Times VPL Limited Represented By Its Head HR R. Suresh Kumar v. Union Of India
2011-04-11
D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. Writ petition by an employer questioning the levy of damages by the Regional Provident Fund – II, Sub – Regional Office at Hubli u/s 14–B of the Employee’s Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (for short ‘the Act’) in an enquiry held u/s 7–A of the Act. 2. Petitioner had availed the remedy of appeal available to an employee u/s 7–1 of the Act to the Tribunal but the Tribunal having dismissed the appeal in terms of its order dated 24.12.2010 in A.T.A.No.332/6/2007 as per Annexure – G, the present writ petition by the employer. 3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner/employer, submission of Sri.S.N.Murthy, learned senior counsel, is that the order passed by the Tribunal is an apology for an order in an appeal u/s 7–1 of the Act, that it is a totally non–speaking order, without spelling any reasons as to why the Tribunal is in agreement with the order passed by the Commissioner, that the order falls short of an order required to be passed within the scope of Section 7–1 of the Act. 4. It is also the submission of Mr.Murthy, that the learned Member of the Tribunal has not applied his mind at all to the nature of the order appealed against, has not shown any awareness to the extent of levying the damages being almost to the extent of about 80% of the arrears of contribution that was payable by the employee which is an unreasonably high quantum of damages even in terms of Section 14 – B of the Act ; that the employer has not only made contributions of the entire amount as determined by the Provident Fund Commissioner in terms of order dated 12.04. 2007 in a sum of Rs. 69,75,462/- but also has subsequently paid the interest for the delayed remittances in a sum of Rs. 17,50,000/- and in such state of affairs levying of damages of such a huge amount particularly the damages under Section 14 – B now being only in the nature of penalty as the interest is levied separately u/s 7-Q of the Act and moreover levy of damages at such a high rate being in the teeth of the order and the observations made by the Madras High Court in the case of SHANTI GARMENTS PVT. LTD., VS. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMISSIONER (2003 (1) LLJ 467). 5. Submission of Sri.
LTD., VS. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMISSIONER (2003 (1) LLJ 467). 5. Submission of Sri. Murthy, is that the Madras High Court had an occasion to refer to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases : i) ORGAND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES VS. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1979 SC 1803 ), ii) HINDUSTAN TIMES LIMITED VS. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1998 SC 688 ) iii) REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER VS. COMMISSIONER VS. S.D. COLLEGE, HOSHIARPUR ( AIR 1997 SC 3645 ). 6. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical Industries’ case has been subsequently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Times’ case and also in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. S.D. College, Hoshiyaarpur wherein it has been held as under: “In other words, the Act envisages the Imposition of damages for delayed payments. The Act is a beneficial welfare legislation to ensure health And other benefits to the employees. The employerunder the Act is under a statutory obligation to deduct the specified percentage of the contribution from the employee’s salary and matching contribution, the entire amount is required to be deposited in the fund within 15 days after the date of the collection, every month. Thereby the employer is under a statutory obligation to deposit the amount to the credit of the fund every month. In the event of any default committed in that behalf, Section 14 – B steps in and calls upon the employer to pay damages by way of penalty, the maximum of which is the accumulated arrears. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is given discretion only to reduce a percentage of damages and he has no power to waive altogether. “ 7. The observations as extracted above and the observations in the case of ORGANO CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES VS. UNION OF India ( AIR 1979 SC 1803 ) as under : “The expression damages occurring in Section 14 – B is, substance a penalty imposed on the employer for the breach of the statutory obligation. The object of imposition of penalty under Section 14 – B is not merely to provide compensation for the employees. We are clearly of the opinion that the imposition of damages under Section 14-B serves both the purposes. It is meant to penalise defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees.
The object of imposition of penalty under Section 14 – B is not merely to provide compensation for the employees. We are clearly of the opinion that the imposition of damages under Section 14-B serves both the purposes. It is meant to penalise defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of thee statutory requirements of Section 6, but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries, i.e., to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them, There is nothing in the Section to show that the damages must bear relationship to the loss which is caused to the beneficiaries under the Scheme. The word ‘damages’ in Section 14-B is related to the word ‘default’. The words used in Section 14-B are ‘default in the payment of contribution’ and, therefore, the word ‘default’ must be constructed in the light of para. 38 of the Scheme which provides that the payment of contribution has got to be made by the 15th of the following month and, therefore, the word ‘default’ in Section 14-B must mean failure in ‘performance’ or failure to ‘act.’ At the same time, the imposition of damages under Section 14-B is to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees.” It was further observed at p. 427 of L.L.J: “38)……… Nor can it be accepted that there are no guidelines provided for fixing the quantum of damages. The power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages under Section 14-B is a quasi-judicial function. It must be exercised after notice to the defaulter and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The direction to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the statute. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under Section 14-B and the consequences that ensure therefrom, an order under Section 14-B must be a ‘speaking order; containing the reasons in support of it.
The direction to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the statute. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under Section 14-B and the consequences that ensure therefrom, an order under Section 14-B must be a ‘speaking order; containing the reasons in support of it. The guidelines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word ‘damages’ the liability for which in Section 14-B arises on the making of ‘default’ while fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration, as he has done here, various factors, viz., the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. The word ‘damages’ in Section 14-B lays down sufficient guidelines for him to levy damages.” wherein the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the meaning and the scope of the word ‘damages’ as it occurs in Section 14-B of the Act particularly with reference to paragraph 34 of the Scheme, categorically and emphatically states that it is not merely in the nature of compensation but more in the nature of a penal levy on the employer for the breach of the statutory obligation. The observations and the view taken by the Supreme Court in the context of understanding the scope of Section 14-B of the Act particularly the word ‘damages’ in no way advances the case of the employer as in the present case, it is an admitted fact that there was a delay in the remittance. 8. However, the contention that is sought to be urged by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the provisions of the Act were made applicable to the working journalists for the first time for the year 1999 onwards by the amendment of the schedule to the Act and the Scheme and as the matter was in litigation with regard to the justification or otherwise of extending the provisions of the Act and scheme to such persons, either before the High Court or before the Supreme Court and ultimately as the matter was resolved by the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the applicability of the provisions of the Act and the scheme to such employees also, as per the judgment rendered in the case of EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADHURAI) LIMITED AND ANOTHER VS.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOHTER (AIR 2004 SCW 1739), the picture got cleared only by then; that thereafter, the employer has made contributions that in such a situation, there was no justification for levy of damages at all particularly when interest is also separately collected u/s 71 of the Act and at any rate levy of damages at such a high percentage is definitely neither warranted nor justified is the submission. 9. In the absence of any worthwhile input either in the appellate order or in the petition averments, I have perused the order passed by the Commissioner levying damages of Rs.52,68,099/-. The provident Fund Commissioner, has exhibited his awareness to the length of the delay and the frequency of defaults in the light of guidelines provided in the Scheme and has applied his mind, has discussed the object and the purpose of the Act and the scope of Section 14-B, fully in consonance with the law as has been done by the Supreme Court in Organo Chemical Industries case and followed by Supreme Court in the two other cases referred to above and has also shown his awareness for a progressive increase of the rate of damages as the damages have been levied at the following rates: 10. A glance at this discussion and the manner in which the damages are levied particularly the Commissioner having kept in mind the delay up to two months for levying damages at the rate of 17% of the contributions for the period less than two months, for two months and above but for period above two months but less than four months at the rate of 22%, for four months and above but less than six months at 27% and for six months and above at the rate of 37% is an order which is unexceptional and the Commissioner has shown proper understanding of the provisions of the Act and the scope of Section 14-B, and this also being in consonance with the guidelines as are available at paragraph 32 A of the Scheme. 11. I find that the order passed by the Commissioner is a perfectly valid and legal order and not one which calls for interference in any jurisdiction muchless under Article 227 jurisdiction of this Court. 12. A petition under article 227 is not a petition in the nature of an appeal to the High Court.
11. I find that the order passed by the Commissioner is a perfectly valid and legal order and not one which calls for interference in any jurisdiction muchless under Article 227 jurisdiction of this Court. 12. A petition under article 227 is not a petition in the nature of an appeal to the High Court. It is one exercising a supervisory jurisdiction or a power of superintendence over the manner of functioning of the Tribunals. 13. While it is true that the order of the Tribunal does give rise to some frowning and therefore, I have examined the original order and find that it is a valid and proper order in law. I find no justification to entertain this writ petition to further delay the collection of the amount which has been levied by way of damages and quantified by the Commissioner, way back on 12.04.2007 which is more than four years old now! 14. No merit in the writ petition. No need for interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Writ petition is dismissed.