Judgment Nisar Ahmad Kakru, CJ. Two appeals arising out of a common judgment are taken up together for disposal. The 1st appellant – societies established institutes of technical and engineering colleges namely K.K.C Institute of Technology and Engineering for Women and Swetha Institute of Technology and Science for Women in the year 2008 which received approval of the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) vide F. Nos. 730-50-702(E)/ET (W)/2008, dated 30-06-2008 and 730-50-684(E)ET(W)/2008, dated 30-06-2008 respectively, consequently all the concessions those are available to a women’s college have been availed of by the appellants for three years and thereafter applied for conversion of the women’s institutes into co-education institutes, but Clause 18.7 (1) of Appendix 18 of the norms and standards prescribed by the AICTE being a legal impediment to the conversion sought, therefore challenge thrown to Clause18.7 (1) itself which reads: “A certificate stating that less than 40% admissions for three consecutive years issued by Competent Admission Authority.” 2. The challenge is sought to be founded on the ground that three years norm is unreasonable, for, it does not take into account possible unviability of an institute, which could not prevail on the learned single Judge because of the dictum of the judgments handed down by the apex Court, for, same do not approve of dislodging of decisions of the academic bodies by the Courts. Writ Court also noticed that the norms notified by the AICTE envisage that an application for conversion can be filed in case there is less than 40% student strength for last three consecutive years. Rightly so because assessment in respect of strength needs to be observed for a reasonable period which in the wisdom of AICTE is three years and the fact remains that the above said requisite percentage of 40% is shown for one academic year only i.e., 2010-11 and not for three consecutive years, consequently, the appellants are rendered disentitled to seek the conversion. 3. The appellants’ challenge to the norms of AICTE is required to be appreciated in the light of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (for short ‘the Act’), a Central Act enacted by the Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of VII Schedule of the Constitution which reads: “66. Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.” 4. Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.” 4. The statement of objects and reasons in enacting the Act shows that one of the objects is proper planning and coordinated development of technical education through out the country and accordingly powers and functions assigned to AICTE inter alia provide laying down norms and standards for programmes and institutions, giving approval for setting of technical institutions etc. Section 10 of the Act provides for functions of the AICTE. It would be appropriate to extract relevant portion of Section 10: “10. Functions of the Council: - (1) It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring coordinated and integrated development of technical and management education and maintenance of standards and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act, the Council may, -- (a) undertake survey in the various fields of technical education, collect data on all related matters and make forecast of the needed growth and development in technical education; (b) co-ordinate the development of technical education in the country at all levels’ (c) ……. (d) …….. (e) formulate schemes for promoting technical education system for women, handicapped and weaker sections of the society;” 5. The Supreme Court State of T.N v. Adhiyaman Edu & Research Institute (1995) 4 SCC 104 has considered the variety of functions entrusted to the AICTE, the relevant portion of para 22 thereof is as follows: “The aforesaid provisions of the Act including its preamble make it abundantly clear that the Council has been established under the Act for coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system at all levels throughout the country and is enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth………………………This duty and responsibility cast on the Council implies that the norms and standards to be set should be such as would prevent a lopsided or an isolated development of technical education in the country. For this purpose, the norms and standards to be prescribed for the technical education have to be such as would on the one hand ensure development of technical educational system in all parts of the country uniformly; that there will be a coordination in the technical education and the education imparted in various parts of the country and will be capable of being integrated in one system; that there will be sufficient number of technically educated individuals and that their growth would be in a planned manner; and that all institutions in the country are in a position to properly maintain the norms and standards that may be prescribed by the Council. The norms and standards have, therefore, to be reasonable and ideal and at the same time, adaptable, attainable and maintainable by institutions throughout the country to ensure both quantitative and qualitative growth of the technically qualified personnel to meet the needs of the country.” 6. The Supreme Court also interpreted expression ‘coordination’ in Entry 66 and has laid down in para 41(i) as follows: “(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonisation with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. It, therefore, includes action not only for removal of disparities in standards, but also for preventing the occurrence of such disparities. It would, therefore, also include power to do all things which are necessary to prevent what would make ‘coordination’ either impossible or difficult. This power is absolute and unconditional and in the absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must be given its full effect according to its plain and express intention.” 7. In another decision in All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan (2009) 11 SCC 726 , the Supreme Court reiterated thus: “The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory professional technical bodies and take decisions in academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education. In another decision in All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan (2009) 11 SCC 726 , the Supreme Court reiterated thus: “The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory professional technical bodies and take decisions in academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education. If the courts start entertaining petitions from individual institutions or students to permit courses of their choice, either for their convenience or to alleviate hardship or to provide better opportunities, or because they think that one course is equal to another, without realising the repercussions on the field of technical education in general, it will lead to chaos in education and deterioration in standards of education.” 8. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as above, clause 18.7 (1) of norms of AICTE cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable because prescription of such norm has become imperative for the growth of technical education among Indian women by continuing exclusive women’s engineering colleges. 9. What has further prevailed on us is the reasoning recorded by the competent authority depicting that the grant of relaxation would defeat the very objective of national policy aimed at promotion of the rights of the women students who are lagging behind in technical education because of the reluctance of the conservative parents to send their daughters to co-education colleges. 10. On the face of the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any fault with the impugned judgment. Dismissed.