Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 422 (RAJ)

Laxman Singh Rana v. State of Rajasthan

2011-02-24

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - Out of these four writ petitions, petitioners Laxman Singh Rana and Hari Singh Yadav, who were both working as Upper Division Clerk (for short 'UDC') with Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, have each filed two petitions. They are aggrieved by common order passed by Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, dated 06.05.1998 by which they have been compulsorily retired from services. Petitioner Laxman Singh Rana has challenged validity of order in Writ Petition No. 2526/1998 and petitioner Hari Singh Yadav in Writ Petition No. 2674/1998. 2. Basic foundation of aforesaid order of compulsory retirement in the case of petitioner Laxman Singh Rana is order dated 29.04.1998 by which disciplinary proceedings under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, 'CCA Rules') was imposed upon him, which he has separately challenged in Writ Petition No. 2574/1998. 3. Writ Petition No. 2675/ 1998 has been filed by petitioner Hari Singh challenging validity of order dated 30.04.1998 vide which Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, reopened an already closed matter and held that regularisation of period of his suspension from 17.10.1977 to 20.10.1981 by Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Buhana, was illegal and that petitioner Hari Singh Yadav could not be held entitled to receive entire salary for the afore-mentioned period and, therefore, in future he shall not be entitled to any increment and pay fixation etc. till sanction for regularisation of aforesaid period of suspension is not granted by the State Government. 4. Since both petitioners have simultaneously filed writ petition making allegations of mala fides against respondent Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer and have asserted that they were victimised at his hands only because they obeyed instructions of the then Zila Pramukh and there was a feud between the then Zila Pramukh and Chief Executive Officer. This was not taken kindly by latter. In order to teach a lesson to petitioner, the then Chief Executive Officer hurriedly passed impugned order in utter breach of relevant provisions of law and for ulterior motives and mala fides. Considering that petitions are founded on identical facts and orders of penalty and compulsory retirement are assailed raising similar arguments, at these four petitions were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 5. Considering that petitions are founded on identical facts and orders of penalty and compulsory retirement are assailed raising similar arguments, at these four petitions were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 5. Petitioner Laxman Singh Rana was appointed on post of Lower Division Clerk in office of Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, on 13.07.1964; he was confirmed as LDC by order dated 27.10.1969 he was then promoted to the post of UDC on 17.01.1994. Respondents granted him third selection scale on completion of 27 years of service in lieu of promotion by order dated 05.03.1994, which was made effective from 25.01.1992 when Government promulgated such scheme. Similarly, petitioner Hari Singh was appointed as LDC in Zila Parishad by order dated 06.05.1965 and was confirmed as such by order dated 21.10.1981 with effect from 06.05.1967; he was promoted LDC by order dated 01.01.1994; he was also granted second selection scale on completion of 18 years of service vide order dated 23.06.1992 and thereafter third selection scale was also given to him on completion of 27 years of service by order dated 25.06.1992. He was placed under suspension as far back as on 17.10.1977 in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings but eventually the disciplinary authority by order dated 20.10.1981 reinstated him in service. Charge-sheet dated 19.10.1977 was served upon him. However, the BDO, Panchayat Samiti, Buhana, passed an order on 01.06.1982 exonerating petitioner of all the charges and directed that he shall be paid full salary for period of suspension. Thus the period of his suspension was regularised in terms of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service Rules. 6. Trouble for petitioners started when serious differences developed between Shri Prahlad Singh Yadav, the then Zila Pramukh and Shri Gautami Mukherjee the then Chief Executive Officer. According to petitioners, they were having strained relations and in fact, Shri Prahlad Singh Yadav, the hen Zila Pramukh made complaints against the then Chief Executive Officer Shri Gautam Mukherjee to the Government. Being heard of Zila Parishad, the Zila Pramukh used to call both petitioners. Petitioner Hari Singh used to take his dictations in long hand and petitioner Laxman Singh Rana was then required to type out letters thus written in hand. A serious complaint was made by the then Zila Pramukh against Chief Executive Officer. Being heard of Zila Parishad, the Zila Pramukh used to call both petitioners. Petitioner Hari Singh used to take his dictations in long hand and petitioner Laxman Singh Rana was then required to type out letters thus written in hand. A serious complaint was made by the then Zila Pramukh against Chief Executive Officer. Coming to know that petitioners were doing typing work of Zila Pramukh, Shri Gautatm Mukherjee not annoyed with both the petitioners. He warned them that if in future the petitioners still obeyed directions of Zila Pramukh, he would see to it that they are dismissed from services. Since petitioners were in the regular service of Zila Parishad they could not afford to disobey the command of Zila Pramukh order, who was head of institution. This further offended Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer. 7. It was thereafter that the Chief Executive Officer issued a memo under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules to petitioner Laxman Singh Rana on 31.3.1998. Petitioner submitted reply to aforesaid memo on 13.03.1998. Petitioner submitted reply to aforesaid memo on 13.05.1998 . He was required by letter dated 20.04.1998 to produce certain documents in support of his reply. Petitioner submitted reply to this letter also. he was required by letter dated 20.04.1998 to furnish certain information. Petitioner submitted reply to this letter also on 21.04.1998. The Chief Executive Officer then passed order of penalty on 29.04.1998, thereby stopping two grade increments of petitioner with cumulative effect. Petitioner submitted a representation to the Chief Executive Officer. It was on the basis of this adverse material that the Chief Executive Officer by order dated 06.05.1998 order compulsory retirement of the petitioner. 8. Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad Jhunjhunu, continued his tirade against petitioner Hari Singh Yadav as well. He got entire record of petitioner scrutinised and could only find order passed by Block Development Officer. Panchayat Samiti, Buhana, on 01.06.1982 by which petitioner was exonerated of the charges and period of his suspension was ordered to be regularised with full salary. Finding this Shri Gautam Mukherjee, Chief Executive Officer, served upon petitioner a notice on 17.04.1998 calling upon him to show cause as to why order passed by Block Development Officer on 01.06.1982 may not be cancelled. Finding this Shri Gautam Mukherjee, Chief Executive Officer, served upon petitioner a notice on 17.04.1998 calling upon him to show cause as to why order passed by Block Development Officer on 01.06.1982 may not be cancelled. It was mentioned in notice that Block Development Officer was not competent to regularise period of absence and that he was not even competent to revoke the order of suspension. The Chief Executive Officer went to the extent of maintaining that Block Development Officer was hand in gloves with petitioner, therefore, passed such illegal order. Petitioner was also required to explain as to where did he mark his attendance during period of absence from 18.10.1977 to 19.02.1981. If any charge-sheet was served upon petitioner, what reply did he file. Petitioner Hari Singh Yadav submitted reply to show cause notice refuting all allegations. The Chief Executive Officer then passed impugned order dated 30.04.1998. It was thereafter that by order dated 06.05.1998 petitioner Hari Singh Yadav was compulsorily retired from service invoking Rule 244 (2) of Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (Rule 51 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996. Hence these writ petitions. 9. Ms. Namita Parihar, learned counsel for petitioners, argued that petitioners had to suffer only because of feud between the then Zila Pramukh and Chief Executive Officer of Zila Parishad, because they obeyed direction of Zila Pramukh, who was elected head of the institution. They did do so in discharge of their duties. Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the Chief Executive Officer wanted that petitioners should never follow directions given by Zila Pramukh. Had they refused to abide directions of Zila Pramukh, it would have been a case of insubordination. Petitioners had to undertake work of typing etc. because they were employees of Zila Parishad and Zila Pramukh was head of the institution. They were not under an obligation to follow illegal command of Chief Executive Officer because they were not his personal servants but were employees of Zila Parishad. It is argued that when petitioners expressed their difficulty to Chief Executive Officer, he felt highly offended and threatened them with dire consequences. Notice under Rule 17 of CCA Rules was deliberately issued to petitioner Laxman Singh Rana with mala fide intention to create an adverse material against him. It is argued that when petitioners expressed their difficulty to Chief Executive Officer, he felt highly offended and threatened them with dire consequences. Notice under Rule 17 of CCA Rules was deliberately issued to petitioner Laxman Singh Rana with mala fide intention to create an adverse material against him. Prior to this there was no adverse material whatsoever against petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, he was never visited with any penalty, whether major or minor at any point of time during his service career of preceding 34 years, nor was communicated any adverse remarks. Referring to impugned order of retirement dated 06.05.1998 in the case of petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, learned counsel for petitioners argued that as per this order, meeting of screening committee was convened on 01.04.1998 so as to consider cases of only these two petitioners Laxman Singh Rana and Hari Singh Yadav and that simultaneously meeting of District Establishment Committee was shown to have been convened on 04.04.1998 against to consider only their case. The charge memo under Rule 17 of CCA Rules was issued to petitioner Laxman Singh Rana on 31.03.1998 only with a view to creating adverse material against him because till the date of convening meeting of screening committee on 01.04.1998 and meeting of District Establishment Committee on 04.04.1998 there was no adverse material against petitioner Laxman Singh Rana. It is argued that there was no specific allegation against petitioner nor there was any material against him but screening committee still made recommendation of compulsory retirement of petitioner Laxman Singh Yadav. This penalty, therefore, could not be used by competent authority to compulsory retire the petitioner. 10. That allegations against petitioner Laxman Singh Rana in the notice under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules was very vague such as that he did not properly maintain files, account registers, service books of employees, annual assessment registers of establishment section. on such a vague charge, even otherwise, it was not shown that despite warning the petitioner did not improve his working, penalty of stoppage of two grade increments could not be imposed on such vague charge. Learned counsel argued that Division Bench of this Court in K.D. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, RLR 1987 (1) 346 , has conclusively held that penalty of stoppage of one or more number of grade increments with cumulative effect cannot be imposed in proceedings under Rule 17 of CCA Rules. Learned counsel argued that Division Bench of this Court in K.D. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, RLR 1987 (1) 346 , has conclusively held that penalty of stoppage of one or more number of grade increments with cumulative effect cannot be imposed in proceedings under Rule 17 of CCA Rules. Order of penalty is, therefore, absolutely incompetent and without authority of law. 11. Ms. Namita Parihar, learned counsel for petitioner argued that Chief Executive Officer had no justification whatsoever to reopen the matter of suspension in the case of Hari Singh Yadav, which was already closed in 1982. Petitioner was of course placed under suspension on 17.10.1977 but then he was reinstated on 20.10.1981. Disciplinary proceedings initiated against pursuant to charge-sheet dated 19.10.1977 also stood concluded with exoneration of petitioner. It was in that context that Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Buhana, by order dated 01.06.1982 ordered that petitioner be paid salary for suspension period thereby regularised aforesaid period. Block Development Officer was competent to pass such order because petitioner was at that time working only as LDC. Approval in the matter with regard to regularisation of suspension period need not he obtained from the State Government. which deals with cases of only members of State service. In fact, petitioner was thereafter granted benefit of second and third selection scale on completion of 18 and 27 years of service, which is akin to promotion and which as per relevant Rules is granted only if the employee as satisfactory service record. The Chief Executive Officer merely completed a reitual of service a notice upon petitioner on 17.04.1998 whereas contents of notice clearly show that Chief Executive Officer had already made up his mind and was predetermined to create adverse material against petitioner so as to justify his compulsory retirement. He even ordered that petitioner shall not be entitled to any increment or pay fixation and pay revision till the State Government did not regularise his suspension period. 12. Learned counsel argued that excepting this order passed by Chief Executive Officer on 30.4.1998, there was no other adverse material against petitioner and suspension of the petitioner that was revoked in the year 1982, being an incident of remote past, could not be the basis to hold that he was not fit to be retained in service or had otherwise become liability of employer. I hold this because for long period of 16 years from 1982 till 1998, there had seen no adverse material whatsoever against petitioner. He was never communicated with any adverse remarks nor was any penalty awarded to him whether minor or major and was rather granted benefit of two selection cases. 13. Therefore petitioners have deliberately impleaded Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer, on allegations of mala fides in their petitions. Despite service of notice, however, Shri Gautam Mukherjee has not filed any affidavit in rebuttal denying such allegations. Thus, allegations of mala fide should be accepted as correct. 14. Learned counsel argued that meeting of District Establishment Committee of Zlla Parishad was never convened by the Chief Executive Officer. In fact Zila Pramukh whom the petitioner impleaded as party to Writ Petition No. 2526/1998; in his reply to the writ petition has denied that any such meeting was ever convened and that intimation of such meeting was never given to him. He being head of institution, meeting of District Establishment Committee of Zila Parishad could not be held in his absence. It was further argued that the Chief Executive Officer formed the screening committee of the Officer hand picked by him, which consisted of himself and Senior Deputy District Education Officer. 15. In substance, argument of learned counsel for petitioners is that order of compulsory retirement of both petitioners has been passed in a most arbitrary, capricious and colourable exercise of power and for reasons of mala fides on the part of the then Chief Executive Officer. The power contained in Rule 90 has thus been abused and order of compulsory retirement has been passed in an unreasonable manner. Mandatory provisions contained in Section 91 (3) of Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1994 and Rule 299 (2) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Rules, 1996 have been violated which requires that such a decision has to be taken by District Establishment Committee. The Chief Executive Officer had, therefore, no competence to pass such order. There was no material with the respondent to justify compulsory retirement of petitioners. The Chief Executive Officer had, therefore, no competence to pass such order. There was no material with the respondent to justify compulsory retirement of petitioners. Learned counsel in support of his argument, relied on judgments of this court in State of Rajasthan v. The Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6465/1994 decided on 02.08.2005 , and in Prem Chand Chauhan v. RSRTC and Another, 2006 (5) WLC (Raj) 158 and various judgments of Supreme Court relied therein. It is, therefore, prayed that writ petitions be allowed in terms prayed for. 16. Per contra Shri L.N. Boss, learned Additional Government Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, argued that order of penalty dated 29.04.1998 by which penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect was imposed on petitioner Laxman Singh was rightly passed under Rule 17 of CCA Rules. He submitted that for this nature of penalty. the disciplinary proceedings are not required to be conducted under Rule 16 of CCA Rules. Similarly regarding petitioner Hari Singh Yadav, he argued that Block Development Officer was not competent to regularise period of suspension of petitioner and therefore he could also not order payment of entire salary for such period to him. Impugned order dated 30.04.1998 was passed after notice was duly served upon petitioner Hari Singh on 17.04.1998 and his reply obtained. Reply submitted by petitioner Hari Singh Yadav was considered and thereafter impugned order was passed. Merely because 16 years had gone by from date the BDO passed order dated 01.06.1982 regularising suspension period could not be a reason not to pass such order if illegality came to notice of Chief Executive Officer later on. This was because an illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. Learned counsel argued that both the petitioners had become liability to service and deadwood to be chopped off and practically there was no utility of them to the employer. In making such decision, the competent authority was guided by recommendations of screening committee consisting of himself and Senior Deputy District Education Officer as per Rule 244 (2) of RSR. According to that Rule such of the Government servants who have completed age of 50 years and qualifying service of 25 years and more were liable to be considered for purpose of compulsory retirement. According to that Rule such of the Government servants who have completed age of 50 years and qualifying service of 25 years and more were liable to be considered for purpose of compulsory retirement. Firstly the District Screening Committee made recommendation and thereafter the natter was placed before the District Establishment Committee, which approved the same and then the Government had given its approval for compulsory retirement of both the petitioners. Learned counsel denied that meeting of District Establishment Committee was not convened. It is submitted that this fact cannot be accepted merely because Zila Pramukh did not participate in the meeting. Even if Zila Pramukh, who is Chairman of District Establishment Committee, did not participate in the meeting held on 04.04.1998, yet the meeting was convened because remaining three members were present. Zila Pramukh did not attend number of previous meetings also. It is argued that as per provisions contained in Sections 89 and 91, the State Government is competent to appoint a person on post of Clerk and, therefore, order of compulsory retirement has also been rightly passed on resolution of the District Establishment Committee. 17. Learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied on judgment of Supreme Court in K.L. Binjolkar v. State of M.P., (2005) 6 SCC 224 . It is, therefore, prayed that writ petitions be dismissed. 18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 19. I propose to first consider writ petition no. 2570/1998 filed by petitioner Laxman Singh Rana against order dated 29.04.1998 awarding penalty of stoppage of two grade increments and writ petition no. 2675/1998 filed by petitioner Hari Singh Yadav challenging order dated 30.04.1998 vide which the Chief Executive Officer directed that order passed by Block Development Officer on 01.06.1982 regularising his suspension period was illegal and incompetent and that annual grade increments and pay fixation granted to him for intervening period was not in accordance with the Rules and accordingly made an entry in his service record. 20. In this writ petition, petitioner Laxman Singh Rana has assailed validity of penalty order dated 29.04.1998 on various grounds including that of mala fide. 20. In this writ petition, petitioner Laxman Singh Rana has assailed validity of penalty order dated 29.04.1998 on various grounds including that of mala fide. A perusal of notice dated 31.03.1998 served upon the petitioner under Rule 17 of CCA Rules shows that allegations against petitioner were only general in nature in that while posted as a clerk in establishment section of Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, he did not discharge his duties as per the Rules. He did not maintain record of letters received and did not properly maintain files; despite verbal and oral instructions he did not improve his working. He even did not properly maintain note-sheets, did not fulfil service books of employees, did not complete entries in service books, did not maintain pay increment registers of employees; he did not timely take steps to get APARS of employees filled in. One Santosh Yadav, a teacher in Panchayat Samiti, Buhana, did not have requisite educational qualification and as per judgment of Supreme Court in Case No. 7031/1993 and circular of the Government dated 07.04.1994, she was liable to be removed from service, the petitioner, by giving a wrong reference of an earlier judgment of this court in writ petition no. 2023/1989, mislead his higher authorities and got a stay order issued in her favour. Thus, he wanted to confer undue favour on Smt. Santosh Yadav. One matter was referred to administrative committee of Panchayat Samiti, Khetri, against one Mahendra Singh Choudhary, Gram Sevak, on allegation of encroachment upon a Government land in 1995, and when no action was reported, the petitioner did not send any reminder for two years. Similarly he did not initiate any action against Banwari Lal employee of Panchayat Samiti, Bilasisar, despite specific direction of Director, Gramin Vikas and Panchayat Raj Department and kept the matter pending for long. That he got 58 days earned leave sanctioned in favour of Hari Singh Yadav, LDC, in 1995-96 from 16.08.1995 to 12.10.1995, vide order dated 17.10 1995, where as during that period there was no vacant post of LDC in Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, and Hari Singh Yadav was relieved on 14.08.1995. 21. That he got 58 days earned leave sanctioned in favour of Hari Singh Yadav, LDC, in 1995-96 from 16.08.1995 to 12.10.1995, vide order dated 17.10 1995, where as during that period there was no vacant post of LDC in Zila Parishad, Jhunjhunu, and Hari Singh Yadav was relieved on 14.08.1995. 21. The kind of charges that have been framed against petitioner clearly show that the then Chief Executive Officer got entire record of petitioner Laxman Singh scrutinised and attributed to him number of lapses but the record does not corroborate the allegations because for none of these allegations, was the petitioner ever issued any memo. 22. And in doing so, main motto of the then Chief Executive Officer was to penalise petitioner Laxman Singh Rana and thereby create material for his compulsory retirement. The Chief Executive Officer did not even care to follow the law. According to Section 91 (B) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act punishment of censor or with holding of increment could be made only with approval of Chairperson of concerned Panchayat Raj Institution, which in this case would be Zila Pramukh. No such approval was obtained from the Chairperson of the Panchayat Raj Institution. Besides that, penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect could not have been imposed in proceedings under Rule 17 of CCA Rules as this is a major penalty having effect of permanently reducing pay of an incumbent. A Division Bench of this court in K.D. Sharma has authoritatively held that penalty of this nature in the scope of Rule 17 of CCA Rules cannot be evident that it was a case of hoodwink and not genuine disciplinary proceedings with a view to penalising him, and was motivated by mala fide intention on the part of the then Chief Executive Officer Shri Gautam Mukherjee. The order of penalty of stoppage of two grade increments awarded to petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, therefore, deserves to be quashed. 23. Adverting now to Writ Petition No. 2675/1998 filed by Hari Singh Yadav, who has impleaded the then Chief Executive Officer Shri Gautam Mukherjee as party respondent to writ petition but despite that Shri Gautam Mukherjee has not chosen to deny those allegations, which even otherwise are evidently proved on the basis of material on record. Petitioner Hari Singh Yadav has challenged the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer dated 30.04.1998. Petitioner Hari Singh Yadav has challenged the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer dated 30.04.1998. By this impugned order, the Chief Executive Officer has reopened disciplinary matter which had already been closed way back in the year 1982. Initially, in that matter, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 17.10.1977 but thereafter he was reinstated in service on 20.10.1981. Petitioner was served with charge-sheet dated 20.10.1977, but thereafter he was reinstated in service on 20.10.1981. Disciplinary proceedings were concluded with exoneration of petitioner of the charges levelled against him. It was thereupon that the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, by order dated 01.06.1982 while regularising suspension period of petitioner directed differential payment of salary during the suspension period. The petitioner was then granted second and third selection scales on completion of 18 and 27 years of service, respectively. As per relevant instructions, selection scale is granted which is granted in lieu of promotion and is akin to promotion, on his satisfactory service record. There was apparently no justification for reopening this matter 16 years thereafter in 1998. The timing of notice dated 17.04.1998 served upon the petitioner, speaks volumes about intention of Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer. This clearly proves mala fides on his part that he in any case wanted to get rid of him and was bent on creating adverse material against the petitioner so as to justify his compulsory retirement. The kind of order that has been passed had very serious consequences. Not only this, the Chief Executive Officer observed that the Block Development Officer was not competent to revoke suspension of the petitioner but he went on further to hold that till such time suspension period of the petitioner is not regularised by the State Government, the petitioner will not be entitled to any pay. increment or pay fixation. Status of petitioner of Hari Singh at the relevant time was that of LDC. There was, therefore, no question of State Government to give approval of revoking his suspension. Suspension order dated 17.10.1977 is on record of Writ Petition No. 2675/1998 as Annexure-5. The revocation order was passed by none other than the Block Development Officer, and order passed by BDO clearly stipulates that this revocation was without prejudice to pending disciplinary enquiry. There was nothing illegal in it. Suspension order dated 17.10.1977 is on record of Writ Petition No. 2675/1998 as Annexure-5. The revocation order was passed by none other than the Block Development Officer, and order passed by BDO clearly stipulates that this revocation was without prejudice to pending disciplinary enquiry. There was nothing illegal in it. Surprisingly, the Chief Executive Officer in present case has gone into the question of competence of BDO to revoke the order of suspension but he did not utter a single word about such competence when BDO placed the under suspension. The manner in which this impugned order dated 30.04.1998 was passed by Chief Executive Officer proves allegation of mala fide on the part of Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer. The petitioner arrayed him as party respondent to writ petition on specific allegation of mala fide. Despite service of notice, Shri Gautam Mukherjee has not filed affidavit in rebuttal denying those allegations. The impugned order dated 30.04.198 cannot therefore be sustained in law. 24. Coming now to the order of compulsory retirement dated 06.05.1998 passed in the case petitioners, it is evident from the record that in so far as suspension of petitioner Laxman Singh Rana is concerned, the screening committee recommended his compulsory retirement on 01.04.1998 whereas such recommendation is said to have been endorsed by the District Establishment Committee on 04.04.1998. The order of penalty against petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, whereby his two grade increments were stopped with cumulative effect. curiously enough, was passed on 29.04.1998. As on that date when screening committee recommended and/or District Establishment Committee approved compulsory retirement of petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, no penalty was awarded to the petitioner. Even otherwise, there was no adverse remark or any penalty order whatsoever passed against petitioners at any point of time earlier. The minutes which were drawn by screening committee dated 01.04.1998 are on record as Annexure R/2 in Writ petition No. 2526/1998 filed by Laxman Singh Rana. The screening committee recommended compulsory retirement of petitioner Laxman Singh exactly on very same allegation on which he was served with charge memo under Rule 17 of CCA Rules and ultimately awarded penalty of stoppage of two grade increments. The screening committee recommended compulsory retirement of petitioner Laxman Singh exactly on very same allegation on which he was served with charge memo under Rule 17 of CCA Rules and ultimately awarded penalty of stoppage of two grade increments. All these allegations are highly vague unspecific and unambiguous, made on the grounds that he did not discharge his duties as per rules; did not maintain record of letters; did not property maintain files, account registers, service books, pay increment registers. did not timely take steps to get annual performance appraisal reports of employees filled in etc. Neither the charge memo nor penalty order specified as to for which period these allegations pertained and if these were in general relating to entire service career of petitioner Laxman Singh, whether in past he was served with any memo or notice, let alone charge sheet on the ground of any such alleged misconduct or lapse on his part. In the proceedings of screening committee, it is mentioned that petitioner was given several written and oral warnings but details of none of such warnings, at least written warning, have been furnished either in these proceedings or in reply to writ petition before this court. The recommendation of screening committee is on record at Annexure R/4 in writ petition no. 2674/1998. In the case also, recommendation was made on 01.04.1998 by screening committee and on 04.04.1998 same was approved by the District Establishment Committee. Interestingly however impugned order against petitioner Hari Singh, which is assailed in writ petition No. 2675/1998 was passed on 30.04.1998 i.e. much after the recommendation for compulsory retirement of" petitioner was made. Nevertheless the recommendation of screening committee was entirely based on very same allegations on which show cause notice was served upon petitioner on 17.04.1998 and the order dated 30.04.198 was passed directing that petitioner shall not be entitled to any pay increments and pay fixation during suspension period. These recommendations which have been made by the screening committee in both the cases, were authorised by none other than the Chief Executive Officer himself, who included one of his subordinate officer as another member of the committee, who was working on the post of Senior Deputy District Education Officer in Zila Parishad itself. These recommendations which have been made by the screening committee in both the cases, were authorised by none other than the Chief Executive Officer himself, who included one of his subordinate officer as another member of the committee, who was working on the post of Senior Deputy District Education Officer in Zila Parishad itself. This clearly substantiates the allegation of petitioner that the said officer was hand-picked by the Chief Executive Officer himself, otherwise the recommendations the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was solely mooted by the Chief Executive Officer. 25. Recommendations of District Establishment Committee dated 04.04.1998 are on record. In these proceedings, it is evident that cases of only two employees were placed before the District Establishment Committee for the purpose of their compulsory retirement and they were petitioners Laxman Singh Rana and Hari Singh Yadav. In one para relating to Laxman Singh, the general allegations about his inefficiency, as noticed above, were reiterated wordings which were exactly similar to recommendations of the screening committee. In another para relating to petitioner Hari Singh Yadav again averment similar to recommendations of screening committee have been reiterated. There is thus striking similarity between what has been observed by District Establishment Committee with recommendations of screening committee in the case of each of two petitioners. And obviously this had to be so because the proceedings of District Establishment Committee were also drawn by Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer, who has authored the report of screening committee. This meeting is shown to have been attended by Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the Chief Executive Officer as member Secretary of Zila Parishad, who incidentally chaired the same with one Shri T.C. Bohra, a member as representative of Collector and one Bajrang Lal Choudhary, another member. This assumes significance because the Zila Pramukh in his reply to one of these writ petitions has denied having ever been informed about the meeting of District Establishment Committee. No meeting of District Establishment Committee could be convened without participation of head of institution i.e. Zila Pramukh. Section 82 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act., 1994, provides for appointment of Chief Executive Officer. Section 84 of the Act provides that Chief Executive Officer shall carry out the policies, decisions and directions of the Zila Parishad and discharge his duties imposed upon him by or under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder. Section 82 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act., 1994, provides for appointment of Chief Executive Officer. Section 84 of the Act provides that Chief Executive Officer shall carry out the policies, decisions and directions of the Zila Parishad and discharge his duties imposed upon him by or under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder. Sub-section (2) of Section 84 provides that Chief Executive Officer shall under instructions of Zila Pramukh issue notice for convening every meeting of Zila Parishad and standing committees, and may take part in the discussion but shall not have the right to move any resolution or to vote. Composition of District Establishment Committee is given in Section 90 of the Act which consists of Zila Pramukh, as the Chairman; Chief Executive Officer and Senior Deputy District Education Officer, an officer nominated by the competent authority. Section 91 of the Act authorizes the Chief Executive Officer to award penalties on Class IV employees, in regard to other employees of higher status, if they hold their appointment under that Zila Parishad. Although the Chief Executive Officer can authenticate the order of penalty of censure, withholding of increment or promotion, but only with approval of Chairperson of concerned Panchayati Raj Institutions. From all these relevant provisions of the Act, it is thus evident that District Establishment Committee has to necessarily have the Zila Pramukh as its Chairman and in the absence of participation of Zila Pramukh, it cannot be considered to be District Establishment Committee. 26. The Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1020 : [1992(2) SLR 2 (SC)] , in paras 23 and 24 of judgment, held as under : 23. We now come to the decision in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this case, there were no adverse entries in the confidential records of the appellant for a period of five years prior to the impugned order. Within five years, there were two adverse entries. In neither of them, however, was his integrity doubted. These adverse remarks were not communicated to him. The Bench consisting of E.S.Venkataramiah and K.N. Singh, JJ. quashed it on two grounds viz.- 1. Within five years, there were two adverse entries. In neither of them, however, was his integrity doubted. These adverse remarks were not communicated to him. The Bench consisting of E.S.Venkataramiah and K.N. Singh, JJ. quashed it on two grounds viz.- 1. It would not be reasonable and just to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore good entries of recent past. If entries for a period of more than 10 years past are taken into account it would be an act of digging out past to get some material to make an order against the employee. 2. In Gurdyal Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCR 518 ( AIR 1979 SC 1622 ) and Amarkant Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (1984) 2 SCR 299 ; ( AIR 1984 SC 531 ), it was held that unless an adverse report is communicated and representation, if any, made by the employee is considered, it may not be acted upon to deny the promotion. The same consideration applies where the adverse entries are taken into account in retiring an employee prematurely from service. K.N. Singh, J. speaking for the Bench observed: " It would be unjust and unfair and contrary to principles of natural justice to retire pre-maturely a Government employee on the basis of adverse entries which are either net communicated to him or if communicated, representations made against those entries are not considered and disposed of. This is the first case in which the principles of natural justice were imported in the case of compulsory retirement even though it was held expressly in J.N. Sinha ( AIR 1971 SC 40 ) that the said principles are not attracted. This view was reiterated by K.N. Singh, J. again in (1989) 4 SCC 664 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2218 ) Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa. (Bench comprising of K.N. Singh and M.H. Kania, JJ.). In this case, the Review Committee took into account the entire service record of the employee including the adverse remarks relating to the years 1969 to 1982 (barring certain intervening years for which no adverse remarks were made). The employee had joined the Orissa Government service as an Assistant Engineer in 1955. In 1961 he has promoted to the post of Executive Engineer and in 1976 to the post of Superintending Engineer. The employee had joined the Orissa Government service as an Assistant Engineer in 1955. In 1961 he has promoted to the post of Executive Engineer and in 1976 to the post of Superintending Engineer. In 1979 he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar with effect from 1.1.1979. He was compulsorily retired by an order dated 10.11.1983. The Bench held in the first instance that the adverse entries for the period prior to his promotion as Superintending Engineer cannot he taken into account. It was held that if the officer was promoted to a higher post, and that too a selection post, notwithstanding such adverse entries, it must be presumed that the said entries lost their significance and cannot be revived to retire the officer compulsorily. Regarding the adverse entries for the subsequent years and in particular relating to the years 1981-82 and 1982-83 it was found that though the said adverse remarks were communicated, the period prescribed for making a representation had not expired. The Bench observed (at p. 2221 of AIR ): "......These facts make it amply clear that the appellant's representation against the aforesaid adverse remarks for the year 1981-82 and 1982-83 was pending and the same had not been considered or disposed of on the date of impugned order was issued. It is settled view that it is not permissible to prematurely retire a Government servant on the basis of adverse entries, representations against which are not considered and disposed of. See Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1987 SC 948 )." 24. On the above basis, it was held that the Review Committee ought to have waited till the expiry of the period prescribed for making representation against the said remarks and if any representation was made it should have been considered and disposed of before they could be taken into consideration for forming the requisite opinion. In other words, it was held that it was not open to the Review Committee and the Government to reply upon the said adverse entries relating to the years 1981-82 and 1982-83, in the circumstances. Unfortunately, the decision in J.N. Sinha ( AIR 1971 SC 40 ) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges when deciding the above two cases. 27. Unfortunately, the decision in J.N. Sinha ( AIR 1971 SC 40 ) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges when deciding the above two cases. 27. Moreover, in present case, none of petitioners had any order of penalty against them during entire service career nor were they communicated any adverse remarks. There was no other adverse material against them. They were both granted benefit of selection scales on completion of 18 and 27 years of service, respectively, for which concerned Government servant should have satisfactory service record. When both the petitioners had such a clean or unblemished service record for last almost three decades and especially when two impugned penalty orders passed against each of them have been found to be unsustainable in law, it cannot be said that there was any adverse material against them. The order of compulsory retirement passed in the case of petitioners must be held to have been passed in colourable exercise of power in most arbitrary and capricious manner in as much as no reasonable person on such material could have arrived at a decision to compulsory retire the petitioners because on such material it could not be concluded that petitioners had otherwise become deadwood to be chopped off or had become liability to service. 28. In given facts and circumstances of the cases, though the impugned order is an order of compulsory retirement but in fact and in effect it was an order of removal by way of compulsory retirement in a shortcut and arbitrary manner. Supreme Court in a recent judgment in M.P. State Co-op Dairy Fedn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 221 - while expressing on the law relating to power of judicial review held that although such a power is restricted one, which has many facets and can be interfered with when it is based on no material, it is arbitrary, it is without application of mind and when there is no evidence to support the same. 29. Even in the case of M.L. Binjolkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh , supra, cited by learned Additional Government Counsel, what has been held by Supreme Court is that an employer can pass an order of compulsory retirement when the employee is considered to be a dead wood and practically of no utility to the employer. 29. Even in the case of M.L. Binjolkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh , supra, cited by learned Additional Government Counsel, what has been held by Supreme Court is that an employer can pass an order of compulsory retirement when the employee is considered to be a dead wood and practically of no utility to the employer. The purpose and object of premature retirement of a Government employee is to weed out the inefficient, corrupt, dishonest or dead wood, from Government service, but in present cases, as already discussed above, the material that was available with respondent was not such which can support their compulsory retirement on any of these parameters. This is besides the fact that order of compulsory retirement of petitioners was even otherwise illegal and incompetent having been passed for reasons of mala fides on the part of Shri Gautam Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer, and because it was not authenticated by a duly constituted District Establishment Committee as envisaged by Section 90 of the Act. In fact present one is a case of persecution and victimisation of the petitioners by the then Chief Executive Officer of Zila Parishad. 30. In view of what has been discussed above, all writ petitions deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. The order of penalty dated 30.04.1998 passed against petitioner Hari Singh Yadav which is assailed in Writ Petition No. 2675/1998, and order of penalty dated 29.04.1998 passed against petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, which is assailed in Writ Petition No. 2570/1998 are quashed and set aside. Likewise, the common order of compulsory retirement dated 06.05.1998 impugned in Writ Petition No. 2674/1998 filed by petitioner Hari Singh Yadav and in Writ Petition No. 2526/ 1998 filed by petitioner Laxman Singh Rana, is also quashed and set aside. Petitioners are held entitled to reinstatement with all consequential benefits. Since both petitioners have attained age of superannuatioe during pendency of writ petitions, they shall be deemed to have retired from service on attaining age of superannuation with all consequential benefits throughout. They would be further entitled to all retiral benefits and also costs which in each of these petitions, is quantified at Rs. 2500/-. Thus a sum of Rs. 5000/- shall be additionally payable to each of petitioners. They would be further entitled to all retiral benefits and also costs which in each of these petitions, is quantified at Rs. 2500/-. Thus a sum of Rs. 5000/- shall be additionally payable to each of petitioners. The Government however shall be entitled to recover this amount from salary/pension of Shri Gautami Mukherjee, the then Chief Executive Officer, who masterminded the impugned orders for reasons of mala fides and ulterior motives. 31. Compliance of judgment be made within a period of three months from the date its copy is produced before respondents.Petition allowed. *******