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2011 DIGILAW 407 (GUJ)

Forge & Forge v. Union of India

2011-05-09

HARSHA DEVANI, R.M.CHHAYA

body2011
Judgment Ms. Harsha Devani, J.—By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seeks the following substantive reliefs:— “9. In the premise of what is stated hereinabove the petitioners pray that: 1. YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of declaration or a writ in the nature of declaration or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, holding and declaring that the impugned order dated 4.12.2003 passed by the Respondent No. 3 is illegal, null and void; 2. YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the impugned order dated 4.12.2003 passed by Respondent No. 3 and be further pleased to direct the respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 38,87,472.72, being duty paid by the petitioner under protest, alongwith interest @ 18%. 2. The petitioner No. 1, a private limited company, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner company’) is inter alia engaged in the activity of manufacture of steel forgings. During the relevant period, that is, 1986-87, the petitioner company had filed Classification List for its products ‘Roughly Shaped Forged Articles of Steel’, with effect from 18th November, 1986 under Sub-Heading 7208.00 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Taking recourse to the provisions of rule 173B(5) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (the Rules), the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajkot by an order dated 26th June, 1987 unilaterally modified the Classification List filed by the petitioner company under S.H. 7208.00 and classified the same under S.H. 7308.90 attracting 15% ad valorem duty. In view of the modification of the Classification List filed by it, the petitioner company addressed a letter dated 3rd July, 1987 to the Superintendent of Central Excise, wherein it was stated that since the petitioner company intended to prefer an appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector modifying its classification list, during the pendency of the said appeal, it would be paying duty under protest at the rate modified by the said authority. The petitioner company accordingly paid duty under protest for the period from 1st July, 1987 to 28th February, 1988. 3. The petitioner company accordingly paid duty under protest for the period from 1st July, 1987 to 28th February, 1988. 3. The petitioner company also preferred a writ petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No. 4109 of 1987 challenging the above referred order modifying the classification list which came to be allowed by an order dated 31st December, 1987. In the said order, the Court observed that since the duty was paid by the petitioner company under protest, the respondent authorities will have to refund the same in case the classification list submitted by the petitioner company is approved. The Court also quashed and set aside the order dated 18th November, 1987 modifying the classification list. The respondent authorities were also directed to refund the amount of excise duty paid by the petitioner company under protest within two months in case the classification list classifying the product under S.H. 7208.00, filed by the petitioner company is finally approved. 4. The order dated 18th November, 1987 passed by the Assistant Collector was also challenged by the petitioner company before the appellate authority, that is, the Collector of Central Excise (Mumbai), who set aside the said order and remanded the matter to the lower authority for examining the classification list. Pursuant thereto, the Assistant Collector passed Order-in-Original dated 16th March, 1989 ordering classification under S.H. 7308.90 and confirming demand of central excise duty. Being aggrieved, the petitioner company preferred an appeal before the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), who upheld the said Order-in-Original. Against the said order, the petitioner company went in appeal to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (the Appellate Tribunal), who, by an order dated 24th August, 1993, allowed the appeal by holding that the product in question is classifiable under S.H. 7208.00. The said order of the Appellate Tribunal came to be challenged by the Department before the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 2658 of 1994, which came to be dismissed by a judgment and order dated 24th October, 2002. 5. It is the case of the petitioner company that till the matter as regards classification attained finality by the decision of the Supreme Court, the assessment/approval was provisional for the said period. 5. It is the case of the petitioner company that till the matter as regards classification attained finality by the decision of the Supreme Court, the assessment/approval was provisional for the said period. It is further the case of the petitioner company that in view of the aforesaid factual background, the respondent authorities ought to have refunded the amount of duty paid under protest. However, the respondent authorities did not do so. The petitioner company, therefore, by a letter dated 23rd December, 2002 addressed to the Respondent No. 3 requested to refund the said amount. However, no heed was paid by the said authority. In response to the said letter dated 23rd December, 2002 addressed by the petitioner company, the petitioner company received a letter dated 13th January, 2003 addressed by the Respondent No. 3 asking for certain details namely classification list, letter of protest and statement showing the amount of duty payable and paid during the said period. By a letter dated 31st January, 2003, the petitioner company supplied all the details asked for by the above referred letter including the statement showing the amount to be refunded to the petitioner company which according to the petitioner was Rs. 38,87,472.72. According to the petitioner, it supplied all the information and documents as and when required by the respondent authorities. Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 7th March, 2003 came to be served upon the petitioner company calling upon it to show cause as to why its claim for refund of the said amount of Rs. 38,87,472.72 should not be rejected under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act) and if found sanctionable, why the same should not be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund of India. The petitioner company by its reply dated 28th April, 2003 requested for refund of the amount in question and drew the attention of the authority to the order passed by this Court whereby it had directed the Department to refund the amount of duty paid under protest within two months in the event of the classification list being approved in favour of the petitioner company. The petitioner company also addressed a letter dated 30th July, 2003 making its submissions that till the Supreme Court decided the classification in its favour, the same continued to be provisional and, therefore, was not hit by the bar of unjust enrichment more particularly when duty was paid under protest. By the impugned order dated 4th December, 2003, the Respondent No. 3 rejected the claim of the petitioner company for refund of duty paid under protest by sanctioning the same and crediting it to the Consumer Welfare Fund of India established under section 12C of the Act. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the reliefs noted hereinabove. 6. Mr. Uday Joshi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the impugned order seeks to take away the legal right which has been created in favour of the petitioner company by the order of this Court, which in no uncertain terms, directed the respondent authorities to refund the amount in question in case of the classification being finalized in favour of the petitioner company. It was submitted that in addition thereto, when the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue upholding the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal which ordered the classification in favour of the petitioner company, the respondent authorities were bound to refund the amount of duty paid under protest. 6.1 It was further submitted that until the issue as regards classification of the product came to be finally determined by the Supreme Court in favour of the petitioner company, the assessment continued to be provisional and upon its approval in favour of the petitioner company, it became entitled to the said refund as a consequence of final assessment/determination of classification of the product in question. It was submitted that the assessment continued to be provisional till the classification in favour of the petitioner came to be decided by the Supreme Court and, therefore, evidently the bar of unjust enrichment would not come in the way of the petitioner company’s claim for refund. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Hindalco Industries Ltd., 2010 (262) E.L.T. 106 (Guj.) for the proposition that the provisions of section 11B of the Act would not apply to refunds arising on finalization of provisional assessments. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Hindalco Industries Ltd., 2010 (262) E.L.T. 106 (Guj.) for the proposition that the provisions of section 11B of the Act would not apply to refunds arising on finalization of provisional assessments. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2002) 9 SCC 416 for the proposition that when the petitioner has paid duty under protest, the bar of unjust enrichment would not apply. 7. Opposing the petition, Mr. Y.N. Ravani, learned senior standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents invited attention to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents and more particularly to the averments made in Paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-reply, to point out that in the present case, no provisional assessment has either been sought by the petitioners or ordered by the Department in terms of rule 9B of the Rules and as such, the question of finalization of provisional assessment does not arise. It was also pointed out that the RT-12 returns filed by the petitioners were assessed finally at the relevant time. It was submitted that the duty had only been paid by the petitioners under protest and that the assessment was not provisional. It was further submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. is no longer good law inasmuch as the same has been held to be per incuriam by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II vs. Allied Photographics India Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 34 , wherein the Court has held that there is a difference under the Act between payment of duty under protest on one hand and refund consequent upon finalization of provisional assessment on the other hand. It was submitted that in the present case, since the duty has been paid under protest, the provisions of section 11B of the Act would be attracted and as such, the bar of unjust enrichment would operate. It was submitted that in the present case, since the duty has been paid under protest, the provisions of section 11B of the Act would be attracted and as such, the bar of unjust enrichment would operate. Inviting attention to the impugned order dated 4th December, 2003, it was pointed out that the adjudicating authority has recorded a categorical finding of fact to the effect that it was not disputed by the assessee that they had collected the duty paid under protest from the customers. It was submitted that the petitioner having collected the duty from the customers, the principles of unjust enrichment would be clearly attracted and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to the refund of central excise duty and that the impugned order being just, legal and proper, does not warrant any interference by this Court. 8. From the facts and contentions noted hereinabove, the first two issues that arise for consideration are, firstly as to whether in the light of the order dated 31st December, 1987 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4109 of 1987, the petitioner is entitled to refund of the excise duty paid under protest without considering the applicability of the provisions of the Act and secondly as to whether the assessment of the petitioner continued to be provisional till the classification came to be finally determined by the Supreme Court in favour of the petitioner company. 9. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 31st December, 1987 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4109 of 1987 shows that the Court had taken note of the fact that the show cause-cum-demand notice had been issued to the petitioners on 16th July, 1987 and that the petitioners had paid the excise duty under protest. The Court, therefore, partly allowed the petition observing that as the petitioners had paid excise duty under protest, the respondents will have to refund the same in case the classification list submitted by the petitioners on 18th November, 1986 classifying the products as falling under Item No. 7208.00 is approved by the proper officer. 10. Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as it stood at the relevant time insofar as the same is relevant for the present purpose reads thus:— 11B. 10. Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as it stood at the relevant time insofar as the same is relevant for the present purpose reads thus:— 11B. Claim for refund of duty.—(1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the expiry of six months from the relevant date: Provided that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been paid under protest (2) If on receipt of any such application, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise paid by the applicant should be refunded to him, he may make an order accordingly. However, subsequently, with effect from 20th September, 1991, section 11B of the Act came to be amended and insofar as the same is relevant for the present purpose reads thus:— “11B. Claim for refund of duty.—(1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the expiry of six months 2[from the relevant date] 3[in such form as may be prescribed and the application shall be accompanied by such documentary or other evidence (including the documents referred to in section 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of duty of excise in relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the incidence of such duty had not been passed on by him to any other person: Provided that where an application for refund has been made before the commencement of the Central Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, such application shall be deemed to have been made under this sub-section as amended by the said Act and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) as substituted by that Act:] Provided further that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been paid under protest. [ * * * * ] (2) If, on receipt of any such application, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund: Provided that the amount of duty of excise as determined by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise under the foregoing provisions of this sub-section shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to— 1. rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India; 2. unspent advance deposits lying in balance in the applicant’s account current maintained with the Collector of Central Excise; 3. refund of credit of duty paid on excisable goods used as inputs in accordance with the rules made, or any notification issued, under this Act; 4. duty of excise paid by the manufacturer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty to any other person; 5. the duty of excise borne by the buyer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty to any other person; 6. the duty of excise borne by any other such class of applicants as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify: Provided further that no notification under clause (f) of the first proviso shall be issued unless in the opinion of the Central Government, the incidence of duty has not been passed on by the persons concerned to any other person. (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2). 11. (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2). 11. Sub-section (3) of Section 11B of the Act lays down that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2). Thus, in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 11B of the Act, refund has to be made only in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 11B despite any order to the contrary having been passed by any Court under any provision of the Act or rules made thereunder. In the circumstances, reliance placed upon the judgment and order dated 31st December, 1987 passed by this Court would not come to the assistance of the petitioners inasmuch as in the light of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 11B of the Act, the petitioners would not be entitled to refund except as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 11B notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the said decision. 12. Insofar as the claim of the petitioner company that the assessment was provisional till the classification came to be finalized by the decision of the Supreme Court is concerned, it is the case of the respondents that no provisional assessment has been sought for by the petitioners or ordered by the Department and as such, the question of finalization of provisional assessment does not arise. In this regard, it may be relevant to refer to the provisions of rule 9B of the Rules which provides for provisional assessment to duty and reads as under:— “Rule 9B. Provisional assessment to duty.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules:— 1. where the proper officer is satisfied that an assessee is unable to produce any document or furnish any information necessary for the assessment of duty on any excisable goods; or 2. Provisional assessment to duty.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules:— 1. where the proper officer is satisfied that an assessee is unable to produce any document or furnish any information necessary for the assessment of duty on any excisable goods; or 2. where the proper officer deems it necessary to subject the excisable goods to any chemical or any other test for the purpose of assessment of duty thereon; or 3. where an assessee has produced all the necessary documents and furnished full information for the assessment of duty, but the proper officer deems it necessary to make further enquiry (including the inquiry to satisfy himself about the due observance of the conditions imposed in respect of the goods after their removal) for assessing the duty, the proper officer may, either on a written request made by the assessee or on his own accord, direct that the duty leviable on such goods shall, pending the production of such documents or furnishing of such information or completion of such test or enquiry, be assessed provisionally at such rate or such value (which may not necessarily be the rate or price declared by the assessee) as may be indicated by him, if such assessee executes a bond in the proper form with such surety or sufficient security in such amount, or under such conditions as the proper officer deems fit, binding himself for payment of the difference between the amount of duty as provisionally assessed and as finally assessed. (2) [* * * *] (3) The Collector may permit assessee to enter into a general bond in the proper Form with such surety or sufficient security in such amount or under such conditions as the Collector approves for assessment of any goods provisionally from time to time: Provided that, in the event of death, insolvency or insufficiency of the surety or where the amount of the bond is inadequate, the Collector may, in his discretion, demand a fresh bond and may, if the security furnished for a bond is not adequate, demand additional security. (4) The goods provisionally assessed under sub-rule (1) may be cleared for home consumption or export in the same manner as the goods which are not so assessed. (4) The goods provisionally assessed under sub-rule (1) may be cleared for home consumption or export in the same manner as the goods which are not so assessed. (5) When the duty leviable on the goods is assessed finally in accordance with the provisions of these rules, the duty provisionally assessed shall be adjusted against the duty finally assessed, and if the duty provisionally assessed falls short of, or is in excess of the duty finally assessed, the assessee shall pay the deficiency or be entitled to a refund, as the case may be. 13. In the facts of the present case, though the petitioner has asserted at several places in the petition that till the Supreme Court decided the classification in its favour, the same continued to be provisional and, therefore, was not hit by the bar of unjust enrichment more particularly when the duty was paid under protest, there is nothing whatsoever to indicate that the assessment was provisional in terms of rule 9B of the Rules. Under rule 9B of the Rules, the proper officer may, either on a written request made by the assessee or his own accord, direct that the duty leviable on goods, in the eventualities stated in the said rule, be assessed provisionally at such rate or value of such goods as may be indicated by him provided the assessee executes a bond in the proper form with such surety or sufficient security in such amount, or under such conditions as the proper officer deems fit, binding himself for the payment of difference between the amount of duty as provisionally assessed and as finally assessed. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had made any written request to the proper officer or that the proper officer on his own accord directed the provisional assessment of the duty payable on the goods manufactured by the petitioner. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has executed a bond in the proper form as contemplated under rule 9B of the Rules. Thus, as to whether the petitioner has been assessed provisionally is primarily a question of fact. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has executed a bond in the proper form as contemplated under rule 9B of the Rules. Thus, as to whether the petitioner has been assessed provisionally is primarily a question of fact. The learned advocate for the petitioner is not in a position to point out from the averments made in the petition or the supporting documents, that the provisions of rule 9B of the Rules have been complied with. In the impugned order, the Respondent No. 3 has specifically observed that there is nothing in the record that shows that the petitioner had opted for provisional assessment under rule 9B. It is also observed that the petitioner had not forwarded any evidence in this regard that it had opted for provisional assessment under rule 9B and completed the formalities such as execution of bond etc. in its written submission or during personal hearing. The Respondent No. 3, therefore, did not accept the case of the petitioner that this was a case of provisional assessment. Moreover, in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents, there is a categorical averment to the effect that in the instant case, no provisional assessment has either been sought by the petitioners or ordered by the Department and as such, the question of finalization of provisional assessment does not arise and that the RT-12 returns filed by the petitioners were assessed finally at the material time. The petitioners have not filed any rejoinder affidavit refuting the aforesaid averments made on behalf of the respondents. In the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that till the Supreme Court decided the classification in favour of the petitioner company, the assessment continued to be provisional. 14. In the aforesaid backdrop the Court is required to examine the validity of the impugned order passed by the Respondent No. 3 holding that the refund claim of Rs. 38,87,472.72 is liable to be sanctioned but on the grounds of unjust enrichment, it has to be credited into the Consumer Welfare Fund of India established under Section 12C of the Act. 15. The petitioner company in support of its claim for refund has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Supra). 15. The petitioner company in support of its claim for refund has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Supra). In the facts of the said case, the assessee had paid the excise duty under protest. Upon the appeals before the Tribunal having been decided in their favour, the assessees claimed repayment of the amount of duty paid by them under protest. In September, 1991, the provisions of Section 11B of the Act came to be amended. Thereafter, the assessees were served with notice which asked them to show cause why the amount of excise duty paid by them under protest should not be retained by the revenue having regard to the provisions of section 11B, as amended. The assessees showed cause but to no avail. The matter ultimately reached the Tribunal who upheld the contention of the revenue. The Court thereafter referred to the decision of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 and more particularly to Paragraph 104 thereof and observed that it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the revenue that the decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. governs the appeal and allowed the appeals. On behalf of the petitioner company, Mr. Joshi submitted that the facts of the said case are similar to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the present case also, the petitioner had paid the excise duty under protest. 16. The aforesaid contention of the petitioners cannot be accepted in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II vs. Allied Photographics India Ltd. (Supra) wherein, the issue before the court, interalia, was as to whether refund of duty paid under provisional assessment is similar to duty paid under protest as both are “on-account” payments adjustable on finalization of assessment or vacating of protest. The Court, after considering the provisions of Section 11B of the Act as amended as well as the provisions of rule 9B of the Rules held as follows: “14. As stated above, Para 104 of the judgment in the case Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (Supra) states that if refund arises upon finalisation of provisional assessment, Section 11B will not apply. Para 104 of the said judgment does not deal with payment under protest. As stated above, Para 104 of the judgment in the case Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (Supra) states that if refund arises upon finalisation of provisional assessment, Section 11B will not apply. Para 104 of the said judgment does not deal with payment under protest. In the light of what is stated herein, we may now consider the judgment of this Court in the case Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). In that matter, the assessee was a manufacturer. The assessee claimed exemption which was denied by the Department. The assessee went in appeal to CEGAT. Pending appeal, assessee paid excise duty under protest. The assessee succeeded before the CEGAT and claimed refund on 17-1-1991. Refund was denied by the Department. Therefore, it was a case of payment of duty under protest. However, in the said decision, this Court applied Para 104 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (Supra), which with respect, had no application. As stated above, Para 104 of the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (Supra) dealt with refund consequent upon finalisation of provisional assessment. Para 104 does not deal with refund of duty paid under protest. As stated above, there is a difference under the Act between payment of duty under protest on one hand and refund consequent upon finalisation of provisional assessment on the other hand. This distinction is missed out, with respect, by the judgment of this Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (Supra). We may also point out that the judgment in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is based on the concession made by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the Department. That judgment is, therefore, per incuriam.” Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II vs. Allied Photographics India Ltd. (Supra) has held that its earlier decision in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is per incuriam. In the circumstances, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. (Supra) does not carry the case of the petitioners any further. 17. In the circumstances, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sinkhai Synthetics & Chemicals (P) Ltd. (Supra) does not carry the case of the petitioners any further. 17. In the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II vs. Allied Photographics India Ltd. (Supra), it is apparent that the duty paid under protest falls under section 11B of the Act and as such, would attract the principles of unjust enrichment. In the circumstances, the Respondent No. 3 – Adjudicating Officer was justified in invoking the provisions of Section 11B of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Also, in the light of the findings of fact recorded by the adjudicating authority that the assessee had not disputed that they had collected the duty paid under protest from the customers, it is apparent that this is a clear case of unjust enrichment and as such, no infirmity can be found in the impugned order in sanctioning the refund claim of Rs. 38,87,472.72 but crediting the same into the Consumer Welfare Fund of India established under section 12C of the Act. The impugned order passed by the Respondent No. 3 being in consonance with the statutory provisions as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II vs. Allied Photographics India Ltd. (Supra), does not warrant any interference by this Court. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.