JUDGMENT K.K.SASIDHARAN, J. ( 1. ) WHETHER actual communication of the order passed by the Government not permitting the employee to retire, on account of his suspension pending initiation of departmental proceedings before the date of superannuation, is a mandatory requirement for the purpose of retaining the employee in service, is the core issue that arises for determination in these two writ appeals. ( 2. ) THE writ appeal in W.A. No. 131 of 2010 is at the instance of the State and the challenge is to the order dated 22.7.2009 in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009 whereby and whereunder the learned single Judge quashed the order of suspension dated 17.6.2009 and directed the appellant to permit the employee to retire from service on 30.6.2009 the date on which he attained the age of superannuation. The intra Court appeal in W.A. No. 927 of 2010 is at the instance of the employee and the challenge is to the order dated 23.3.2010 in W.P. No. 5747 of 2010 dismissing the writ petition impugning the order dated 30.6.2010 retaining him in service and the related charge memo dated 15.7.2009. Summary of background facts: ( 3. ) THE appellant in Writ Appeal No. 927 of 2010 (hereinafter referred to as "the employee") was appointed as Sub Registrar on 22.10.1977 in the department of Registration and later he was promoted as District Registrar. He was due to retire on 30.6.2009 ( 4. ) WHILE the employee was functioning as District Registrar, Virugambakkam, he was suspended from service as per proceedings dated 17.6.2009 pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The order of suspension was challenged before the Writ Court in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009 mainly on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were initiated long after the alleged misconduct. When the writ petition came up for final hearing before the learned single Judge, it was represented by the Government that an order dated 30.6.2009 has already been passed retaining the employee in service. In short, the employee was not permitted to retire, even though he attained the age of superannuation on 30.6.2009. The learned Judge found that the order dated 30.6.2009 retaining the employee in service was not communicated to him as on the date of his superannuation and as such, he should be permitted to retire from service. In short, the employee was not permitted to retire, even though he attained the age of superannuation on 30.6.2009. The learned Judge found that the order dated 30.6.2009 retaining the employee in service was not communicated to him as on the date of his superannuation and as such, he should be permitted to retire from service. The learned single Judge held that there should be a specific order by the Competent Authority to retain the employee in service and unless such an order is passed before the date of superannuation, there is no question of suspending the employee or continuing with the suspension. The writ petition was allowed with a specific direction to the Government to allow the employee to retire with effect from 30.6.2009 and to pay him the terminal benefits within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the order. It is the said order which is challenged by the Government in W.A. No. 131 of 2010. ( 5. ) THE competent authority issued a charge sheet to the employee on 15.7.2009 taking advantage of the order of retention dated 30.6.2009 THE order dated 30.6.2009 and the charge sheet dated 15.7.2009 were challenged in W.P. No. 5747 of 2010. ( 6. ) ACCORDING to the employee, the order retaining him in service was passed on 30.6.2009 However, it was not communicated to him. The communication was received on 6.7.2009 and the same is evident from the official records. Therefore, there was no valid order retaining him in service as on 30.6.2009 and as such, he should be treated as retired on the date on which he had completed 58 years. The charge sheet dated 15.7.2009 was challenged mainly on the ground that no proceeding would lie after retirement. The delay in initiating departmental proceedings was the other ground taken to quash the charge sheet. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition in W.P. No. 5747 of 2010 by observing that the affidavit filed by the writ petitioner was sworn to only by the power agent, who has no personal knowledge. The contention regarding non service of the order dated 30.6.2009 was negatived mainly on account of the factual position that the order in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009 was the subject matter of appeal and stay has already been granted by the Division Bench. The contention regarding non service of the order dated 30.6.2009 was negatived mainly on account of the factual position that the order in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009 was the subject matter of appeal and stay has already been granted by the Division Bench. The said order is challenged in W.A. No. 927 of 2010. Note on Submissions: ( 7. ) THE learned Advocate General appearing for the appellant in W.A. No. 131 of 2010 contended that the order retaining the employee in service was issued on 30.6.2009 itself and the fact that it was not actually received by the employee does not matter much. According to the learned Advocate General, Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules gives authority to the Government to retain a suspended employee in service by not permitting him to retire. THEre is no requirement that the order retaining the employee in service should be communicated to him before the date of retirement. THErefore, the employee was not justified in his contention that the failure on the part of the Government to communicate the order would vitiate the order retaining him in service. ( 8. ) THE learned counsel for the employee while justifying the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009 and opposing the order passed by the learned Judge in W.P. No. 5747 of 2010 contended that the order passed by the statutory authority should be communicated well before the date of retirement as otherwise, there would be no order in the eye of law. It was his further contention that the order dated 30.6.2009 was received only on 6.7.2009 and by that time the employee had already retired. THE question of continuing the order of suspension beyond the period of retirement would not arise in case no order was passed retaining the employee in service, in spite of his attaining the age of superannuation. The learned Additional Government Pleader while resisting the writ appeal filed by the employee contended that the order retaining the employee came into force on 30.6.2009 and as such the charge sheet issued thereafter has to be treated as one issued during the currency of service. ( 9. ) THE learned counsel for the employee placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contention. ( 9. ) THE learned counsel for the employee placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contention. (i) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta (2007) 7 SCC 309 : LN1ND 2007 SC 905. (ii) Union of India v. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar AIR 1998 SC 2722 : (1998) 7 SCC 569 : 1998-II-LLJ-748 (iii) State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram AIR 1970 SC 214 : (1969) 3 SCC 28 . (iv) State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others v. R. Karuppiah and Others (2005) 2 MLJ 555 . ( 10. ) THE core issue is whether the order retaining the employee in service beyond the period of superannuaion is required to be served on him before the actual date of superannuation. Rule 56(1) of the Fundamental Rules reads thus: "Retirement on Superannuation: (a) Every Government servant in the superior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. He shall not be retained in service after that age except with the sanction of the Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing but he shall not be retained after the age of sixty years except in very special circumstances: Provided that this clause shall not apply to Government servants who are treated as in superior service for the purpose of these rules but as in the Tamil Nadu Basic Service for the purpose of pension. Such Government servants as well as all basic servants shall retire on attaining the age of sixty years: Provided further that on and from the 1.1.1993 a District Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Subordinate Judge or District Munsif- cum -Judicial Magistrate, who, in the opinion of the High Court, Madras has potential for continued useful service beyond the age of fifty eight years, shall retire from service on attaining the age of sixty years. (G.O. Ms. (G.O. Ms. No. 365, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (FR.1V) Department, dated 4.10.1996 - with effect from 1.1.1993.) Explanation I: When a Government servant is required to retire, revert or cease to be on leave on attaining a specific age, the day on which he attains that age is reckoned as a non-working day and the Government servant shall retire, revert or cease to be on leave, with effect on and from that day. Explanation II: The grant under Rule 86 or corresponding other rules of leave extending beyond the date on which a Government servant must retire or beyond the date upto which a Government servant has been permitted to remain in service shall not be treated as sanctioning an extension of service for the purpose of Pensionary or Contributory Provident Fund benefits or retention of lien. The Government servant shall, for the purpose of pensionary benefits, be deemed to have retired from service on the date of retirement or on the expiry of the extension of service, if any, and shall become eligible to all pensionary benefits from the date of retirement or from the day following the date of termination of extension of service, as the case may be. (b) Omitted. (c) Not withstanding anything contained in Clause (a), a Government servant who is under suspension (i) on a charge of misconduct; or (ii) against whom an enquiry into grave charges of criminal misconduct or allegations of criminal misconduct, is pending; or (iii) against whom an enquiry into grave charges is contemplated or is pending; or (iv) against whom a complaint of criminal offence is under investigation or trial Shall not be permitted by the appointing authority to retire on his reaching the date of retirement, but shall be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge of misconduct or criminal misconduct or the enquiry into allegations of criminal misconduct or the enquiry into contemplated charges or disciplinary proceeding taken under Rule 17(c) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or Rule 3(c) of the Tamil Nadu Police Sub-ordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as the case may be, in respect of item (iv) above is concluded and a final order passed thereon by the competent authority or by any higher authority." ( 11. ) THERE is no dispute that under normal circumstances every Government employee should retire from service on his attaining the age of 58 years. Sub clause (c) of Rule 56(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Fundamental Rules is in the nature of a preventive order restraining the employee from retiring on attaining the age of superannuation, in case he was placed under suspension, on account of his involvement in acts of misconduct or criminal case. ( 12. ) RULE 56(1)(c) is very specific when it provides that not withstanding anything contained in Clause (a), a Government servant who is under suspension, shall not be permitted by the appointing authority to retire, on his reaching the age of retirement, but shall be retained in service until enquiry into the charge of misconduct or criminal misconduct is concluded and a final order is passed by the competent authority. A plain reading of RULE 56(1)(c) make the position clear that the provision regarding retirement on superannuation would be applicable only to a Government Servant who is not placed under suspension on charges of misconduct or complaint of criminal offence under investigation or trial. Though the provision could be read as an embargo placed on a suspended employee from retirement in spite of attaining the age of superannuation, without a formal order to that effect, the fact remains that the Government had been passing orders retaining the service of the employees invoking sub clause (c) of RULE 56(1) of the Fundamental RULEs . The issue as to whether a formal order under Rule 56(1 )(c) is necessary to retain a suspended employee in service in spite of attaining the age of superannuation, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in N.M. Somasundaram v. Director General of Police, Madras-4 and Others (1997) WLR 120: 1997-I1-LLJ-222: (1997) 1 MLJ 486 . The Division Bench was of the view that a positive order in writing shall have to be passed by the Government under Rule 56(1)(c). The relevant observation reads thus at p. 488 of MLJ: "8. The Division Bench was of the view that a positive order in writing shall have to be passed by the Government under Rule 56(1)(c). The relevant observation reads thus at p. 488 of MLJ: "8. A reading of Rule 56(a) and (c) together would lead to an irresistible conclusion that in order to retain a public servant or a Government servant in service on attaining his age of superannuation, a positive order in writing shall have to be passed by the Government giving the reasons as to on what grounds which should be on public grounds, a Government servant is retained in service. No doubt Rule 56(c) says that a Government servant under suspension on a charge of misconduct should not be required or permitted to retire of his reaching the date of compulsory retirement. It further says that he should be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge is conducted and a final order passed thereon by the Competent Authority. Therefore, even though it may not be necessary to permit to Government servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending, to retire from service, in order to retain him in service for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, a positive order in writing is required to be passed. The public ground for passing the said order is the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. But, what is necessary is that there should be an order passed by the Government not permitting a Government Servant to retire from service." ( 13. ) THE very same view was taken by a Division Bench earlier in Mahadevan v. Special Officer/Deputy Registrar, South Arcot, Stores Ltd., (1987) WLR 120 . ( 14. ) THE correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench in Mahadevan v. Special Officer/Deputy Registrar, South Arcot, Stores Ltd. (supra) was doubted by a Division Bench in Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. G. Manoharan 2010 (2) CTC 234 : LNIND 2009 Mad 3845. We are not called upon to decide the issue as to whether a positive order is necessary under Rule 56(1 )(c) in the present writ appeals. ( 15. ) RULE 56(1 )(c) is akin to Fundamental RULE 56(f) and (ff) of the then All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) RULEs, 1965. While construing Fundamental RULE 56(ff) in PR. We are not called upon to decide the issue as to whether a positive order is necessary under Rule 56(1 )(c) in the present writ appeals. ( 15. ) RULE 56(1 )(c) is akin to Fundamental RULE 56(f) and (ff) of the then All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) RULEs, 1965. While construing Fundamental RULE 56(ff) in PR. Nayak v. Union of India AIR 1972 SC 554 : (1972) 1 SCC 332 : 1972-I-LLJ-535, at page 352), the Supreme Court indicated that the retirement is negatived by the positive act of suspension indicating thereby no formal order retaining the employee in service is necessary in case he is already placed under suspension. The following paragraphs would make the position clear at p. 563 of LLJ: "49. The fourth contention on behalf of the appellant was that the order of suspension was bad inasmuch as there was no order under Fundamental RULE 56(ff) requiring the appellant not to retire. At the outset it has to be borne in mind that the order of suspension is not under Fundamental RULE 56(ff). The order of suspension is under RULE 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) RULEs, 1969. Fundamental RULE 56(ff) is a RULE laying down the consequences of an order of suspension. When a valid order of suspension has been made as in the present case during the period of extension of the services of the appellant it could not in the same breath be said that he is not permitted to retire. That is the concomitant of the order of suspension. Furthermore, the language of Fundamental RULE 56(ff) is that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (a), (d) and (f) a member of the Indian Civil Service who is under suspension shall not be required or permitted to retire. Therefore, Fundamental RULE 56(ff) itself contains the words forbidding retirement of a member placed under suspension. Fundamental RULE 56(ff) means these things. First, Fundamental RULE 56(f) is deleted from coming into operation during the period of suspension inasmuch as the words used are "notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (f)". Secondly, the language of Fundamental RULE 56(ff) is that he shall not be required or permitted to retire. The language is not that he shall be required not to retire. In other words, retirement is negatived by the positive effect of suspension. Secondly, the language of Fundamental RULE 56(ff) is that he shall not be required or permitted to retire. The language is not that he shall be required not to retire. In other words, retirement is negatived by the positive effect of suspension. Thirdly, the entire consequence of Fundamental RULE 56(ff) is that the member shall be retained in service until the enquiry into the charges is concluded and the final order is passed. This Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, stressed the importance of passing an order of suspension where a disciplinary enquiry could not be concluded before the date of retirement. In short the order of suspension means that he is in service but this (sic) services are temporarily suspended and no retirement can therefore take place." ( 16. ) THE challenge to the proceedings dated 30.6.2009 basically is, on the ground that it was not communicated to the employee before the actual date of his retirement. THErefore, the issue is whether such a communication is actually necessary before the actual date of retirement, so as to retain the employee in service and to continue with the order of suspension. While considering an issue like this, the nature of the order and its consequence should also be taken into consideration. ( 17. ) THE purpose of passing the order in terms of sub clause (c) of Rule 56(1) is to retain the suspended employee in service on account of the pending proceedings against him. THE requirement even as per the statute is only to pass an order to retain the employee. THE receipt of such an order by the employee before the actual date of his retirement is not a mandatory requirement. ( 18. ) THE date of communication would assume significance in case, there is a period of limitation prescribed for challenging the order. In all such cases, it is the date of communication or receipt of the order alone would be material and the period of limitation would run from such date of receipt. According to the employee, the order should be communicated before the date of retirement and any order communicated thereafter would have no relevance inasmuch as by the time, he has already retired from service. The learned single Judge concurred with the said view. According to the employee, the order should be communicated before the date of retirement and any order communicated thereafter would have no relevance inasmuch as by the time, he has already retired from service. The learned single Judge concurred with the said view. In case the contention of the employee is accepted, it would enable the suspended employees to evade the order made under Rule 56(1)(c) till the date of his retirement and thereafter to contend that the order has not been served upon him before the cut off date and as such, he is deemed to have been retired on the date on which he attained the age of superannuation. Authorities cited by the employee ( 19. ) (i) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta (supra). In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta (supra), the competent authority under the Municipal Corporation of Delhi assessed the property tax payable by the assessee. The final order was belatedly challenged before the appellate authority. Therefore, the appeal was rejected. Before the High Court the assessee contended that the order was not communicated and as such the appellate authority was not justified in rejecting the appeal. The High Court distinguished the expressions "made" and "communicated" and set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority. When the matter was taken up by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Supreme Court observed that the order, ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. However, communication is necessary in case the order would bring an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law, in case he is aggrieved. The relevant observation reads thus: "26. A distinction, thus, exists in the construction of the word "made" depending upon the question as to whether the power was required to be exercised within the period of limitation prescribed therefor or in order to provide the person aggrieved to avail remedies if he is aggrieved thereby or dissatisfied therewith. Ordinarily, the words "given" and "made" carry the same meaning. 27. An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a government servant from services requires communication thereof as has been held in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika but an order placing a government servant on suspension does not require communication of that order. Ordinarily, the words "given" and "made" carry the same meaning. 27. An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a government servant from services requires communication thereof as has been held in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika but an order placing a government servant on suspension does not require communication of that order. (See State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra).) What is, therefore, necessary to be borne in mind is the knowledge leading to the making of the order. An order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. Once it is signed and an entry in that regard is made in the requisite register kept and maintained in terms of the provisions of a statute, the same cannot be changed or altered. It, subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, attains finality. Where, however, communication of an order is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby, the order is required to be communicated." (ii) Union of India v. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar (supra). The concerned employee was terminated from service without serving the show cause notice or charge sheet. The Administrative Tribunal, Bombay found that the charge sheet which was issued to the employee by Registered Post was returned with the postal endorsement "not found" while the show cause notice was straightaway published in the newspaper. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the service was insufficient and resultantly the order of dismissal was set aside. When the matter was taken up in Civil Appeal, the Supreme Court observed that in case disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge sheet or show cause notice is issued to the employee to submit his reply, actual communication is absolutely necessary. The Supreme Court said at p. 750 of LLJ: "9. Where the services are terminated, the status of the delinquent as a government servant comes to an end and nothing further remains to be done in the matter. But if the order is passed and merely kept in the file, it would not be treated to be an order terminating services nor shall the said order be deemed to have been communicated. 10. But if the order is passed and merely kept in the file, it would not be treated to be an order terminating services nor shall the said order be deemed to have been communicated. 10. Where the disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge-sheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the charge-sheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So also, when the show- cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of "communication" cannot be invoked and "actual service" must be proved and established. It has already been found that neither the charge-sheet nor the show-cause notice were ever served upon the original respondent, Dinanath Shantaram Karekar. Consequently, the entire proceedings were vitiated." (iii) State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra). The employee before the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram (supra) was in the service of the State of Punjab and he was deputed to the Co-operative service in the State of Himachal Pradesh. On 16.7.1958, the Himachal Pradesh Government had granted the employee leave preparatory to retirement, which was to take effect from 4.8.1958 The Punjab Government as per its telegram dated 25.7.1958 asked the Himachal Pradesh Government to revert the employee to the Punjab Government immediately. On 31.7.1958, the Punjab Government sent a telegram to the employee at his home town informing him that he had been suspended with effect from 2.8.1958 The Punjab Government after holding an enquiry dismissed the employee. The employee filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of suspension on the ground that it was received by him only after his retirement on 4.8.1958 and it could not have the effect of refusal to permit him to retire. The writ petition was allowed by the writ Court and it was confirmed in appeal. When the matter was taken up, the Supreme Court reversed the finding regarding communication and observed: "17. The question then is whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned government servant. The writ petition was allowed by the writ Court and it was confirmed in appeal. When the matter was taken up, the Supreme Court reversed the finding regarding communication and observed: "17. The question then is whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned government servant. The order of suspension in question was published in the Gazette though that was after the date when the respondent was to retire. But the point is whether it was communicated to him before that date. The ordinary meaning of the word "communicate" is to impart, confer or transmit information. (Cf. shorter oxford english Dictionary. Vol. 1, p. 352). As already stated, telegrams, dated 31.7.1958 and 2.8.1958 were despatched to the respondent at the address given by him where communications by Government should be despatched. Both the telegrams transmitted or imparted information to the respondent that he was suspended from service with effect from 2.8.1958 It may be that he actually received them in or about the 1958, after the date of his retirement. But, how can it be said that the information about his having been suspended was not imparted or transmitted to him on 31.7.1958 and 2.8.1958 i.e. before 4.8.1958 when he would have retired? It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But, once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word "communication" ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actual knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh contemplates. But, such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid." (iv) State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others v. R. Karuppiah and Others (supra) In State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others v. R. Karuppiah and Others (supra), the employee was permitted to retire from service on 31.5.1990 without passing any order retaining him in service as required under Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules . Thereafter disciplinary proceedings were initiated on 30.7.1990. When the proceedings were challenged before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, the charge memo dated 30.7.1990 was set aside with a declaration that the appellant was deemed to have been retired on the date of his superannuation on 31.5.1990 While confirming the said order, the Division Bench observed at p.561 of MLJ: "29. Thereafter disciplinary proceedings were initiated on 30.7.1990. When the proceedings were challenged before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, the charge memo dated 30.7.1990 was set aside with a declaration that the appellant was deemed to have been retired on the date of his superannuation on 31.5.1990 While confirming the said order, the Division Bench observed at p.561 of MLJ: "29. From the above note it is also clear that to proceed against a Government Servant, who is under suspension on a charge of misconduct, after his retirement, the fulfilling of the requirements under Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules is a mandatory one, otherwise, the competent authority cannot have any jurisdiction on the retired Government servant to proceed against him and the non-compliance of the said rule has vitiated all the proceedings initiated against the first respondent and therefore, the same are not sustainable under law and are liable to be set aside." ( 20. ) THE authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the employee would not support his case that the order retaining the employee in service under Rule 56(1)(c) should be served before the date of retirement. THE Supreme Court in the judgments cited by the learned counsel very clearly held that the question of actual service would be relevant only for the purpose of considering the question of limitation. THE judgment in State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others v. R. Karuppiah and Others (supra), has no application to the case on hand, inasmuch as in the said case, the order under Rule 56(T)(c) itself was passed only after permitting the employee to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation. That is not the factual position in the subject case. The Supreme Court in CCE v. M.M. Rubber and Co., (1992) Supp 1 SCC 471, observed that a decision comes into force from the date it is passed and the concerned- authority loses power to change it. The Supreme Court said: "12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The Supreme Court said: "12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The order or decision of such authority comes into force or becomes operative or becomes an effective order or decision on and from the date when it is signed by him. The date of such order or decision is the date on which the order or decision was passed or made: that is to say when he ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a different order and when he ceases to have any locus paetentiae . Normally that happens when the order or decision is made public or notified in some form or when it can be said to have left his hand. The date of communication of the order to the party whose rights are affected is not the relevant date for purposes of determining whether the power has been exercised within the prescribed time." ( 21. ) THE employee has no case there was no order retaining him in service. According to him, the order was received only on 6.7.2009 and by that time he has attained the age of superannuation. As indicated by the Supreme Court in P.R. Navak v. Union of India (1972) 1 SCC 332 language of Rule 56(1)(c) is that an employee shall not be required or permitted to retire. THE language is not that it shall be required not to retire. THErefore, the very fact that there was an order suspending him from service and the same has not been withdrawn till the date of superannuation is indicative of the fact that he is retained in service and he would not be permitted to retire. THE order passed under Rule 56(1)(c) is only a formal order retaining him in service. ( 22. ) WE are therefore of the considered view that belated communication of the order made under Rule 56(1 )(c) would not affect the validity of the decision taken the Government to retain an employee in service beyond the period of his superannuation. The basic contention taken by the employee in W.R No. 5747 of 2010 relates to the issuance of charge memo subsequent to the date of his retirement. The basic contention taken by the employee in W.R No. 5747 of 2010 relates to the issuance of charge memo subsequent to the date of his retirement. It was mainly on the ground that the suspension order has already been set aside by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 11695 of 2009. Now that we have arrived at a conclusion that the learned single Judge was not justified in setting aside the order of suspension, necessarily, the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 5747 of 2010 has to be confirmed. Accordingly, we confirm the said order. ( 23. ) IN the result, the appeal filed by the State in W.A. No. 131 of 2010 is allowed and the appeal at the instance of the employee in W.A. No. 927 of 2010 is dismissed. Consequently, the connected MP is closed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.