Judgment Ram Chand Gupta, J. 1. Facts leading to the present Regular Second Appeal are as under : 2. Respondent No. 1-plaintiff through its devotee and next friend Shri Maman Chand son of Mool Chand filed suit for possession against appellant -defendant No. 1 and respondent Nos. 7 to 11-defendant Nos. 2 to 6 for possession of the property in dispute. Plea has been taken that plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 through whom suit has been filed on behalf of Moorti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj Brajman Mandir Shri Radha Krishan and defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are Makboozadars in possession of plot of land bearing Khewat No. 16 khata No. 42, Khasra No. 473(1K-2M) situated in the revenue estate of Hidayatpur Chhaoni, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, as per jamabandi for the year 1972-73. On the northern portion of the said plot of land, there exists a temple, which is private temple of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 and defendant Nos. 3 to 6. Moorti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj is the presiding Deity in the said temple. In the site plan filed with the plaint, the temple was described by letters `ABCDEF and the boundaries of the temple have been given as under :- "East :- Gurgaon Delhi Road West :- Road leading to the Haryana Roadways Bus Stand. North :- Remaining portion of khasra No. 472 in which a well and tin shed are situated and remaining portion is vacant. South:-Remaining portion of khasra No. 473 in which two shops are built by the plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 and remaining portion is vacant." 3 It is further averred that in village Hidayatpur Chhaoni status of makboozadar is equal to status of proprietor of land and that the land in possession of makboozadar can be alienated, inherited and in all respects managed by makboozadars like proprietor of land. Defendant No. 1 claimed to be nephew of defendant No. 2. They had taken possession of the said Mandir about four years before filing of this suit, without any right or title over the same. Hence, this suit for decree for possession on the basis of title. 4. Appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 filed written statement contesting the suit of plaintiffs, inter alia, on the ground that the temple is not a private temple and that the same is a public temple and that plaintiff-defendant Nos. Hence, this suit for decree for possession on the basis of title. 4. Appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 filed written statement contesting the suit of plaintiffs, inter alia, on the ground that the temple is not a private temple and that the same is a public temple and that plaintiff-defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are not the owners of the temple. It is also denied that status of makboozadars is akin to status of proprietor. It is also denied that defendants had taken forcible possession of the Mandir. Rather specific plea has been taken that they are in possession of the temple as Pujari since the time of their forefathers and that earlier their forefathers were pujaris of the temple and that as per the custom pujari cannot be removed from the temple, as defendants and earlier their forefathers had been serving in the temple as pujaris, as a matter of right. Hence, it is contended that plaintiffs are having no right to take possession of the temple. 5. In the replication, plea was taken by respondent-plaintiffs that the temple is not a public temple and that rather the same is their private temple. It is also denied that defendants are in possession of the temple as pujaris, since the time of their forefathers. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by learned trial Court vide order dated 4.6.1979 :- "1. Whether plaintiffs No. 2 to 4 and defendants No. 3 to 6 were in the enjoyment of proprietary and possessory rights over the property in suit and they have been illegally dispossessed therefrom by defendant Nos. 1 and 2? OPP 2. Whether there existed a private temple of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4 and defendant Nos. 3 to 6 with Moorti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj as Presiding Deity therein as alleged, and if so, to what effect? OPP 3. Whether plaintiffs No. 2 to 6 have no right to file this suit? OPD 4. Whether the defendants No. 3 to 6 have been unnecessarily impleaded as parties and if so, to what effect? OPD 5. Whether the proceedings of this suit are liable to be stayed on account of pendency of earlier litigation? OPD 6. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction etc.? OPP 7. Relief." 7. OPD 5. Whether the proceedings of this suit are liable to be stayed on account of pendency of earlier litigation? OPD 6. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction etc.? OPP 7. Relief." 7. Parties adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions before learned trial Court. 8. One of the plaintiffs-Maman, appeared as PW1 and deposed that Mandir is situated in Khasra No. 473 and that the same is owned by him and other plaintiffs. He also proved site plan Ex.P1 and deposed that Mandir is their private property, which was constructed by their ancestor Baba Lalji. He has also deposed that earlier Sheo Narain was the Pujari in the said temple to whom they used to pay Rs.25/- per month for his services. He also deposed that the Commission had also visited the Mandir and made necessary measurements. He deposed that Rajinder appellant or Bholu never remained Puajaris in the said temple and that they had taken possession of the temple for the last five years. 9. However, in the cross-examination, he deposed that the Mandir was already in existence before he acquired the age of discretion. He also deposed that Sheo Narain remained Pujari for 5-7 years and that he was father of Bholu Ram. He has failed to prove any receipt regarding alleged payment of emoluments to Sheo Narain. He also could not say as to who was the Pujari before Sheo Narain. He also deposed that public at large visit temple to pay obeisance. 10. Plaintiff closed evidence after tendering in evidence copy of jamabandi Ex. P2; copy of Naksa Frishat Ex. P-3; copy of khasra Paimaish for the year 1877 Ex.P4; copy of jamabandi for the year 1877 P5; copy of jamabandi for the year 1906-07 Ex. P-6; copy of misal Hakiyat 1940-41 Ex. P7, copy of aks sizra Ex. P-8; copy of khasra girdawari Ex. P9; copy of jamabandi Ex. P10; copy of decree-sheet Ex. P-11; copy of sharait wazib-Ul- Arz Ex.P12; copy of judgment of appeal Ex.P13 copy of decree in appeal Ex.P14 and copy of report of commission Ex. P-15. 11. On the other hand, appellant-defendant No. 1 Rajinder appeared as DW1 and deposed that Sheo Dhan was his grand-father and Sheo Narain was brother of Pandit Sheo Dhan. P-11; copy of sharait wazib-Ul- Arz Ex.P12; copy of judgment of appeal Ex.P13 copy of decree in appeal Ex.P14 and copy of report of commission Ex. P-15. 11. On the other hand, appellant-defendant No. 1 Rajinder appeared as DW1 and deposed that Sheo Dhan was his grand-father and Sheo Narain was brother of Pandit Sheo Dhan. Further deposed that Bholu Ramdefendant is son of Sheo Narain and that earlier Sheo Narain was Pujari in the temple, who died in the year 1971. He also deposed that earlier Sheo Dhan was Pujari in this temple and earlier to that Ram Partap and before that Laik Ram, his great grand father were Puajaris in the temple. He also deposed that Laik Ram and Ram Partap are brothers and all these facts were told to him by Sheo Narain. He denied that he had ever taken forcible possession of the temple. He deposed that the expenditure of temple is being met by offerings made by general public as the temple is visited by general public and the same is not a private property of respondent-plaintiffs. 12. DW2 is Rajender Kishore, who was 64 years of age at the time of examination. He had deposed that he has been seeing the temple in dispute for the last 50 years and that in these days Pujari of the temple is Rajinder and that earlier Pandit Shiv Narain was the Pujari, who died in the year 1971-72 and earlier to that his brother Sheo Dhan was the Pujari, who died in the year 1938. He also deposed the temple is a public temple and the expenditure is met by offerings given by the public. 13. DW3 is Gur Parshad Garg, who was 69 years of age at the time of examination. He also deposed that temple is a public temple and that earlier Shiv Dutt predecessor-in-interest of present appellant was Pujari in the temple and thereafter Shiv Narain became Pujari of temple and that he had seen Shiv Narain working as Pujari in the temple. However, he could not say as to whether after death of Shiv Narain, Bholu Ram and Rajinder had been working as Pujaris. 14. DW4 is Mamchand Bhardwam, who was 68 yeas of age at the time of examination. However, he could not say as to whether after death of Shiv Narain, Bholu Ram and Rajinder had been working as Pujaris. 14. DW4 is Mamchand Bhardwam, who was 68 yeas of age at the time of examination. He deposed that he has been seeing the temple since 1947 and earlier Shiv Narain was the Pujari and after his death Rajinder-appellant is Pujari and that the expenses are being met by offerings given by public. 15. Shiv Lal son of Polia Ram has also been numbered as DW4 by learned trial Court and the same can be read as DW4/A. He was 83 years of age at the time of examination. He deposed that earlier Sheo Dhan was the Pujari in the temple and thereafter Shiv Narain became the Pujari of the temple, who died 7-8 years ago. He also deposed that after death of Shiv Narain Rajinder became Pujari of the temple. He also deposed that the temple is being run by offerings of the public and that nobody is sole owner of this temple. 16. DW-5 is Dev Dutt son of Hira Lal. He was 80 years of age at the time of examination. He retired as Excise and Taxation Officer. He also deposed that he had been seeing the temple since the year 1914 and that earlier Ram Partap was the Pujari of the temple and thereafter Sheo Dhan was the Pujari and after death of Sheo Dhan, Shiv Narain remained the Pujari and after the death of Shiv Narain Rajinder -appellant is in possession as Pujari. He also deposed that temple is a public temple. 17. DW6 is Bholu Ram son of Shiv Narain, respondent No. 7-defendant No. 2, who also corroborated the version of appellant-Rajinder. He specifically deposed that for the last 70-80 years, he and his ancestors had been continuing in possession of temple as Pujaris. 18. Leaned trial Court after hearing counsel for both the parties and after considering the entire evidence, decided issue No. 1 to the effect that temple in dispute vests in Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj Brajman Mandir Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj and that appellant -defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 had not taken illegal possession of the same and that present appellant- defendant No. 1-Rajinder had been continuing as Pujari lawfully. 19. Issue Nos. 19. Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were discussed together and it was held that property vests in Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj Brajman Mandir Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj and that defendant No. 1-Rajinder was not lawfully removed as Pujari of the temple. It was also observed that Maman Chand has failed to prove that he is next friend or Manager of plaintiff No. 1 and that either he or plaintiff Nos. 3 to 6 in any capacity can lawfully remove Rajinder Pujari. 20. While discussing issue No. 5, it was observed that previously suit was instituted by Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj through Shri Bhagwant Dayal against Maman Chand and Sheo Narain for removal of defendant No. 1 and however, during pendency of that suit Sheo Narain Pujari died and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were not brought on the record and were not impleaded as defendants in that suit. It was also held that points in controversy in issue between the parties in that suit were also different and that question of possession of Sheo Narain as Pujari or defendant No. 1-Rajinder of this suit as Pujari was not an issue in that suit. 21. Regarding issue No. 6, it was observed that the same was not pressed at the time of arguments. 22. As a consequential to findings on various issues, present appellant- defendant No. 1 was held to be in possession of the temple in dispute lawfully and hence suit filed by respondent-plaintiffs for possession of the temple was dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost. 23. Aggrieved against the dismissal of suit filed by respondent No. 1- plaintiffs, they filed appeal before learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, who reversed the judgment passed by learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 19.2.1982 and the suit filed by respondent- plaintiffs was decreed and it was ordered that they are entitled for decree for possession of the property marked by letters `ABCDEF in the site plan Annexure P1. 24. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree passed by then learned Additional District Judge,Gurgaon, the present Regular Second Appeal was filed by appellant-defendant No. 1 -Rajinder, which was admitted by this Court vide order dated 28.4.1982 without framing substantial question of law. 25. 24. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree passed by then learned Additional District Judge,Gurgaon, the present Regular Second Appeal was filed by appellant-defendant No. 1 -Rajinder, which was admitted by this Court vide order dated 28.4.1982 without framing substantial question of law. 25. Regular Second appeal was decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 10.5.2002 accepting the appeal filed by present appellant- defendant No. 1 and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1982 passed by then learned Additional District Judge,Gurgaon and the judgment and decree passed by then learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Gurgaon, dated 11.9.1980 was restored. 26. Aggrieved against the said decision of this Court dated 10.5.2002, respondent-plaintiffs filed Special Leave Petition before Honble Apex Court. Honble Apex court granted Special Leave to appeal to respondent-plaintiffs and set aside the judgment and decree passed by this Court in Regular Second appeal and the case was remanded to this Court for disposal afresh, in accordance with law, by observing as under :- "Leave granted. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 10th May, 2002 passed in Regular Second Appeal No. 575 of 1982 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Admittedly, the High Court has set aside the order of the first appellate court in the Second Appeal without framing a substantial question of law, as enjoined by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure(for short "CPC"). This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC in second appeal only on the basis of substantial question of law framed at the time of admitting the appeal or modified or substituted later at the time of hearing and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial question of law, if any. Judgment rendered by the High Court in second appeal without following the aforesaid procedure is not sustainable in law. Judgment rendered by the High Court in second appeal without following the aforesaid procedure is not sustainable in law. Reference may be made to R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi, 2001(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 192 : 2001(4) SCC 688, M.S.V.Raja & Another v. Seeni Thevar & Others, 2001(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 669 : 2001(6) SCC 652, Kanhaiyalal & Others v. Anupkumar & Others, 2003(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 293 : 2003(1) SCC 430, R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.Temple & Another, 2003(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 705 : 2003(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 579 : 2003(8) SCC 752, Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead)by Lrs. v. Jagadish Kalita & Others, 2004(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 682 : 2004(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 114 : 2004(1) SCC 271, Thiagarajan & Ors. v. Sri Venugopalaswamay B. Koil & Ors., 2004(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 444 : JT 2004(5) SC 54. In all the aforesaid cases, this Court has held that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law, if any. A judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 CPC without following the aforesaid procedure is not sustainable in law. As indicated above, in the present case, the High Court has assumed jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC and, without framing a substantial question of law, set aside the order of the first appellate court. On this ground alone, the appeal is accepted. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the case is remitted back to the High Court for disposal afresh in accordance with law. The High Court will first frame questions of law, if any, and then proceed with the matter and decide the same in accordance with law. Since the proceedings pertain to a suit having been instituted in the year 1971 and the second appeal itself of the year 1982, we would request the Honble Chief Justice to list the second appeal on priority basis and, if possible, dispose it off within three months of the receipt of a copy of this order. The appeal stands allowed accordingly." 27. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the whole record carefully. 28. The appeal stands allowed accordingly." 27. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the whole record carefully. 28. After remand of the case by learned Apex court, learned counsel for the appellant has framed the following questions of law stated to be arising in this Regular Second Appeal :- "1. Whether the Lower Appellate court could have reversed the order of the trial Court without dealing with the well reasoned findings of the trial Court ? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court could have completely ignored the unrebutted evidence of DW2, DW4, DW5, DW6 on the record while holding the temple to be a private one ? 3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has misread the evidence on the record? 4. Whether the Judgment & decree of the Lower Appellate Court is perverse?" 29. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that well reasoned judgment passed by learned trial Court has been set aside by learned Appellate Court without discussing the reasons given by learned trial court and without considering unrebutted evidence adduced by appellant on the point that temple is a public temple and not a private temple of respondent- plaintiffs. Hence, it is contended that aforementioned substantial questions of law arise in this Regular Second Appeal for adjudication of this Court. 30. On the other hand, it has been argued by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs that law is well settled that while in first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as the `Code), the appellate Court can go into question of fact and however in second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code, the High Court cannot interfere in the findings of the fact of the first Appellate Court and it is confined only to questions of law. It is further contended that this Court is having no jurisdiction to interfere without formulating substantial question of law, even if this Court is satisfied that the Courts below committed error in recording finding of fact. It is further contended that in this case no substantial question of law arises and hence, it is contended that appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. He has also placed reliance upon Narayanan Rajendran and another v. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, 2009(2) RCR (civil) 286. 31. It is further contended that in this case no substantial question of law arises and hence, it is contended that appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. He has also placed reliance upon Narayanan Rajendran and another v. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, 2009(2) RCR (civil) 286. 31. There is no dispute regarding legal proposition that after amendment of 1976, in Section 100 of the Code, a duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal. It was only on account of this reason that judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court has been set aside by Honble Apex Court and the case was remanded to this Court with the direction to decide the same afresh in accordance with law, after framing questions of law, if any, and then to proceed further with the matter and to decide the same in accordance with law. 32. Though question of law was not framed at the time of admission of present appeal, and however, it has been observed by Full Bench of this Court in Dayal Sarup v. Om Parkash (since deceased) through L.Rs and others, 2010(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 594 : 2010(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 113 : (2010-4)160 PLR 1, that this Court can formulate question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the Code at any point of time before hearing of the appeal, even without amending the grounds of appeal. It has also been held that it is the duty of the court to formulate substantial question of law while hearing the appeal under Section 100(4) and 100(5) of the Code and question of law can be permitted to be raised at any stage of proceedings. 33. Hence, this Court is to see as to whether any substantial question of law arises in this regular second appeal, which requires consideration by this Court. 34. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwar (Dead) by Lrs., 2001(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 243 : JT 2001(2) SC 407, it was observed by Honble Apex Court that in order to maintain second appeal, substantial question of law should arise from the finding of fact and it should be formulated by the High Court. 34. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwar (Dead) by Lrs., 2001(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 243 : JT 2001(2) SC 407, it was observed by Honble Apex Court that in order to maintain second appeal, substantial question of law should arise from the finding of fact and it should be formulated by the High Court. It was further observed that trial Court had decreed the suit and first appellate Court reversed the finding of trial Court and on the facts of that case, it was held that substantial questions of law arise particularly when trial Courts findings were reversed by first appellate Court. It was observed that the task of an appellate Court affirming the finding of trial Court is an easier one and appellate Court agreeing with the view of trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court and that expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. However, it is averred that while writing a judgment of reversal, the appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles: firstly the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial Court must weigh with the appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge, who authors the judgment and if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. It is further observed that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of the trial Judge on a question of fact. It was also observed that while reversing the finding of fact, the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by learned trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. 35. It was also observed that while reversing the finding of fact, the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by learned trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. 35. On the facts and circumstances of that case, Honble Apex Court framed the following substantial question of law for decision by the High Court :- "Whether on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendant the First Appellate Court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was made out by the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more so when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the findings of the trial Court ?" 36. In the present case as well, finding recorded by learned trial Court regarding status of temple being public temple and regarding the fact that the appellant-defendant No. 1 since the time of his forefathers has been continuing in possession of the same as Pujari, which is based on unrebutted oral evidence, was set aside by learned first Appellate Court and the temple was held to be a private temple without any evidence being adduced on the point by respondent-plaintiffs. Hence, in my view the following substantial question of law arises for decision in this regular Second Appeal :- "Whether on the pleadings and material brought on record by the plaintiffs, the first appellate Court was right in holding that the temple is a private temple of respondent-plaintiffs and that appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 are liable to be ejected as Pujari of the temple and that respondent-plaintiffs are entitled for decree for possession of the said temple, more so, when such findings were arrived at in reversal of the finding of the trial Court." 37. It has been vehemently argued by learned counsel for the appellant- defendant No. 1 that respondent-plaintiffs were to stand on their own legs. It was for them to prove as per their assertions that the temple was constructed by their forefathers and that it was their private property and that they were in possession of the same and they were forcibly dispossessed by appellant- defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. It was for them to prove as per their assertions that the temple was constructed by their forefathers and that it was their private property and that they were in possession of the same and they were forcibly dispossessed by appellant- defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. However, it has been contended that no evidence has been adduced by respondent-plaintiffs in order to prove the said assertion except self-serving statement of one of the plaintiffs. It is further contended that it was deposed by Maman Chand, when he appeared as PW1 that the temple was constructed by Baba Lalji and that however, he has failed to prove as to who was Baba Lalji and when the temple was constructed by him. It is further contended that rather he has admitted that earlier Sheo Narain, father of respondent-defendant No. 2 was the Pujari of the temple and he could not say as to who were the Pujaris earlier to Sheo Narain. It is further contended that respondent-plaintiffs also failed to prove that they were in possession of the temple and that they were allegedly dispossessed about four years before filing of the suit. It is further contended that sufficient oral evidence was adduced by appellant-defendant No. 1 to prove that temple is a public temple and that appellant-defendant No. 1 has been continuing in possession of the same as Pujari and that earlier to appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2, their ancestors used to be in possession as Pujaris for the last 70 years and hence, it is contended that without considering the said evidence, well reasoned judgment rendered by learned trial Court has been reversed by learned appellate Court. 38. On the other hand, it has been contended by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs that merely on the ground that public visit to pay obeisance in the temple or merely on the ground that appellant-defendant No. 1 is working as Pujari in the temple, it cannot be said that temple has acquired the status of a public temple. It is further contended that even as per report of Local Commissioner, the temple is standing on Khasra No. 473 owned by respondent-plaintiffs and hence it is contended that learned first appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment rendered by learned trial Court. 39. It is further contended that even as per report of Local Commissioner, the temple is standing on Khasra No. 473 owned by respondent-plaintiffs and hence it is contended that learned first appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment rendered by learned trial Court. 39. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs further argued that dedication of private temple to public cannot be readily inferred from the mere fact that members of public are freely admitted to the temple for worship and/or for attending festivals celebrated by Pujaris/mahants.On the point he has placed reliance upon The Bihar State Boad of Religious Trust, (Patna) v. Mahanth Sri Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2057. 40. He has also contended that a Pujari is not having any right to continue in a office as a matter of right, as he is appointed only to conduct worship. On the point he has placed reliance upon Chakrabarti v. Broja Lal Singha and others, 1923 Calcutta 142. He has also placed reliance upon State of W.B. And others v. Sri Sri Lakshmi Janardan Thakur and others, (2006)7 Supreme Court Cases 490, wherein learned Apex Court has mentioned certain factors to be taken into consideration while ascertaining whether a religious trust is a private or public. Relevant paragraph 15 of the judgment reads as under :- "15. In order to ascertain whether a trust is private, the following factors are relevant : (1) If the beneficiaries are ascertained individuals; (2) If the grant has been made in favour of an individual and not in favour of a deity; (3) The temple is situated within the campus of the residence of the donor; (4) If the revenue records or entries suggest the land being in possession of an individual and not in the deity. On the other hand an inference can be drawn that the temple along with the properties attached to it is a public trust : (1) If the public visit the temple as of right (2) If the endowment is in the name of the deity. (3) The beneficiaries are the public. (4) If the management is made through the agency of the public or the accounts of the temple are being scrutinized by the public." 41. (3) The beneficiaries are the public. (4) If the management is made through the agency of the public or the accounts of the temple are being scrutinized by the public." 41. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the respondent- plaintiffs that a judgment which is not an inter party is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of the right to the property in dispute and hence, it is contended that previous judgment though not between the same parties and however, regarding the property in dispute is also relevant for the purpose of decision of present controversy. On this point he has placed reliance upon Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, 1998(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 6 : 1998(1) RCR (Rent) 610; Mohinder Pal and others v. Prem Kumar and others, 2005(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 828 : 2005(3) PLR 768 and Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, 2002(1) RCR (Civil) 724. 42. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon Teki Venkata Ratnam and others v. Dy. Commissioner, Endowments and others, (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 106, wherein it was observed as under : "9. The second submission based on the decision of the District Court made in O.P. No. 1 of 1940 declaring the temple as private, as rightly held by the High Court, has no merit or force. It must be remembered that a private temple in course of time depending on various factors and developments may gradually acquire the nature of a public temple. The Division Bench of the High Court in this regard relied on the decision of this Court in G.S. Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Rancchhoodas Kalidas. Para 15 of the said judgment reads :- `Though most of the present day Hindu public temples have been founded as public temples, there are instances of private temples becoming public temples in course of time. Some of the private temples have acquired great deal of religious reputation either because of the eminence of its founder or because of other circumstances. They have attracted large number of devotees. Gradually in course of time they have become public temples..............." 43 He has also placed reliance upon T.D. Gopalan v. The Commissioner of Hindu religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1716, relevant paragraph of which reads as under :- "11. Mr. They have attracted large number of devotees. Gradually in course of time they have become public temples..............." 43 He has also placed reliance upon T.D. Gopalan v. The Commissioner of Hindu religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1716, relevant paragraph of which reads as under :- "11. Mr. Natesan who appears for the plaintiff-appellant has assailed the whole approach of the High Court to the question of the character of the temple which, according to him, had been proved to be private in origin. It has been contended by him that the usual state of affairs to be found in Madras as per the observations of the Privy Council could not be applied to the case of Saurashtra community which migrated from the territories which now form part of the State of Gujarat centuries ago. This community, has, apart from several other individual characteristics, maintained a tradition of having private temples. Moreover if the origin of the temple had been proved to be private then according to the law laid down by the Privy Council itself in Babu Bhagwan Dins case 67 Ind. App1 : (AIR 1940 PC 7) dedication to the public was not to be readily inferred. Such an inference, if made, from the fact of user by the public was hazardous since it would not, in general, be consonant with Hindu sentiment or practice that worshippers should be turned away; and, as worship generally implied offerings of some kind, it was not to be expected that the managers of a private temple should in all circumstances desire to discourage popularity. It was further emphasized by their lordships that the value of public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right. In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuii v. Rannchboddas Kalidas, (1970)2 SCR 275 : AIR 1970 SC 2025, it was pointed out that the appearance though a relevant circumstance was by no means decisive. The circumstance that the public or a section thereof had been regularly worshipping in the temple as a matter of course and they could take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in that temple apparently as a matter of right was a strong piece of evidence to establish its public character. The circumstance that the public or a section thereof had been regularly worshipping in the temple as a matter of course and they could take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in that temple apparently as a matter of right was a strong piece of evidence to establish its public character. If votive offerings were being made by the public and the expenses were being met by public contribution, it would be safe to presume that the temple was public. In short the origin of the temple the manner in which its affairs were managed the nature and extent of the gifts received by it, rights exercised by devotees in regard to worship therein, the consciousness of the manager and the consciousness of the devotees themselves as to the public character of the temple were factors that went to establish whether a temple was public or private." 44. Law is well settled that respondent-plaintiffs are to stand on their own legs. They have come to the court with a specific plea that the temple in dispute is their private temple and that they were dispossessed by appellant- defendant No. 1 forcibly about four years before filing of this suit. Hence, it was for them to prove that the temple in dispute was a private temple and that they were in possession of the same and that they were dispossessed about four years before filing of this suit by appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 in order to succeed in their suit for possession against appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. 45. As already discussed above, evidence of plaintiffs consists of oral statement of one of the plaintiffs, Maman Chand, PW1, and the revenue record of khasra No. 473 since the year 1877 and the copies of judgment of trial Court and appellate Court in a previous litigation to which present appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were not the parties. From the said documentary evidence, the only fact, which is proved is that plaintiffs are recorded as macboozadars of khasra No. 473. From the report of Local Commissioner the only fact which is proved is that the temple is existing on the said khasra number. However, plaintiffs have failed to prove as to when the temple was constructed and by whom. From the report of Local Commissioner the only fact which is proved is that the temple is existing on the said khasra number. However, plaintiffs have failed to prove as to when the temple was constructed and by whom. Plaintiffs also failed to prove as to when and how Maman Chand -plaintiff came to act as Manager of temple and as to who had appointed him. As per oral deposition of PW1 Maman Chand, the temple in dispute was constructed by one Baba Lalji and however, except for his bald statement there is no other oral or documentary evidence to support his version. Even he has failed to prove as to who was Baba Lalji. 46. Further as per his own version, Sheo Narain remained Pujari of temple for 5 to 7 years and he does not know as to who remained Pujari of temple before Sheo Narain. He has deposed that Sheo Narain is father of respondent-defendant No. 2-Bholu Ram. He does not know as to who was the Pujari of temple 10-15 years prior to the filing of the suit. He has also failed to adduce evidence that he was in possession of the temple in dispute and that he was forcibly dispossessed by appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 about four years before filing of the suit. The pleadings of respondent-plaintiffs on the point are vague one and no sufficient evidence was adduced by respondent-plaintiffs to prove the assertions made in the plaint. 47. On the other hand, sufficient oral evidence has been adduced by appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 that their ancestors were appointed as Pujaris of the temple for the last more than 60-70 years and that they had been continuing in possession of the temple as Pujaris since the time of their forefathers and that temple is visited by public at large and the same is being run by donations being given by the public. 48. Appellant-defendant-Rajinder himself appeared as DW1 and deposed regarding this fact, as detailed above. His deposition has been corroborated by DW5 Dev Dutt, retired Excise and Taxation Officer, who was also 80 years of age at the time of examination. 48. Appellant-defendant-Rajinder himself appeared as DW1 and deposed regarding this fact, as detailed above. His deposition has been corroborated by DW5 Dev Dutt, retired Excise and Taxation Officer, who was also 80 years of age at the time of examination. He deposed that earlier Ram Partap was the Pujari and after his death his son Sheo Dhan became Pujari and after Sheo Dhan, his brother Sheo Narain remained as Pujari, who remained in the same capacity till his death in the year 1971 and after his death Rajinder became the Pujari and at present he is continuing as such. His statement was not controverted in the cross-examination on the point. 49. Merely on the ground that in the cross-examination, defendant No. 2, who appeared as DW6 admitted that Ram Partap was appointed as Pujari by residents of the city including ancestors of Maman Chand, conclusion cannot be drawn that Ram Partap was appointed as Pujari by ancestors of Maman Chand and that ancestors of Maman Chand were owners of the temple. Rather, it only shows that ancestors of Maman Chand also participated alongwith other residents in the appointment of Ram Partap as a Pujari. 50. Moreover it is admitted case of both the parties that the proprietary rights of the temple in dispute are vested in the Deity, i.e., Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj. Respondent-plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are having any right to remove the appellant-defendant No. 1-Rajinder as a Pujari of the temple. Hence, it has been rightly held by learned trial Court that appellant-defendant No. 1-Rajinder continues to hold the office of Pujari of the temple in question. 51. The conclusion as to whether the land on which the temple is constructed is owned or possessed by plaintiff Nos. 2 to 6 is immaterial for the purpose of decision of present controversy. As already discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to prove that the temple was constructed by their ancestors and that the temple is their private property. Proprietary rights of suit property vest in Deity, i.e., Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj. Temple is being visited by public at large and the same is being managed by present appellant-defendant No. 1 from the public donations. 52. Proprietary rights of suit property vest in Deity, i.e., Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj. Temple is being visited by public at large and the same is being managed by present appellant-defendant No. 1 from the public donations. 52. Hence, in view of the legal proposition as held in the aforementioned authorities by Honble Apex Court, in the present case it can be said that the temple has acquired the status of public temple, though respondent-plaintiffs have failed to prove that the same was a private temple of their ancestors. 53. Learned First Appellate Court has set aside the well reasoned judgment passed by learned trial Court without given any cogent reasons for discarding unrebutted oral evidence adduced by appellant-defendant No. 1. 54. So far as judgment in previous suit Ex. P13 is concerned, which was passed in a suit instituted by one Bhagwant Dayal acting as next friend of Deity, i.e., plaintiff No. 1 against Maman Chand, now plaintiff No. 2 and Sheo Narain, appellant-defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were not parties to that said suit. The claim made by Bhagwant Dayal was that it was a public temple and Maman Chand should be removed from its management. The suit was dismissed. First appeal preferred by Bhagwant Dayal was also dismissed and the second appeal was withdrawn and hence, even first appellate Court had observed that as present contesting respondent was not a party to that litigation and as such the judgment is not binding upon them. Hence, though it can be said that it is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, however, on the basis of the said judgment it cannot be said that respondent- plaintiffs are having any right to dispossess appellant-defendant No. 1 from the temple in dispute. 55. Hence, though it can be said that it is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, however, on the basis of the said judgment it cannot be said that respondent- plaintiffs are having any right to dispossess appellant-defendant No. 1 from the temple in dispute. 55. Learned trial Court has rightly observed that Pujari was initially appointed by residents of city and the services remained in the family of Ram Partap and even if for the time being it is taken that services of Pujariship remained in the family of Ram Partap, may not be sufficient to make user binding for all times to come and however, it is proved that Sheo Dhan, Sheo Narain and present appellant-Rajinder have been continuing as Pujaris with implied consent of all the residents including respondent-plaintiffs and there is no evidence or material on the record to reach the conclusion that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 illegally dispossessed respondent-plaintiffs. 56. Hence, learned trial Court has rightly held that suit property vests in Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj Brajman Mandir Shri Radha Krishan Ji Maharaj and that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not illegally dispossessed anyone including respondent-plaintiffs and that defendant No. 1 is lawfully coming as Pujari in the temple and hence, respondent-plaintiffs have no right to dispossess him and hence, learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit filed by respondent-plaintiffs. 57. Learned first Appellate Court has reversed the finding of learned trial Court without giving any cogent reasons. The authorities cited by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, as discussed above, are not applicable to the facts of present case. As already discussed above, in the present case plaintiffs have failed to prove that they were owners of temple in question and that the temple in question is their private property and that they are competent to remove Rajinder from the post of Pujari. 58. Hence, the substantial question of law as framed by this Court is decided in favour of appellant-defendant No. 1. 59. As a consequence thereof, the present appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated February 19, 1982 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge First Class, Gurgaon dated September 11, 1980 is restored. 60. 59. As a consequence thereof, the present appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated February 19, 1982 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge First Class, Gurgaon dated September 11, 1980 is restored. 60. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.