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2011 DIGILAW 41 (UTT)

Madan Lal Aggarwal v. District Judge, Pauri Garhwal

2011-01-06

TARUN AGARWALA

body2011
JUDGMENT : Heard Sri Arvind Vashisth, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sudhir Kumar, Brief Holder for the State/respondent no. 1 and Sri B. D. Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2. 2. An application under Section 21(1)(a) in U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P.Act No. XIII of 1972), was instituted by the landlord in the year 1977, showing his need for the shop in question for himself and for his four sons. The applicant urged that his four sons are unemployed and that they want to start a business, and if the shop is not released, they would suffer irreparable hardship. The tenant resisted the application and contended that the landlord or his sons had no bonafide need, as they were carrying on separate business as contractors and that the application should be rejected. 3. The Prescribed Authority, after considering the material evidence on record, allowed the application by judgment dated 4-1 0-1977, holding that the petitioners have a genuine and bonafide need and consequently, released the shop in question. 4. The tenant, being aggrieved, filed an appeal, which was allowed by a judgment dated 13-4-1978. The appellate court held that since the landlord had not disclosed the nature of business that he wanted to start, consequently the need was not bonafide. The appellate court not only allowed the appeal, but also set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and rejected the application of the petitioner for the release of the premises in question. 5. The landlord-petitioners, being aggrieved, filed Writ Petition No. 6667 of 1978 before the Allahabad High Court, which was allowed by a judgment dated 17-8-1981. The High Court found that the petitioners in the Release Application had urged that they want to start their ancestral business but since the exact nature business was not indicated, the writ court allowed the petition and quashed the order of the appellate court and remitted the matter to the appellate court to decide the matter afresh and a liberty was given to the petitioner to file an application and an affidavit disclosing the nature of business sought to be carried on in the shop in question. 6. 6. Pursuant to the order of the writ court, the petitioner filed an application along with an affidavit indicating that the petitioner along with his sons would like to carry on their ancestral business in cloth from the premises in question. On the other hand the tenant filed an objection reiterating that the petitioner had no bonafide need. 7. The appellate court found that the landlord was already doing a business of transportation and was plying his own trucks and that one of the sons of the landlord was a contractor in U.P. Jal Nigam and that another son was doing the work of a contractor in the Irrigation Department at Lansdowne and consequently, concluded that the need of the shop to restart the family business in cloth does not appear to be genuine or bonafide and that a mere desire to do business was not sufficient. The lower appellate court, consequently found that the need of the landlord did not appear to be genuine or bonafide. On the question of hardship, the appellate court also found that the tenant, having no other alternate accommodation, would suffer more hardship than the petitioner or their sons, who were already settled in life. The lower appellate court consequently allowed the appeal again and set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority. 8. The landlord, being aggrieved, filed the present writ petition and during its pendency died and his heirs have been substituted. 9. An affidavit along with an application has been filed indicating that during the pendency of the writ petition, subsequent events have taken place and that the grandsons of the original landlord have also grown up who are unemployed and, consequently, are also required to be settled in business. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that apart from the original need, the need has further increased for the grandsons, which should now be considered by the Court. Apart from the aforesaid, the learned counsel submitted that the finding of a lower appellate court is patently erroneous and perverse and was liable to be set aside. The finding that the landlord or his sons had no bonafide need was totally perverse and was based on no evidence. 10. Apart from the aforesaid, the learned counsel submitted that the finding of a lower appellate court is patently erroneous and perverse and was liable to be set aside. The finding that the landlord or his sons had no bonafide need was totally perverse and was based on no evidence. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, the landlord filed another application for the release of another premises on the same ground, namely, to do the family business by himself and by his sons, which was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and eventually, the need was confirmed by the writ court in Writ Petition No. 3072 of 2001 (M/S), decided on 7-9-2009. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that pursuant to the said judgment, the premises has been released in favour of the landlord, which they have occupied and are carrying some business and this subsequent event should be noted of. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed the certified copy of the order of the writ court. The aforesaid facts, as stated by the learned counsel for the respondents, have not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, but submitted that in view of the fact that the premises in question was not released and twenty seven long years had lapsed, the original landlord or his sons could not remain idle and consequently, applied for the release of another premises. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the mere fact that another premises has been released, would not indicate that the need has dissipated, but would only indicate the genuineness of the need to carry on the business from the premises in question, quite apart from the fact that during the pendency of the petition, the grandchildren have grown up and the need has further increased since they are unemployed. 11. Subsequent event is an important factor and is required to be taken into consideration in our legal system. This court will not spell out much on our legal system and will only quote what the Supreme Court has said. In Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava 2001 (2) see 604, the Supreme Court observed on the judicial system : "15. 11. Subsequent event is an important factor and is required to be taken into consideration in our legal system. This court will not spell out much on our legal system and will only quote what the Supreme Court has said. In Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava 2001 (2) see 604, the Supreme Court observed on the judicial system : "15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termni, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused.” 12. In Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, 2002 (1) SCC 254, the Supreme Court declared that although the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit yet the court has power to mould the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied: "11. ... (i) that the relief as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; . (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and . (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise." 13. In Kedar Nath Agarwal (dead) & another Vs. Dhanraji Devi (dead) by LRs and another 2004 (8) SCC 76, the Supreme Court held that the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of the institution of the suit or proceedings and that the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. The Supreme Court held that it did not mean that the subsequent events could not be considered and further held it is the power and duty of the court to consider the changed circumstances and that the court would take into account subsequent events. 14. In light of the aforesaid, it is clear that subsequent events can only be considered to a limited extent, namely, to see as to whether the bonafide need of the landlord still exists or not and whether the said need has dissipated during the pendency of the writ petition. 15. In the present case, the Court finds that a categorical finding of fact has been given by the lower appellate court that the need to do ancestral business by the original landlord and his sons in order to augment the income was only a mere desire, and was not a genuine and bonafide need. This finding of the lower appellate court was based on the fact that the original landlords and his sons were gainfully employed, doing separate business in transportation and contract business, which has not been dispelled by any cogent evidence. Such finding given by the appellate court, in the opinion of the Court, is not perverse and consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the said order does not require any interference. 16. With regard to subsequent need, the Court finds from the application and affidavit that the mere fact that the grandchildren have grownup and are unemployed, does not mean that there exists a genuine need. The application and affidavit is vague and does not indicate the nature of business that is required to be set up for the grandchildren. Specific assertion for each grandchildren should have been made to show their need and a bald assertion is not sufficient. Further, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Gupta (dead) through LRs Vs. Riyaz Ahmad & another 2009 (10) SCC 197, unless the pleadings are amended to bring the subsequent events on record, the same cannot be taken into consideration. 17. In light of the aforesaid, the need to do business for the grandchildren in the premises in question cannot be taken into consideration. Riyaz Ahmad & another 2009 (10) SCC 197, unless the pleadings are amended to bring the subsequent events on record, the same cannot be taken into consideration. 17. In light of the aforesaid, the need to do business for the grandchildren in the premises in question cannot be taken into consideration. A certified copy of the Judgment of this Court has been placed which indicates that a shop has been released in the year 2009 Nothing has been indicated as to whether the release of the said Shop has or has not dissipate the need of the landlord, his sons or his grandchildren. Consequently, for the reasons a~ stated aforesaid, the Court is of the opinion that the impugned order does not require any interference. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.