JUDGMENT M. VENUGOPAL, J. 1. The appellant/writ petitioner has filed the instant writ appeal as against the order dated 4.2.2000 in W.P. No. 1269 of 2000 passed by the Learned Single Judge. 2. The Learned Single Judge, while passing the Order in W.P. No. 1269 of 2000, has, among other things, observed that ‘the fact finding authority has gone into in detail on the claim of the petitioner for the source of purchase of the properties and found that they are illegally acquired properties in the absence of acceptable evidence’ and resultantly, dismissed the writ petition. 3. Feeling aggrieved against the order of dismissal dated 4.2.2000 in W.P. No. 1269 of 2000 passed by the Learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal as an aggrieved person before this Court. 4. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant urges before this Court that the Learned Single Judge has erred in not admitting the writ petition which amounts to refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested on him. 5. It is the case of the appellant/petitioner that the Appellate Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and by not considering the question of law as well as question of fact and this has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 6. The appellant has taken a plea that since there was only forfeiture of part of the property i.e. Wuttucattan Street property of 43.75% share, it is imperative on the part of the 1st respondent/Competent Authority to provide an option of redemption which has been argued before the Appellate Authority which has not considered the same. 7. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the Tribunal refused to receive additional evidence without any justification and without providing any reason, by merely observing that they filed belatedly without giving any proper reason. 8. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that in the present case in respect of all the three properties, the onus has been discharged and as such, the properties are not liable to be forfeited. 9. 8. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that in the present case in respect of all the three properties, the onus has been discharged and as such, the properties are not liable to be forfeited. 9. Per contra, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the respondents that the Learned Single Judge has found that the fact finding authority has gone into in detail as regards the source of purchase of the properties have been illegally acquired and rightly dismissed the writ petition which need not be disturbed at this distance of time. 10. The appellant/petitioner has been issued with the notice dated 13.2.1980 under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 by the 1st respondent requiring him to state within 35 days of the service of the notice, the sources of his income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which, he has acquired the properties described in the Schedule annexed with the evidence on which he relies etc. and further to show cause why the aforesaid properties should not be declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government under the said Act. The Schedule is as follows: S. NO. 1 Description of the property 2 Name of the present holder of property 3 Right title and interest in 1. No. 6 Rangaiah Chetty Street, Chennai Asmath Pasha 2. Property at K.G.F. -do- 3. 19 Kattur Sadaiappan Street, Chennai - 3 -do- 4. 38 MunusamyRoad, Bangalore -do- 5. 2/10, Wuthu kattan Street, Chennai - 3 -do- Movables:Right, title and interest in 1. Tabarack & Co. Chennal -do- 2. Nasreen Stores, Chennai-3 -do- 11. The appellant/petitioner, in his written arguments before the 1st respondent/Competent Authority, has, among other things, stated that he was engaged in buying and selling old clothes and that the pattern of this business is that number of persons have got to be employed under one leader, and each one of those persons carry over his head in a basket utensils etc. and go hawking from street to street and place to place, inviting house wives to come out from the house with old and used clothes and to exchange them for utensils. In this. and go hawking from street to street and place to place, inviting house wives to come out from the house with old and used clothes and to exchange them for utensils. In this. business, gradually some profit is made and if a person works hard, he is also able to reasonably build up himself financially because in the initial stage the expenditure are very limited. 12. The appellant also stated that from small stage when his income has arisen to the level of taxability under the Income Tax Law, he got himself assessed, and a scrutiny of his file would reveal that the progress has been slow and steady that it is evidencing a situation which is basically inconsistent with any concept of an illegal acquisition of property or acquisition of property- from and out of the income earned by trade or calling which is illegal etc. 13. The appellant/petitioner, in his written arguments dated 2.2.1995, has mentioned the following details: 1) Address of the property No. 6 Rangaiah Chetty St, Choolai, Madras. 2) Date of Acquisition 24.7.1974 3) Consideration paid for acquisition Rs. l3,000/- 4) Source of payment of consideration From the savings from cloth business. Please see my income tax statement for the relevant year. 5) Present position of the property It was sold on 24.5.1979 for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- 6) Remarks The answering person ceased to be the owner long before the issuance of the notice by the department 7) Additional documents submitted Copy of the sale deed was submitted at the time of hearing. There is no other document. Sale is reflected in account, refer to Income tax file. Xerox copy of the purchase deed dt. 24.7.1974 is filed. 1) Address of the property No. 499 Maharaja Road, Robertsonpet, Kolar Gold Field, Karnataka. 2) Date of Acquisition September, 1975. 3) Consideration paid for acquisition Rs. 17,500/- 4) Source for payment of consideration: From and out of savings mortgage loan was given to one Ms. Sabira Bee. That loan was returned. The Mortgage Deed was canceled on 23.7.1975 on receipt of Rs. 18,785/-. This is also reflected in the income tax statement for the relevant year. 5) Present position of the property The property was sold on 13.3.1988 under two sale deeds for a consideration of Rs. 47,000/- under each sale deed, making a total of Rs. 94,000/-. The said consideration of Rs. 18,785/-. This is also reflected in the income tax statement for the relevant year. 5) Present position of the property The property was sold on 13.3.1988 under two sale deeds for a consideration of Rs. 47,000/- under each sale deed, making a total of Rs. 94,000/-. The said consideration of Rs. 94,000 was invested in the unit Trust of India to save the capital gain tax. 6) Remarks This was a bona fide sale 7) Additional documents submitted In addition to what was submitted at the time of hearing. The investment made in Unit Trust of India is supported by certificate, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. Further following additional documents are submitted. True copy of the Mortgage Deed dt. 25.11.1974 is filed herewith. 1)Address of the property No. 19 Kattur Saidappan St. Madras-3. 2) Date of Acquisition 23.9.1975 on the date of the death of mother of the answering person, the answering person got ¾ share under the law of succession as applicable to the Mohammedans and another ¼ share went to father of the answering person. 3) Original date of acquisition 12.10.1950 father of the answering person got it from Abdul Jalal under document No. 2244/50. 4) Consideration paid for acquisition At this distance of time, the answering person is not able to give the exact amount of consideration. In- these days it was a meager amount. 5) Source for payment of consideration by father He was doing his own Independent business in old clothes, and had his own savings. 6) Date of acquisition by mother On 22.1.1959 father settled the property on mother. Mother therefore acquired under settlement-deed. The question of consideration does not arise. The settlement was in consideration for love and affection. 7) Present position of the property On 6.5.1976, father made a settlement deed in favour of the grand son of the answering person. He continues to own the said share of 25% and the answering person is owning 75% share. 8) Remarks Though the property was settled by the father on the mother, on the demise of the mother, father in his capacity as legal heir and and sharer under the Mohammedan Law got ¼ and answering person as son got ¾ share. Since subsequently, the father settled ¼ on the son of the answering person at present, answering person has ¾ share and son of the answering person has ¼ share. Since subsequently, the father settled ¼ on the son of the answering person at present, answering person has ¾ share and son of the answering person has ¼ share. 9) Additional documents submitted Copy of the settlement deed dt. 6.5.1976 1) Address of the property No. 38 Munusamy Road, Bangalore 2) Date of Acquisition In 1972, it was acquired by mother of the answering person. 3) Consideration paid for acquisition Rs. 23,000/- 4) Source for payment of consideration The mother had independent source. She was settle in respect of No. 2 Kattu Sadaiappan St, Madras-3.,vide item No. She was having rental income from it She was also owning property 1/20 Wuttucattan St., settled on her by father of answering person and savings from rental income was the source. 5) Present position of the property On the death of the mother, father got ¼ share and the answering person got ¾ share. The answering person settled on his daughter his share. Thereafter, father of the answering person and daughter of the answering person became co-owners. Subsequently father of the answering person released his share in favour of the daughter. The name of the daughter is Hajeera Nasreen She is now not the owner as she settled the property on her relation. 6) Remarks The property was not acquired by the answering person at all. The question therefore of the acquisition being legal or illegal does not arise. Further, the mother of the answering person had her own resources. The amount spent for acquisition was a meager amount. It cannot justify any inference of acquisition either illegally or from tainted source. 7) Additional documents submitted Release deed dt. 30.4.1980 Estate duty order dt. 16.2.1976 issued by the Estate duty officer, Asst. Controller of Estate Duty (I) Madras-6. Reference to all properties are made in the said estate duty orders. 1) Address of the property No. 2/10 Wuttu Cattan St. Madras-3. 2) Date of Acquisition Answering person acquired only ¼ share on 18.9.1975. 3) Consideration paid for acquisition Total consideration was Rs. 90,000/- and the share, of the answering person was Rs. 22,500/- 4) Source for payment of consideration For acquiring this property, loan was taken from Syed Kasim Sahib. Syed Kasim Sahib got the amount by way of service dues from hte employer (Loan was taken to mother Muqbal Jan) and answering person gave from his account his share. 90,000/- and the share, of the answering person was Rs. 22,500/- 4) Source for payment of consideration For acquiring this property, loan was taken from Syed Kasim Sahib. Syed Kasim Sahib got the amount by way of service dues from hte employer (Loan was taken to mother Muqbal Jan) and answering person gave from his account his share. Investment made by father is also reflected in his I.T. Statement. 5) Present position of the property Since one more ¼ share was owned by the mother of the answering person, on her demise 75% of her 25% share equal to 18.75% in the whole went to the answering person. Father of the answering person made settlement on one of the daughter of the answering person by name Amina @Yasmeen of his own ¼ share, and 1/16 share which he got on the demise of his wife to the daughter of answering person by name Fathima Bi @ Asfia Bi. 6) Remarks The source of acquisition of this property came from the business of the answering person. The contribution of the answering person was very meager. It is consistent with sources of his income viz., business in old clothes. It does not lead to any inference of either illegal acquisition from tainted source. 7) Additional documents submitted Settlement deed dt. 6.5.1976 in favour of Ameena and dt. 6.5.1976 in favour of Asfia Bi. Letter issued by the Accounts Officer, Mysore State Electricity Board to Syed Kasim Saheeb dt. 20.12.1975 along with confirmation of February, 1979. Purchase deed dt. 18.9.1975. 14. Further, the appellant has stated that the Department has so far not disclosed any materials to the answering person on the basis of which, the Competent Authority is said to have formed an opinion that it can reasonably think that the property possessed or acquired are illegally acquired properties. Further, nothing can be said against the appellant/petitioner except the illegal detention. Also, in one case, a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000/- has been levied as per Section 112 of the Customs Act and the same has been reduced to Rs. 10,000/-. 15. Further, nothing can be said against the appellant/petitioner except the illegal detention. Also, in one case, a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000/- has been levied as per Section 112 of the Customs Act and the same has been reduced to Rs. 10,000/-. 15. The 1st respondent, in the Letter dated 13.1.1997, has asked the appellant to furnish details for the relevant assessment orders: (a) in respect of various statement of accounts filed during the course of hearing and along with the written submissions; (b) the assessment orders of Smt. Zahida Begum and Shri Haji Sahik Ahmed for the relevant assessment years; (c) The statement of accounts filed by him before the Assistance Controller of Estate Duty in the Estate of Smt.Maqbool Jan; (d) The assessment orders made by the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle XIV, Madras and the jurisdictional Income Tax officers, city circle VII (2) as regards the assessment years 1974-75 to 1982-83; (e) The originals of ail the sale deeds, purchase deeds, release deeds, Mortgage Deeds and other documents produced in evidence; and (f) To state whether the units have been redeemed in respect of the investment made in Unit Trust of India, and to inform the details of the investment made on redemption etc. 16. The appellant, by his reply dated 7.2.1997 to the Assistance Director of the 1st respondent, has furnished (i)the copies of his Income Tax assessment order for the assessment years-1974-75, 75-76, 76-77, 77-78, 78-79, 79-80, 80-81 and I.T.C.C. dated 19.4.1984 upto the assessment year 1983-84; (ii) copies of the assessment order of Smt.Zehida Begum, for the assessment years 1974-75, 75-76, 76-77, 78-79, 79-80, 80-81, 81-82 and 83-84. Further, the appellant has also furnished the copy of the statement of accounts filed before the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty and also the assessment order in the estate of Smt. Maqbool Jan. Moreover, he has stated that none of the assessment orders of Shri. Haji Shaik Ahmed are available with him for production. 17. That apart, the appellant has furnished the original documents for verification and return in respect of old No. 19, New No. 2 Kattur Sadaiappan Street, belonging to Abdul Razak and Abrar Ahmed, copy of the settlement deed dated 6.5.1975 enclosed, since the original is with the bankers, Bank of India, Mount Road Branch, Chennai. 17. That apart, the appellant has furnished the original documents for verification and return in respect of old No. 19, New No. 2 Kattur Sadaiappan Street, belonging to Abdul Razak and Abrar Ahmed, copy of the settlement deed dated 6.5.1975 enclosed, since the original is with the bankers, Bank of India, Mount Road Branch, Chennai. Original documents relating to the property at 2/1010, New No. 39, Wuthukattan Street, Periamet, Chennai-3 (i) Sale deed dated September, 1975. (ii) Settlement deed dated 6.5.1976, executed by Haji Shaik Ahmed in favour of Asphia Bee. (iii) Settlement deed dated 6.5.1976 executed by Haji Shaik Ahmed in favour of Yasmin. Furthermore, he has stated that the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore has been settled in favour of his daughter Ms. Hajeera Nasreen, by his father to the extent of his share namely 1/4th share and the balance 3/4th share has been settled on her by him on 30.4.1980. 18. Apart from the above, the appellant has also stated that the sale proceeds of the K.G.F. Property has been invested in the month of September 1988 in UTI and the same has been redeemed after 3 years on October 1991, thus, availing the benefit of long term capital gains and the same has been properly disclosed and exemption claimed. Though the date of certificate is mentioned as January 1989, the actual date of investment is September 1998 and the amount received on redemption of UTI has been invested with Tropical Exports as proprietary concern, Proprietor being Abrar Ahmed, his son. Presently, he is assessed under GIR No. 711187 - A with the Income Tax Office, City Ward VII (1) Madras. 19. The 1st respondent has passed an order in proceedings F. No. OCA/MDS/2101/80 dated 20.3.1998, among other things, mentioning that the first property for consideration is the right, title and interest in No. 6, Rangaiah. Chetty Street, Madras and this property is seen to have been disposed off by the person affected (appellant) on 24.5.1979 viz. , before the issue of forfeiture notice. As such, the same cannot be considered for forfeiture and accordingly further proceedings in respect of this property are dropped. 20. Chetty Street, Madras and this property is seen to have been disposed off by the person affected (appellant) on 24.5.1979 viz. , before the issue of forfeiture notice. As such, the same cannot be considered for forfeiture and accordingly further proceedings in respect of this property are dropped. 20. Moreover, in regard to the right, title and interest in the property at K.G.F. the 1st respondent has observed that the person affected (appellant) has produced a copy of the purchase deed dated 3.9.1975 according to which the consideration for sale is Rs. 17,500/- and further, the person affected has stated that he received a sum of Rs. 18,785/- on 23.7.1975 from one Ms. Sabira which was earlier given to her as loan of Rs. 17,000/- against Mortgage Deed dated 25.11.1974 executed by Sabira Bi in favour of the person affected in respect of her two immovable property mentioned therein. 21. The 1st respondent, in the course of the order, has opined that the copy of the Mortgage Deed does not bear the signature of any person, nor it has been attested as a true copy by the counsel. As per terms of the Mortgage Deed, the person affected advanced a sum of Rs. 17,000/- to Ms. Sabira Bi which was to be repaid on demand. Ms. Sabira Br was to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum to the person affected punctually before the 10th of every month. The 1st respondent has also observed that the appellant has not tendered any evidence regarding the sources from which the loan amount of Rs. 17,000/- was given to Ms. Sabira Bi. He merely stated that it was out of his savings and that this amount was subsequently returned by her for cancellation of the Mortgage Deed. Though it has been stated that the Mortgage Deed was cancelled, no documentary proof as regards the cancellation has been produced. On the last page of the copy of the Mortgage Deed submitted by the appellant as evidence, it is written as ‘on 23.7.1975 received Rs. 15500/- balance to be received Rs. 1500/-’. It is not known as to how the appellant has paid the remaining amount of Rs. 2,000/- on the purchase consideration of Rs. 17,500/-. Moreover, the person from whom the appellant has received the balance sum of Rs. 1,500/- has not been indicated. 22. 15500/- balance to be received Rs. 1500/-’. It is not known as to how the appellant has paid the remaining amount of Rs. 2,000/- on the purchase consideration of Rs. 17,500/-. Moreover, the person from whom the appellant has received the balance sum of Rs. 1,500/- has not been indicated. 22. The 1st respondent has observed that in the trial balance as on 30.6.1976 the person affected (appellant) has indicated the purchase of K.G.F. Property valued at Rs. 18,861/-. In the trial balance statement, there is no indication in the said statement regarding receiving back of the amount given as mortgage loan to Ms. Sabira Bi amounting to Rs. 17,000/-. The appellant has claimed to have received a sum of Rs. 18,785/- on 23.7.1975 from Ms. Sabira Bi. But, this is not reflected in the appellant’s statement of Income Tax for the relevant year filed before the Income Tax authorities. Therefore, the 1st respondent has observed that this claim is contrary to the endorsement made on the last page of the Mortgage Deed, in and by which, the person affected received only Rs. 15,500/- on 23.5.1975. The explanation of the appellant is that the property has been purchased out of the amount received back from Ms. Sabira Bi was not accepted. 23. Further, the 1st respondent has observed that the logical conclusion is that the investment has been made from illegal sources and therefore, the said property is liable for forfeiture under the Act. The appellant has stated that he sold the said property as per two documents dated 3.3.1988 for a total sum of Rs. 94,000/- and invested the sale proceeds in Unit Trust of India to an extent of Rs. 87,100/- by purchasing 8710 units of the face value of Rs. 10/- each. Since the property has been disposed off by the person affected (appellant) after the issuance of forfeiture notice, such a transfer has been held to be null and void in terms of Section 11 of the Act by the 1st respondent. 24. The 1st respondent as regards the property No. 19, Kattu Sadayappan Street, Madras has stated that this property has been acquired by the appellant (person affected) through succession and its legality has been explained and hence, held that the same is not liable for forfeiture and the proceedings in respect of this property have been dropped. 25. 24. The 1st respondent as regards the property No. 19, Kattu Sadayappan Street, Madras has stated that this property has been acquired by the appellant (person affected) through succession and its legality has been explained and hence, held that the same is not liable for forfeiture and the proceedings in respect of this property have been dropped. 25. In regard to the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, the 1st respondent has observed that this property was acquired by the mother of the appellant (person affected) in the year 1972 for Rs. 23,000/- and the source was that of the rental income of; the mother from the two properties which she owing at the material time. The mother of the appellant was not an Income Tax assessee and therefore, no details were furnished regarding the rental income she received. The copy of the assessment order in respect of this property shows that the estate duty has been furnished. But, this does not throw any light about the sources. The 1st respondent has observed that no details or evidence have been furnished about the rental income and savings made in the assessment from the mother of the appellant Therefore, the 1st respondent has come to the conclusion that the source for the acquisition of the property has remained unexplained. Further, this property has been purchased in the year 1972, when the appellant (person affected) was actively engaged in the illegal activities and was later detained. The logical conclusion that has been arrived at by the 1st respondent is that the illegal earnings of the appellant were utilised for the acquisition of the property in his mother’s name and on the death of his mother, by virtue of succession, the said property has been transferred in the names of the appellant, his father and his daughter. The appellant (affected person) is possessing 75% share of the property in his name and hence, his share of the property has been forfeited in the proceedings. 26. In regard to the property at No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Madras-3 the same has been purchased as per document No. 969/75 dated 18.9.1975 for Rs. 90,000/- jointly by the appellant, his wife, his father and mother each having 1/4th share valued at 22,500/-. 26. In regard to the property at No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Madras-3 the same has been purchased as per document No. 969/75 dated 18.9.1975 for Rs. 90,000/- jointly by the appellant, his wife, his father and mother each having 1/4th share valued at 22,500/-. The 1st respondent/Competent Authority, in his order, has stated that the appellant has produced the statement of accounts for the assessment year 1977-78 (accounting year July 1975-June 1976) wherein Rs. 25,794.50 being his 1/4th share under the caption ‘property’. As regards the appellant’s share, the Learned Counsel, during the personal hearing dated 17.1.1995, has stated before the Competent Authority that the appellant has taken a loan from one Shri Syed Khasim. But, in the written reply dated 2.2.1995, different explanation has been given mentioning that the appellant has made the investment from his own account. A letter of confirmation of February, 1979 from one Shri.Syed Khasim has been furnished stating that he lent a sum of Rs. 20,000/- on 17.9.1975 to Smt. Maqbool Jan at 7% interest per annum. As per this letter, the said loan has not been taken by the appellant from Shri Syed Khasim but by his mother. 27. The 1st respondent has gone to the extert of observing in his-order that the appellant was doing old cloth business and the initial capital for the said business stated to be the presents received by him during his marriage and the past savings amounting to Rs. 5,565/- as on 30.06.1960 (assessment year 1961-62). The appellant has not produced any evidence in respect of receipt of marriage presents or his past savings for the initial capital contribution amounting to Rs. 5,565/-. Also, no evidence has been produced by the appellant in support of his contention that he has been carrying on business in old clothes. The statements of the appellant and copies of capital account produced for the period from 30.6.1960 to 30.6.1973 only indicate credits of profits as from old clothes business and interest. He also stated, that he indulged in money lending business earning interest. The names of the persons to whom the money has been lent, the money lent and interest collected have not been furnished by the appellant. The capital account from Rs. 36,737/- as on 30.6.1973 has been increased to Rs. 53,955.38 in the beginning of July 1975. He also stated, that he indulged in money lending business earning interest. The names of the persons to whom the money has been lent, the money lent and interest collected have not been furnished by the appellant. The capital account from Rs. 36,737/- as on 30.6.1973 has been increased to Rs. 53,955.38 in the beginning of July 1975. No books of accounts or contemporaneous letter of confirmation, basic details of money-lending business, gifts received etc, have been given by the appellant as regards the sources for the property under consideration. The first assessment return during the year 1974-75 has been filed by the appellant and the property has been purchased during the year 1975 and during this period, the appellant has been actively engaged in illegal activities and has been detained. Hence, the 1st respondent has come to a logical conclusion that the statement of accounts and the capital accumulation has been a built up account to explain away the sources for acquisition of the property. The earnings made by the appellant from his illegal activities have been invested in the property. 28. The appellant’s mother died on 23.9.1975. On her death, 75% share of 1/4th of her property was bequeathed to the appellant. The 1st respondent has observed that the appellant share in the property at the time of issue of forfeiture of notice was 43.75%. On behalf of the appellant before the 1st respondent, the contention has been raised that the mother of the appellant received a loan of Rs. 25,000/- from one Syed Khasim and a copy of the confirmation letter of February 1979 has been produced in evidence. As per the said confirmation letter, Syed Khasim has lent Rs. 20,000/- to Maqbool Jan on 17.9.1975. No explanation or evidence has been tendered for the balance amount of Rs. 2250/-. A plea has been taken before the 1st respondent that Syed Khasim paid the loan from an amount received by him as services due from his empfoyer viz. , Mysore State Electricity Board and a copy of the sanction order of Rs. 20,000/- given by the Accounts Officer has been produced. The said Sanction Order speaks of advance amount of Rs. 20,000/- being sanctioned to Syed Khasim as per order dated 20/22/12.1975. The property under consideration has been acquired during September 1975. , Mysore State Electricity Board and a copy of the sanction order of Rs. 20,000/- given by the Accounts Officer has been produced. The said Sanction Order speaks of advance amount of Rs. 20,000/- being sanctioned to Syed Khasim as per order dated 20/22/12.1975. The property under consideration has been acquired during September 1975. The purchase deed also indicates that the entire amount has been paid on 18.9.1975 itself in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the 1st respondent has come to a conclusion that the advance of Rs. 20,000/- sanctioned to Syed Khasim by Mysore Electricity Board could not have been availed by Smt. Maqbool Jan for effecting payment of her share under consideration. 29. Apart from the above, Maqbool Jan died on 23.09.1975 viz., five days after the acquisition of the property. The Maqbool Jan’s share in the property has been stated to be at Rs. 25,000/-, as per the assessment order copy wherein the estate duty has been computed. As a matter of fact, this assessment order does not refer to any details of the loan availed from Syed Khasim. Also, the appellant has not furnished any explanation in regard to the repayment of loan amount to the Syed Khasim. The statement of accounts of the appellant for the relevant period do not reflect any transaction of the said loan amount and interest thereon. No evidence has been furnished for the return of the loan amount. Hence, the 1st respondent has come to a conclusion based on oral consideration that the source claimed by Maqbool Jan has been disproved and further that this property has been acquired during the period when the appellant has been actively engaged in illegal activities and the investment by late Maqbool Jan for her share of the property has also been made through such illegal earnings of the appellant. Accordingly, the 1st respondent has held that 43.75% share of the property in the name of the appellant as on date of the issue of forfeiture notice has been held liable for forfeiture under the Act. 30. As regards the balance share of the property, the same has been held by the 1st respondent to-have been acquired by the father and wife of-the appellant and hence, not considered the same for forfeiture. 31. 30. As regards the balance share of the property, the same has been held by the 1st respondent to-have been acquired by the father and wife of-the appellant and hence, not considered the same for forfeiture. 31. In respect of the two movable properties, as per explanation submitted and evidence produced, the 1st respondent has held that forfeiture is not feasible. 32. In the light of the discussions as mentioned supra, the 1st respondent/Competent Authority as per Section 7(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 has passed an order forfeiting the following properties which were acquired by the. appellant, as indicated below, to the Government of India free from all encumbrance. SL. NO. Description of the property 1. Right, title and interest inProperty at K.G.F. (i.e. ) Land and building situated at Khata No. 499 (Old) 605 (New) and Asst. No. 668 at Maharaja Road, Robertsonpet, K.G.F., within the Robertsonpet Town Municipal limits, Robertsonpet Hobli, Bangarpet Taluk, 2. 75% share in the property at Corporation Door No. 38 (Old No. 2) Munusamy Road of TuskarTown, Bangalore-51. 3. 43.75% share in the property at 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Madras-3. 33. Also, the 1st respondent/Competent Authority has stated that the transfers, if any, affected in the above properties after the issue of notice under Section 6(1) of the Act are hereby ignored and declared null and void in terms of Section 11 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. 34. The appellant has preferred an Appeal in F.P.A. No. 10/MDS/98 before the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal as per Section 7(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) as against the order of the 1st respondent/Competent Authority, Chennai dated 20.03.1998 in F. No. OCA/MDS/ 2101/80. 35. The Appellate Authority, after hearing both sides, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and on consideration of material record, has justified in coming to the conclusion that the property at K.G.F. is the illegal property of the appellant during the period when he has been engaged in illegal activities. 36. In regard to the 2nd property viz. 36. In regard to the 2nd property viz. , at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, the 2nd respondent/Appellate Authority has upheld the finding of the 1st respondent that no details with regard to the rental income has been furnished and that the mother of the appellant was not an income tax assessee and the assessment order relating to Estate Duty does not help him as no details of rental income were mentioned. 37. Further, as regards the property at No. 2/10 Wuttucattan Street, Chennai-3, the Appellate Authority on consideration of the entire gamut of the matter, has, inter alia, held that there are no details of the persons to whom the money was said to have been lent and the interest earned have been furnished, no books lent and the interest earned have “been furnished, no books of account were maintained and in the absence of any material, it cannot be believed that the appellant was earning money through money lending business and the capital account is nothing but a built up account to explain the sources for the acquisition of the property and that the appellant’s mother had no legal source for acquisition of the property and finally agreed with the finding of the 1st respondent. Also, it has not admitted the two sets of additional evidence which have been filed at a belated stage and that the appellant had ample opportunity to produce all evidence before the 1st respondent/Competent Authority. 38. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the property at K.G.F. (1st property) has been acquired by the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 17,500/- and he has acquired the same out of the business income and from savings though money lending and further, the appellant has lent a sum of Rs. 17,000/- on a registered simple mortgage to one Sabira Bi and that the borrower has repaid the sum of Rs. 17,000/- together with interest of Rs. 1785/- which is reflected in the trial balance at page No. 30 of the assessment year 1975-76 and page No. 44 assessment year 1977-78 wherein the amount of Rs. 1785/- has been shown as interest and the name of the Sabira Bi, borrower has not been reflected in the trial balance as she has repaid the amount and in the trial balance, only an outstanding amount is to be shown. 39. 1785/- has been shown as interest and the name of the Sabira Bi, borrower has not been reflected in the trial balance as she has repaid the amount and in the trial balance, only an outstanding amount is to be shown. 39. The contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that since the loan of Rs. 17,000/- has been repaid.with an interest of Rs. 1785/-, the property at K.G.F. has been purchased with legal source. Further, the income tax authorities have accepted the statements of the appellant and also the mortgage amount as well as the interest due have been mentioned in the relevant proceedings which point out a legitimate source. Added further, the Profit and Loss account also shows that the appellant has excess income over the expenditure. 40. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the first property at K.G.F. has been purchased from and out of the business and savings and a loan has been given and the same has been returned and also the Mortgage Deed has been cancelled on 23.7.1975 on receipt of Rs. 18,785/- which is reflected in the income tax of the statement of the relevant year. As such, the first property. has been fully explained by the appellant and that the 1st respondent is not justified in forfeiting the property as all relevant documents were produced and hence, the Appeal against this property may be allowed by releasing the property. 41. In regard to the 2nd property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that- the property has been acquired by the appellant’s mother for a consideration of Rs. 23,000/- and she possessed independent source as she was settled two properties 19, Kattur Sadayappan Street, Periamet, Chennai-3 and the other property at 1/20, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chenna-3 settled on her by the father of the appellant in the year 1959 and that the 1st respondent/Competent Authority has issued notice under Section 6(1) of the property at 19, Kattur Sadayappan Street, Periamet, Chennai-3 and has accepted the source of the mother of the appellant and has released the property. 42. 42. It is the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the mother of the appellant has sold the property at 1/20, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai and she possessed her own independent source of income by way of rents and savings from the property which she has sold. 43. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contends that on the death of the appellant’s mother, the appellant inherited the 3/4th share as the only son and the father of the appellant Haji Sheikh Ahmed as Husband inherited l/4th share in the property (No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore) as legal heirs. Further, the father of the appellant settled his 1/4th share in the said property in favour of his grand-daughter viz. , Hajira Nasreen on 6.5.1976. The appellant has also settled his 3/4th share in No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore to his daughter Hajira Nasreen and therefore, the appellant’s daughter viz. , Hajira Nasreen is the absolute owner of the property viz. , No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore. 44. The 1st respondent, by its order dated 17.9.2002, has accepted the source of the mother of the appellant for acquiring the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore and released the property in the hands of Hajra Nasreen. Since the property has been owned by the appellant’s mother, even for the proceedings against the appellant as a heir, the 1st respondent must record reasons as per Section 64 which is a pre-condition for a valid proceedings. 45. In regard to the 3/4th share inherited by the appellant in the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, the same has been forfeited by the 1st respondent and the same has been confirmed by the 2nd respondent. 46. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the respondents 1 and 2 have not accepted the sources of acquisition by the appellant’s mother but, the same source when explained before the 2nd respondent in the appeals in F.P.A. No. 27 & 28/MDS/2000 which arose out of the proceedings of the 1st respondent in respect of the share of the property at No. 2/10 Wuttucattan Street, the Appellate Authority, by its order in the above Appeals dated 10.8.2001, wherein the two daughters of the appellant viz. , Ameena Bee and Fathima Bee have been party, has accepted the independent source of the mother of the appellant for acquiring the property bearing No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore. 47. According to the appellant, based on the order of the 2nd respondent in F.P.A. No. 27 & 28/MDS 2000, dated 10.8.2001, the 1st respondent released the property bearing No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore so far as it has been owned by Hajira Nasreen. The order of the 1st respondent/Competent Authority has clearly held that Maqboot Jan, the mother of the appellant, who purchased the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore possessed independent income and source and it was not the money contributed by the appellant. The said finding has become final and the Appeal in respect of the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore is to be allowed. 48. As regards the property at No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Chennai, it is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the property has been purchased jointly in the name of the appellant, his father Haji Shaikh Ahmed, his mother Maqbool Jan and his wife Zahida Begum each 1/4th share for a total consideration of Rs. 90,000/-, each contributing Rs. 22,500/- and that the issuance of Section 6(1) notice by the 1st respondent as if the property was exclusively owned by the appellant is wrong and in respect of this property also, the order of the Appellate Tribunal in F.P.A. No. 27 & 28/MDS/2000 dated 10.8.2001 in favour of the daughters of the appellant will govern the issue. 49. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the father of the appellant, Haji Shaikh Ahmed settled his 1/4th original share which he had purchased, in favour of his grand-daughter viz., Ameena Bee and the 1/4th share devolved on the father of the appellant, on demise of his wife, was.settled in favour of another grand-daughter Fathima Bee and that the Competent Authority started proceedings against the daughters of the appellant viz. , Ameena Bee and Fathima Bee with a view to forfeit the share settled on them. 50. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the 1st respondent/Competent Authority passed an order on 31.1.2000 forfeiting the share of Ameena Bee and Fathima bee in the property at No. 2/10 Wuttucattan Street, Chennai. , Ameena Bee and Fathima Bee with a view to forfeit the share settled on them. 50. The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the 1st respondent/Competent Authority passed an order on 31.1.2000 forfeiting the share of Ameena Bee and Fathima bee in the property at No. 2/10 Wuttucattan Street, Chennai. On 10.8.2001, the Appellate Tribunal, on an appeal, allowed the Appeal in F.P.A. No. 27 & 28/MDS/2000 and set aside the order of confiscation in respect of the shares of Ameena Bee and Fathima Bee and that the Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the property has been independently acquired by the father and mother of the appellant. 51. According to the appellant, he possessed independent source to acquire his 1/4th share for a consideration of Rs. 22,500/- as he had sufficient cash in hand and Rs. 31,244.61/- as per the Profit and Loss Account statement for the Assessment Year 1975-76. In the subsequent statement of the financial year 1977-78, his 1/4th share has been clearly reflected and the cash balance also has gone down. The purchase of the property has been shown in the trial balance for the Assessment Year 1977-78 in the heading properties. Therefore, in view of the findings of the Appellate Tribunal even the share of the appellant cannot be forfeited and moreover, the source for acquiring this property has been fully explained and in any event, only 1/4th share of the property belongs to the appellant and that the Competent Authority has not been justified in forfeiting the entire property and hence, the Appeal in respect of 3rd property may also be allowed. 52. In the Income Tax Assessment Order dated 31.7.1976 as per Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act in respect of the year 1975-76 for the accounting year ending 30.6.1974 relating to the appellant, it is, among other things, mentioned that ‘the assessment is made on a total income of Rs. 6,680/- as per return’ and the Business is mentioned as ‘Trade in old clothe and money lending Net income as declared in the return is accepted Rs. 6680/- and the total income is mentioned as Rs. 6680/-’. 53. A perusal of the trial balance of the appellant in respect of the Accounting Year July, 74/June, 75 (Assessment Year 75/76), it is mentioned as Sabiri Bi Rs. 17,000/-. 6680/- and the total income is mentioned as Rs. 6680/-’. 53. A perusal of the trial balance of the appellant in respect of the Accounting Year July, 74/June, 75 (Assessment Year 75/76), it is mentioned as Sabiri Bi Rs. 17,000/-. In respect of Accounting Year July 1975/June 1976 dealing with the Assessment Year 1977/1978, the appellant in his Receipts and Expenses Account for the year ending 30.6.1976 has stated the Interest Receipts amount to Rs. 1,785/-. It is the stand of the appellant that the name of Sabiri Bi/Borrower has not been reflected in the trial balance as the same has been repaid and only the outstanding sum is expected to be reflected in the trial balance. 54. In F.P.A. No. 27 and 28/MDS/2000 filed by the two daughters of the appellant, the Appellate Tribunal/2nd respondent, by its order dated 10.8.2001, has, among other things, stated as follows; “The appellants have pleaded that their grandfather Hajee Sheik Ahmed and grandmother Maqbul jan, who had independent source of income long before their brother Abdul Rajah was detained under COFEPOSA. It has been stated that Hajee Sheik was carrying on business in leather at Chennai and from his own earnings, had purchased as far back in 1950, a premise bearing No. 19, Katur Sadiappan Street, Madras 3. He built a 3 storied building (4000 sq ft) over a site measuring-1500 sq ft). Again in 1953, he purchased another property at 1/20 Wuthu Kattan Street, Madras 3. Copies of sale deed have been filed and they indicate clear title of Hajee Sheik Ahmed. He was also an income tax assessee, but the appellants have pleaded inability to adduce supportive evidence due to long lapse of time. Documentary evidence has been submitted to show that way back in 1959, the above two properties were settled by Hajee Sheik in favour of his wife Maqbul jan in lieu of Mehr, and that she received a rental income of Rs. 8842/- per annum from these properties. A claim has been made that out of the earnings of rental income, Maqbul jan acquired another property at 38 Muniswami Road, Bangalore, for Rs. 23,000/-. A claim has been made that out of the earnings of rental income, Maqbul jan acquired another property at 38 Muniswami Road, Bangalore, for Rs. 23000/- some time in 1972 and that her aggregate rental income from all properties came to Rs. 23,000/-. A claim has been made that out of the earnings of rental income, Maqbul jan acquired another property at 38 Muniswami Road, Bangalore, for Rs. 23000/- some time in 1972 and that her aggregate rental income from all properties came to Rs. 13440/- per month. About the purchase of impugned property in Sept ember 1975 at 2 /10 Wuthukattan st, Madras 3, for a sum of Rs. 90000 it has been contended that Hajee Shaik, made the purchase along with wife Maqbul jan, son Abdul Rajak, and daughter-in-law Zahida, each contributing Rs. 22500/- and thus each enjoyed 25% ownership of the property. Shortly after the purchase Maqbul Jan died and according to Muslim law of inheritance, her husband’s share in the entire property went up from 25% to 31.25%. The appellants have submitted that their father Abdul Rajak, the detenue had not made any contribution towards 31.25% ownership of the property and the portion gifted by a deed of settlement, in 1976 when they were minors, pertained to the above share which were acquired by grand father Hajee Sheik and grand mother jan from their1 own sources of income of a much earlier period. The appellants have pleaded that reasonable supporting evidence, produced not withstanding constraints of time, have been disregarded in a sweeping manner and the untainted properties forfeited merely on suspicion. In regard to Maqbul Jan’s resources of investment, the appellants have cited certain observation in the Competent Auhority’s order in the case of appellant’s father Abdul Razak (reproduced below) in support of their plea that she was already an owner of properties and further she had borrowed Rs. 20,000/- about the time of joint purchase of the property in 1975. 5. Next, for consideration property at No. 19, Kattur Sadayappan Street, Madras-3. From the records, it is seen that this property was acquired by the person affected, through succession and its legality stands explained. Hence, the same is held not liable for forfeiture, and the proceedings in respect of this property are dropped. 7........ It is seen from the records that a letter of confirmation of February, 1979 from one Sri. Syed Khasim has been furnished stating that he had lent Rs. 20,000/- on 17.9.1975 to Smt. Maqbool Jan at 7% interest per annum. This letter confirms that the loan from Sri. Syed Khasim was not available by the person affected but by his mother.” 55. Syed Khasim has been furnished stating that he had lent Rs. 20,000/- on 17.9.1975 to Smt. Maqbool Jan at 7% interest per annum. This letter confirms that the loan from Sri. Syed Khasim was not available by the person affected but by his mother.” 55. Furthermore, the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal has also observed thus: “Appellants have in their written submission described at some length the nature of business in which, their father Sri Abdul Razak, was engaged at the time he was detained under COFEPOSA. It has been said that ‘at no point of time Abdul Razak indulged in smuggling activities or foreign exchange manipulating activities or any such business which was prohibited by law.’ He was carrying on business in old and used garments, including garments sold by customers in public auction. There was a search in his godown in February, 1976 which led to the seizure of 45 bales of garments. The Collector of Customs confiscated it absolutely and imposed penalty of Rs. l lac on Razak. (Order dated 11.11.1977). In this connection appellants have cited an order dtd 30.7.1980 of Spl. Secretary to Govt. of India reducing the penalty of Rs. l lac to only Rs. 10,000/- as a mitigating factor. The appellants have pleaded that the documentary evidence which went to the roots had been produced despite the fact that notice for forfeiture was received by the appellants, 23 years after the death of grand mother and 10 years after the death of grand father, and the evidence was sufficient to prove that they had acquired the property not from their father, but from the grand father and grand mother, who enjoyed independent source of income. Finally, it has been submitted that the property, owned by appellants viz. 25% and 6% share in the property at 2/10 Wuthukattan St Chennai is a legally acquired property of appellants and that by no stretch of imagination an illegally acquired property and subsequently the impugned order passed under Section 7 of SAFEMA be set aside. We have given careful consideration to the facts of the case, the findings of the learned Competent Authority, and submissions made on his behalf, and the written and oral submissions made on behalf of the appellants.” 56. We have given careful consideration to the facts of the case, the findings of the learned Competent Authority, and submissions made on his behalf, and the written and oral submissions made on behalf of the appellants.” 56. In the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal’s order, it is stated the following: “As to 1st point, the appellants have reiterated what had been already urged before the Competent Authority and substantiated with additional documentary evidence produced before us. 1. The income earning activity and financial independence of Hajee Sheikh Ahmed, is sought to be established by the evidence of the certified copy of the sale deed dated 12.10.1950 under which Shri Ahmed had purchased property at 19, Kattur Sadyappan Street, Periampet, Madras, and on which a three storied building was constructed nearly 15 years before his son Shri Abdul Razak was detained under COFEPOSA. 2. This reference is further supported by the purchase of another immovable property at 1/20 Wuthu Katton Street, Madras in the year 1953 and as evidenced by certified copy of the sale deed dated 22.1.1953. 3. The income earning activities or financial independence of Smt. Maqbul Jan has been sought to be established by producing a copy of the settlement deed dated 22.1.1959 executed in her favour, and a copy of the sale deed dated 6.4.1972 in respect of property No. 38, Muniswamy Road, Bangalore purchased by Smt.Maqbul Jan for Rs. 23,000/-.” 57. That apart, the 2nd respondent/Appellate tribunal, has, inter alia, observed, in its order dated 10.8.2001, as follows: “We agree that proximity of acquisition of the property could be regarded as an evidence of nexus with engagement in illegal activity that led to the issue of detention order. However, in the scheme of Section 2 of the FAFEMA Act, which encompasses a wide range of persons in the domain of relatives and associates, as ‘affected person’ and similarly in terms of Section 3 ibid the scope of ‘illegally acquired properties’ extends so far beyond the nature of illegal activity which resulted in the issue of detention order, that the proximity factor or the gravity factor are inconsequential, for determining whether then character of the property was legal and illegal. Indeed, if this were to be a relevant factor, then notice need not even be issued if the property had been acquired long ago or long after illegal activity was committed. Indeed, if this were to be a relevant factor, then notice need not even be issued if the property had been acquired long ago or long after illegal activity was committed. It may not be out of place to mention that the Govt. of India had substantially reduced the quantum of penalty on Abdul Razak, but since relevant factors are not the gravity of offence, or the proximity to the time of illegal activity, the burden of proof was the only route to determining an illegally acquired property as defined in Section 3(c) of SAFEMA. The proximity and gravity factors cannot be taken into consideration either to the disadvantage or advantage of the appellants and the choice of one to the exclusion of the other would be even more unfair. In our considered view of the facts and circumstances, we are required to satisfy ourselves if Hajee Shaik Ahmad and Maqbul Jan, had sufficient income of their own to be able to contribute their shares in the joint property and whether such satisfaction could be based on the evidence adduced before the Competent Authority and finally if reliance had to be placed upon additional evidence, must the matter be remanded to the Competent Authority for reappraisal of additional evidence or this Tribunal could decide on the basis of its own appraisal of evidence. We find that both appellants had emphasized that no notice was issued to them for 18 years after the proceedings were initiated against their father Abdul Razak. They were still children when property was bequeathed out of love and affection. All they knew the grand father was having his own business, as far back as 1950, when father Abdul Razak was only 9 years old and that he was an income-tax assessee and the grand mother was also enjoying rental income from two properties which had been settled on her as far back as 1959, at which time also no adverse evidence could be inferred on account of relationship. There is no adverse finding on authenticity of the document containing the narration of the circumstance of settlement of their shares consequent to the death of the grandmother, which is socially natural, but no credibility was attached by the Competent Authority. There is no adverse finding on authenticity of the document containing the narration of the circumstance of settlement of their shares consequent to the death of the grandmother, which is socially natural, but no credibility was attached by the Competent Authority. We feel that instead of appreciating the genuine difficulties in retrieval of evidence of half a century ago, particularly when neither of the two grand parents were alive, the Competent Authority embarked on an arithmetical exercise of disproving what seems to us a fairly reasonable evidence of bona fides of the appellants and their grand parents. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that it did not even occur to mind that it was still possible to obtain 50 years old documents from a public office and the evidence would to provide in there would be a public office. We feel that there is self evident justification to admit evidence which is specific to the point for consideration before the Competent Authority and is also the moot point of consideration in appeal, namely, the financial independence of the grand parents. We have therefore admitted the additional documents and carefully examined them. The sale deed dated 12.10.1950, and another sale deed dtd 27.1.1953, certified copies of which were taken on record, during last hearing, are ample proof of financial independence of grand father Hajee Sheik Ahmad. The certified copy of the settlement deed No. 4133/1959, which settles two properties (property at 2/10 Wuthukattan Street, Periamet, Chennai 3 - Ameenabee and at 2/10 Wuthukattan Street, Periamet Chennai - Fathimabee) on the grand mother Maqbul Jan, in lieu of mehr, is also ample proof of her financial independence. We do not agree within the learned C.A.’s findings that their shares in the property, totally valued at Rs. Forty five thousands, did not emanate from their own earnings, but were illegal earnings of their son Abdul Razak. We also do not think old cases such as this should be kept alive by remand to the lower authority and instead finalized on the basis of overall evidence before us and resultantly, set aside the impugned order of the 1st respondent/ Competent Authority dated 31.01.2000 and allowed the appeal.” 58. At this stage, we pertinently refer to the Order of the 1st respondent in Proceedings F. No. OCA. MDS. At this stage, we pertinently refer to the Order of the 1st respondent in Proceedings F. No. OCA. MDS. 2865 of 1998 dated 17.9.2002, wherein at paragraph 6, it is, among other things, observed as follows: “6. I have carefully gone through the records of the cases, explanations tendered for acquisition of the property under notice by the grandmother of the Person Affected and various documents furnished. The Person Affected has claimed that the property, under notice, was acquired by her grandmother from her independent source of income; that she had accumulated rental income from two properties which she owned and also the sale proceeds of one of the property which was disposed off by her. The said two properties came to her grandmother by way of settlement from her grandfather. A perusal of the said settlement deed dated 22.01.1959 reveals that both the properties were mortgaged in 1956 indicating these properties were very much available with the grandfather when Shri Abdul Razaak, the detenu, was just fifteen years old and being a minor, no adverse inference could be drawn that the said properties- could have emanated from the detenu. The property at 1/20 Wuthukattan St., was sold by Smt. Maqbool Jan during 1959 for an amount of Rs. 12,500/- as evidenced by the sale document furnished in these proceedings. The estate duty particulars submitted indicates that l/3rd portion of 19, Kattu Sadayappan St. was used for residence and the rest was let out and that the said house property was in the hands of Smt. Maqbool Jan till her death in 1975. Thus, the grandmother had sufficient sources to purchase the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore for an amount of Rs. 23,000/-. Further, in the case of Smt.Ameenabee and Smt.Fathimabee, sisters of the Person Affected, the Hon’ble ATFP has held that Smt.Maqbool Jan was a lady of means and had independent source to purchase the portion of the property at No. 19, Kattur Sadayappan St., and dropped forfeiture proceedings against the property in the appeal.” 59. 23,000/-. Further, in the case of Smt.Ameenabee and Smt.Fathimabee, sisters of the Person Affected, the Hon’ble ATFP has held that Smt.Maqbool Jan was a lady of means and had independent source to purchase the portion of the property at No. 19, Kattur Sadayappan St., and dropped forfeiture proceedings against the property in the appeal.” 59. Further, the 1st respondent, in paragraph 7 of its order dated 17.9.2002, has held that in view of the various documentary evidence submitted and nothing on record to contradict the same, it is felt that the properly under consideration is not available for forfeiture and consequently, dropped all the further proceedings in respect of the property at No. 38, (old No. 2), Munusamy Road, Tusker Town, Bangalore - 51 (under Notice under Section 7(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976). 60. It is to be borne in mind that the smuggling activities and foreign exchange manipulations do have a catastrophic effect on the national economy. The individuals engaged in these malpractices derive unfair advantage by increasing their wealth, status and violate the Income Tax, Wealth Tax etc. The smuggling activities and foreign exchange manipulation activities will certainly affect an economy and security of the country. 61. The individuals engaged in these malpractices derive unfair advantage by increasing their wealth, status and violate the Income Tax, Wealth Tax etc. The smuggling activities and foreign exchange manipulation activities will certainly affect an economy and security of the country. 61. Section 3(c)- Definitions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 enjoins ‘illegally acquired property’, in relation to any person to whom this Act applies, meaning as follows: “(a) “Appellate Tribunal” means the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property constituted under Section 12; (b) “competent authority” means an officer of the Central Government authorised by it under sub-section (1) of Section 5 to perform the functions of a competent authority under this Act; (c) “illegal acquired property”, in relation to any person to whom this Act applies, means, - (i) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets derived or obtained from or attributable to any activity prohibited by or under any law for the time being in force relating to any matter in respect of which Parliament has power to make laws; or (ii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets in respect of which any such law has been contravened; or (iii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income earnings or assets the source of which cannot be proved and which cannot be shown to be attributable to any act or thing done in respect of any matter in relation to which Parliament has no power to make laws; or (iv) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or partly traceable to any property referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) or the income or earnings from such property; and includes- (A) any property held by such person which would have been, in relation to any previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such previous holder had not ceased to hold it, unless such person or any other person who held the property at any time after such previous holder or, where there are two or more such previous holders, the last of such previous holders is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration; (B) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or partly traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings therefrom; (d) “prescribed “ means prescribed by rules made under this Act; (e) “property” includes any interest in property, movable or immovable; (f) “trust” includes any other legal obligation. (2) Any reference in this Act to any law which is not in force in any areas shall, in relation to that area, be construed as a reference to the corresponding law, if any, in force in that area. (3) Any reference in this Act to any officer or authority shall, in relation to any area in which there is no officer or authority with the same designation, be construed as a reference to such officer or authority as may be specified by the Central Government by notification in the Office Gazette.” 62. Section 8 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 deals with the ‘Burden of Proof’. The burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under section 6 is not illegally acquired property is on the person affected. 63. It cannot be also lost sight of Section 9 of the Act speaks of ‘Fine in lieu of forfeiture’. Also, Section 11 of the Act refers to the ‘certain transfers to be null and void’. 64. In this connection, we worth recall the following decisions: (a) In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Attorney General for India etc. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Others etc. AIR 1994 SC 2179 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 1325 : LNIND 1994 SC 519 itis observed and held as follows: “Both the enactments COFEPOSA and SAFEMA being placed in the IXth - Schedule, they enjoy the immunity conferred by Article 31(B). Thus the attack upon the validity of the said definition on grounds of unreasonableness, arbitrariness or for that matter on any of the grounds relatable to Part-III is of no avail. Even apart from the protection of Article 31(B), it cannot be said that the definition is arbitrary or discriminatory. And there is no reason for reading down the said definition to confine it to the violation of the acts referred to in Section 2(2)(a) of SAFEMA. So far as justification of such a provision is concerned, there is enough and more. After all, all these illegally acquired properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt - at the cost of the people and the State. The State is deprived of its legitimate revenue to that extent. These properties must justly go back where they belong to the State. After all, all these illegally acquired properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt - at the cost of the people and the State. The State is deprived of its legitimate revenue to that extent. These properties must justly go back where they belong to the State. In conclusion it can be said that the interests of society are paramount to individual interests and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relation. A mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been of the past.” (b) In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aamenabai Tayebaly and Others v. Competent Authority under SAFEMA and Others AIR 1998 SC 484 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 482 : LNIND 1997 SC 1451 it is held as follows: “In the instant case the property in question at the relevant time stood in the name of purchaser’s vendor Tahira Sultana. As she was the relative of the COFEPOSA detenu, her husband, the competent authority issued a notice to her under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA in connection with Dharam Jyoti Building flat, the dispute property herein. After hearing her, the competent authority passed an order under Section 7 of SAFEMA forfeiting the said property on 12.10.1977 of is this order which was challenged by her in the Bombay High Court. She had undertaken not to alienate the said property and still in flagrant breach thereof she sold the property in 1981 to purchaser Tayab Ali. Apart from the fact that the said transaction had exposed purchaser’s vendor Tahira Sultana to contempt proceedings and she was punished, the question survives whether the purchaser Tayab Ali could derive any benefit out of the said tainted transaction. It is, of course, true that pending the writ petition there was already a stay order of the High Court of Bombay by which the order of forfeiture of the said property had remained stayed. But it was not an absolute order. It was conditional on the purchaser’s vendor Tahira Sultana, the writ petitioner, not transferring or alienating the said property pending the proceedings. The said injunction of the High Court reflected by the undertaking of Tahira Sultana made the said property inalienable pending the writ petition proceedings moved by purchaser’s vendor before the High Court. It was conditional on the purchaser’s vendor Tahira Sultana, the writ petitioner, not transferring or alienating the said property pending the proceedings. The said injunction of the High Court reflected by the undertaking of Tahira Sultana made the said property inalienable pending the writ petition proceedings moved by purchaser’s vendor before the High Court. Under these circumstances even though Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, strictly speaking, may not apply as the lis was not registered in Bombay as informed to us, the prohibition against alienation of this property, by way of undertaking of purchaser’s own predecessor-in-title before the High Court had its full sway and operation. Therefore, if ultimately the writ petition was dismissed the transfer effected by the writ petitioner in breach of the prohibition and the undertaking would not give any benefit to the purchaser. It would be too much for him to contend that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. It is not the case of the purchaser that any such enquiry was made by him at the relevant time when he entered into the said transaction pending the writ petition in the Bombay High Court as to how COFEPOSA detenu’s wife Tahira Sultana became the owner of this property and what had happened to this property in the proceedings under SAFEMA and whether title of the said flat was clear or not. Thus on broad probabilities of the case it must be held that purchaser willingly and with open eyes played with fire and purchased litigation and it is too tall a claim on his part to submit that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Such stand does into bear scrutiny on the touchstone of probabilities. The transaction of transfer in favour of purchaser could be said to have been effected after the notice under Section 6, issued to the wife of detenu and before the order of forfeiture ultimately got confirmed by the High Court and by the Supreme Court and which had back effect of confirming the same from date of original order. It must, therefore, be held that the transaction of purchase was also hit by Section 11 of SAFEMA. It must, therefore, be held that the transaction of purchase was also hit by Section 11 of SAFEMA. In substance it amounted to selling of Central Government’s property by a total stranger in favour of the purchaser, No title, therefore, in the said property passed to the purchaser and his heirs. Purchaser, therefore, had no legal defence against the claim of the authorities in calling upon the heirs of the original purchaser to vacate and hand over the possession of the property to the Central Government as full owner thereof.” Also, in the aforesaid decision, at page 485 in paragraph 11 it is laid down as follows: “Tainted money earned by smuggler who is convicted under COFEPOSA may result in purchasing number of properties. It cannot, therefore, be said that these properties when confiscated after following due procedure of SAFEMA would amount to multiple forfeiture. In the instant case the original vendor wife of the COFEPOSA smuggler had purchased disputed ‘D’ flat in 1975. It was forfeited under SAFEMA in 1977 by the competent authority. During pendency of writ petition challenging forfeiture, she had sold it to purchaser for large amount. Subsequently she had purchased second flat. Even assuming that for the purchase of the said flat she utilised money obtained by her from the purchaser as consideration for the sale of the ‘D’ flat to him it cannot be said that the original forfeiture of ‘D’ flat was in any way affected by the subsequent forfeiture of another immovable property purchased by the wife of original COFEPOSA smuggler when she purchased the second flat. The said transaction was quite independent of the earlier transaction which had already resulted in forfeiture of the disputed property. It is not as if that ‘D’ flat is being forfeited twice. Consequently the forfeiture of the ‘D’ flat by the competent authority must be treated to be quite an independent transaction as compared to the latter order of forfeiture of second flat. The latter order of forfeiture of entirely different immovable property cannot retrospectively invalidate the earlier order of forfeiture pertaining to ‘D’ flat. At the time when the earlier order was passed the said disputed property clearly reflected the utilitsation of tainted money. The latter order of forfeiture of entirely different immovable property cannot retrospectively invalidate the earlier order of forfeiture pertaining to ‘D’ flat. At the time when the earlier order was passed the said disputed property clearly reflected the utilitsation of tainted money. If subsequent dealing with the said property is found to be unauthorised and inoperative in law and if such subsequent transaction qua the said property remains a still born one no life can be infused in it on account of the subsequent forfeiture of some other property of the original vendor when a subsequent forfeiture has stood on its own and has become final.” (c) In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tekchand and Others v. Competent Authority (1993) 3 SCC 84 : LNIND 1993 SC 303 , it is observed thus: “13. So far as the contention based upon Sections 11 and 16 Sections 11 and 16 of Voluntary Disclosure Act is concerned we have already pointed out, while setting out the said provisions that the immunity conferred thereunder is of a limited character and that it is not an absolute or universal immunity. The immunity cannot be extended beyond the confines specified by the said provisions. There is also no reason to presume that the Parliament intended to extend any immunity to smugglers and manipulators of foreign exchange who are proceeded against under enactments other than those mentioned in sections 11 and 16 sections 11 and 16 of the Voluntary Disclosure Act. So far as the argument that the authorities under the Act have not properly considered the explanation offered by the appellants and the material produced by them, we must say that we are unable to agree with the same. Both the competent authority and the Appellate Authority have considered the same and held against the appellants. We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. We are equally unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the findings recorded by the authorities are either.perverse or that they are based on no evidence. We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. We are equally unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the findings recorded by the authorities are either.perverse or that they are based on no evidence. That the authorities acted with due care and caution is evident from the fact that with respect to one of the immovable properties the authorities were of the opinion that the failure to explain pertains only to part of income/assets and accordingly invoked Section 9 and imposed a fine instead of forfeiting the same.” (d) In Shyam Babu and Others v. Union of India and Others 1997 Cri.L.J. 3348 held thus: “34. This Court has considered this aspect of the matter and learned counsel for the respondents has fairly submitted that the Central Government cannot forfeit the said amount of Rs. 20,000/- and again the house property in view of the fact that the same was acquired with the help of the said Rs. 20,000/-. In other words two orders of forfeiture cannot be passed in respect of the amount of Rs. 20,000/-. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the order of forfeiture in so far as the house property is concerned, in the case of Sita Devi cannot be upheld. But insofar as forfeiture of Rs. 20,000/-as against Pushkar Lai Banka, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the same. The reasons for non-interference will be indicated hereinafter.” (e) In P.S.Ahammad Koya and Another v. Competent Authority, Madras and Others LNIND 1995 Ker 312 : (1996) 1 MLJ (Crl) 570 , it is observed as follows at p. 571 and 572 of MLJ (Crl): “10. This is a case where neither the competent authority nor the appellate tribunal has entered upon a finding that only a part of the source which is less than one-half of the sale consideration is the income derived from activities prohibited by law. Learned counsel contended that the authorities should have considered and entered upon a finding whether option should have been given to the appellants or not. According to us, the question of option would arise only when there is a positive finding regarding the primary aspect. Learned counsel contended that the authorities should have considered and entered upon a finding whether option should have been given to the appellants or not. According to us, the question of option would arise only when there is a positive finding regarding the primary aspect. Authorities are hence not obliged to give any option to the concerned person unless they have reached a finding that income from smuggling was used only to make up less than half the sale consideration. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants made an endeavour to show that the income of the appellants form Private sources was enough to raise the sale consideration used for acquiring the two items of properties. The fact finding authorities have considered in detail the above aspects and reached a finding adverse to the appellants. The contention that the family expenses were met by the father-in-law of the first appellant was repelled by the appellate tribunal which, assessed, the entire income of the said father-in-law and pointed out that he himself had to maintain his own family with such a meagre income. The burden is entirely on the appellants to prove that the income which the first appellant derived from smuggling activities had not been used for acquiring the land. Such burden would not be discharged by merely saying that his father-in-law was meeting all his domestic expenses and so his own income entirely became saving. The said contention was totally unacceptable to the fact finding authorities. We are not persuaded to interfere with the finding.” (f) In Aftab Abdul Rehman Chatriwala v. State of Karnataka and Others LNIND 1994 Kant 46 it is held as follows: “Proceedings for forfeiture of property against sister of detenu initiated under Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 could be supported only if there was a valid detention order and where the very detention order forming the basis of said proceeding is vitiated due to non-supply of grounds, the forfeiture proceedings would also be invalid and reply to show cause notice for initiating said proceedings need not be given.” (g) In S. Usha Selvi v. The Competent Authority and 3 Others LNIND 2010 Mad 4277 : (2011) 3 MLJ 408 , this Court, in paragraphs 8 and 9, has observed as follows: “8. In the instant case, a notice under Section 6(1) was issued to the third respondent on 4.11.1993. In the instant case, a notice under Section 6(1) was issued to the third respondent on 4.11.1993. It appears that there was no challenge to the said notice and the third respondent did not appear in the writ petition as well as in this appeal. Admittedly, the appellant purchased the properties much after the notice, that is on 1.2.1999 from the fourth respondent, who is said to have purchased the property from the third respondent on 6.3.1999. Prima facie such transaction is hit by Section 11 of the Act. For better appreciation Section 11 of the Act is extracted hereunder: 11. Certain transfers to be null and void: Where after the issue of a notice under Section 6 of under Section 10, any property referred to in the said notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government under Section 7, then, the transfer of such property shall be deemed to be null and void. 9. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that Section 11 of the Act, after notice issued under Section 6 or Section 10, if any property referred to in the notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. In such circumstances no right accrues either to the third respondent, the appellant’s vendor or to the fourth respondent on account of their purchaser and those transactions are null and void and non-est in law. In such circumstances no right accrues either to the third respondent, the appellant’s vendor or to the fourth respondent on account of their purchaser and those transactions are null and void and non-est in law. Thus, the learned single Judge, rightly dismissed the writ petition.” (h) In Ashok Kumar v. Competent Authority LNIND 2001 Del 165 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that ‘The burden of proof under Section 8 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act casts on the affected person and further that the person proceeded against has to establish his stand by discharging the burden to prove as provided under Section 8 of the Act.’ (i) In Bajranglal Agarwala v. Competent Authority and Others MANU/OR/0248/1991 1991 (2) OLR 509 , in paragraph 7, it is, among other things, observed as below: “The definition of “illegally acquired property” in Section 3(1)(c) of the Act clearly stipulates that the property in question either wholly or partly must have been acquired by means of income, earning or assets derived or obtained from or attributable to any activity prohibited by or under law for the time being in force in respect of any matter in respect of which Parliament has power to make laws. All the clauses of Section 3(1)(c) indicate that the property in question must have been acquired out of earnings of an activity which is prohibited under law. In other words, applying the same to the present case, it must be indicated that the property of the petitioner was acquired from out of the earnings of Gopichand who was in fact detained under the provisions of the Conservation of Foriegn Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Thus some nexus must be there between the acquisition of the property in question and the illegal activity of either the owner of the property or some other person out of whose earnings the property was acquired. The materials on record are totally silent in this regard. There is not an iota of material to indicate that the petitioner had acquired the property out of any illegal activity prohibited under law nor is there any material to indicate that the property was in fact acquired out of the earnings of said Gopichand who was involved in smuggling. The materials on record are totally silent in this regard. There is not an iota of material to indicate that the petitioner had acquired the property out of any illegal activity prohibited under law nor is there any material to indicate that the property was in fact acquired out of the earnings of said Gopichand who was involved in smuggling. In that view of the matter, the impugned order of forfeiture is bad in law and cannot be sustained The contention of Mr. Palit on this score, therefore, must succeed.” 65. In the present case on hand, although the appellant/petitioner has taken a categorical stand that he has purchased the 1st property viz. , Property at K.G.F. on 3.9.1975 for a sale consideration of Rs. 17,500/-, according to him, the source of payment is that he received a sum of Rs. 18,785/- from one Sabira Bi on 23.07.1975 which sum was given to her earlier as a loan of Rs. 17,000/- as per Mortgage Deed dated 25.11.1974. 66. According to the appellant, he has advanced a loan of Rs. 17,000/- to Sabira Bi from and out of his savings. A perusal of Receipts and Expenses Account for the year ending 30.6.1976 (in respect of the Accounting Year July 1975/June 1976, Assessment Year 1977/1978), only indicates that there is a reference to a sum of Rs. 1,785/- under the caption ‘Interest Receipts’, but, nowhere there is any indication that the appellant has received back the sum of Rs. 18,785/- on cancellation of mortgage. Notwithstanding the fact, a plea has been taken on behalf of the appellant that the loan of Rs. 17,000/- has been returned and that the Mortgage Deed dated 25.11.1974 has been cancelled on 23.7.1975 on receipt of Rs. 18,785/-. In the absence of the appellant/petitioner having failed to establish the source for lending a sum of Rs. 17,000/- to Sabira Bi, much credence cannot be given to the Mortgage Deed dated 25.11.1974. 67. The 1st respondent/Competent Authority, in his order dated 20.3.1998, has also observed that the endorsement made on the first page of the Mortgage Deed shows that the appellant has received only Rs. 15,500/- on 23.7.1975. Thus, it is candidly clear that the appellant is endeavouring to take an umbrage under the mortgage loan of Rs. 17,000/- advance of Ms. Sabira Bi. 15,500/- on 23.7.1975. Thus, it is candidly clear that the appellant is endeavouring to take an umbrage under the mortgage loan of Rs. 17,000/- advance of Ms. Sabira Bi. As a matter of fact, in the Mortgage Deed can be furnished by the appellant, it is also mentioned that a balance to be received Rs. 1,500/- and the sale deed dated 3.9.1975 shows the sale consideration is Rs. 17,500/- as on 23.7.1975, in what mode/manner the appellant has received the outstanding amount of Rs. 1,500/- has not been spelt out by him. The 1st respondent/Competent Authority has observed that as on 30.6.1976 the appellant has indicated the purchase of K.G.F. property valued at Rs. 18,861/-. There is no mention as to the mortgage loan amount being returned by Mrs.Sabira Bi, since the appellant/petitioner has not discharged his burden of proof as per Section 8 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act to the effect that the 1st property viz., K.G.F. mentioned in the notice as per Section 6 has not been illegally acquired, the resultant conclusion is that the said property has been purchased not from a legal source. Consequently, the said property is liable to be forfeited under the Act, in the considered opinion of this Court. 68. Admittedly, the appellant/petitioner has sold the 1st property viz. , K.G.F. property by means of two Sale Deeds dated 3.3.1988 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 94,000/-. He invested the sale proceeds to an extent of Rs. 87,100/- in Unit Trust of India by purchasing 8710 units of the face value of Rs. 10/- each. After the issuance of forfeiture notice only, the 1st property viz. , Property at K.G.F. has been disposed off, hence, we hold that the said property transfer is null and void in the eye of law, as per Section 11 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. 69. As regards the 2nd property viz. , No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, the 1st respondent/Competent Authority, in his proceedings F. No. OCA.MDS.2865/98 dated 17.9.2002, has clearly observed and held that the mother of the appellant had sufficient sources to purchase the property at No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore for an amount of Rs. 23,000/-. Indeed, the said order of the 1st respondent dated 17.9.2002 has become final, conclusive and binding on the respondents. 23,000/-. Indeed, the said order of the 1st respondent dated 17.9.2002 has become final, conclusive and binding on the respondents. As such, the 2nd property viz., No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore, by no stretch of imagination, is liable to be forfeited. Viewed in that perspective, we hold that the 2nd property is not liable for forfeiture. 70. In regard to the 3rd property viz. , No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Chennai, the property has been purchased as per Sale Deed dated 18.9.1975 jointly in the name of appellant, his father Haji Shaikh Ahmed, his mother Maqbool Jan and his wife Zahida Begum each 1/4th share for a total consideration of Rs. 90,000/-, each contributing Rs. 22,500/-. 71. It is not in dispute that the appellant has been detained Under Section 12-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. The 1st respondent/Competent Authority has come to a conclusion that the appellant has been actively engaged in illegal activities and later, he has been detained. Further, the 1st respondent/Competent Authority has observed that within eight months, share of late Haji Shaik Ahmed has been settled on PA 1, the daughter of the detenu apparently this arrangement was done to give legality to the illegal earnings of Shri Abdul Razack in acquisition of this property. Moreover, the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal has also observed that in the absence of any evidence about the resources of late Haji Shaik Ahmed, the only logical conclusion that can be drawn is that the investment in the name of late Haji Shaik Ahmed was made from the illegal earnings of his detenu son. Resultantly, it has come to the conclusion that the share of’the property held in the name of the PA 1 is held as acquired through tainted sources and is liable for forfeiture under the Act. 72. Consequent to the death of Ms. Maqbool Jan, the mother of the appellant, her share devolved upon in favour of the appellant 3/4th and in favour of the father of the appellant 1/4th. 73. It is the case of the appellant that 1/4th share in the 3rd property devolved on the father of the appellant on the demise of his wife, which has been settled in favour of appellant’s daughter Fathima Bee. 74. 73. It is the case of the appellant that 1/4th share in the 3rd property devolved on the father of the appellant on the demise of his wife, which has been settled in favour of appellant’s daughter Fathima Bee. 74. The crucial aspect which is to be taken note of is that the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal, by its order in F.P.A. No. 27 and 28/MDS/ 2000 dated 10.8.2001, has clearly observed that in the scheme of Section 2 of SAFEMA Act which encompasses a wide range of persons in the domain of relatives and associates, as ‘affected persons’ and similarly in terms of Section 3 ibid the scope of ‘illegally acquired properties’ extends so far beyond the nature of illegal activity which has resulted in the issue of detention order, that the proximity factor or the gravity factor are inconsequential, for.determining whether then character of the property was legal or illegal. Indeed, if this were to be a relevant factor, then notice need not even be issued, if the property had been acquired long ago or long after illegal activity was committed. 75. The 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal, in.F.P.A. No. 27 and 28/MDS/2000 dated 10.8.2001, has clearly come to the conclusion that the Sale Deeds dated 12.10.1950 and 27.1.1953, certified copies of which were taken on record, are ample proof of financial independence of grandfather Hajee Sheik Ahmed and further that the certified copy of the Settlement Deed No. 4133/1959, which settles two properties (property at 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai 3 - Ameena Bee and at 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai 3 - Fathima Bee on the grandmother of Maqbool Jan, in lieu of mehr, is also ample proof of her financial independence and accordingly, allowed the appeal. Therefore, the observation of the 2nd respondent/Appellate Tribunal that grandmother-Maqbool Jan of the appellant’s daughter had ample proof of financial independence, has become final, conclusive and binding. In that view of the matter, we hold that the 3rd property viz., at No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai is not liable to be forfeited. 76. For the forgoing reasons and on an overall assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case in a cumulative fashion, we come to the inevitable conclusion that the 1st property viz. In that view of the matter, we hold that the 3rd property viz., at No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai is not liable to be forfeited. 76. For the forgoing reasons and on an overall assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case in a cumulative fashion, we come to the inevitable conclusion that the 1st property viz. , Property at K.G.F. is liable for forfeiture and in this regard, we confirm the finding of the Learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 1269 of 2000 dated 4.2.2000 and the findings of the respondents No. 1 and 2. In regard to the 2nd and 3rd property, viz., No. 38, Munusamy Road, Bangalore and. No. 2/10, Wuttucattan Street, Periamet, Chennai, we hold that they are not liable to be forfeited and the contra findings of the Learned Single Judge in the order dated 4.2.2000 in W.P. No. 1269 of 2000 and the findings of the respondents No. l and 2are set aside by this Court, in furtherance of substantial cause of justice. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed in part, in above terms. No costs. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. Appeal allowed.