JUDGEMENT B.CHANDRA KUMAR 1. This appeal is directed against the judgement and decree dt. 14.8.2002 passed in O.S.No. 75 of 2000 by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Eluru, West Godavari District. 2. The parties will be referred to as they are arrayed before the lower Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The plaintiff filed the suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit schedule shop and also for damages. His specific case is that himself and the defendant entered into a lease agreement on 01.01.1998 agreeing to lease out the suit schedule shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 1800/- and the lease period was for two years from 01.01.1998 and that the defendant has also paid an advance of Rs. 15,000/-. It was agreed that the advance amount would be repaid by the plaintiff at the time of defendant vacating the shop without any interest. The original agreement was kept with the defendant and the plaintiff retained a Photostat copy of the said agreement. The grievance of the plaintiff is that though the period of lease was over and inspite of several requests made by him, the defendant did not vacate the premises. It was also stated that the defendant effected certain changes causing damage to the suit schedule shop and that the plaintiff should spend at least Rs. 18,000/- to get the suit schedule shop to its original shape. The plaintiff got issued a legal notice to the defendant to vacate the shop as per the terms of the lease agreement and that the defendant having received the said notice, got issued a false reply stating that that the lease period is upto 31.12.2000 and that he had spent about Rs. 100,000/- for effecting repairs. 4. The defendant filed written statement admitting that he is the tenant of the suit schedule shop on monthly rent of Rs. 1800/-. However his specific case is that the lease period is for three years from 1.1.1998 to 31.12.2000 and that the period of lease was mistakenly mentioned as two years in words instead of three years. It was further stated that suit is not maintainable without issuing a valid notice, as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The other averments made by the plaintiff have been denied. 5. It was further stated that suit is not maintainable without issuing a valid notice, as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The other averments made by the plaintiff have been denied. 5. The trial court framed necessary issues and on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself was examined as Pw.1 and Pws 2 to 4 were examined and Exs: A.1 to A.3 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, the defendant himself was examined as DW.1 and DWs 2 and 3 were examined but no documents were marked on his behalf. 6. The trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, held that the lease period was for two years only and that the version of Pw.3 is acceptable on this point and that no notice is required under Section 106 of the T.P. Act since there is specific recital with regard to lease period and that on expiry of lease period, the defendant has to vacate the suit schedule shop. As far as damages are concerned, the lower Court held against the plaintiff, but however, the suit was decreed with proportionate costs directing the defendant to vacate the suit schedule shop and deliver the vacant possession of the same to the plaintiff within two months from the date of judgement, failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to get it done through the process of law. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed. 7. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is that when the date has been specifically mentioned in the lease deed as 31.12.2000, the lease period cannot be said to be only for two years. It is also contended that Ex:A.1 is an unregistered instrument and therefore inadmissible in law. It is also submitted that the plaintiff who is examined as Pw.1 has admitted that he has been receiving rents after issuing quit notice without any protest and it amounts to waiver of quit notice and therefore without issuing a fresh notice as required under Section 106 of the T.P. Act, the suit is not maintainable. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that though Ex:A.1 is an unregistered lease deed, when the parties have admitted about the execution of Ex:A.1, the contents of Ex:A.1 can be looked into for collateral purpose. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that though Ex:A.1 is an unregistered lease deed, when the parties have admitted about the execution of Ex:A.1, the contents of Ex:A.1 can be looked into for collateral purpose. It is further submitted that the evidence on record clinchingly establishes that the lease period is only for two years. It is further submitted that merely because the plaintiff has received rents after issuing quit notice that will not amount to waiver of earlier notice. It is also submitted that when specific period of two years has been mentioned in the lease deed, there is no need to issue a notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. It is also his submission that mere acceptance of rent subsent to the issuing of quit notice cannot be said to be a conduct of signifying “assent” to the continuance of the lease even after expiry of lease period. In support of his contention, he has relied on a judgement in the case between Shanti Prasad Devi and another vs. Shankar Mahta and others reported in AIR 2005 SC 2905 . 9. The points that arise for consideration are: i) Whether the lease period is for two years or three years. ii) whether a fresh quit notice is required to be issued when the landlord accepted rents after issuing quit notice. iii) whether Ex:A.1 un-registered lease agreement can be relied upon. Point No.1: The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that though the period has been specifically shown as three years i.e. from 1.1.1998 to 31.12.2000, the trial court committed a mistake in treating the period as two years. I have gone through the entire evidence. The scribe who is examined as Pw.3 categorically stated in his evidence that the lease period is only for two years i.e. from 1.1.1998 to 31.12.1999. Further, in the lease deed it is mentioned in words that the period of lease is for two years. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that the lease is only for two years needs no interference. Point No. 3: The next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the lease is for more than one year, the lease deed ought to have been registered and since the leased deed is not registered, the contents of the same cannot be looked into. Point No. 3: The next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the lease is for more than one year, the lease deed ought to have been registered and since the leased deed is not registered, the contents of the same cannot be looked into. The evidence of defendant who is examined as DW.1 goes to show that he has admitted the execution of the lease deed. When the execution of lease deed has been admitted by both the parties and when it is not in dispute, though the lease deed is not registered, it can be looked into for collateral purpose. Point No.2: It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant/tenant that the respondent even after issuing quit notice has received rents and that when the respondent received rents after issuance of quit notice, a fresh quit notice is necessary. Quit notice is necessary when there is no specific period of lease is mentioned in the lease deed. When a specific date showing the expiry of lease period has been shown in the lease deed, the question of issuing quit notice does not arise under Section 106 T.P. Act. Since the issue of quit notice is not necessary, the question of issuing fresh on the premise of accepting rents after issuing quit notice does not arise. More over in the case referred above i.e. in the case between Shanti Prasad Devi and another, Appellants vs. Shankar Mahto land others, Respondents, it was held as follows: “On expiry of period of lease, mere acceptance of rent for the subsequent months in which the lessee continued to occupy the lease premises cannot be said to be a conduct of signifying “assent” to the continuance of the lease even after expiry of lease period.” 10. By efflux of time itself the lease will be determined. I have gone through the entire record. There are no merits in the appeal and the same is dismissed. However, as the appellant/defendant seems to be running a shoe mart in the suit schedule shop, I consider it just and reasonable to give six months time from today to vacate the premises. 11. With the above direction, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.