JUDGEMENT :- Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1 This appeal is directed against order dated 6.8.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in proceedings registered and numbered as Civil Writ Petition No. 5752 of 1999. 2 By the aforesaid order, the learned Single Judge has affirmed the award of the Labour Court dated 12.01 .1999 by which the respondent-workman was directed to be reinstated in service with 50% back wages. 3 The brief facts that are required to be noticed for an effective adjudication of the controversy that has arisen in the present case may be enumerated hereinafter. 4 The respondent-workman was appointed as a Junior Draftsman in the Punjab Police Housing Corporation Limited w.e.f. 19.08.1992. The said appointment was for a period of three months which was extended from time to time with short breaks. In that manner, the respondent-workman worked upto 19.3.1995 whereafter no extension was forthcoming. Infact by an order dated 27.3.1995 the service of the workman was discontinued on the ground of lack of work. 5 Adispute having been raised by the workman, the matter was referred for adjudication to the learned Labour Court by a reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Before the learned Labour Court, both the contesting parties filed their respective written statements and also led oral and documentary evidence. The learned Labour Court, on the basis of the evidence adduced, came to the finding that the dispensation of the services of the workman was by way of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act not having been complied with, the same was bad in law. Hence the award of reinstatement with 50% back wages was passed. 6 The Management being aggrieved by the award dated 12.01.1999 passed by the learned Labour Court instituted the writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen. The learned Single Judge recorded a finding that the temporary breaks in the service of the workman would not defeat the definition of continuous service as contained in Section 25(B) of the Act. The learned LabourCourt, therefore, came to the conclusion that present was a case of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. The learned Single Judge recorded a finding that the temporary breaks in the service of the workman would not defeat the definition of continuous service as contained in Section 25(B) of the Act. The learned LabourCourt, therefore, came to the conclusion that present was a case of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. It was the admitted case of the parties that no notice was served nor any retrenchment compensation was paid to the workman. That apart, from the materials on record, the learned Labour Court came to a conclusion that several Junior Draftsmen appointed subsequent to the respondent were retained in service and were infact regularized whereas the respondent was retrenched from service. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. 7 We have considered the award dated 12.01.1999 passed by the learned Labour Court and the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no manner of doubt that except for short breaks of a few days, the service of workman was extended from time to time and that workman had completed nearly 2½ years of service under the management. The definition of continuous service contained in Section 25-B of the Act requires rendering of service of 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months. It does not exclude rendering of service with artificial break of few days. In the present case, by virtue of definition contained in Section 25-B of the Act, the service rendered by the workman would, therefore, be continuous service. The said fact was infact admitted by the Management Witness No.1 before the learned Labour Court. If the workman had rendered the continuous service as contemplated by Section 25-B of the Act, the dispensation of his service by refusing extension would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. If be so, the retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Act would be required to be paid which admittedly was not paid. That apart, the evidence led by the workman before the learned Labour Court clearly indicates that at least four junior Draftsmen were appointed subsequent to the workman, namely, Reeta Rani, Upkar Singh, Simpa Batra and Mandeep Pal were continued and the services of first three employees were regularized after termination of the services of the workman. That apart, the evidence led by the workman before the learned Labour Court clearly indicates that at least four junior Draftsmen were appointed subsequent to the workman, namely, Reeta Rani, Upkar Singh, Simpa Batra and Mandeep Pal were continued and the services of first three employees were regularized after termination of the services of the workman. From the said facts which have been proved by adducing evidence before the learned Labour Court, it clearly transpires that the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act laying down the principle of 'last come first go' have been violated by the management. The said facts would render discontinuation of the services of the workman bad in law and contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, in the light of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. The Letters Patent Appeal, therefore, is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.