JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners, defendants in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction (T.S. No. 349 of 2005), had filed their written statement beyond the time limit stipulated in Order VIII Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code (hereafter the Code). A plea was set up before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court at Sealdah, who is in session of the suit, that the written statement could not be prepared for want of documents, which the plaintiff sought to rely on to establish his claim in the plaint. The learned Judge was of the view that prior to September 8, 2009, the defendants did not make any prayer for direction on the plaintiff to file documents required for preparation of the written statement. The delay of 46 (forty-six) months in filing the written statement that had occurred in the meanwhile was so long that it could not be condoned. Accordingly, rejection of the prayer of the defendants/petitioners for acceptance of the written statement followed. 2. In this application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the defendants/petitioners call in question propriety of the order dated December 7, 2009 passed by the learned Judge. 3. Mr. Ghosh, learned advocate for the defendants/petitioners contended that delay in filing the written statement was occasioned not because of any lapse or negligence on the part of the defendants/petitioners. The delay actually resulted owing to the plaintiff/opposite party’s inability to furnish to the defendants/petitioners copies of the documents it intended to rely on in support of the plaint case. The learned Judge, according to him, committed gross jurisdictional error in not appreciating the response of the defendants/petitioners in the proper perspective and has passed an order, which is perverse. 4. In support of his submission that provisions contained in Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code are directory and that the learned Judge ought to have accepted the written statement filed beyond time, Mr. Ghosh relied on the decisions reported in AIR 2006 SC 396 : Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar & ors., and 2009 (2) CHN 54 : Shankar Lal Rajgharia v. Harish Chandra Shaw & ors. 5. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the impugned order ought to be quashed and the trial Court directed to accept the written statement. 6. Per contra, Mr. 5. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the impugned order ought to be quashed and the trial Court directed to accept the written statement. 6. Per contra, Mr. Mitra learned advocate representing the plaintiff/opposite party contended that the learned Judge, in the circumstances, was justified in rejecting the prayer of the defendants/petitioners. The cause for the delay in filing the written statement cannot be attributed to the plaintiff/opposite party. He referred to the decision reported in (2009) 3 SCC 513 : Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad & ors., wherein the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in permitting filing of written statement after delay of three years in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, particularly when both the trial Judge and the revisional Court had assigned sufficient reasons in support of their orders rejecting the application for condonation of delay. He prayed for dismissal of the application. 7. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the order under challenge. 8. An order passed by a subordinate Court may be upset by the High Court under Article 227 only on limited grounds. Having regard to the law laid down in Mohammed Yusuf (supra), if the order suffers either from illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety, the High Court may be justified in its interference. I shall, therefore, examine whether the order under challenge withstands scrutiny or not keeping in mind the above principle of law. 9. In my opinion, the learned Judge approached the problem before him from a wrong angle. If the learned Judge had recorded a satisfaction, supported with reasons, that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained by the defendants in their response to the show cause, the situation would have been otherwise. The scrutiny of the Court would not be that intrusive. However, the learned Judge appears to have been swayed by the length of delay of 46 (forty-six) months. The learned Judge missed the point that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, together with its local amendment, does not lay down that the Court may exercise its discretion in condoning delay only if the delay is within a certain limit. It is settled law that length of delay is not relevant, what is relevant is acceptability of the explanation for the delay. Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, together with its local amendment, does not lay down that the Court may exercise its discretion in condoning delay only if the delay is within a certain limit. It is settled law that length of delay is not relevant, what is relevant is acceptability of the explanation for the delay. The Court may, for want of just explanation, decline to condone short delay; whereas, in an appropriate case when the explanation is found to be satisfactory, even long delay can be condoned [see: (1998) 7 SCC 123 : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, and (2008) 14 SCC 582 : State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan]. The parameters for extending time to file written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code have been delineated by the Supreme Court in several cases starting from the decision reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480 : Kailash v. Nanhku, which unfortunately appears not to have been considered while passing the impugned order. 10. This is a fit case for interference. The order under challenge is set aside. The matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration. This direction is made because the learned Judge ought to consider at the first instance, whether what the defendants/petitioners claim is correct or not and, further, whether the explanation furnished by the defendants/petitioners is satisfactory or not deserving condonation of delay in the light of the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court. The High Court exercising power of superintendence should not convert itself into a fact finding Court. The learned Judge shall give a reasoned decision within a month from date of receipt of this order, after hearing the parties. 11. The application stands allowed. However, there shall be no order for costs. 12. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be furnished to the applicant at an early date.