddy 2005 ACJ 344 gave specific directions to the police to comply with the provisions of Section 158(6) of the M.V. Act. Several directions were also given to the Director of Medical and Health Services. The authorities concerned should look into those directions and do the needful. 94. Recently I have read in newspapers that every year 1.50 lakh people are dying in motor accidents. 95. In the above circumstances, the Tribunals are directed to specifically follow the Rules 455, 456, 457, 458, 466, 471, sub-rule (2) of Rule 475, 476 and 476-A and the awards passed by the Tribunals should reflect whether the Tribunals have complied with those provisions or not. If these rules are strictly followed by the Tribunals then it may help for early disposal of the cases. 96. Further, to prevent or to reduce the occurring of accidents and false implication of drivers or vehicles, the following suggestions have been made. I) As soon as the accident information report about the occurring of an accident is received by the police the concerned police officials must immediately rush to the place of accident, render all necessary help to the victims such as first aid etc., if necessary shift the injured to the nearest hospital and see that necessary treatment is provided to them. The directions given by the Apex Court and other Courts in this regard have to be strictly implemented (See the direction given by the Apex court in Jai Prakash’s case). The directions given by the Apex Court and other Courts in this regard have to be strictly implemented (See the direction given by the Apex court in Jai Prakash’s case). II) The Government should keep some amount at the disposal of such officials to spend the same in case of emergency, such as for engaging vehicles, shifting the victims to the hospital or to give first aid and life saving medicines to the injured. In fact when help is rendered by non-officials to the victims, their services have to be recognized and appreciated. They should be encouraged by giving letter of appreciation and in addition to it in appropriate cases money reward may be given. III) The Police officials must observe the scene of place (place of accident) and note all minute details such as skid marks, location of vehicles, its distance from the centre of the road, or road margin etc., take photographs etc., and prepare rough sketch of scene of offence. IV) The Police Officials must collect all the necessary documents such as insurance policy, driving licence, permit, registration certificate, way bill and SR and send the copies of the same to the Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police as the case may be to prevent fabrication of false case of false implication of any vehicle or driver at a subsequent stage. Delay in dispatch of FIR and other documents to the Courts and superior officers always gives scope for fabrication of false cases. V) The Police officials must immediately inform to (a) the near relations of the victim(s), (b) the insured, (c) the insurance company and (d) the concerned Superintendent of Police and preserve acknowledgment. VI) They must also send accident information report as required under Section 158(6) of the Act (as per the directions of the Apex Court in Jai Prakash’s Case cited above) VII) The insurance companies, as soon as they receive information about the occurring of an accident, must immediately enquire into the matter, verify the facts and see that no vehicle or driver is falsely implicated in any case. VIII) The Insurance Companies may consider, while issuing policies, whether it is possible to issue only one type of policy covering all the persons including insured (because insured in many cases may become a victim of an accident). No policy should be issued unless all the third parties are covered. VIII) The Insurance Companies may consider, while issuing policies, whether it is possible to issue only one type of policy covering all the persons including insured (because insured in many cases may become a victim of an accident). No policy should be issued unless all the third parties are covered. If necessary, the relevant provisions should be amended (Third parties mean except insured or insurer all others have to be treated as third parties). IX) Insurance companies should obtain required security bonds from the insured to see that in case it pays compensation to the victims, it can recover the same from the insured. X) The Insurance Companies may consider whether it is possible to have mechanism to check and verify whether insured has been following the conditions of policy or not? And if the insured has violated the policy conditions, to cancel such policy. XI) The insurance companies may take steps and see that the property of the insured is attached in all such cases wherein it is alleged that the insured has violated the terms and conditions of the policy. XII) The concerned Government should take all appropriate and strict measures and see that no vehicle plies on road or passes through a check post with violations of the relevant provisions of the MV Act, for example without valid driving licence and a vehicle driven by a driver who is under the influence of alcohol or drug, without valid permit etc. If any vehicle passes through a check post or from the jurisdiction of the concerned official who has to check the violations and subsequently after occurring the accident or in a subsequent check if it is found that the vehicle has passed through the check post or from the jurisdiction of a particular officer with violations, the officers in-charge of that check post through which the vehicle was allowed to pass through should be made responsible for the same and the Government should take strict action against the erring officials. XIII) As a social security measure, the Central and State Governments should pay just and reasonable amount as compensation to all the victims of road accidents (who are unable to get compensation for any reason), victims of natural calamities, victims of fire accidents, drowning cases and see that the victims are not forced to starvation and difficulties. 97. In the result, the appeal is allowed. 97. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The appellants are entitled to Rs.3,46,000/-towards compensation with interest at 7.5% p.a., from the date of petition till the date of realisation with proportionate costs. The Insurance Company is liable to pay the same and may, if advised, initiate necessary proceedings to recover the same by proving the violations against the insured. From the compensation awarded, the claimants 1 and 2 are entitled to receive at Rs.1,50,000/-each and claimant No.3 is entitled to receive Rs.46,000/-. The claimants 1 to 3 are permitted to withdraw 50% of the amount awarded and costs. The remaining amount shall be kept in fixed deposits for a period of five years. 98. It would not be proper on my part, if I conclude this judgment, without placing on record the commendable help and valuable suggestions given to this Court by Smt. A. Chayadevi, learned counsel for the claimants, Smt. A. Jayanthi, learned counsel for the second respondent-insurance company, and Sri Kota Subba Rao, Sri Mahender Rao and Sri Venugopal Reddy, learned counsel appearing for various Insurance Companies.