Sheikh Hussain @ Sheikh Lakhan Sheikh Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra, through Chief Secretary, Home Ministry
2011-03-31
PRASANNA B.VARALE
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. Shri P.V. Bhoyar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives notice on behalf of the respondents. 2. By way of present petition, the petitioner is seeking challenge to the externment order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate2 respondent No.2 on 20th August, 2010 under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. 3. Shri R.R. Dawada, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a petty tea stall owner and a law abiding citizen of the locality namely Chandkha Plot, Akola. Learned Counsel for the petitioner by inviting my attention to the show cause notice as well as the order dated 20th August, 2010 passed by the respondent No.2 thereby externing the petitioner and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 18th November, 2010 confirming the order of respondent No.2, sought challenge to these orders on the following grounds. (i) The material considered by the authorities is vague; (ii) There is no live link in the order passed by the concerned authorities and the alleged material in the nature of the offences against the petitioner, in short the stale material is used by the authorities to arrive at a conclusion resulting into passing impugned orders; and (iii) The orders suffers from the vice of excessive externment that is expanding the limits in so far as the alleged activities are related to only locality of old city Akola; whereas the petitioner is externed from whole Akola district. 4. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondents at length. 5. Shri R.R. Dawada, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, by inviting my attention to the notice, submits that in the notice dated 19th May, 2010 and the subsequent notice dated 31st July, 2010, the list of offences is given forming material against the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the list of the offences includes the offences from the years 2007 to 2010. He further submits that in most of the offences, the offences are either pending for their decision in the Court or at the stage of investigation. Learned Counsel further submits that even considering the nature of the offences, most of the offences related to either under Bombay Prohibition Act or some minor offences.
He further submits that in most of the offences, the offences are either pending for their decision in the Court or at the stage of investigation. Learned Counsel further submits that even considering the nature of the offences, most of the offences related to either under Bombay Prohibition Act or some minor offences. He further submits that apart from the list of offences, a vague statement is made in the notices that the activities of the petitioner are of such nature that it is creating an atmosphere of danger and threat to the residents of the locality. He further submits that in the notice, a proposal was forwarded for externing the petitioner from five districts, namely, Akola, Amravati, Yavatmal, Buldana and Washim. Learned Counsel further submits that even by considering the nature of the offences, it cannot be termed the petitioner as a habitual offender. He submits that the petitioner has submitted his reply to the notice and stated that he is falsely involved in the said offences out of the political rivalry between various groups. He further submits that in the reply it is stated that the petitioner made a scapegoat of these warring groups. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the reply is neither considered by the authority nor the material is considered by the appellate authority and ultimately the authorities arrived at an erroneous consideration. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner strongly contends that in view of non mentioning of specific material and the vagueness in the so called material, the orders passed by the authorities are unsustainable in the eyes of law. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel places reliance on the judgments in the cases of Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar .v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, the State of Maharashtra (reported in 1972EQ( SC)0570); Silva Gora Silva Ayanar Arjun .v. Nawal Bajaj, Deputy Commissioner of Police (reported on 2006EQ( BOM)01580); Punjaji Dagdu Gaikwad .v. State of Maharashtra (reported in 2001EQ( BOM)0262); and Dhananjay Manohar Sapkal v. State of Maharashtra and another (reported in 2005(2) Mh.L.J., 384). 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, while concluding his submissions, submits that the son of the petitioner is suffering from ailment and he is the only bread winner of his family, the externment order would deprive the petitioner from earning his livelihood. 8.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, while concluding his submissions, submits that the son of the petitioner is suffering from ailment and he is the only bread winner of his family, the externment order would deprive the petitioner from earning his livelihood. 8. Shri P.V. Bhoyar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondents, supports the impugned orders. He submits that the authorities have considered the material in its proper perspective. Learned APP places the material on record for perusal of this Court. He submits that there is no substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the stale offences are considered by the authorities. Learned APP, by inviting my attention to the observation of the authorities, submits that out of the list of nine offences, the sponsoring authority has restricted the material only in respect of four offences i.e. offence of the year 2007, one offence of the year 2009 and two offences of the year 2010. 9. It is revealed that the offences against the petitioner are of the latest past i.e. of the year 2008-2009. Insofar as those offences are considered, the offence i.e. referring to an incident of 06th January, 2010 and the other is of 04th March, 2010; whereas the offence of the year 2009 refers to an incident of 15.12.2009. On considering this material, I find that the offences are not of a petty nature but these offences are of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. In all these incidents, it reveals that the petitioner was armed with certain weapons and caused assault to the victims. In view of these facts, there is no merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that these are the petty offences. On the contrary, it clearly reveals that the nature of the offences is serious. The present of the applicant armed with weapons causing injuries to the victims clearly reveals the seriousness of the offences. 10. Insofar as the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that stale offences are used against the petitioner, I find that there is one offence of the year 2007; one offence of the year 2009; and two offences of the year 2010 and as such the authorities have considered latest material against the petitioner.
10. Insofar as the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that stale offences are used against the petitioner, I find that there is one offence of the year 2007; one offence of the year 2009; and two offences of the year 2010 and as such the authorities have considered latest material against the petitioner. As such there is no merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the stale material is considered against the petitioner. 11. Insofar as the ground raised by the petitioner that the order is vague in the form that there is only statement made that because of the activities of the petitioner, nobody is coming forward to depose against the petitioner. The order reflects that an enquiry was conducted by the Sub Divisional Police Officer when the sponsoring authority forwarded the material. The material of enquiry which was placed by the learned APP before this Court for perusal includes the statements of the persons of the locality. In those statements, in clear words, the witnesses have stated that the activities of the petitioner. It is also stated in these statements that the petitioner is moving in the area threatening the people and his activities of such nature that the people are afraid of lodging any objection. The statements also reveal that whenever any attempt was made to object the petitioner, the objector was faced with threats of dire consequences. The reference in the order is sufficient to show the nature of the activities of the petitioner. It is not necessary to give all the details. The authorities can certainly keep the secrecy of the makers of the statements. The material to support the opinion of the authorities, is placed before this Court and this Court is satisfied with the material placed by the learned APP. 12. Insofar as the ground raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the nature of externing the petitioner from Akola district and an attempt was made to suggest that the order is excessive in nature is concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Umar Mohamed Malbari .v. K.P. Gaikwad, Dy.
Commissioner of Police and another (reported in 1988 Mh.L.J., 1034) as well as Punjaji Dagdu Gaikwad .v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and Silva Gora Silva Ayanar Arjun .v. Nawal Bajaj, Deputy Commissioner of Police (cited supra), which deal with the excessive nature of the order. In my opinion, these judgments are of no help to the petitioner for the reason that in those judgments the petitioners were externed from the neighbouring districts. It was observed by the Court that the alleged activities of the petitioners were restricted to district; whereas the petitioner was externed from the neighbouring district. In the case at hand, though the sponsoring authority proposed the externment of the petitioner from five districts, ultimate orders passed by the authorities externing the petitioner was restricted to only Akola district and I find no fault with the conclusion arrived at by the authorities considering the nature of the activities of the petitioner. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar .v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, the State of Maharashtra (cited supra). This judgment is also of no help to the petitioner. It will be useful to refer the observation of the Apex Court in the said judgment that while dealing with the issue of the satisfaction of the authority so as to arrive at a conclusion of externment and the apex Court observed thus : “ As regards the last point, it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the externment order can be made effective, so as to subserve its real purpose. How long, within the statutory limit of 2 years fixed by Section 58, the order shall operate and to what territories, within the statutory limitations of Section 56 it should extend, are matters which must depend for their decision on the nature of the data which the authority is able to collect in the externment proceedings. There are cases and cases and therefore no general formulation can be made that the order of externment must always be restricted to the area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend. A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised with the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings.” 14.
There are cases and cases and therefore no general formulation can be made that the order of externment must always be restricted to the area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend. A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised with the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings.” 14. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, the authorities, by considering the material and the data collected in the enquiry can certainly decide the area and the period of externment. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dhananjay Manohar Sapkal .v. State of Maharashtra and another (cited supra). In my opinion, as the facts are clearly distinguishable, the judgment in the said case is of no help to the petitioner. In the case at hand, apart from the offence of Bombay Prohibition Act, there are serious offences registered against the petitioner involving the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal code. The appellate authority has also considered all the grounds raised by the petitioner. 16. On considering the material, I am of the opinion that no fault can be found with the authorities in passing the order of externment against the petitioner and confirming the order by the appellate authority. Lastly, insofar as the ground raised by the petitioner of the illness of the son is concerned, perusal of the record shows that this ground is only taken up at the stage of hearing of the petition. The ground raised before the appellate Authority was the illness of the petitioner himself and while dealing with the ground of the illness, the appellate Authority observed that the petitioner can avail of the medical help at other places. No fault can be found with the observation of the authorities. It is also not in dispute that most important consideration in the matter of externment is apart from the offence if the activities of the person are creating an atmosphere of threat and danger to the residents of the locality, in such a situation to arrest the activities of the petitioner, the externment proceedings are initiated.
It is also not in dispute that most important consideration in the matter of externment is apart from the offence if the activities of the person are creating an atmosphere of threat and danger to the residents of the locality, in such a situation to arrest the activities of the petitioner, the externment proceedings are initiated. As the record reveals that there was no lapse in following procedure laid down under the Act and the procedure was duly followed, I see no reason to show any indulgence at the hands of this Court. It will be useful to refer the observation of Apex Court in the case of Gazi Saduddin .v. State of Maharashtra and another (reported in 2003(7) SCC 330 ). “It has not been pointed out that there was any lapse in following the procedure laid down under the Act and the Rules in passing the order of externment. The procedure laid down under the Act culminating in passing of the order of externment was duly followed. Primarily, the satisfaction has to be of the authority passing the order. If the satisfaction recorded by the authority is objective and is based on the material on record then the courts would not interfere with the order passed by the authority only because another view possibly can be taken. Such satisfaction of the authority can be interfered with only if the satisfaction recorded is either demonstratively perverse based on no evidence, misreading of evidence or which a reasonable person could not form or that the person concerned was not given due opportunity resulting in prejudicing his rights under the Act.” The Apex Court while considering the statements of witnesses, observed that : “... It has been stated by the witnesses that the appellant used to give threats and beating to poor persons in the locality and had created a terror in the locality...” 17. In the present case also, as observed above, the statements of witnesses reveal that the petitioner is moving in the area giving threats and whosoever objecting him was faced with threat of dire consequences. In view of the material placed on record, it can certainly be said that the satisfaction recorded by the authority is objective and based on the material on record and as such requires no interference at the hands of this Court.
In view of the material placed on record, it can certainly be said that the satisfaction recorded by the authority is objective and based on the material on record and as such requires no interference at the hands of this Court. In view of these facts, I am of the considered opinion that the petition is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed as such.