JUDGMENT S. R. BRAHMBHATT, J. The petitioner, who happens to be original applicant in Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009, filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 22, Ahmedabad, under the provision of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Domestic Violence Act'), for seeking protection from the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, has approached this Court, challenging the order dated 5-5-2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.8, Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2009, partly allowing the Appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove, and modifying the order dated 30-10-2009 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate reducing the amount of maintenance to be paid to the petitioner's minor son from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 1500/- per month and remanding the matter back to the trial Court for examining the aspect of interim protection to the petitioner and her son against eviction by the respondent No.1 to 4 and granting her interim protection in residential premises, to be decided bearing in mind the Apex Court's decision in case of S. R. Batra v. Smt. Taruna Batra, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1118 : [2007 (2) GLR 1582 (SC)]. 2. The facts in brief leading to filing of this petition deserves to be to set out as under : The petitioner, as per her say in the petition, was constrained to approach the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, seeking interim protection against the domestic violence from her in-laws and husband vide application dated 23-7-2009. The said complaint came to be registered as Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009. The petitioner narrated in detail the incidents of domestic violence alleged to have been perpetrated by her husband and in-laws compelling her for invoking provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. The petitioner had to pray for immediate protection. The petitioner's prayers for interim protection came to be vehemently opposed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove, and ultimately, the Court passed an interim order on 30-10-2009 under the provision of Sec. 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, granting interim protection, ordering payment of Rs. The petitioner had to pray for immediate protection. The petitioner's prayers for interim protection came to be vehemently opposed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove, and ultimately, the Court passed an interim order on 30-10-2009 under the provision of Sec. 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, granting interim protection, ordering payment of Rs. 4,000/- per month to the minor son aged about 8 years, without making any order of interim maintenance in favour of the petitioner as she is employed, and granting interim protection to the petitioner-wife and her minor son from being evicted from their residence, admittedly not occupied by husband, and in-laws; but granting them permission to visit the premises as it was submitted that two rooms were in their possession. Thus, mother and son were granted immediate protection from being deprived of their shelter during pendency of the complaint proceedings. This interim order dated 30-10-2009 came to be assailed, by the present respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove, in the Sessions Court by preferring appeal under Sec. 29 of the Domestic Violence Act and the appellate Court while partly allowing the appeal, vide its order dated 5-5-2010, reduced the amount of interim maintenance to minor son, from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 1,500/- and quashed and set aside the order qua protection of residence to the complainant-petitioner and her son and remitted the matter back to the trial Court for examining this aspect in light of the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra). This order of the Sessions Court dated 5-5-2010 is assailed in this petition by the wife for the grounds stated in the memo of the petition. This Court (Coram : Anant S. Dave, J.) on 15-6-2010 issued Rule and granted interim relief in terms of Para 7(C), staying the execution, implementation and operation of the order passed by the learned Sessions Court on 5-5-2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2009. 3. Learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 requested the Court for assigning priority in the matter, as the ex-parte order granted by this Court was inuring in favour of wife and the respondents were suffering deprivation of the residential accommodation. The Court granted and accepted the request for priority, and accordingly, the matter was taken up for final disposal by consent of both the sides. 4. The Court granted and accepted the request for priority, and accordingly, the matter was taken up for final disposal by consent of both the sides. 4. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that the first appellate Court ought not to have reduced the amount of interim maintenance granted to the minor son aged about 8 years, as the learned Magistrate while ordering the amount of Rs. 4,000/- has categorically recorded reasons for awarding the said amount. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that the provision of Domestic Violence Act and the duty cast upon the Court to accord protection to the woman against the domestic violence, indicate that the violence in any manner is not permitted to be perpetrated or continued against the woman, and therefore, the amount of Rs. 4,000/- ordered, was in no manner excessive or required any interference so as to reduce it Rs. 1,500/-. The appellate Court has not given any reason which would justify the said reduction of maintenance amount impugned in this petition. The interim order of protection in fact did not warrant any interference as the entire matter, in the form of Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009, is pending and the order appealed against was merely, an order made under the provision of Sec. 23 of the Act according interim protection which was warranted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. 5. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the protection as envisaged under the Domestic Violence Act is available to the wife who is complaining her subjection to such violence. The violence is required to be nipped in the bud. In the instance case, the incidence of violence narrated in the complaint indicate that concentrated efforts were heaped upon the wife to see to it that she may succumb to such violence and give up her dignified way of living. The bare minimum requirement for petitioner and her son to lead their lives peacefully without any imminent threat of losing shelter warranted passing of order of interim protection without which she would have been rendered so helpless as to give up her very complaint which she had filed against the present respondents and that would have emboldened the respondents in heaping excessive torture upon the petitioner and her minor son. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Magistrate was just and proper and did not call for any interference under the power vested in the appellate Court under Sec. 29 of the Domestic Violence Act. 6. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that the appellate Court did not appreciate the fact that the order impugned before him granting immediate protection to wife and minor son was only an interim order only and when the very complaint was to be heard and decided by the learned Magistrate there was no need to interfere with the same. The order appealed against was merely an order of interim protection and even as per the provision of Domestic Violence Act also final orders passed in such matters are not in any manner affecting the parties' right qua title and/or entitlement in respect of property or otherwise. Therefore, the protection granted by learned Magistrate was not required to be disturbed in any manner. The learned appellate Court unfortunately missed this aspect, and therefore, the order impugned is required to be quashed and set aside and the order of Magistrate is required to be restored. 7. The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that close reading of the order of learned Magistrate would clearly show that the relevant aspects justifying the passing of order of interim protection were discussed in detail and those findings are not in any manner shown to be incorrect or unreasonable, therefore, the appellate Court ought not to have modified the order without recording reasons for modification of the order. The order of the appellate Court is, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside. 8. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that the appellate Court did not appreciate the fact that the learned Magistrate has referred to the pleadings and facts in detail, and hence, the appellate Court ought to have recorded its own reasons for substituting the reasoning of the trial Court. The appellate Court's order did not contain any such reasoning for modifying the order impugned therein, and hence, the same is required to be quashed and set aside. 9. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove contended that the order passed by the Magistrate was passed without appreciating the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra). 9. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 hereinabove contended that the order passed by the Magistrate was passed without appreciating the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra). The Apex Court has in case of S. R. Batra (supra) clearly laid down the law that the wife under the Domestic Violence Act has no right to oust the parents of the husband as she cannot claim any entitlement of residence against the parents of the husband. This fundamental principle of law pronounced by the Apex Court is so clear as to prevent any Court from according any protection to complainant-wife against her in-laws under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. Learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 has further contended that the petitioner-wife is not entitled to claim a right of residence in a shared house-holds owned by her parents-in-law. 10. The learned Magistrate ought to have appreciated this aspect and should not have granted protection to the petitioner. The evidence are on record to indicate that the parents-in-law of the petitioner are owners of the premises in which the wife is given protection, and hence, the learned Magistrate could not have accorded protection to the petitioner-wife, and therefore, learned appellate Court has rightly quashed that portion of the order and remanded the matter back for deciding it afresh in light of the judgment of the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra). Learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 contended that the petitioner-wife was misbehaving in such a fashion that the in-laws were compelled to leave the shared house hold. 11. Learned Advocate for the respondents contended that the petitioner-wife was behaving in such a way which compelled the father-in-law and mother-in-law to leave their own house and take shelter at the father's house of the father-in-law and husband and petitioner-wife with her child were left in the premises. The in-laws moving out of shared household, and leaving it to husband, wife and child, also did not satisfy the wife, and therefore, she behaved in such a way that husband has also had to leave that house and joined with his parents and brothers who were residing in the house of father of father-in-law. The in-laws moving out of shared household, and leaving it to husband, wife and child, also did not satisfy the wife, and therefore, she behaved in such a way that husband has also had to leave that house and joined with his parents and brothers who were residing in the house of father of father-in-law. The petitioner-wife's in-laws left the house in March, 2006 and husband left the house on 26th October, 2006. The parents-in-law of the petitioner had to collect their belongings and keep it in two rooms of the house and lock them so as to keep their goods and belongings safe. The custody of these two rooms is still with the parents-in-law, and therefore, the parents-in-law were permitted by Magistrate to visit the house and she is creating all hurdles, and therefore, the learned Magistrate's order was in fact creating a situation whereunder the owners of the property were deprived of the enjoyment of their property. This situation was rightly deprecated by the learned appellate Court, and hence, the order of protection came to be quashed. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 invited this Court's attention to page No. 24 in the compilation of the petition and contended that the wife has asked for alternative accommodation and the expenses and the rent would be paid by the respondents. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 indicated that the learned Appellate Court has observed that the learned Magistrate ought to have appreciated the aspect that despite there being enough material available on record, indicating that the house is belonging to the parents-in-law of the petitioner and the petitioner could not have been given any protection whatsoever as the petitioner is earning more than Rs. 18,000/- per month. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court incase of S. R. Batra v. Smt. Taruna Batra, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1118 : [2007 (2) GLR 1582 (SC)] submitted that the learned Magistrate could not have passed any order of even interim protection qua residence in question. The petitioner-wife and her minor son did not have any right to reside in the said house against the wishes of her father-in-law even by way of interim protection as it was owned by parents-in-laws. The petitioner-wife and her minor son did not have any right to reside in the said house against the wishes of her father-in-law even by way of interim protection as it was owned by parents-in-laws. The order of interim protection, therefore, deserved to be quashed and the appellate Court has rightly quashed the same. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, reported in AIR 2008 SC 2675 : [2009 (1) GLR 200 (SC)] submitted that the Apex Court in fact has reiterated the position of law laid down in the case of S. R. Batra cited hereinabove. Thus, in view of the established position of law the order of protection need not be granted against the parents-in-law of the petitioner. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, relying upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Neetu Mittal v. Kanta Mittal, reported in AIR 2009 Del. 72 , submitted that while dismissing the petitioner-wife's petition, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra), held that the petitioner-wife who had challenged the order of injunction granted in favour of the parents-in-law against the her preventing her from entering the premises of plaintiff was just and proper. The learned Advocate for the respondents also relied upon the decision in case of Shumita Didi Sandhu v. Sanjay Singh Sandhu, reported in F.A.O. (O.S.) No. 341 of 2007, decided on 26-10-2010, relevant Paras are 43 to 47. 15. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the appellate Court has also accorded cogent reasons for reducing the amount of interim maintenance granted in favour of the minor son aged about 8 years from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 1,500/-. Those reasons cannot be said to be in any manner contrary to the provision of law or contrary to the material on record, and hence, the same deserves to be upheld by this Court, and therefore, no interference is called for and petition is required to be dismissed. 16. Learned Advocate for the petitioner at this stage invited this Court's attention to page No. 307, a receipt issued by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to indicate that the house in which at present respondent Nos. 16. Learned Advocate for the petitioner at this stage invited this Court's attention to page No. 307, a receipt issued by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to indicate that the house in which at present respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are residing, is owned and occupied by father-in-law, and therefore, learned Advocate for the respondents was not justified in saying that the in-laws had to take shelter in the house belonging to father-in-laws father, as at the best it can be said that they moved into that house leaving the son and daughter-in-law behind, and thereafter, son also i.e. husband of the petitioner also moved out of the house. This submission is vehemently objected by learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and said that the receipt produced herein in this petition is misleading and would not prove ownership of father-in-law as according to the father-in-law of the petitioner, premises is owned by his father and his name is shown at page No. 307 referred to in document at receipt dated 28-9-2010 of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, wherein at present respondents are residing, is owned by father of the father-in-law of the petitioner. 17. Learned Advocate Mr. Adheshara for respondents submitted that father-in-law who has been constrained to leave his own house and to live in house of his father has to pay Rs. 7,201/- every month towards instalment of housing loan which he has availed for the flat in question. The said loan instalment is required to be paid till August, 2014. This is an additional factor which may be considered by the Court as the father is residing away from the flat and the flat is now under protection granted to the petitioner for which the housing loan instalment is required to be paid by father-in-law without being actually capable of using the property. 18. This Court heard learned Advocate for the parties and perused the order impugned. The following indisputable aspects emerge therefrom need to be set out as under, namely : (1) The petitioner has to file complaint invoking various provisions of Domestic Violence Act. In the said complaint, she has made allegation against all the private respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 18. This Court heard learned Advocate for the parties and perused the order impugned. The following indisputable aspects emerge therefrom need to be set out as under, namely : (1) The petitioner has to file complaint invoking various provisions of Domestic Violence Act. In the said complaint, she has made allegation against all the private respondent Nos. 1 to 4. (2) A plain reading of the complaint especially column No.4 would indicate that petitioner has alleged that incidences of violence were perpetrated by not only the husband but also by his family members, i.e. mother-in-law, father-in-law and brother-in-law. The complainant has alleged various incidences of violence and they cannot be brushed aside by calling it a triviality. The allegations coupled with the details therein would also merit its consideration in proper perspective. The complaint contains allegations of violence against husband as well as the in-laws. (3) The learned Magistrate, therefore, had issued notice to all the private respondents. During the pendency of the said complaint which came to be registered as Misc. Criminal Application No. 418 of 2009, the question of immediate protection and interim relief to complainant came up for consideration and in that process the Magistrate passed interim order under provision of Sec. 23 of Domestic Violence Act. The complaint and final relief so far as the provision of Domestic Violence Act are concerned, are yet to be considered and decided. Thus, the order impugned was only an interim order and not final order, so as to conclude finally the rights and contentions of the parties. (4) Learned Magistrate while granting interim order took into consideration various factors and granted interim relief, but no interim relief, of maintenance to wife is granted as it was not disputed by the wife that she is earning as a teacher, but for the minor of 8 year who happens to be the child born out of wedlock and residing with the petitioner is a school going child, and therefore, bearing in mind the immediate requirements of minor in light of the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, relief of Rs. 4,000/- came to be granted by way of interim maintenance only in favour of minor son. (5) It may be noted that the parents-in-laws have filed Civil Suit No. 1920 of 2008 against the present petitioner and one Mahendra K. Jhaveri (whom they have styled as "so-called Chairman" of Deepmala Co-op. 4,000/- came to be granted by way of interim maintenance only in favour of minor son. (5) It may be noted that the parents-in-laws have filed Civil Suit No. 1920 of 2008 against the present petitioner and one Mahendra K. Jhaveri (whom they have styled as "so-called Chairman" of Deepmala Co-op. Housing Society Division No.2 known as "Sagar Samrat" wherein the Flat No. A/901, subject-matter of protection order is located) in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 13/14-8-2008 for declaration, that petitioner-wife herself and the minor son Malav through her are not entitled to use and occupy the said flat and also prayed for direction to petitioner-wife-defendant No.1, to hand over peaceful possession thereof. A copy of the plaint is placed on record at page 116 on this compilation, by the respondents in this petition. (6) The parents-in-law of the petitioner also filed application for interim relief in the aforesaid civil suit, copy has also come on record wherefrom it could be seen that the respondent No.2 and 3 have prayed for mandatory interim relief of possession and claimed Rs. 2,70,000/- from the defendant No. 1-wife for using the flat till August, 2008 sought interim direction against the wife that she should keep paying an amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month regularly from September, 2008 per month till she retains the possession. (7) A close perusal of plaint as well as interim relief application filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the City Civil Court reveals the following :- That when the complaint was filed i.e. on 23-7-2009, the in-laws as well as the husband were not sharing the same house and it was occupied only by the wife and her minor son with two rooms in possession of her in-laws. The parents-in-laws are stated to have moved out of the premises in the month of 22-3-2006 leaving behind the petitioner-wife, her minor son and her husband. Thus, from 22-3-2006 till 26-10-2006 the petitioner and her husband shared the household with their minor son. On 26-10-2006 even the husband left the said premises and went to stay separately, leaving his wife, the present petitioner and her minor son in the shared household. As it is stated hereinabove two rooms in the flat wherein the petitioner-wife resides with her minor son, are retained by the parents-in-laws for keeping their belongings safely. On 26-10-2006 even the husband left the said premises and went to stay separately, leaving his wife, the present petitioner and her minor son in the shared household. As it is stated hereinabove two rooms in the flat wherein the petitioner-wife resides with her minor son, are retained by the parents-in-laws for keeping their belongings safely. These two rooms are locked and keys are with the parents-in-law. (8) The respondent No. 2 and 3 have mentioned in their plaint of the civil suit that the flat in question is of 160 sq. yards and it has three bed rooms one drawing room and kitchen with three balconies. Thus, out of total three rooms two rooms are in the custody of the parents-in-laws of the petitioner-wife for keeping their belonging safely and these two rooms are in fact under lock since the parents-in-law left the premises on 22-3-2006. (9) Thus, it is not disputed that till 22-3-2006 the flat wherein petitioner-wife resides was shared by petitioner as well as by respondent and hence it was a shared-household. After March 2006 when the parents-in-laws left it to husband and wife with their minor son it still remained shared household as wife, husband and their minor son continued living therein. After 26-10-2006, on husband's leaving it for living separately it came to be occupied only by the petitioner-wife and her minor son. (10) The respondents have not even pleaded anywhere that the petitioner-wife and her 8 years minor son could take shelter so as to keep their lives going peacefully. In other words, respondents have not shown any premises or residential accommodation which might be offered to the wife and minor for their living. (11) The respondents have in fact pleaded that they are ready and willing to offer alternate accommodation to the petitioner and her minor son, but no concrete evidence of procuring the alternative accommodation were produced before the Court of learned Magistrate who passed the interim order. (12) The respondents have not indicated as to whether husband has any residential accommodation for himself. (13) The respondents have rather emphatically submitted that the flat in question is purchased jointly by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The Share Certificate also clearly indicates names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as joint owner of the property in question. (12) The respondents have not indicated as to whether husband has any residential accommodation for himself. (13) The respondents have rather emphatically submitted that the flat in question is purchased jointly by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The Share Certificate also clearly indicates names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as joint owner of the property in question. (14) The petitioner-wife, in proceedings of Family Suit and other proceedings, has taken a stand that the flat in question is a joint property of entire family. (15) In other words, the wife has disputed that contention of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that the said property is of their exclusive ownership. (16) Husband is said to have been earning only Rs. 5,000/- per month and he is, therefore, not even capable of parting with Rs. 4,000/- for sharing minor's maintenance with his wife. (17) The private respondent pleaded that requisite document before the Magistrate to show that the property in question where the protection order is inuring is owned and belonged to father-in-law and mother-in-law both, and the parents in-law are jointly responsible for paying he using loan instalment of Rs. 7,201/- every month which is said to be paid till August, 2014. (18) The Court at the first instance, therefore, has passed order of interim relief or interim protection pending final disposal of the complaint and application in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. (19) The said order of learned Magistrate passed on 30-10-2010 was assailed in appeal under Sec. 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, and learned Sessions Judge (lower appellate Court) in light of the observations of Apex Court in case of Batra (supra) quashed and set aside that portion of the order wherein residential protection is granted and remanded the matter back for consideration of that issue afresh. While remanding the matter, the observations are made in the operative part whereunder the Sessions Court called upon the Magistrate Court to adjudicate the issue qua alternative accommodation only. (20) Learned Sessions Court for the reasons recorded, in the order reduced the amount of interim maintenance from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 1,500/-, this order is assailed in this petition. 19. Against the background of aforesaid factual aspects of the case, this Court is to examine rival contentions of learned Advocates of the parties. (20) Learned Sessions Court for the reasons recorded, in the order reduced the amount of interim maintenance from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 1,500/-, this order is assailed in this petition. 19. Against the background of aforesaid factual aspects of the case, this Court is to examine rival contentions of learned Advocates of the parties. Before adverting to rival contentions of Advocates for the parties, it is appropriate for this Court to set out the relevant provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, for understanding and appreciating rival submissions of learned Advocates for the parties. 20. Section 2(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or family members living together as joint family;" 21. Section 2(g) "domestic violence" has same meaning as assigned to it in Sec. 3. 22. Section 2(p) "residence order" means an order granted in terms of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 19. 23. Section 2(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act. 24. Section 2(s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them, in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. 25. The relevant extract of provision of Sec. 3 of the Domestic Violence Act read as under: Sec. 3. Definition of domestic violence :- For the purpose of this Act any act omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it- ...... 25. The relevant extract of provision of Sec. 3 of the Domestic Violence Act read as under: Sec. 3. Definition of domestic violence :- For the purpose of this Act any act omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it- ...... Explanation I : For the purpose of this Section - (iv) "economic abuse" includes (a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under, any law or custom whether payable under an order of a Court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rentals, related to the shared household and maintenance. (b) disposal of household, effects, any alienation of assets, whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds, and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and (c) prohibit or restrict to continue access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II - For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission, or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this Section the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. 26. Section 17 : Right to reside in a shared household :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for time-being in force, every woman, in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 27. Section 19 : Residence orders :- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-sec. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 27. Section 19 : Residence orders :- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order - (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal right or equitable interest in the shared household. (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household. (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides. (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing d the shared household or encumbering the same. (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same if the circumstances so require : Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is woman. (2) The Magistrate imposed any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-sec. (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under sub-sec. (1), sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (3), the Court may also pass an order directing the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under sub-sec. (1), sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (3), the Court may also pass an order directing the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under sub-sec. (1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer-in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order. (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to. 28. Section 20 : Monetary reliefs :- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved persons as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited to,- (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time-being in force. (2) The monetary relief granted under this Section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. (3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump-sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require. (4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-sec. (1) to the parties to the application and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides. (4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-sec. (1) to the parties to the application and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides. (5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under sub-sec. (1). (6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-sec. (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the Court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent. 29. Section 23 : Power to grant interim relief and ex-parte orders : (1) In any proceedings before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex-parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Sec. 18, Sec. 19, Sec. 20, Sec. 21 or, as the case may be, Sec. 22 against the respondent. 30. Section 26 : Relief in other suits and legal proceedings :- (1) Any relief available under Sees. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceedings was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-sec. (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a Civil or Criminal Court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. 31. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. 31. Now, let us discuss the exact purport of the provisions on their plain reading applying simple rule of interpretation in light of the unequivocally pronounced legislative intent as could be seen from the object and reason for enacting the present statute : (1) The Statements of Objects and Reasons for enactment called The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 unequivocally declares all the participants States to the Vienna Accord of 1994, Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) avowed to protect women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family. The law makers have candidly admitted that "The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not, however, address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under the Arts. 14, 15, and 21, of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the Society". Thus, present law of Domestic Violence Act definitely a step ahead in providing protection to woman than the existing laws like Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which in Chapter III and in terms of Secs. 18 to 28 do provide for some protection to woman against vagaries of life. (2) The definition of "aggrieved person" does not restrict it to the woman in her capacity as "wife" alone. The essential is only that an aggrieved person is or has been in a "domestic relation" with respondent. 18 to 28 do provide for some protection to woman against vagaries of life. (2) The definition of "aggrieved person" does not restrict it to the woman in her capacity as "wife" alone. The essential is only that an aggrieved person is or has been in a "domestic relation" with respondent. Thus, plain language of this definition clearly indicates that the act is not confined only to take care of relationship of husband and wife or relations similar to it, but it also, as it is stated in the object and reason for the enactment, has been enacted for providing better remedy, to women in their all capacity and role, in civil law which law makers felt was non-existent or inadequate. Thus, the definition of "domestic relationship" as defined under Sec. 2(e) assumes greater, significance in context of its applicability and for invoking various vital provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. The definition shows that it envisages a relationship between two persons for its applicability with additional requirements of their living together presently or in past, in shared household when they are related (1) by consanguinity, or (2) by marriage, or (3) by a relationship in the nature of marriage, or (4) on account of relationship of adoption or (5) they are related to each other as family members living together as joint family. Thus, in other words it could be elucidated in little different way also that for invoking provisions of Domestic Violence Act the aggrieved person and respondent should be either living together or should have lived together at any point of time in past in the shared household and they also should be related to each other by they being consanguineous, or married to each other, or being related to each other on account of they being adoptee and adopter, or on account of they being related as family members living together in joint family. (Emphasis supplied) Now, the last relationship, indicated hereinabove with little more emphasis for differentiating it from other mentioned hereinabove, would clearly embrace in its sweep all the members of joint family and would thus not confine it merely to a relationship between husband and wife or adoptee and adopter or consanguineous relations or relations in nature like marriage but would also include all members and their inter se relationship on account of they being members of "joint family". (3) The phrase "joint family" specifically finding its place in the definition of "domestic relationship" under Sec. 2(f) is eloquently conspicuous to be overlooked by anyone. The phrase "joint family" is not defined anywhere in the said statute and its simple meaning in contemporary context of Indian society where since time immemorial the epics and ethos have approved and encouraged continuation of "joint family" in preference to nuclear family, hardly needs any further elaboration. Therefore, one may safely deduce therefrom that "domestic relationship" need not necessarily be confined to those specific relationship enumerated in the sub-section, but it takes in its sweep relationship existing between joint family members sharing household. (4) Now, while keeping the phrase "joint family" as it occurs in the definition of "domestic relationship" with its true purport and meaning in mind, let us look at the definition of "shared household" as defined in Sec. 2(s) of the Act. Plain reading of this definition clearly indicate that "shared household" means a household where the aggrieved person lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them, in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title, or interest in the shared household. Thus, shared household is where (1) the person aggrieved lives or has at any stage lived in "domestic relationship" (which includes all the domestic relationships not necessarily only that of marital or alike and or only those enumerated expressly in that definition of domestic relationship but also includes relationship between the members of "joint family"; who shared or had in past shared household) either singly or along with the respondent, and (2) includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or tenanted by either of them, in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest, or equity, and (3) includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title, or interest in the shared household. Thus, the said definition needs to be viewed bearing in mind the avowed pronouncement of Legislature justifying and emphasizing dire need to provide adequate remedies to women for maintaining effectively their dignity and morale in commensurate with their respective life styles, which hitherto was found to be non-existent or absolutely inadequate. It hardly needs any emphasis that the Legislature has, by enacting the Domestic Violence Act, endeavored to provide unconventional and unique remedy to Indian women for safeguarding their morale, dignity and decency against various forms of violence enumerated in Sec. 3 of the Act, which prior to its advent were not available in the law. The word "household" has definite connotation, and therefore, it need not be construed as interchangeable with word "house" in its simple etymological sense, had it been so, than nothing prevented Legislature from using it straightaway instead of employing the word "household" in the statute in question. The word "house", has many meanings out of which one is "building for people to live in, usually for one family," as defined in the Oxford Advance Dictionary, New 7th Edition, The American Heritage Dictionary defines "House" as "1. a structure serving as dwelling unit for one or more persons, especially for a family". The word "household" is defined in Oxford Advance Dictionary New 7th Edition as "all people living together in a house" and in the American Heritage Dictionary it is defined as "Household" means 1. a structure serving as dwelling unit for one or more persons, especially for a family". The word "household" is defined in Oxford Advance Dictionary New 7th Edition as "all people living together in a house" and in the American Heritage Dictionary it is defined as "Household" means 1. a. domestic unit consisting of the members of a family who live together along with non-relatives such as servants b. The living space and possession belong to such unit 2. A person or group of people occupying single dwelling." 32. The word "joint family" is defined in "Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008 as under : "Joint family" - family in which members of a unilinealdescent group (a group in which descent through either the female or the male line is emphasized) live together with their spouses and offspring in one homestead and under the authority of one of the members. The joint family is an extension of the nuclear family (parents and dependent children), and it typically grows when children of one sex do not leave their parents' home at marriage but bring their spouses to live with them. Thus, a patrilineal joint family might consist of an older man and his wife, his sons and unmarried daughters, his sons, wives and children, and so forth. For a man in the middle generation, belonging to a joint family means joining his conjugal family to his family of orientation (i.e., into which he was born)." 33. Thus, provisions of Domestic Violence Act need to be construed in its proper perspective in light of the avowed legislative intent. The aforesaid provisions, would not, as laid down by the Apex Court, entitle the aggrieved person - wife to claim any right of residence in the property or premises exclusively acquired and owned by her parents-in-law, wherein no one else including the husband has any claim, any right or equity. The parents-in-law thus have absolute right over the residential property which they acquired and therein even their son also cannot claim any right against their will and desire. The parents-in-law are absolutely free and well within their right to deal with the way they like. 34. The Apex Court has in case of S. R. Batra v. Taruna Batra. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1118 : [2007 (2) GLR 1582 (SC)], has observed as under: "13. The parents-in-law are absolutely free and well within their right to deal with the way they like. 34. The Apex Court has in case of S. R. Batra v. Taruna Batra. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1118 : [2007 (2) GLR 1582 (SC)], has observed as under: "13. As held by this Court in B. R. Mehta v. Atma Devi, 1987 (4) SCC 183 , whereas in England the rights of the spouses to the matrimonial home are governed by the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, no such right exists in India. 14. In the same decision it was observed "it may be that with change of situation and complex problems arising it is high time to give the wife or the husband a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of the marriage breaking-up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife". 15. In our opinion, the above observation is merely an expression of hope and it does not lay down any law. It is only the Legislature which can create a law and not the Court. The Courts do not legislate, and whatever may be the personal view of a Judge, he cannot create or amend the law, and must maintain judicial restraint. 16. There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law. 17. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house. 18. Appellant No.2, the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondent then relied upon the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. He stated that in view of the said Act respondent Smt. Taruna Batra cannot be dispossessed from the second floor of the property in question. 20. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondent then relied upon the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. He stated that in view of the said Act respondent Smt. Taruna Batra cannot be dispossessed from the second floor of the property in question. 20. It may be noticed that the finding of the learned Senior Civil Judge that in fact Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the premises in question is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with either under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra cannot claim any injunction restraining the appellants from dispossessing her from the property in question for the simple reason that she was not in possession at all of the said property, and hence, the question of dispossession does not arise. 21. Apart from the above, we are of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a 'shared household' within the meaning of Sec. 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Section 2(s) states : " 'shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. " 22. Learned Counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Sees. 17 and 19(1) of the aforesaid Act, which state : "17. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time-being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. 17 and 19(1) of the aforesaid Act, which state : "17. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time-being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 19. (1) While disposing of an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order - (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman." 23. Learned Counsel for the respondent-Smt. Taruna Batra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence, the said property is her shared household. 24. We cannot agree with this submission. 25. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence, the said property is her shared household. 24. We cannot agree with this submission. 25. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband's father, husband's paternal grand parents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned Counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband's relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd. 26. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. 27. Learned Counsel for the respondent-Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Sec. 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives. 28. As regards Sec. 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence, it cannot be called a 'shared household'. 29. No doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Sec. 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society. 30. Hence, it cannot be called a 'shared household'. 29. No doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Sec. 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society. 30. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of Senior Civil Judge dismissing the injunction application of Smt. Taruna Batra is upheld. No costs." The facts of the case of S. R. Batra (supra) as could be seen from the Apex Court decision are as under : "3. The facts of the case are that respondent-Smt. Taruna Batra was married to Amit Batra, son of the appellants, on 14-4-2000. 4. After the marriage respondent-Taruna Batra started living with her husband Amit Batra in the house of the appellant No.2 in the second floor. It is not disputed that the said house which is at B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi belongs to the appellant No. 2 and not to her son Amit Batra. 5. Amit Batra filed a divorce petition against his wife Taruna Batra, and it is alleged that as a counter-blast to the divorce petition Smt. Taruna Batra filed an F.I.R. under Sees. 406/498A/506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and got her father-in-law, mother-in-law, her husband and married sister-in-law arrested by the police and they were granted bail only after three days. 6. It is admitted that Smt. Taruna Batra had shifted to her parent's residence because of the dispute with her husband. She alleged that later on when she tried to enter the house of the appellant No. 2 which is at property No. B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi she found the main entrance locked and hence she filed Suit No. 87 of 2003 for a mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The case of the appellants was that before any order could be passed by the trial Judge on the suit filed by their daughter-in-law, Smt. Taruna Batra, along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of the house at Ashok Vihar belonging to appellant No.2, the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra. The case of the appellants was that before any order could be passed by the trial Judge on the suit filed by their daughter-in-law, Smt. Taruna Batra, along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of the house at Ashok Vihar belonging to appellant No.2, the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra. The appellants alleged that they have been terrorized by their daughter-in-law and for some time they had to stay in their office. 7. It is stated by the appellants that their son Amit Batra, husband of the respondent, had shifted to his own flat at Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad before the above litigation between the parties had started. 8. The learned trial Judge decided both the applications for temporary injunction filed in Suit No. 87 of 2003 by the parties by his order on 4-3-2003. He held that the petitioner was in possession of the second floor of the property and he granted a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the possession of Smt. Taruna Batra, respondent herein. 9. Against the aforesaid order the appellants filed an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi who by his order dated 17-9-2004 held that Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the second floor of the premises in question. He also held that her husband Amit Batra was not living in the suit property and the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only wife was residing. He also held that Smt. Taruna Batra had no right to the properties other than that of her husband. Hence, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the temporary injunction application. 10. Aggrieved, Smt. Taruna Batra filed a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. Hence, these appeals." 35. The decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Neetu Mittal v. Kanta Mittal, reported in AIR 2009 Delhi 72 is pertaining to a wife's challenge to the order dated 4-11-2006 passed by Addl. Aggrieved, Smt. Taruna Batra filed a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. Hence, these appeals." 35. The decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Neetu Mittal v. Kanta Mittal, reported in AIR 2009 Delhi 72 is pertaining to a wife's challenge to the order dated 4-11-2006 passed by Addl. Senior Judge allowing appeal of the respondents parents-in-law of the petitioner-wife who were constrained to file a civil suit against the daughter-in-law, their own son and parents of daughter-in-law and sought injunction against wife that she may not enter their residence on the facts that petitioner-wife and their son though initially resided with them, later on had shifted to a flat taken by husband of the petitioner away from the flat of the original respondent, but petitioner-wife found the same to be lacking in facilities like cooler, fan etc., and hence, the wife wanted to come back to her in-laws house on the ground that it was her matrimonial house and as such she had right to reside therein. Therefore, petitioner-wife's in-laws had filed Civil Suit against wife, their own son and his in-laws for restraining them from entering their residence forcibly and against their will. The trial Court refused to grant such temporary injunction under Order 39 of C. P. C. and the appellate Court had allowed the parents "in-law's appeal being aggrieved by the order of the appellate Court, the wife original defendant had preferred the petition before Delhi High Court wherein the Court relying upon the decision of Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra (supra) held that wife does not have right to residence against her parents-in-law. 36. The law laid down by the Apex Court in case of S. R. Batra is now quite clear that wife has no rights against the parents-in-law or their property and she has right against her husband and his interest in the joint property. 37. A question, therefore, arises as to whether in peculiar facts of the present case whether learned Magistrate committed so grave an error as to persuade the appellate Court to pass impugned order dated 5-5-2010 and remanded matter for the Magistrate's consideration even reducing the amount of interim maintenance from Rs. 4,000 to 1,500. The answer would be emphatic "NO". 38. A question, therefore, arises as to whether in peculiar facts of the present case whether learned Magistrate committed so grave an error as to persuade the appellate Court to pass impugned order dated 5-5-2010 and remanded matter for the Magistrate's consideration even reducing the amount of interim maintenance from Rs. 4,000 to 1,500. The answer would be emphatic "NO". 38. The appellate Court ought to have appreciated that petitioner-wife had enlisted in detail the monthly expenditure for maintaining the minor son. The wife is working woman and her minor son is aged about 8 years. The wife has pleaded that on account of various details enumerated on the record per month Rs. 12,000/- was child's expenses. The learned Magistrate has only awarded Rs. 4000/- as an interim maintenance which the appellate Court reduced to Rs. 1,500/- without any just reasons. The appellate Court has not awarded any sound reasons for not accepting the reasoning of the trial Court for awarding Rs. 4,000/- p.m. to child. In my view the order of the appellate Court being based upon only surmises and conjecture cannot be sustained, and hence, it needs to be quashed and set aside, and the Magistrate order for Rs. 4,000/- needs to be restored. 39. The following peculiar indisputable facts are required to be reiterated at the cost of repetition so as to examine as to whether the learned Magistrate was justified in passing the order dated 30-10-2009 : (1) The petitioner-wife and the respondent No.1 married on 22-11999 in Ahmedabad. The wife gave birth to a male child on 17-12-2000. (2) The petitioner-wife has claimed in the Family Suit No. 13 of 2007 in Paragraph 3 on page 86 of the present compilation that she is serving as teacher in municipal school since last three and half years. (3) The petitioner-wife has stated in the said suit in Para 7 that the residential property was purchased three years ago from the joint family income and as such all the members of joint family have right and entitlement therein. Besides, her son Malav has direct interest in the said property. (4) The mother-in-law and father-in-law of the petitioner-wife have filed Civil Suit No. 1920 of 2008 in the City Civil Court of Ahmedabad against the present petitioner and one Chairman of the society for declaration and recovery of possession. Besides, her son Malav has direct interest in the said property. (4) The mother-in-law and father-in-law of the petitioner-wife have filed Civil Suit No. 1920 of 2008 in the City Civil Court of Ahmedabad against the present petitioner and one Chairman of the society for declaration and recovery of possession. (5) The parents-in-law have stated in that plaint that the property in question was purchased by their own earning in their joint name and possession was handed over to them on 13-8-2004. The petitioner-wife and her husband came to stay with them in the said property only on 15-5-2005. (6) The parents-in-law left the said premises on 22-3-2006 leaving behind petitioner, her husband and their child. (7) The petitioner's husband respondent No.1 also left the residence on 26-10-2006 and joined his parents though the parents have contended that he had gone to stay some where but not indicate the exact place. (8) Thus, after 26-10-2006 the petitioner-wife and her minor son are the sole residents of the premises in question. (9) The parents-in-law have already filed Civil Suit for recovering possession and prayed by way of interim relief that wife should pay an amount of Rs. 10,000 per month to them till she retains the possession of the flat. (10) The parents-in-law have claimed that two rooms are in fact in their possession and their belongings are kept therein. (11) It is required to be noted that no concrete offer for alternative accommodation was placed on record of the Court of learned Magistrate so as to inspire confidence about it being available. (12) The provision of Sec. 17 of the Domestic Violence Act also makes it clear that aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part thereof by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. (13) The provisions of Sec. 26 of the Domestic Violence Act enables the aggrieved persons to seek relief available under Sees. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 in any legal proceedings before Civil or Criminal Court. (14) The order dated 30-10-2009 is passed by the Magistrate in exercise of the powers and duty cast upon him under Sec. 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, and hence, it is merely an order of interim protection without finally deciding about the complaint of the petitioner. 40. (14) The order dated 30-10-2009 is passed by the Magistrate in exercise of the powers and duty cast upon him under Sec. 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, and hence, it is merely an order of interim protection without finally deciding about the complaint of the petitioner. 40. In view of these, when the learned Magistrate had admittedly passed the order dated 30-10-2009 as an interim protection during pendency of the complaint itself in exercise of power under Sec. 23 of the Domestic Violence Act can it be said to be so perverse as to quash it? The answer is emphatic "NO". The non-granting of the order of interim protection would have left the wife and her minor son to the mercy of others and it would have worked contrary to the very spirit and letters of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. 41. The interim order dated 30-10-2009 passed by the Magistrate is in no way capable of militating against the rights of the parents-in-law on their establishing that the property in question is acquired and owned by parents-in-law exclusively out of their income and not out of the income of joint family. The Civil Suit filed by them is pending, and therefore, the same needs to be brought to its logical conclusion. At the same time, it is also required to be observed that it would be quite open to the respondent No. 2 and 3 hereinabove to establish before even the learned Magistrate that the flat in question was purchased out of their income and not out of the income of the joint family. 42. It is required to be noted that the mother-in-law cannot be prevented from entering the property in any manner even by the interim order, the learned Magistrate has clearly recorded that as the possession of two rooms are with respondents they be permitted to visit it, but due to bitter altercation it was in presence of concerned officer the mother-in-law in my view is not restricted from entering the property in any manner. 43. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the order dated 30-10-2009 passed by the learned Magistrate in Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009 did not deserve to be interfered in Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2009 hence the order dated 5-5-2010 passed by the Addl. 43. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the order dated 30-10-2009 passed by the learned Magistrate in Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009 did not deserve to be interfered in Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2009 hence the order dated 5-5-2010 passed by the Addl. City Session Judge, Court No.8 in Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2009 is hereby quashed and set aside and the order dated 30-10-2009 passed by the learned Magistrate in Misc. Application No. 418 of 2009 is restored. Rule made absolute to the said extent. 44. Learned Advocate for the private respondents at this stage requested that this order may be stayed so as to allow the respondents to move the Apex Court. Learned Advocate further submitted that by virtue of this order, the other side will go ahead with the complaint, and therefore, let there be stay against prosecuting the complaint. This request is accepted and it is expected that the complaint may not be proceeded with by the petitioner-wife for a period up to 7-9-2011. This staying will not in any manner affect the right of wife to file appropriate proceedings for realizing the arrears of maintenance amount which is said to have been withheld till date despite of the interim order. It is made clear that, only further proceedings of the complaint are stayed, but any application by petitioner-wife for enforcement of the interim order, complaining any breach thereof shall be permitted to be proceeded with by learned Magistrate. Application allowed.