Judgment :- A.P. Bhangale, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.11.2007 passed by 3rd Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati in Sessions Case No. 160 of 2006 whereby appellants were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. They were also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each, in default, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case, is as under : Victim Maya was married to Mahendra, son of appellant no. 1 and brother of appellant no. 2. Maya was ill-treated by appellants on various counts like, she has failed bring money from her parents; she had failed to conceive etc. On 13.5.2006 at about 09.00 am, appellants picked up quarrel with Maya. Appellant no. 1 poured kerosene on the person of Maya. Appellant no.2 then held her and appellant no.1 lit matchstick and set Maya on fire. Maya shouted for help on which neighbourers assembled and they poured water on her body. Maya was then removed to Irwin Hospital, Amravati. Three dying declarations of Maya were recorded. Offences under Section 498A and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were registered against the appellants vide Crime No. 42/2006. Maya died of the burn injuries and therefore, offence under Section 307 was converted to Section 302 of the Penal Code. P. W. 6 PSI Madhukar recorded statements of witnesses, namely, Jijabai, Mahendra, venubai Dhok, Kantabai, Khushalrao, Vishambhar, Pramod and Subhash Ingle on 3.8.2006. Articles which were seized during the course of investigation were sent to chemical analyser on 7.8.2006 under forwarding letter (exhibit 27). Upon completion of investigation, appellants were chargesheeted before the J.M. F.C., Nandgaon Khandeshwar. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 20.10.2006. Charge was framed against the accused on 11th January 2007 to which accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Prosecution examined in all nine witnesses and closed its case while appellants/accused did not lead any evidence in defence. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 20.10.2006. Charge was framed against the accused on 11th January 2007 to which accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Prosecution examined in all nine witnesses and closed its case while appellants/accused did not lead any evidence in defence. Learned trial Judge after hearing the parties, proceeded to convict the appellants and sentenced them, as mentioned above. 3. We have heard learned Advocate for the appellants and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State. We have perused the evidence led on record and impugned judgment and order of conviction. 4. Learned Advocate for the appellants strenuously submits that dying declarations at exhibits 46 and 49 cannot be relied upon in order to affirm the conviction of the appellants. In these dying declarations, victim Maya claimed that appellant no. 1 threw kerosene on her person, appellant no. 2 held her and appellant no. 1 lit the matchstick and ablazed her. Mr Daga took us through relevant part of the evidence in this behalf. He submits that it is the dying declaration at exhibit 48 which is alone worthy of acceptance. 5. We have perused all the three dying declarations. Dying Declaration (exhibit 46) was recorded by Executive Magistrate Sachin Shejal. In this dying declaration, Maya alleged that appellants used to torture her. On 13.5.2006 during the quarrel in the morning, her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her person, her brother-in-law held her and her mother-in-law lit the matchstick and set her on fire. Thereafter she fell unconscious. In the dying declaration at exhibit 49 which was recorded by ASI Trimbak (P. W. 8), Maya attributed commission of crime to appellants. However, in this dying declaration, she claims that appellant no. 1 threw kerosene from vessel on her person and adds that after she was set on fire, she poured water from bucket on her person and neighbourers who had assembled on hearing her shouts, had also poured kerosene on her person. She also adds that Sau Jeeja Kolankar removed her to the hospital. Thus, in the dying declaration (exh. 46) Maya claims that kerosene was poured while in the dying declaration (exh. 49) she claims that it was thrown on her person from vessel by appellant no. 1. In the dying declaration (exh. 46) she alleges that she became unconscious immediately while in dying declaration (exh. Thus, in the dying declaration (exh. 46) Maya claims that kerosene was poured while in the dying declaration (exh. 49) she claims that it was thrown on her person from vessel by appellant no. 1. In the dying declaration (exh. 46) she alleges that she became unconscious immediately while in dying declaration (exh. 49) she adds many more things like pouring of water by herself and by neighbourers on her person and her shifting to hospital by Jeeja. 6. In the dying declaration recorded too by ASI Trimbak (P. W. 8), Maya did not hold anybody responsible for burn injuries caused to her. She said that her mother-in-law and brother-in-law (appellants) reside separate on 1st floor. On 13.5.2006 while she was cooking, her saree-end fell on burning gas owing to which she was burnt. She herself poured water and her mother-in-law and brother-in-law also poured water on her person. She further states that it was her mother-in-law and brother-in-law who removed her to hospital. She asserts that she was not set to fire by anybody and that there was no quarrel etc. Doctor certified that the patient was able to give statement. P. W. 8 ASI Trimbak deposed that while dying declaration at exhibit 48 was being recorded in presence of medical officer, mother and husband of deceased Maya were also present and when dying declaration (exhibit 49) was recorded, doctor was not present. 7. Taking note of the dissimilarities between dying declaration (exh. 46) and dying declaration (exh. 49), inconsistencies with the contents of dying declaration (exh. 48) where Maya attributes the burn injuries to none but specifically states that they were as a result of accident, it would not be safe to convict the appellants of the offence of murder as graver the charge, stricter shall be the proof. In the present case, dying declarations (exhibits 46 and 49) placed on record are not free from doubt and cannot be relied upon in absence of corroboration. Moreover, admissions given by P. W. 8 Trimbak are fatal to the prosecution case. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that burnt pieces of clothes of Maya and three burnt matchsticks were seized vide seizure memo (exhibit 13) which is proved by one of the panchas. He further points out from C. A. Report (admitted by appellants) that kerosene residues were detected on the said burnt pieces of clothes of Maya. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that burnt pieces of clothes of Maya and three burnt matchsticks were seized vide seizure memo (exhibit 13) which is proved by one of the panchas. He further points out from C. A. Report (admitted by appellants) that kerosene residues were detected on the said burnt pieces of clothes of Maya. He contends that had deceased Maya met with accidental death, kerosene residues could not have been detected on her burnt pieces of clothes. 9. As against this, learned Advocate for the appellants contends that no questions in relation to evidence of witness who proved spot panchanama, seizure memo or C. A. Report were put to any of the appellants in their examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. No opportunity was made available to the accused and, therefore, submission made by learned Addl. Public Prosecutor ought not be accepted. Learned Advocate for appellants has placed reliance on the following rulings: (1) AIR (38) 1951 SC 441 (2) (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 732 Vikramujit Singh alias Vicky v. State of Punjab (3) (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371 Tara Singh v. The State Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra 10. We have gone through the above rulings. In Tara Singh v. State (supra) relied on in Vikramjit’s case (supra), the Apex Court observed thus : “The High Court also bases its conclusion on the circumstantial evidence arising from the production of the kripan and the recovery of the shirt from the appellant. Those articles are said to be stained with human blood. The appellant was not asked to give any explanation about human blood. The appellant was not asked to give any explanation about this The serologist’s repo0rt had not been received when the appellant was questioned by the Committing Magistrate. Therefore, he could not be asked to explain the presence of human blood stains on the kripan. All he was asked was whether the bloodstained kripan was recovered at his instance. That is not enough. He should also have been asked whether he could explain the presence of bloodstains on it. The two are not the same. Then, in the Sessions Court there was the additional evidence of the imperial serologist showing that the kripan had stains of human blood on it. That is not enough. He should also have been asked whether he could explain the presence of bloodstains on it. The two are not the same. Then, in the Sessions Court there was the additional evidence of the imperial serologist showing that the kripan had stains of human blood on it. That was an additional and very vital piece of evidence which the appellant should have been afforded an opportunity of explaining.” 11. Relying upon the above observations in Tara Singh’s case, the Apex Court had acquitted accused in Vikramjit Singh’s case. 12. Settled legal position as could be gathered from the above rulings is that the object of examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. is to give the accused reasonable opportunity to explain the case made out against him. The statement so recorded may be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus shifting on the accused to explain and discharge it. It shall depend on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus. The questions shall be framed by the trial Judge to put it to the accused in such a way so as to enable the accused to know what he is required to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him for which an explanation is needed. A conviction based on the accused’s failure to explain what he was never put to explain is bad in law and may occasion failure of justice. The whole object of specific points framed in the charge on which the prosecution rely so as to make out case against the accused so that he may be called upon to give such explanation as he desires to give. In the present case, no questions were put up to the appellants while recording their statement under Section 313 Cr. P. C. and still the trial Judge has proceeded to base conviction of the appellants relying upon seizure memo, spot panchanama and C. A. report. On this count also, finding of guilt for the offence under Section 302 IPC suffers from impropriety, unjustness and will have to be set aside. 13. We have perused the evidence of P. W. 3 Venutai, sister and P. W. 4 Gajanan, brother of deceased. They merely say that appellants used to harass Maya. On this count also, finding of guilt for the offence under Section 302 IPC suffers from impropriety, unjustness and will have to be set aside. 13. We have perused the evidence of P. W. 3 Venutai, sister and P. W. 4 Gajanan, brother of deceased. They merely say that appellants used to harass Maya. However, there are no particulars set out by them as to how Maya was complaining to them as to the harassment to her by appellants. It has come in their evidence that Maya and her husband were residing separate on 1st floor. P. W. 3 Venutai refers to the household dispute between accused and Maya. On going through the relevant evidence, prosecution has failed to prove that deceased Maya was subjected to harassment by appellants or any one of them. Therefore, conviction recorded by the trial Judge for an offence punishable under Section 498A IPC will have also be set aside as the reasons recorded are too farfetched to implicate accused for “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case suffers for want of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. 14. In the result, appeal is allowed. Conviction of the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and consequent order of sentence as rendered by the Adhoc District Judge-3 and Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati in Sessions Trial No. 160 of 2006 by judgment & order dated 17.11.2007 is hereby set aside. Appellants/accused are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged. Appellant no. 1 is on bail. Her bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Appellant no. 2 be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Fine amount, if paid by the appellants, shall be refunded to them.