F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, ACJ.;— 1. The respondent in the writ petition is the appellant. The challenge is to the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 26-11-2009 passed in WP no. 448/1999. 2. The issue pertains to the right of ownership of the parties herein pertaining to the land measuring 8 kanal and 14 Maria under survey nos. 501/min, 310/min, 1109/min, 1110, 1679, 1670, 1671 and 3047 min situated in village Kunich Tehsil Bandipora. The said land originally belonged to one Ahmad Mir, who died intestate leaving behind two wives and an adopted son namely the appellant herein. The names of both the wives are the same, namely, Taja. It is common ground that appellant was adopted by late Ahmad Mir as his son. The said Ahmad Mir died on 29-01-1976. After his death the appellant and the two widows equally shared the properties left by late Ahmad Mir by mutual consent. Subsequently, one of the wives died and after her death the appellant and the other widow shared the properties left behind by the deceased widow in equal shares again by mutual consent which was mutated by mutation dated 04-06-1984. Subsequently the 2nd widow also died in the year 1996. After her death her share of property was also mutated in favour of the appellant by mutation dated 27-07-1996. The said mutation was corrected by the Tehsildar Agrarian Reforms Bandipora in favour of the respondent. Aggrieved against the same, the appellant approached the Land Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms Baramulla. His appeal was dismissed by order dated 03-12-1997. The appellant preferred a revision against the order of the Commissioner Agrarian Reforms Baramulla before the Jammu and Kashmir Special Tribunal under Section 21 of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act read with Section 23 of the J&K Special Tribunal Act. By order dated 30-07-1999 in File no. STS/2914/98 the Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner dated 03-12-1997 as well as the order of Tehsildar Bandipora dated 07-02-1996 and remitted the matter back to the Tehsildar with a direction to attest the mutation of inheritance in respect of land in dispute measuring 8 Kanal and 14 Maria situated in village Kunich, Tehsildar Bandipora in favour of the appellant. Aggrieved against the same the respondent preferred the writ petition. The writ petition having been allowed, the appellant has come forward with this appeal. 3. Mr. Aggrieved against the same the respondent preferred the writ petition. The writ petition having been allowed, the appellant has come forward with this appeal. 3. Mr. S.T. Hussain, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents raised two preliminary objections to this appeal. The first objection related to the maintenance of this appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground that the writ of certiorari and the revision under Section 115 of the CPC have the same complexion and, therefore, when the writ petition was an extension of superintending power of the Court over its subordinate Tribunal, a further appeal under Clause 12 was not maintainable. The other preliminary objection raised by the learned senior counsel was on the very status of the appellant to claim any right in the landed properties based on the fact that he was adopted son of late Ahmad Mir and by virtue of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, Act no. IV of 2007, no Muslim can claim any right in his capacity as an adopted son. In other words, having regard to the coming into force of Act no. IV of 2007 all such rights which were in vogue under the provisions of the Shri Partap Jammu and Kashmir Laws Consolidation Act, Samvat 1977 stood repealed which were, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act IV of 2007 as well as by virtue of Section 2 of the Act no. IV of 2007, and the question regarding intestate succession, special property of females including personal property inherited etc, where the parties are Muslims, would be governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, notwithstanding any customs or usages to the contrary. Learned senior counsel would therefore contend that once the said Act was introduced the appellant had no right in law to claim any benefits on the basis of his so-called status as an adopted son of late Ahmad Mir. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1962(1) SCR 67 , C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unissa and others in support of his above submissions. 4. Inasmuch as, we find the 2nd preliminary objection would strike at the very root of the claim of the appellant, we prefer to deal with the said submission in the first instance. 5. 4. Inasmuch as, we find the 2nd preliminary objection would strike at the very root of the claim of the appellant, we prefer to deal with the said submission in the first instance. 5. When we examine the said submission with reference to the facts involved herein, we find that the appellant was admittedly an adopted son of late Ahmad Mir. It is common ground that prior to coming into force of Act No. IV of 2007 the parties were governed by the provisions of Shri Partap Jammu and Kashmir Laws Consolidation Act, Samvat 1977. Section 4 of the said Act provided that any question regarding succession, special property of females etc, the rule of deci.cion was the Mohammedan Law in case where the parties were Muslims -and Hindu Law where the parties were Hindus, except in so far as such law had been, by that Act or any other enactment altered or abolished as had been modified by any custom applicable to the parties which was not contrary to justice, equity and good conscience and which had not been declared to be void by any competent authority. 6. The statement of objects and reasons of Act no. IV of 2007 also throws much light on this aspect and disclose that this Court in the case of Yaqoob Laway and others v. Gulla and another reported in 2004 (II) SLJ 761: 2005 (3) JK] [HC] 122 dealt with the issue elaborately and laid down that in the matters of inheritance, it is the personal law that would apply to the parties and there can be no presumption in favour of any custom. The High Court further held that no civil court can presume the existence of customs unless specifically pleaded and proved, and that no support of Section 50 of the Evidence Act can be taken to have established such a custom. There was also an observation in the said decision that the customary law prevalent in the State has resulted in chaos and was giving rise to endless litigation and delay in disposal of cases. It was further observed that there was no authentic record of customs, that the code of tribal custom was outdated and obsolete and that certain Incidents of customs recorded, on the face of it, were unreasonable. It was further observed that there was no authentic record of customs, that the code of tribal custom was outdated and obsolete and that certain Incidents of customs recorded, on the face of it, were unreasonable. It was in the above stated background the Act no IV of 2007 came to be enacted and was published in the Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette Vol. 119 Jammu dated 26-02-2007. 7. It is well known that under the Muslim Personal Law adoption was not permitted. Apparently based on the so-called custom adoption of the appellant was stated to have been resorted to by late Ahmad Mir prior to 1976. Now after the advent of Act no. IV of 2007, the question for consideration is as to whether the appellant can continue to claim any right in his capacity as an adopted son of late Ahmad Mir and that too against the properties of the wives of late Ahmad Mir. 8. In this context we find the reliance placed upon by learned senior counsel on the decision reported as 1962(1) S.C.R, 67, Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unissa and others is apposite in all respects. At page 73 the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the Shariat Act 1937 along with the amendment made by Madras Act 18 of 1949 which contained an identical provision like Section 2 of the Act no. IV of 2007, and has declared the legal position as under: "Under the Shariat Act, 1937, as framed, in questions relating to charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments, the custom or usage would prevail. But the Act enacted by the Central Legislature was amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 and S.2 as amended provides: "Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract, or gift or any other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including Tallaq, ila, Zihar, Lian, Khula and Mubarrat, maintenance dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)". Manifestly by this Act, "the rule of decision" in all questions relating to intestate succession and other specified matters including wakfs, where the parties to the dispute are Muslims, is the Muslim Personal Law. Manifestly by this Act, "the rule of decision" in all questions relating to intestate succession and other specified matters including wakfs, where the parties to the dispute are Muslims, is the Muslim Personal Law. The terms of the Act as amended are explicit. Normally, a statute which takes away or impairs vested rights under existing laws is presumed not to have retrospective operation. Where vested rights are affected and the question is not one of procedure, there is a presumption that it was not the intention of the legislature to alter vested rights. But the question is always one of intention of the legislature to be gathered from the language used in the statute. In construing an enactment; the court starts with a presumption against retrospectively if the enactment seeks to affect vested rights; but such a presumption may be deemed rebutted by the amplitude of the language used by the Legislature. It is expressly enacted in the Shariat Act as amended that in all questions relating to the matters specified, "the rule of decision" in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law. The injunction is one directed against the court; it is enjoined to apply the Muslim Personal Law in all cases relating to the matters specified notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary. The intention of the legislature appears to be clear; the Act applies to all suits and proceedings which were pending on the date when the Act came into operation as well as to suits and proceedings filed after that date. It is true that suits and proceedings which have been finally decided would not be affected by the enactment of the Shariat Act, but if such a suit or proceeding be pending even in appeal on the date when the Act was brought into operation, the law applicable for decision would be the Muslim Personal Law if the other conditions prescribed by the Act are fulfilled. In our view, the High Court was right in holding that it was bound to apply the provisions of the Shariat Act as amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 to the suit filed by the plaintiffs." (Emphasis added) 9. In our view, the High Court was right in holding that it was bound to apply the provisions of the Shariat Act as amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 to the suit filed by the plaintiffs." (Emphasis added) 9. Having regard to the said categoric pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made in relation to the Shariat Act, 1937 along with Madras Act 18 of 1949, as per Section 2 of the said Act which is in parimateria with Section 2 of Act No. IV of 2007, there is no scope for any further discussion than to merely apply the proposition of law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 10. Applying the above dictum to the case on hand, since the writ petition was in continuation though filed after the initiation of the proceedings earlier, since by that time the writ petition came to be filed in this Court and before it was finally decided, the Act No. IV of 2007 had come into effect, it goes without saying that the claimed status of the appellant as adopted son of late Ahmad Mir got extinguished by operation of the law. As such, there was no right in the appellant to seek for any remedy based on the extinguished status as an adopted son. This legal position having now been ascertained after the coming into force of Act no. IV of 2007, as rightly contended by learned senior counsel, there was no locus in the appellant to claim any right to file the present appeal. To put it in more plain words, the so-called status of the appellant as an adopted son stood extinguished on the advent of the Act No. IV of 2007 and thereafter the question of claiming any right based on the said status did not survive. 11. To put it in more plain words, the so-called status of the appellant as an adopted son stood extinguished on the advent of the Act No. IV of 2007 and thereafter the question of claiming any right based on the said status did not survive. 11. Besides the above legal position as to the status of the appellant and his locus as is now declared, when we examine the order of the learned Single Judge, the learned Judge has held as under while dealing with the claim of the appellant: "It appears that while making the order dated 30-7-1999 tribunal has been influenced by the fact that Ahad Sheikh was the adopted son of Ahmed Mir as such was entitled to get the property left by Taja but while doing so the Tribunal has lost sight of a very material fact that the Tehsildar concerned was while directing mutation of the land dealing with the estate left by Taja and not with the estate left by Ahmed Mir. Ahmed Mir's estate as noticed above got mutated in favour of three persons. Ahad Sheikh accepted this position and did not raise any objection. After the death of 1st widow her estate also got mutated in favour of the second widow and Ahad Sheikh. This time also Ahad Sheikh did not dispute the fact. After the death of second widow, it was now the estate left behind by her which was the subject matter of mutation. The status claimed by Ahad Sheikh as adopted son of Ahmed Mir, was confined to the rights he could get from Ahmed Mir under the adoption deed executed by the later in favour of Ahad Sheikh. This deed did not govern the widows at all, as such, at the time widow Taja died the Revenue Officer had to look for the heirs of Mst. Taja who were entitled to get her property under the Muslim Personal Law. No custom is pleaded by any of the parties in this respect. Petitioner Murad Shah is the son of sister of Mst. Taja and was thus under the personal law entitled to get estate left by Mst. Taja. The Tehsildar as well as the Commissioner, therefore, rightly held him entitled to the land left by Mst. Taja. This simple principle has not been understood by the Tribunal. Petitioner Murad Shah is the son of sister of Mst. Taja and was thus under the personal law entitled to get estate left by Mst. Taja. The Tehsildar as well as the Commissioner, therefore, rightly held him entitled to the land left by Mst. Taja. This simple principle has not been understood by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has fallen into an error by holding that Ahad Sheikh being the adopted son was entitled to the property left by Mst. Taja." 12. When the status of the appellant as an adopted son got extinguished after the advent of Act No. IV of 2007, there was no right in the appellant to claim any lien viz-a-viz Mst. Taja, the maternal aunt of the respondent, in order to claim any right in the landed properties owned and possessed by the said late Mst. Taja. When the relationship of the respondent as a nephew of late Mst. Taja is not in dispute and when the locus of the appellant to stake any claim in relation to the properties owned and possessed by Mst. Taja get extinguished, there was no right in the appellant to maintain any claim in regard to the said properties of late Mst. Taja The claim of the respondent in his capacity as the nephew of late Mst. Taja having been accepted, the action of the Tehsildar in having mutated the land in favour of the respondent by way of correction of the already attested mutation cannot be challenged. 13. Therefore, while affirming the order of the learned Single Judge on the grounds stated therein, based on our conclusion on the status of the appellant, where we have held that the appellant had no locus to claim any right after the advent of Act No. IV of 2007, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge is re-enforced on this ground as well. 14. A contention was also raised that the appellant was in personal cultivation of the land and in Kharief 1971 and was entitled to get the land as held by the Tribunal. For the very same reason which weighed with this Court on the locus of the appellant, this claim of the appellant cannot be accepted. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the appellant's right as a tenant can, however, be not interfered with. For the very same reason which weighed with this Court on the locus of the appellant, this claim of the appellant cannot be accepted. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the appellant's right as a tenant can, however, be not interfered with. We are not concerned with the said issue as that was not focused in any of the proceedings impugned in the writ petition as well as in this appeal. We, therefore, do not propose to entertain any such plea on that basis in this appeal. In the light of our conclusion based on Act IV of 2007, we do not find any need to examine the first preliminary objection which is left open for determination if need be at any later point of time. 15. The appeal, therefore, fails and same is dismissed. 16. No costs.