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2011 DIGILAW 427 (BOM)

Raju Pasla v. State of Goa

2011-04-06

F.M.REIS, S.C.DHARMADHIKARI

body2011
Judgment : (S. C. Dharmadhikari, J.) In this Criminal Appeal, on 30-11-2009, this Court while noting the argument of the Appellant's Advocate and particularly that the Appellant/Accused was a juvenile in conflict with law had not completed 18 years of age as on the date of the commission of the offence, directed that an inquiry be conducted by the Children's Court at Panaji as to whether the Appellant was a juvenile on the date of the commission of the offence. This Court observed that although the claim was raised during the trial before the trial Court no inquiry was conducted. Therefore, the inquiry be now held and the records and proceedings be sent back to this Court along with the report of the inquiry. The Court directed that the inquiry be completed within three months from the date of communication of the Order. 2. Accordingly, the inquiry has been held and the President, Children's Court of the State of Goa by his Order dated 5-3-2010 held that the Appellant/Accused was about 18 years of age as on the date of the commission of the offence. 3. The records were thus forwarded to this Court with the report and when the Criminal Appeal was placed for hearing and final disposal, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant is desirous of impugning and challenging the findings recorded by the Children's Court in its Order dated 5-3-2010. Accordingly, by an Order passed on 31-3-2011, we permitted the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant to amend the Memo of Appeal and incorporate therein additional grounds to challenge this Order/Report. The Memo of Appeal has been amended. 4. In all fairness, the learned Public Prosecutor did not oppose the amendment and submitted that since the Criminal Appeal is still pending, the Appellant may be given an opportunity as desired by him. 5. Both the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant as well as Shri C. A. Ferreira, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that since extensive arguments have been canvassed in relation to the findings in the report of the Children's Court of Goa, this Court before proceeding with the hearing of the appeal, may render a finding on the conclusions recorded in the report. 6. Accordingly, we have heard Shri J. A. Lobo, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Shri C. A. Ferreira, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. 6. Accordingly, we have heard Shri J. A. Lobo, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Shri C. A. Ferreira, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. With their assistance, we have perused the statements recorded by the Children's Court during the course of the inquiry and its final conclusions as set out in the report dated 5-3-2010. 7. It is submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that the Appellant's case throughout was that he was a juvenile in conflict with law. That his date of birth is 12-7-1987 and the date of the offence is 7-3-2004. Therefore, he had not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of the offence. He was therefore a “juvenile” and a “juvenile in conflict with law”. Inviting our attention to the definition of these terms appearing in Section 2(k) and (l) of the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, it is submitted that the inquiry that is contemplated and provided in Section 7A of the Act is to determine as to whether the claim of juvenility has been substantiated or not. It is submitted that Section 7A has been inserted by Act 33 of 2006 with some specific purpose. The Legislature has provided that when the claim is raised, the Court shall make an inquiry by taking such evidence as may be necessary(but not on affidavit) so as to determine the age of the person and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not stating his age. It is submitted that the trial Court and the President of the Children's Court has in a cursory manner rejected the claim and without bearing in mind the object and purpose, for which the provision is incorporated in the statute. He submits that the order of this Court issued clear directions and the inquiry that is required to be made is in terms of Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. He submits that the order of this Court issued clear directions and the inquiry that is required to be made is in terms of Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. Inviting our attention to Rule 12, it is contended that Sub-Rule 3 thereof provides that the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board, by seeking evidence by obtaining the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available, and in the absence thereof, the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended, and in the absence thereof, the birth certificate given by a corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat. It is submitted that Sub-Rule 3(b) of Rule 12 in clearest terms lays down that only in the absence of the matriculation or equivalent certificate, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended or the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or panchayat that a medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. Therefore, it is submitted that the medical evidence in this case could not have been relied upon as that was in any event; of a Board or an expert and that too rendered on 9-3-2004. The inquiry was directed to be held by this Court on 30-11-2009. Hence, the learned President was in complete error in placing reliance on the findings of the medical opinion and ignoring the evidence of the father of the Appellant/Accused in this case. It is submitted that the father was examined so also the headmaster from the school which was last attended. Similarly, the Investigation Officer in this Court was examined by the learned President. The Investigation Officer himself visited the school which was first attended by the Appellant/Accused in the native place in Dhannur, Andhra Pradesh, and the school authorities informed him that the Appellant/Accused was a student studying in the said school in the primary section. That school issued a Transfer certificate in his favour enabling him to seek transfer from the primary section to a secondary school. In that Transfer application, the date of birth is certified as 12-7-1987. Therefore, the evidentiary value of the certificate stands established. That school issued a Transfer certificate in his favour enabling him to seek transfer from the primary section to a secondary school. In that Transfer application, the date of birth is certified as 12-7-1987. Therefore, the evidentiary value of the certificate stands established. There is nothing on record which would indicate that the entries in the register, the Transfer certificate relating to the date of birth by the school are forged, fabricated or bogus. These are documents not created after the incident and that is not even the allegation or suggestion by the prosecution. The records are indicative of the fact that in July, 1992, the Appellant/Accused was brought to the primary school for admission. The father has deposed that it is the mother who may have taken him to the school. It is the mother who gave information and based on it, the school records show the date of birth as 12-7-1987. This version of the father gets corroboration from the statement made by the school Principal. 8. The learned Counsel submits that this is an inquiry which is to be conducted by the authorities specified in the Act and the Rules. That the President has himself conducted the inquiry. He was obliged to do so, and, therefore he issued summons to the father and the headmaster of the school, namely the Zilla Parishad School and also summoned the Tashildar. It is the President who summoned the Investigation Officer who once again deposed at the said inquiry. Therefore, this is not a case of any witnesses being examined by the Appellant/Accused or any witnesses being summoned pursuant to a request made on his behalf. There are no prosecution witnesses either. However, there was an obligation cast to hold an inquiry and at that inquiry the prosecution could very well requested for cross-examination and such an opportunity was granted in fact as is clear from the deposition of the Investigation Officer recorded by the learned President. In these circumstances, to discard all the documents and the entries therein by some vague and cursory remarks made, when the learned President has overlooked the provisions of the Act and not abided by the orders and directions of this Court, is a grave error of law. The learned Counsel has taken us through the paper book containing the documents of the inquiry. The learned Counsel has taken us through the paper book containing the documents of the inquiry. He has also stated that the Appellant/Accused had throughout maintained that he had not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of the offence. Therefore, this version was being tested and if every single document is produced, its genuineness and authenticity is proved, when the medical opinion is inconclusive, then, the President should have clearly held that the Appellant/Accused had not completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offence. 9. In these circumstances, the finding recorded to the contrary suffers from serious errors. It is also vitiated by perversity because the learned President overlooked the oral and documentary evidence at the inquiry. He has adopted a hyper technical approach with a view to deny the Appellant the protection of the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act and Rules. 10. For all these reasons, he submits that the impugned Order be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel relies upon a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681 (Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Suingh and another). He also relies upon another Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in Criminal Appeal No.113 of 2002 dated 24-1-2002(Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh and another). 11. On the other hand, Shri C. A. Ferreira, learned Public Prosecutor submits thatadmittedly, in this case, no matriculation or equivalent certificate is available. He submits that the production of register of the school which was not first attended but of the school to which the Appellant was transferred subsequently and the entry therein will not satisfy the requirements stipulated by Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) wherein the legislature in its wisdom has specified the school first attended. That is intentionally because the credibility attached to a matriculation or equivalent certificate is foremost and thereafter the certificate which could be termed as reliable is of the primary school. The record pertaining to the date of birth therein has some definite sanctity. It is that school, the child first attends, upon completion of five years of age. Assuming that he is entitled to seek admission to primary section, the legislature has specified that the school first attended should not be a play school. The record pertaining to the date of birth therein has some definite sanctity. It is that school, the child first attends, upon completion of five years of age. Assuming that he is entitled to seek admission to primary section, the legislature has specified that the school first attended should not be a play school. That is advisedly because no records are maintained by such school nor such school is approved. In these circumstances, when such is not the nature of the proof, then no fault can be found with the conclusion of the learned President that the Appellant/Accused was over 18 years of age and had rather completed the said 18 years on the date of commission of the offence. This is in consonance with the stand of the Appellant at the time of framing of the charge. At that stage, namely, on 16-6-2005, the Appellant/Accused stated before the trial Court that he is 19 years of age. Further, in the Statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 30-5-2008, the Appellant/Accused mentioned that he is 21 years of age. Therefore, the conclusion drawn that the Appellant/Accused in order to avoid the consequences of the conviction and sentence has raised a plea of his juvenility, which is not substantiated at all, need not be interfered in this case. Reliance is placed by Shri Ferreira, learned Public Prosecutor on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 8 SCC 714 (Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana). 12. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, it will be worthwhile noticing the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. It is an enactment brought in force on 30-12-2000. It is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by catering to their development needs, and by adopting a child friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of children and for their ultimate rehabilitation, and, for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. In the preamble itself, there is a reference to Articles 15 (3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47, imposing on the State a primary responsibility of ensuring that all the needs of children are met and that their basic human rights are fully protected; and whereas it is the General Assembly of the United Nations which adopted the convention on the Rights of the Child as on 20-11-1989. The Convention on the Rights of the Child to be adhered to by all State parties in securing the best interests of the child. The Convention on the Rights of the Child emphasizes social reintegration of child victims, to the extent possible, without resorting to judicial proceedings. The Government of India has ratified the Convention on 11-12-1992. In such backdrop, that the legislature thought it fit to re-enact the existing laws relating to juveniles bearing in mind the standards prescribed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Therefore, it enacted this Act and by definitions defined the person who has not completed 18 years of age as a juvenile or child. A “juvenile in conflict with law” means a juvenile who has been alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of such offence. 13. Thus, to be a juvenile in conflict with law, one has to be a juvenile. If one has to be termed as a juvenile he should not have completed 18 years of age. The Act does not protect only such persons who are juveniles but also mandates that whenever an inquiry is contemplated into the age of the accused or person who is accused of a commission of crime, but takes a plea that he is a juvenile, that inquiry be held in terms of the Act itself. Chapter II is entitled “Juvenile in conflict with law”. Section 4 provides for establishment of a Juvenile Justice Board. The procedure in relation to the Board is prescribed in Section 5. The Juvenile Justice Board has to be constituted for every district. It is such Board notwithstanding the laws in force which has power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law. The procedure in relation to the Board is prescribed in Section 5. The Juvenile Justice Board has to be constituted for every district. It is such Board notwithstanding the laws in force which has power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law. Section 7 sets out the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate who is not empowered to exercise the powers of a Board under this Act but before whom an occasion arises to record an opinion that a person brought before him under any of the provisions of the Act, other than for the purpose of giving evidence, is a juvenile or a child. One is required to notice Section 7A which was not there but inserted by Act No.36 of 2006. Section 7A reads thus:- “7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court.- (1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be: Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section(1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect. 14. (2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section(1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect. 14. A perusal thereof would indicate that whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any Court or a Court is of the opinion that an accused was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the Court shall make an inquiry, and take such evidence as may be necessary but not on affidavit so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. The proviso thereto is that such a claim can be raised before any Court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the Rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on the date of commission of the offence. Sub-Rule (2) provides that if the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect. 15. It is this provision, which is salutary in nature which was noticed by the Division Bench of this Court and that is how it directed an inquiry to determine the age of the Appellant/Accused. That order and direction of this Court has gained finality. It is in pursuance of this order and direction and bearing in mind Section 7A that the inquiry was to be held. 16. At the inquiry and to enable him to make a report, the President issued summons calling upon the father of the Appellant/Accused and the other witnesses to attend. This is clear from the Order dated 5-3-2010 impugned before us.(See para 2). At this inquiry, firstly, the statement of the Appellant, father Pasula Ramulu was recorded. He states that he is residing at Dhannur-B Boath, Andhra Pradesh, village Khotuwal. This is clear from the Order dated 5-3-2010 impugned before us.(See para 2). At this inquiry, firstly, the statement of the Appellant, father Pasula Ramulu was recorded. He states that he is residing at Dhannur-B Boath, Andhra Pradesh, village Khotuwal. He stated that he was married about 40 to 50 years back. He stated that his elder son was born after one year of marriage. He stated that after the birth of his son, one daughter was born but she died six years from her birth and thereafter the Appellant/Accused was born. It is stated by him that the accused was born within a period of two years from the death of his daughter. He stated that he was born during the rainy season but does not recollect the year. He does not know whether the birth of the son was registered in the Village Panchayat or other authorities. The wife also expired. Therefore, he stated that the wife must be knowing this fact. However, it is pertinent to note that the father stated that the Appellant/Accused was admitted in primary school in village Boath by the wife/mother of the child. He stated that he is illiterate and, therefore, he does not know how the date of birth was disclosed. It is stated that the accused was admitted in the school at Dhannur in IVth Std. but no document was obtained to show the date of birth of the accused. JUDGMENT CONTINUED ON 18th APRIL, 2011. 17. Thereafter, the accused left the house and the father deposes that he was studying in VIIth Std. This is the evidence of AW1, the father of the accused. 18. Thereafter, the Headmaster of the Zilla Parishad School at Bhainsa Mahagaon, Andhra Pradesh was examined who stated that since January, 2009 he is working as Headmaster of that Zilla Parishad School. Thereafter, he was transferred to Zilla Parishad School at Dhannur District Adilabad, Andhra Pradesh as Headmaster. 19. He deposes on the basis of the school record and points out that it is in his custody. He brought the record and he knew that he was being summoned for certifying the date of birth of Raju Pasla, namely the accused. From the register, he deposes that Pasla, son of Santena was admitted on 13-6-1997 in VIth Std. 19. He deposes on the basis of the school record and points out that it is in his custody. He brought the record and he knew that he was being summoned for certifying the date of birth of Raju Pasla, namely the accused. From the register, he deposes that Pasla, son of Santena was admitted on 13-6-1997 in VIth Std. This admission was given on the basis of a transfer certificate from the Primary School, Dhannur showing the date of birth as 12-7-1987. He fairly states that the date of birth certificate was not attached to the transfer certificate from the school. There is no document to show the date of birth of the accused. He also states that the certificate does not show the name of the mother. However, the transfer certificate was an undisputed document and it was taken on record and marked as Exh.308. He states that in the record of his school, the date of birth is registered only on the basis of the transfer certificate from the earlier school and not on the basis of any birth certificate. He fairly states that there is no photograph. However, he clarifies that the transfer certificate dated 12-8-2008 was issued by his predecessor Divakar Reddy. The transfer certificate shows the date of birth as 12-7-1987. The transfer certificate is issued by the school only on the basis of the record of the school which is brought today i.e. the register and the transfer certificate of the earlier school. All these documents are admitted and exhibited. Then, there is the deposition of the Tahsildar at Boath, Adilabad District, Andhra Pradesh. He states that the father of the accused applied for a certificate along with certain documents which are attached to the application. He states that the necessary inquiry as per normal practice is conducted by the Revenue Department and Village Revenue Officer conducts the same and on that basis the certificate is issued. He states that the certificate at Exh.312 has been issued by considering the application filed by the father, ration card and other documents. The questions put to him are with reference to the undated certificate(Exh.312) and it was issued certifying the community, nativity and the date of birth. 20. He states that the certificate at Exh.312 has been issued by considering the application filed by the father, ration card and other documents. The questions put to him are with reference to the undated certificate(Exh.312) and it was issued certifying the community, nativity and the date of birth. 20. Then, there is the deposition of the Investigating Officer/AW4 and what he has stated is that he conducted inquiry regarding the age of Raju Pasla by visiting his native place and the school. During his personal inquiry with the Headmaster, the B.D.O. and father of the accused, it was found that the birth date of the accused was not registered with any authority and he was admitted in the school based on oral information regarding date of birth by the parents. 21. However, his further deposition is material and it reads thus:- “I also made inquiry with the Tasildar office Boath and found that only an affidavit of father and the school records were considered for issuing the certificate but without any confirmed date of birth. I obtained the certificate from the Headmaster as well as from the Tasildar which were submitted by me before the Hon'ble High Court. Both authorities disclosed that there is no birth record but the date of birth is disclosed as per oral information given by the parents. I am producing the copy of certificate issued by the Headmaster which is admitted in evidence and marked as exbt.315 (since the original is produced before the Hon'ble High Court)”. 22. His deposition is thus in consonance with the documents which have been produced on record. The Investigating Officer was cross-examined by the Appellant's Advocate in the inquiry. However, in none of these depositions we find any cross-examination by the prosecution nor the order of the Children's Court indicates that any request was made in that behalf. 23. The Children's Court has referred to all the depositions and documents but in para 13 of the Order commented that although the school record shows the date of birth of the accused is 12-7-1987 that is on the basis of oral statement and not as per any birth record. Thus, such school records do not show accurate date of birth of the accused. Thus, such school records do not show accurate date of birth of the accused. There is no registration of date of birth with the concerned authorities, though due to illiteracy only the school records the same on oral information but that cannot be taken as sufficient proof. The President of the Children's Court concluded that the mother of the child expired about 12 years back, and, therefore it was not possible to know the source of information on the basis of which such date of birth is registered in the school record. To our mind, in the absence of any material produced or any argument canvassed doubting the genuineness of the record of the said school or entries in the register and the transfer certificate, the learned President could not have recorded such a conclusion. This is not a case where any doubt was being raised only because the documents were spoken of or referred to by the father of the Appellant alone. The documents and their contents have been extensively referred to by the Headmaster of the school, the Tahsildar and the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer went personally to the school and met the concerned officials. He has stated that he was informed by these officials that the entries are mentioned in the school. In such circumstances without adverting to any of the requirements in Rule 12 of the Rules nor keeping in mind the object and purpose of the act, the learned President has recorded a finding which to our mind is clearly vitiated. The learned President in para 14 of the impugned Order/Report held that the entries in the school records are to be tested as genuine entries in order to grant or refuse benefits. If such entries are found to be not genuine or given on oral information without any basis, the Court is at discretion either to accept or reject such record. As already held above, none has raised any plea of genuineness of the documents. Further, because the entries in the documents are based on oral information, that by itself and without anything more is not sufficient to term the entries as not genuine. 24. As already held above, none has raised any plea of genuineness of the documents. Further, because the entries in the documents are based on oral information, that by itself and without anything more is not sufficient to term the entries as not genuine. 24. In a recent Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh alias Chhotu Singh and another ( (2009) 6 SCC 681 ), the Supreme Court holds that an entry in a school register may not be a public document and, thus must be proved in accordance with law, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit(1988 Supp SCC 604) but the Supreme Court found in that case that a teacher of the school was examined and although he was not present when the minor was admitted in the school, but he proves the contents of the admission register. Therefore, it cannot be said that the contents of the admission register were not proved. The Supreme Court referred to the Rules then prevailing and the latter Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P.( (2006) 5 SCC 584 ) and held in para 14 that the standard that is required to be applied for the purpose of Section 35 of the Evidence Act is the same as in civil and criminal cases. Yet, in that case, the Supreme Court found that the documents produced were not forged, fabricated or otherwise inadmissible in evidence. The Supreme Court holds that if a document is found to be genuine and satisfies the requirements of law it should be relied upon. The learned President in this case lost sight of this principle and made a sweeping remark about the genuineness of the documents. Thus, the information being oral, by itself, is no ground to discard the documents. The Judgment in the case of Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and another ( (2009) 13 SCC 211 ) is again a pointer as to how the determination of age should be done and what are the principles which are required to be taken into account. There, the Rules which were framed in the year 2007 and particularly Rule 12 fell for consideration. There, the Rules which were framed in the year 2007 and particularly Rule 12 fell for consideration. After reproducing the Rules in paras 26 and 27, the Supreme Court holds that sub-rules (4) and (5) are of specific significance, in that they provide that the age of a juvenile in conflict with law is found to be less than 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any proof specified in sub-rule (3), the Court or the Board or as the case may be the Child Welfare Committee shall in writing pass a written order stating the age of the juvenile or the status of juvenility and no further inquiry is to be conducted after examining and obtaining any documentary proof referred to in sub-rule(3) of Rule 12. Rule 12, therefore, indicates the procedure to be followed in an inquiry under Section 7A when a claim of juvenility is raised. We find that the learned Judge has not referred to Rule 12 leave alone considering as to how the same operates. Once the mandate of the Rules is taken into account and the object and purpose of the act is not lost sight of, then, a conclusion is inevitable that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Appellant/Accused has satisfied the Court that he was a juvenile in conflict with law as he was below 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offence. In this context, the observations of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir in the case of Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and another(supra) are pertinent. Speaking for the Bench, His Lordship holds thus:- “23. Section 7-A makes provision for a claim of juvenility to be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal of a case and sets out the procedure which the court is required to adopt, when such claim of juvenility is raised. It provides for an inquiry, taking of evidence as may be necessary (but not affidavit) so as to determine the age of a person and to record a finding whether the person in question is a juvenile or not. 24. The aforesaid provisions were, however, confined to courts, and proved inadequate as far as the Boards were concerned. 25. It provides for an inquiry, taking of evidence as may be necessary (but not affidavit) so as to determine the age of a person and to record a finding whether the person in question is a juvenile or not. 24. The aforesaid provisions were, however, confined to courts, and proved inadequate as far as the Boards were concerned. 25. Subsequently, in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, which is a comprehensive guide as to how the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, are to be implemented, Rule 12 was introduced providing the procedure to be followed by the courts, the Boards and the Child Welfare Committees for the purpose of determination of age in every case concerning a child or juvenile or a juvenile in conflict with law. 26. Since the aforesaid provisions are interconnected and lay down the procedures for determination of age, the said Rule is reproduced hereinbelow: “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.- (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining-- (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year, and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this Rule. (6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 27. Sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 12 are of special significance in that they provide that once the age of a juvenile or child in conflict with law is found to be less than 18 years on the date of offence on the basis of any proof specified in sub-rule (3) the court or the Board or as the case may be the Child Welfare Committee appointed under Chapter IV of the Act, has to pass a written order stating the age of the juvenile or stating the status of the juvenile, and no further inquiry is to be conducted by the court or Board after examining and obtaining any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Rule 12, therefore, indicates the procedure to be followed to give effect to the provisions of Section 7-A when a claim of juvenility is raised. 48. Rule 12, therefore, indicates the procedure to be followed to give effect to the provisions of Section 7-A when a claim of juvenility is raised. 48. None of the aforesaid decisions are of much assistance in deciding the question with regard to the applicability of the definition of “juvenile” in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, whereby the provisions of the said Act were extended to cover juveniles who had not completed 18 years of age on or before the coming into force of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 on 1-4-2001. 49. The effect of the proviso to Section 7-A introduced by the amending Act makes it clear that the claim of juvenility may be raised before any court which shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made thereunder which includes the definition of “juvenile” in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Act even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. 50. The said intention of the legislature was reinforced by the amendment effected by the said amending Act to Section 20 by introduction of the proviso and the Explanation thereto, wherein also it has been clearly indicated that in any pending case in any court the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile has to be in terms of Section 2(l) even if the juvenile ceases to be so “on or before the date of commencement of this Act” and it was also indicated that the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed. 51. 51. Apart from the aforesaid provisions of the 2000 Act, as amended, and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, Rule 98 thereof has to be read in tandem with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended by the Amendment Act, 2006, which provides that even in disposed of cases of juveniles in conflict with law, the State Government or the Board could, either suo motu or on an application made for the purpose, review the case of a juvenile, determine the juvenility and pass an appropriate order under Section 64 of the Act for the immediate release of the juvenile whose period of detention had exceeded the maximum period provided in Section 15 of the Act i.e. 3 years. 52. In addition to the above, Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is also of relevance and is reproduced hereinbelow: “49. Presumption and determination of age.-(1) Where it appears to a competent authority that person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile or the child, the competent authority shall make due inquiry so as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. (2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile or the child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of person so brought before it, shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 53. Sub-section (1) of Section 49 vests the competent authority with the power to make due inquiry as to the age of a person brought before it and for the said purpose to take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a finding as to whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. 54. 54. Sub-section (2) of Section 49 is of equal importance as it provides that no order of a competent authority would be deemed to have become invalid merely on account of any subsequent proof that the person, in respect of whom an order is made, is not a juvenile or a child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of the person brought before it, would, for the purpose of the Act, be deemed to be the true age of a child or a juvenile in conflict with law. 55. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 indicates that the age determination inquiry by the court or Board, by seeking evidence, is to be derived from: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available, and in the absence of the same; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 56. Clause (b) of Rule 12(3) provides that only in the absence of any such document, would a medical opinion be sought for from a duly constituted Medical Board, which would declare the age of the juvenile or the child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or as the case may be, the Child Welfare Committee, for reasons to be recorded by it, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on the lower side within a margin of one year. 57. As will, therefore, be clear from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended by the Amendment Act, 2006 and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, the scheme of the Act is to give children, who have, for some reason or the other, gone astray, to realise their mistakes, rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives and become useful citizens of society, instead of degenerating into hardened criminals. 59. 59. The law as now crystallised on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1-4-2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted. 62. In any event, the statutory provisions have been altered since then and we are now required to consider the question of the claim of the appellant that his date of birth was Kartik Sudi 1, Samvat Year 2039, though no basis has been provided for the fixation of the said date itself in the light of the amended provisions. Often, parents of children, who come from rural backgrounds, are not aware of the actual date of birth of a child, but relate the same to some event which may have taken place simultaneously. In such a situation, the Board and the courts will have to take recourse to the procedure laid down in Rule 12, but such an exercise is not required to be undertaken in the present case since even according to the determination of the appellant's age by the High Court the appellant was below eighteen years of age when the offence was alleged to have been committed. 25. In the instant case, the matriculation or equivalent certificate was admittedly unavailable. Therefore, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended can be relied upon. That certificate is the entry in the Transfer Certificate issued by the Primary School, Dhannur. That this is the school first attended by the Appellant is undisputed. That the entry in the Transfer Certificate and that document itself is duly proved. This entry could be taken as a date of birth certificate in the present case is clear because no argument is canvassed that it cannot be so read. Therefore, we are not required to construe Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) in the peculiar facts of this case. That the entry in the Transfer Certificate and that document itself is duly proved. This entry could be taken as a date of birth certificate in the present case is clear because no argument is canvassed that it cannot be so read. Therefore, we are not required to construe Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) in the peculiar facts of this case. As a result of the above discussion and bearing in mind that repeatedly the school authorities have certified that the date of birth of the Appellant/Accused Pasla is 12-7-1987, then as on the date of commission of the offence which is 7-3-2004, he had not completed 18 years of age. He was thus covered by the Act. This Court has therefore no hesitation in setting aside the order of the learned President of the Children's Court dated 5-3-2010 as it is wholly erroneous and ignores the documentary and oral evidence on record. Once, the learned President has overlooked these documents and has lost sight of the object and purpose of holding the inquiry into the claim of the Appellant's juvenility, then, his order cannot be sustained. 26. In the result, we hold that the Appellant had not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of the offence. As a result of the above discussion ordinarily, it is open for the Appellant to argue that he has been dealt with and punished by a Court which is not competent to render any finding on his complicity far from sentencing him. However, the Appellant's Advocate states that the Appellant has been arrested on 7-3-2004. He has been tried in the Children's Court in the State of Goa, Panaji in Special Case No.26 of 2007 and the Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence has been delivered on 4-7-2008. The Appellant/Accused No.2 has been convicted of offence of grave sexual assault on the victim of 10 years of age and has been punished for offences committed under Section 8(2) of the Goa Children's Act, 2003 r/w Sections 376 and 377 I.P.C. Further, he is convicted of offence of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. and also for an offence punishable under Section 401 I.P.C. He has been sentenced for all these offences with the punishment of imprisonment for life. 27. 27. Having found that it will be too late in the day to re-open his conviction, the Appellant's Advocate states that the Appellant would be satisfied if he is set at liberty forthwith even if the conviction is confirmed and maintained. 28. In the light of this specific statement of the Appellant's Advocate, it is not necessary to scrutinize the Judgment of the learned President of the Children's Court dated 4-7-2008 regarding the above conviction and sentence. Thus, the question of the Appellant's guilt stands concluded in the light of the conviction recorded. However, after the inquiry was directed to be conducted under the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the result of the inquiry thereunder having been set aside by us now, the sentence that is imposed by the learned President of Children's Court dated 4-7-2008 of imprisonment for life would not stand in the teeth of clear provisions of law. In other words, Sections 14 and 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 would come into play and in terms of Section 15, the Order that may be passed against a juvenile in terms of Clause(g) of Section 15(1) w.e.f. 2006 is a direction that the juvenile be sent to a special home for a period of three years. We are also mindful of the mandate of Section 7A(2) and Section 16(1) which opens with a non obstante clause. Thus, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, for the time in force, no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for any term which may extend to imprisonment for life, or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security subject of course to the proviso thereto. Once, the claim of juvenility has been upheld there cannot be a sentence of imprisonment for life. The juvenile already being in prison and kept behind bars for seven(7) years, interest of justice would be served if this appeal is allowed by modifying the Judgment and sentence and directing that the Appellant/Accused be set at liberty forthwith provided he is not required in any case. The juvenile already being in prison and kept behind bars for seven(7) years, interest of justice would be served if this appeal is allowed by modifying the Judgment and sentence and directing that the Appellant/Accused be set at liberty forthwith provided he is not required in any case. Our view is in consonance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dayanand v. State of Haryana reported in ( (2011) 2 SCC 224 and in Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar reported in ( (2011) 2 SCC 251 . We need not send the case to the Board all over again as this Court is sufficiently empowered to make the modification in the sentence in its inherent jurisdiction and to meet the ends of justice. 29. The appeal is allowed in these terms. 30. We are thankful to both, Shri J. A. Lobo, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Shri C. A. Ferreira, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondent for the assistance rendered to us.