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2011 DIGILAW 430 (KER)

Udayan v. Kerala Agro Machinery Corporation Ltd

2011-04-12

A.K.BASHEER, J.CHELAMESWAR, K.M.JOSEPH

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JUDGMENT :- A.K. BASHEER, J. 1. This Writ Petition has come up before us on a reference made by a Division Bench noticing apparent conflict between two bench decisions. In fact, a learned Single Judge had referred the case to the Division Bench after noticing inconsistency in the views taken by the two Division Benches. 2. The question that has cropped up in this case is whether Respondent No.1 Corporation is justified in tinkering with or varying the minimum qualifications prescribed in the Special Rules for recruitment to the post of Deputy Manager (Technical), while notifying the vacancies. 3. The relevant facts which led to this legal imbroglio may be briefly noticed: Petitioners are now working as Regional Managers (Marketing) in the cadre of Deputy Manager in Respondent No.1 Corporation, which is a Company fully owned by the Government of Kerala. The Corporation, being an instrumentality of the Government of Kerala, is State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution of India. 4. Petitioner No.1 is a B.Tech (Mechanical) with Master of Business Administration (MBA) as an additional qualification. After working as Assistant Engineer in the Kerala Automobiles limited for more than 16 years from 1991 till 2007, he joined Respondent No.1 Corporation as Deputy Manager in March 2007. He has satisfactorily completed the period of probation and is eligible for promotion to the post of Manager. 5. Petitioner No.2 is a Bachelor in Engineering (Mechanical). He owns a Diploma in Computer Application (DCA), in addition to the Post Graduate Diploma in Management and Marketing Management and Post Graduate Degree in Business Administration (MBA). After working in Aluminium Industries Limited, Kollam and in Peninsula Polymers Limited, Trivandrum for more than six years, he joined Respondent No.1 Corporation as Assistant Manager in 1997 and was promoted as Deputy Manager in November 2007. He is also eligible for promotion to the post of Manager. 6. On July 2,2008, the Corporation published Ext. P3 notification, inviting applications from eligible candidates for filling up the two vacancies of Manager (Technical), apart from two other vacancies, which are not relevant for our purpose. The following qualifications were notified in Ext.P3 for the above post: “A First Class Degree in Mechanical/Automobile Engineering from a recognised University. MBA desirable. Experience: A minimum of 10 years in an Automobile manufacturing Company…..” 7. Petitioners applied for the above post in response to Ext.P3 notification. The following qualifications were notified in Ext.P3 for the above post: “A First Class Degree in Mechanical/Automobile Engineering from a recognised University. MBA desirable. Experience: A minimum of 10 years in an Automobile manufacturing Company…..” 7. Petitioners applied for the above post in response to Ext.P3 notification. But they were not invited for the interview, which was scheduled to be held on October 31, 2008. Later, petitioners came to know that they were not invited since they did not possess a First Class Degree in Mechanical/Automobile Engineering. According to the petitioners, insistence for a First Class Degree in Engineering, being totally against the clauses contained in Ext.P5 Special Rules for Recruitment, the action of the Corporation was per se mala fide, illegal and unjust. Therefore, they challenged the proposed selection process in the Writ Petition. 8. When the Writ Petition came up for admission before a learned Single Judge on January 29,2009, Respondent No.1 Corporation was directed not to make the appointment without obtaining permission from the Court. Later, the learned Single Judge, referred the case to the Division Bench, after noticing the apparent conflict in the two bench decisions in Prathapan v. Registrar of High Court of Kerala (1984 KLT 625) and in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Alex (WA No.213/1997). The Division Bench, in turn, has referred this case to a Full Bench. 9. It is beyond controversy that under the Special Rules for Recruitment and Promotion of Managerial and Supervisory Employees in the Corporation, a copy of which is available on record as Ext. P5, the qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment or promotion are as hereunder: “For direct recruitment.--A Degree in Engineering with 10 years experience in the relevant field. MBA desirable. For Promotion.--By selection from Dy. Managers in G-10 having a Degree or Diploma in Engineering with three years service.” (Admittedly the period of minimum qualifying service in the feeder category was reduced from 3 years to 2 years in respect of all Officers’ posts). 10. It may, at once, be noticed that going by the Special Rules, a First Class Degree in the relevant branch of Engineering has not been prescribed as the requisite minimum qualification for direct recruitment/promotion. But, in Ext.P3 notification, it has been stipulated that the requisite qualification is a First Class Degree in Mechanical/Automobile Engineering from a recognised University. 11. It is contended by Sri. But, in Ext.P3 notification, it has been stipulated that the requisite qualification is a First Class Degree in Mechanical/Automobile Engineering from a recognised University. 11. It is contended by Sri. O.V. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel, who appears for the petitioners, that Respondent No.1 Corporation could not have notified a higher or superior qualification at variance with or in total disregard to the stipulation contained in the Special Rules. He submits that unless and until the Special Rules are amended in accordance with law or the norms prescribed, the Appointing Authority cannot deal with the Rules in a whimsical and arbitrary manner and prescribe a higher qualification. Petitioners, who possess the minimum qualification prescribed under the Special Rules, are entitled to nurture a legitimate hope and expectation that they would also be considered for selection and appointment. Denial of an opportunity to participate in the selection process will tantamount to denial of the right conferred on them under Art.16 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted. 12. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel that the Appointing Authority could not have notified a post which is non existent in the approved staff pattern. The post of Manager (Technical) has been created by the Board of Directors without obtaining sanction from the Government. 13. The Corporation, in its counter-affidavit, tacitly admitted that Ext.P3 notification was issued pending amendment of the relevant clause in the Recruitment Rules. In other words, the Corporation admitted that going by the then existing Rules, the minimum qualification prescribed for the post was only a Degree in Engineering and the Rules did not insist for a First Class Degree. But, according to the Corporation, in 2007, it had brought in certain amendments in the Recruitment Rules prescribing First Class Degree in Engineering as the qualification in the entry post to the cadre of Technical Officers beginning with Assistant Engineer in Grade VIII up to the post of General Manager in Grade XIV. Accordingly, Exts.R1 (a) and R1 (b) orders had been issued, bringing in the necessary amendments. The Corporation contended that Ext.P3 notification was issued pursuant to a decision taken by the Board of Directors to fill up the vacancies of Manager (Technical) on August 2, 2008, though, at that time, the Rule relating to the minimum qualification for the post of Manager (Technical), had not been amended. The Corporation contended that Ext.P3 notification was issued pursuant to a decision taken by the Board of Directors to fill up the vacancies of Manager (Technical) on August 2, 2008, though, at that time, the Rule relating to the minimum qualification for the post of Manager (Technical), had not been amended. The Corporation further admitted that the Board had passed a resolution to amend the relevant clause in the Recruitment Rules only on November 22, 2008, as could be seen from Ext.R1 (c). However, the Corporation asserted that prescription of a First Class Degree in Engineering was incorporated in Ext.P3 notification “pending amendment and not with a view to deny an opportunity to the petitioners to compete or to exclude them from the zone of consideration”. 14. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 4 and 5, who have been selected for appointment pursuant to the interview held by the Corporation, it is contended that the Board of Directors of the Corporation is competent to prescribe/modify the qualifications for various posts and that the minimum qualification of First Class Degree for the post of Manager (Technical) was insisted upon since such a prescription was made in respect of other technical posts also, starting from Assistant Manager to General Manager. The inordinate delay in challenging Ext.P3 notification was highlighted by respondents 4 and 5. They further pointed out that, after their selection to the post, the proposal for appointment had been forwarded to the Government for approval. 15. As has been noticed already, the question that is posed for consideration is whether the Appointing Authority could have prescribed a higher qualification for the post of Manager (Technical) overlooking the qualification prescribed in the Special Rules for recruitment. It may, at once, be noticed that the process of selection in the case on hand is only confined to interview or viva voce of the eligible aspirants. If the “suitable persons” fall in the zone of consideration in terms of the qualification prescribed in Ext. P3 notification, they become eligible for attending the interview. It is revealed from the records that 14 “suitable persons” except the two petitioners were invited for interview held on October 31, 2008. Obviously, the 14 suitable persons satisfied the minimum basic qualification of a First Class Degree in the relevant branch of Engineering with a minimum of 10 years’ experience in the field concerned. It is revealed from the records that 14 “suitable persons” except the two petitioners were invited for interview held on October 31, 2008. Obviously, the 14 suitable persons satisfied the minimum basic qualification of a First Class Degree in the relevant branch of Engineering with a minimum of 10 years’ experience in the field concerned. Therefore, going by the prescription contained in Ext.P3 notification, it can be said that the Corporation was justified in not inviting the petitioners for the interview. 16. But, it has been noticed already that the relevant clause in the Recruitment Rules, as on the date of Ext.P3 notification, either for direct recruitment or promotion, prescribes only a Degree in Engineering. Therefore, insistence for a First Class Degree as the minimum qualification and that too without amending the relevant clause in the Rules cannot be justified at all. In this context, it has to be remembered that the Corporation had amended certain other Rules in relation to the posts of Technical Officers starting with Assistant Engineer in Grade VIII up to General Manager in Grade XIV in 2007. More importantly, it is admitted by the Corporation that a resolution had been passed by the Board to amend the relevant clause in the Rules. But, the said decision to amend the Rules was taken only in November 2008, long after the issuance of Ext.P3 notification. Therefore, the action of the Corporation, in initiating the selection process to the vacant posts in question even before amending the Recruitment Rules appropriately, cannot be held to be a valid exercise at all. 17. We may now refer to the two Bench decisions of this Court referred to in the earlier part of this judgment, which have taken contradictory views on the issue. In Prathapan v. Registrar of High Court of Kerala (9184 KLT 625), the Registrar of the High Court had invited applications from first and second class Graduates/Post Graduates/Law Graduates of any recognised University to fill up the vacancies of Assistant Grade II. The application sent by the petitioner in that case, who possessed only a Third Class Degree was rejected by the Registrar. In his Writ Petition, was contended by the petitioner that the relevant clause in the Recruitment Rules prescribes only a Degree of any University in India for the post of Assistant Grade II and therefore, he also ought to have been considered for selection. In his Writ Petition, was contended by the petitioner that the relevant clause in the Recruitment Rules prescribes only a Degree of any University in India for the post of Assistant Grade II and therefore, he also ought to have been considered for selection. A Division Bench of this Court, before which the Writ Petition came up, took the view that prescription of First or Second Class Degree or Post Graduate Degree in Ext.P1 notification “did not involve any modification of the Statutory Rules the qualification prescribed by the Statutory Rules”. The Bench held that such prescription only laid down “a process for screening the candidates by narrowing the field of choice”. In this context, their Lordships relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Sales Tax Non-Gazetted Employees’ Association v. The State of Gujarat (1977 (1) SLR 452) and on another decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sant Lal and Others v. The State of Haryana and Others (1978 (1) SLR 133). 18. In Gujarat State Sales Tax Non-Gazetted Employees’ Association (supra), the recruitment was to the post of Sales Tax Inspector. The relevant Rule relating to direct recruitment prescribed possession of a degree with preference to those who possessed Degree of B.Com with Accountancy or Chartered Accountancy or such other equivalent qualification. More than fifteen thousand candidates applied for the post, out of which, more than one thousand candidates held First Class Degree in different faculties. About 580 out of them were first class Commerce graduates and 101 were first class Arts graduates and about 500 were filed class Science graduates. The Appointing Authority, with a view to restrict the field of choice, decided to invite only one thousand candidates who possessed First Class Degree in various faculties. This was challenged before the High Court of Gujarat, which held that there was nothing inherently wrong in restricting the filed of choice to first class graduates. 19. In Sant Lal’s case (supra), the recruitment was to the post of Food Inspector. Applications were invited from Graduate Sanitary Inspectors, having experience for a minimum period of one year in addition to training for three months in food inspection and sampling works in any of the specified laboratories. Appellants, who were working as Sanitary Inspectors, did not, however, possess the Degree in Sanitation. Appellants were denied appointment since they did not possess the degree. Appellants, who were working as Sanitary Inspectors, did not, however, possess the Degree in Sanitation. Appellants were denied appointment since they did not possess the degree. They challenged the selection of respondents 4 to 7 unsuccessfully before the learned Single Judge primarily on the ground that they could not have been overlooked since they possessed the minimum qualification prescribed in the Rules and that the State had no authority to specify a qualification higher than that was prescribed under the Rules. In appeal, the Division Bench, while confirming the decision of the Single Judge, held that prescription of the minimum qualification or barest requirement of eligibility cannot be a bar for the respondent/State to seek persons with higher qualifications than the lowest level laid down by the rule makers. The Division Bench further proceeded to hold that prescription of minimum qualification did not necessarily mean that every person having such qualification must be considered against the post in question, even though others with higher qualifications were available for selection. 20. From the discussion in Prathapan’s case (supra), it can be seen that the Division Bench of this Court had validated the notification for recruitment since, according to their Lordships, the Appointing Authority did not modify or rewrite the statutory rules, but only evolved a process of narrowing down the field of choice by eliminating third class graduates from the zone of consideration with a view to recruit better talents for the High Court service. 21. In Kerala Public Service Commission & Anr. v. Alex (W.A.No.213/1997), the Commission had issued a notification inviting applications for the post of Assistants in the Kerala Financial Corporation. The Commission issued the notification in the Gazette in two languages, namely, in English and Malayalam. In the Malayalam version of the Gazette, the notified qualification was “a recognised degree from a University either in Economics or Commerce” and in the English version, the requisite qualification was “Bachelor’s Degree in Economics or Commerce of a recognised University.” The respondent, who was a graduate in Mathematics (B.Sc) and Post Graduate in Economics (M.A.) put in his application on the basis of the Malayalam version of the notification. He appeared for the written test conducted by the Commission. But the respondent was denied appointment since, according to the Commission, he did not possess either a B.Com Degree or B.A. (Economics) Degree. He appeared for the written test conducted by the Commission. But the respondent was denied appointment since, according to the Commission, he did not possess either a B.Com Degree or B.A. (Economics) Degree. In other words, the Commission took the view that the Master’s Degree held by the respondent in Economics would not be sufficient to make him eligible for the post, as the requisite qualification was either a B.Com or B.A. in Economics. A learned Single Judge of this Court held that respondent was qualified to hold the post since he held a Master’s Degree in Economics and it was immaterial that he had done his post graduation after taking his Degree in Science. Learned Judge also noticed that the Malayalam version of the notification did not prescribe either B.A. (Economics) or B.Com as the requisite qualification. The Division Bench, after an elaborate consideration of the English and Malayalam versions of the Gazette notification, upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge, particularly in view of the qualifications indicated in the Malayalam version of the Gazette notification. It was held that a Degree in Economics or Commerce as stipulated in the Gazette notification “would include both Graduate Degree and Master’s Degree.” 22. It may, at once, be noticed that in the above decision, the issue that came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court was only the correct interpretation or understanding of the essential qualification that had been prescribed or stipulated for the post. Confusion was apparent in the qualification as notified in the Malayalam and English versions. While in the Malayalam version it was stipulated that “a degree from a recognized University either in Commerce or Economics would be sufficient”, in the English version, the requisite qualification stipulated was “Bachelor’s Degree in Economics or Commerce of a recognized University.” Undoubtedly, both versions, in our view, prescribed Degree in Economics or Commerce. It is true that English version was more forthright and unambiguous in specifying that it must be a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics or Commerce, but the Malayalam version did not specify whether it must be a Bachelor’s Degree or Master’s Degree. We do not propose to deal with that issue any further for obvious reasons. It is true that English version was more forthright and unambiguous in specifying that it must be a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics or Commerce, but the Malayalam version did not specify whether it must be a Bachelor’s Degree or Master’s Degree. We do not propose to deal with that issue any further for obvious reasons. Suffice it to say, the Division Bench had no occasion to deal with any issue, which is, in any way, connected with the question that has come up for consideration. In that view of the matter, we do not notice any apparent conflict in the two decisions referred to by the Division Bench, viz., Prathapan’s case and Alex’s case (supra). 23. However, in our view, the decision rendered by the Division Bench in Prathapan’s case (supra) does not appear to be correct, particularly in the light of the settled position of law as laid down by a catena of decisions. 24. The question whether the Appointing Authority can prefer candidates possessing a higher qualification was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar ((1993)2 SCC 310). In that case, Government of Andhra Pradesh had initiated recruitment process to fill up the various vacancies in the post of Deputy Executive Engineer in different Engineering Services as provided under the relevant rule. The minimum educational qualification for direct recruitment was graduation. However, it was stipulated in the rule that Post Graduate qualification would be treated as an additional qualification and preference shall be given to such candidates. Pursuant to the notification issued by the Government, large number of graduate and Post Graduate Engineering Degree holders had applied for the post. A written test was conducted. Those who secured the qualifying marks were called for oral test/interview. The Public Service Commission selected Post Graduate Engineers from among the successful candidates who participated in the written test in the first stage. Since sufficient number of Post Graduates were available to fill up the vacancies, no graduate was selected. 25. The selection process was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by the graduate Engineers. The Public Service Commission selected Post Graduate Engineers from among the successful candidates who participated in the written test in the first stage. Since sufficient number of Post Graduates were available to fill up the vacancies, no graduate was selected. 25. The selection process was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by the graduate Engineers. The contention raised by the graduates was that preference to the Post Graduates as envisaged in the relevant Rules would come into play only where two candidates had secured equal marks in the test in which event, the candidate possessing Post Graduate qualification could be preferred. In other words, the contention was that if a graduate had secured higher marks than the Post Graduate, the former should be preferred. A learned Single Judge of the High Court repelled the above contention raised by the Graduates. Ultimately when the matter reached the Apex Court, it was held that classification on the basis of higher educational qualification with a view to achieve improvement in administrative performance was not abhorrent to Art.14/16 of the Constitution. The preference rule was applied first by choosing Post Graduates and thereafter graduates and that too after narrowing down the zone of consideration by eliminating those who did not succeed in the qualifying test. The preference rule was applied only among those who succeeded in the Qualifying test and secured the minimum marks in the interview. We are afraid the above decision may not have any application to the case on hand. 26. In M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar ((1994) 6 SCC 293), the Supreme Court held that short listing of candidates is a part of the selection process and such a process may not result in altering the minimum qualification, especially in selections based solely on viva voce test. As against 4 posts of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts under the general category, 180 applicants were found eligible as per requirement of the advertisement. The Public Service Commission decided to invite only 71 from among the 180 applicants since these 71 candidates had completed 71/2 years of practice at the Bar. Going by the provisions contained in S.8(3)(6c) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act 1960, 5 years of practice as an Advocate was the minimum requirement. High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the Writ Petition filed by those candidates who were eliminated at the threshold. Going by the provisions contained in S.8(3)(6c) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act 1960, 5 years of practice as an Advocate was the minimum requirement. High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the Writ Petition filed by those candidates who were eliminated at the threshold. Ultimately when the case came up before the Supreme Court it was held that the process of short listing was not for substituting the eligibility criteria given in the statutory rules or prospectus. It was further held that in substance the process of short listing is part of the process of selection. The selection Board can evolve any rational basis on which the list of applicants should be short listed. 27. A similar view has been taken by the Apex Court and various other High Courts in a catena of decisions, as indicated earlier. In Mohd, Riazul Usman Gani & Ors. v. District & Sessions Judge, Nagpur ((2000) 2 SCC 606), the Apex Court has held that laying of criteria to short-list a large number of candidates is permissible, provided, the criteria are reasonable and not arbitrary having regard to the post for which recruitment is made. But, their Lordships cautioned that any criterion which has the effect of denying a candidate his right to be considered for the post on the principle that he is having higher qualification than the prescribed one, cannot be rational. The Court, however, hastened to add that this ruling has to be confined to the facts of the case on hand and should not be taken to be a rule of universal application. 28. In the above decision, applications were invited to fill up sixty six vacancies of Peons in the District & Sessions Court, Nagpur. In response to the advertisement, 14,965 applications were received. The minimum qualification prescribed for the post of Peon was a pass in the examination of Standard IV in the regional language. The Advisory Committee, constituted in terms of the provisions contained in the Recruitment Rules, prepared a list after laying down four criteria for shortlisting the applicants. In response to the advertisement, 14,965 applications were received. The minimum qualification prescribed for the post of Peon was a pass in the examination of Standard IV in the regional language. The Advisory Committee, constituted in terms of the provisions contained in the Recruitment Rules, prepared a list after laying down four criteria for shortlisting the applicants. The fourth criterion laid down by the Advisory Committee is extracted hereunder: “(d) Applications of those candidates possessing minimum educational qualification of passing IV vernacular standard and/or educated up to passing VII standard only should be considered for the interview to the posts of Peons and those who have studied above VII vernacular standard may not take proper interest in the work of Peons and, therefore, should not be called for interview.” The above criterion was challenged primarily on the ground that the zone of consideration could not have been restricted to those candidates who had possessed fourth standard to seventh standard. The appellants who had obtained higher educational qualification contended that such a stipulation was arbitrary and against the specific clause in the Recruitment Rules. The Apex Court held that the fourth criterion, referred to above, was not “reasonable and rational” and that the High Court was not justified in putting its stamp of approval to another type of reservation for recruitment to the service which was not permissible. The Court proceeded to observe that a poor person can certainly acquire a qualification equivalent to SSC examination and it can never be said that he cannot go beyond Standard VII and therefore, restricting appointment to those candidates, who studied only up to Standard VII, would be in a way encouraging dropouts. 29. We do not propose to refer to the various decisions cited before us relating to shortlisting of candidates for the purpose of restricting the zone of consideration to manageable limits, if the number of applicants is very huge. The settled law is that the Appointing Authority can adopt a methodology by which the candidates, who have obtained higher cut off marks in the written test, can be shortlisted for the final round of selection. Of course, the Appointing Authority must ensure that fair and rational criteria are evolved for this purpose. The settled law is that the Appointing Authority can adopt a methodology by which the candidates, who have obtained higher cut off marks in the written test, can be shortlisted for the final round of selection. Of course, the Appointing Authority must ensure that fair and rational criteria are evolved for this purpose. However, if, in a recruitment process, there is no provision for a written test and the number of applicants is not that huge and the selection is based only on the interview or viva voce, there may not be any relevance for such an elimination or screening process. 30. But, as regards the question whether the Appointing Authority can take any liberty to alter or modify the Statutory/Recruitment Rules while making the appointment, there does not appear to be any controversy at all. It is the settled position of law that the Statutory/Recruitment Rules cannot be tinkered with by the Appointing Authority (Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1351), Malik Mazhar Sultan & Anr. v. U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors. ((2006) 9 SCC 507), etc.). 31. In Umesh Chandra Shukla’s case (supra), it has been held by their Lordships that the Appointing Authority has no power to prescribe minimum marks which a candidate should obtain in the aggregate, which is different from the minimum already prescribed by the Rules. It has been held further thus: “Exercise of such power of moderation is likely to create a feeling of distrust in the process of selection to public appointments which is intended to be fair and impartial. It may also result in the violation of the principal of equality and may lead to arbitrariness.” In Malik Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra), the controversy revolved around the question whether the Public Service Commission was justified in relaxing the age of the candidates. The Apex Court held that relaxation of age can be granted only if permissible under the Rules and not on the basis of the advertisement. Their Lordships reiterated that a notification or advertisement inviting applications for appointments cannot override the provisions of the Statutory Rules. Therefore, error of eligibility requirements, if any, mentioned in the advertisement, being inconsistent with the Rules, would not create any right in favour of the candidates, if they are otherwise ineligible under the Rules. 32. Their Lordships reiterated that a notification or advertisement inviting applications for appointments cannot override the provisions of the Statutory Rules. Therefore, error of eligibility requirements, if any, mentioned in the advertisement, being inconsistent with the Rules, would not create any right in favour of the candidates, if they are otherwise ineligible under the Rules. 32. Similarly, there can be no controversy that the recruiting agency like Union/State Public Service Commission is not vested with any power to deviate from the qualifications prescribed in the notification for the purpose of recruitment. Once certain in norms are indicated in the notification for selection, those norms should be strictly followed. The recruiting agency/appointing authority can, for administrative reasons, prescribe norms or evolve a methodology to narrow down the zone of consideration by prescribing cut off marks, years of experience, etc., if there is possibility that there may be large number of aspirants for the post. But, once the norms or qualifications are notified, they will have for any arbitrariness, favouritism, nepotism, etc., and the process of selection must be open, fair and wholly untainted, in any manner whatsoever. The faith reposed by the public in the purity of administration and fairness in public appointments shall never be eroded. 33. Thus, having regard to the entire aspects of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the Appointing Authority, the Kerala Agro Machinery Corporation, was not justified in notifying a minimum qualification other than what was stipulated in the Recruitment Rules. As has been noticed already, the settled position of law is that the Appointing Authority cannot deviate from the Rules/Regulations prescribed for recruitment in an arbitrary manner. 34. As has been indicated by us earlier, the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Prathapan’s case (supra) has not laid down the law correctly and therefore, it is overruled. The question referred to the Full Bench is answered accordingly. Since the parties have raised some other contentions, we direct the Registry to post the case before the Division Bench for a decision on merits.